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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the role of politics in implementing educational reform in India 
during the period 1994 to 2011. Much of the recent research on politics and educational 
reform has been dominated by the analytical framework of formal political economy, but 
this framework has not been able to explain how reforms are successfully adopted. Also, 
the main focus has been on the negative role of politics, controlled by powerful interest 
groups and biased institutions, in constraining changes likely to benefit poor people. I 
focus instead on understanding the political dynamics in cases of success. In particular, 
why do political leaders and public officials support educational reform even though this 
does not suit their political calculations, and is likely to encounter resistance from teacher 
unions and educational bureaucracies? To understand these dynamics, I use the framework 
of comparative institutionalism, and examine the contested interaction of ideas, interests, 
and institutions, leading to success or failure.  
To analyse the process of reform implementation, I have selected two Indian 
states—Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. Both were educationally backward at the beginning of 
the 1990s and were confronted with a common agenda for reform established by the 
federal government. However, they pursued divergent trajectories over the next decade, 
with the former state achieving higher levels and reduced disparities in primary school 
participation.  I compare the political dynamics in three important arenas: the management 
of teacher interests and their unions, educational decentralisation, and the daily interactions 
between poor households, schools, and the local state.   
I find that political strategies are important in determining variations in outcomes. 
In Andhra Pradesh, the political leadership found an alignment between the new 
opportunities provided by the federal government and its own agenda for development; it 
created new allies for change by reducing discretion in teacher policies, playing on inter-
union rivalries, and creating a local cadre of party loyalists. However, a wider agenda of 
development was missing in Bihar, and even successfully designed school decentralisation 
policies could not be implemented due to weak support from political leaders, and because 
of local elite capture.  In both the states, however, the interaction of the poor with schools 
and the local state was a process of struggle, indicative of the challenges that lie ahead.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  
Understanding the ―Missing‖ Politics in Educational Reform 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation for this Research 
This thesis investigates the role of politics in implementing educational reform in 
developing countries, specifically in India. Although it is commonly understood that 
reforms fail for political reasons, analysing the relationship between politics and 
educational reform has ranked low on the priority list of policymakers, implementers, and 
analysts.  One reason why this relationship has not been adequately investigated is because 
of the predominant conceptualisation of reform being a rational design process, embodied 
in a technical plan, put together with the expertise of educational planners and economists, 
and viewed by them as independent of political interests. In such a conceptualisation, the 
implementation phase is seen merely as the unfolding of a plan by rule-bound, non-
partisan administrators.  Therefore, politics is not seen to feature prominently. Nonetheless, 
politics obviously is central to the reform process, because it is governments that formulate 
and launch reforms, and the importance of politics often becomes visible in the 
implementation process when political factors are blamed for lack of progress. As a result, 
there is something of a paradox—where technical planners and analysts ignore politics 
when designing reforms, yet the execution phase is apparently bedevilled by political 
constraints.  
In the small body of research that does address the relationship between educational 
reform and politics, the dominant approach is one inspired by the political economy 
framework rooted in the discipline of economics.
1
 Also referred to as the ―new‖ or 
―formal‖ political economy approach, it applies the tools of economic analysis to political 
                                                          
1
 The definition of political economy adopted here is borrowed from Merilee Grindle (2001) In Quest of the 
Political: The Political Economy of Development Policymaking. Here, she defines political economy as 
broadly referring to the ―intersection of economics and politics in policy choice, and in policy and 
institutional change‖ (p. 347).  
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phenomenon.
2
 In such an analysis, politics is seen in a negative way, mainly as a constraint 
or hurdle which needs to be overcome so that reforms can be implemented. The starting 
point of this approach is an assumption regarding human behaviour as being essentially 
self-interested, and self-interest being the expression of ―rational‖ behaviour. In the formal 
political economy approach, politicians, public officials, and even states, are treated as 
self-interested actors. I highlight this by citing the arguments from some of the main 
theories and concepts within the framework of formal political economy. Public choice 
theory, for example, posits that politicians and public officials offer policy packages to 
remain in power, or to secure private rewards such as prestige and money. The principal-
agent model posits that the problems in policy implementation occur due to self-interested 
actions of policymakers and implementers. Applying its line of reasoning, policymakers 
are like ―principals‖ of a contract (that is, those who entrust an ―agent‖ to perform certain 
tasks and compensate them financially for it), and service providers are like the ―agents‖ 
(that is, those who execute the tasks/plans). Both the ―principals‖ and ―agents‖, acting in 
their respective self-interest while they implement policies for citizens, can work against 
the interests of the latter. So what we see is a dilemma of sorts, where citizens pay for 
services through their taxes, but have no direct control over what they get. In the case of 
education, citizens pay taxes and elect their political representatives; politicians then 
delegate the provision of educational services to frontline service providers (primarily 
teachers) who they cannot oversee directly. This long ―chain of accountability‖ is viewed 
as the heart of the problem, as it generates different incentives and accountability 
frameworks. Ultimately, citizens feel powerless and politicians respond only to more 
powerful interests in society, in this case the interests of teachers (World Bank 2003a 
p.78). In such a framework, public officials, whether elected or not, have no interest in 
introducing policy changes that favour the broader public interest. The suggested solution 
is one of changing the technical design of contracts—a measure which reinforces the 
understanding of policy reforms as one of technical design alone. The only part played by 
                                                          
2
 The ―new political economy‖ rooted in economics goes back to Adam Smith and has been developed  more 
recently in the work of Robert Bates, Dani Rodrik, Alberto Alessina, and Anne Krueger (Grindle 2001,  
p. 347). Developed primarily by economists, it encompasses the perspectives of public choice and social 
choice theories, and principal-agent models. The terms ―new political economy‖ and ―formal political 
economy‖ have been used interchangeably in the literature and also in this text. 
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politicians in this analytical reasoning, is that of protecting vested interests of powerful 
groups. 
Society-centred explanations of politics, understood in terms of the working of 
groups and interests, underlie most of the arguments made above regarding the negative 
role of politics in educational reform, and of formal political economy‘s understanding of 
the policy process more generally.
3
 In this view, politics is the result of bargaining and 
competition among groups (which are made of self-interested actors). The groups form to 
protect special interests and lobby hard to achieve their ends. Changes brought about by 
educational reform affect these societal interests by awarding benefits to some and 
imposing costs on others. In this process, they create groups of winners and losers. 
Powerful groups are likely to organise and work collectively against reforms if the 
envisaged policy changes infringe on their power or interests. In education, teachers are a 
powerful interest group, and their unions have a strong voice in influencing government 
decisions. Changes brought about by reforms may entail additional work and new 
responsibilities for teachers. Further, these changes may also alter the conditions of work 
for teachers and stimulate concerns that penalties will be imposed on them for poor 
performance. Therefore, teachers are among the most important ―cost-bearing‖ groups 
from new conditions of work, and their unions can launch collective action in order to 
resist change. On the other side, poor people are often the likely beneficiaries of change. 
And, in theory at least, they too can protect their interests by forming a lobby-group to 
demand better schools. However, the poor are usually too weak to organise themselves. So 
they cannot counter the power of unions and demand pro-poor changes. In this view, then, 
policy changes are beholden to the demands of organised social groups that can express a 
strong voice.
4
 
                                                          
3
 ―Society-centred‖ explanations of politics refer to the pluralist tradition in democratic political theory. The 
most famous and early exponent of this tradition is Robert Dahl‘s Who Governs? (1961). Dahl analysed the 
role of special interests in American politics. According to him, politics is the result of competition and 
bargaining of a plurality of groups in society.   
4
 These arguments draw upon Mancur Olson‘s The Logic of Collective Action (1965). See Coralles (1999) for 
a discussion of how winners and losers (among societal interests) are created while pursuing changes in 
education. 
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A second concept used in the formal political economy approach, is that of ―rent-
seeking‖, developed by Anne Krueger in 1974.5 The concept has been used frequently to 
highlight the growth of material interests around specific policies, and the reason why 
policy change is resisted. Krueger uses the term to explain how individuals and groups 
(acting in their self-interest), take advantage of the political process, and extract rents to 
maximise economic gains, especially in situations where there is government control and 
regulation of the economy. This involves a misuse of state power and authority. In the 
provision of school education by the government, such behaviour refers to requests for 
payment by government agents for services that should have been available to the poor 
without price. Thus one is thinking of bribes taken by administrators for the exercise of 
their legal but discretionary authority. Examples of such (mis)use of authority in the 
relationship between educational administrators and teachers include: awarding 
discretionary benefits to teachers in promotions or favoured postings; imposing arbitrary 
penalties (for example, transfers to remote locations); and, in extreme cases, even 
suspension. Rents may also be imposed on poor parents by teachers and educational 
authorities (for example, through the illegal charging of fees for school facilities that 
should be free), practices that may extend to cover admission procedures, the issuance of 
transfer certificates, and school examinations.
6
  Powerful economic interests are often seen 
to develop around policies that are currently in operation, and arguments influenced by the 
political economy tradition would have us believe that it is these interests which provoke 
resistance to change. Apropos education, existing arrangements of service delivery have 
been seen as full of ―rent-seeking‖ opportunities—practices that are likely to be altered in 
the process of reform (Devarajan and Shah 2004; Kingdon and Muzammil 2003). New 
policies would perhaps reduce or even abolish the benefits being reaped from current 
policies in unproductive and illegal ways. Thus political leaders, public officials, and even 
states, are likely to favour the status-quo as opposed to change. 
                                                          
5
 The term was developed by Anne Krueger in her article ―The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society‖ (1974). 
6
 Vinoba Gautam, an Education Programme Officer with UNICEF, and associated with the Bihar Education 
Project since the mid-1990s, reported that there was a practice of teacher unions charging fees from students 
for exam papers that were given out annually in Champaran district in Bihar (Personal interview, UNICEF 
Patna office, Bihar, 6 October 2005).  
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Although this body of work (inspired by the formal political economy approach) 
has contributed significantly to our understanding of the incentives and institutions that 
block reforms, it has been unable to account for situations where they are implemented 
with success. Also, the vision of politics which lies at the core of such a theory remains 
essentially negative. That is, politics is seen as a constraint that needs to be overcome in 
order for educational reform to be successful. Grindle criticises this view of the policy 
process which predicts negative outcomes for society because political and policy actors 
follow their narrow, rational self-interests. She notes that although the ―new political 
economy‖ approach has many strengths, its weakness lies in its assumption that ―politics is 
a negative factor in attempting to get policies right‖ (Grindle 1989 p.9).  As she says: 
―[e]ffective in identifying winners and losers, formal political economy is less able to 
provide insight into the factors that enhance or weaken the power of these interests, nor 
does it anticipate how outcomes are altered by the strategic choices of reform advocates‖ 
(Grindle  2004 p.12) . 
This research also engages critically with another strand of arguments made using 
the tenets of formal political economy. Conceptually, they rest on similar micro-
foundations—the idea of politicians and policymakers as self-interested actors, of teacher 
unions that resist change, and of politics being an impediment for educational reform. 
Also, the fundamentals of society-centred explanations of politics, used in the earlier 
arguments, are reiterated here. However, where these arguments move beyond a static 
political economy framework, is in identifying the measures by which political constraints 
to reform can be overcome. The suggestions are for curtailing the power of unions and 
promoting decentralisation—technical solutions that have worked in instances of public 
sector reforms more generally. It is evident that these policy recommendations tend to be 
based on a more macro-level theorisation of the reform-politics relationship.  
The starting point of this line of argument is a critique of the existing direction of 
educational policies towards centralised expansion. This is because expansion leads to an 
increase in the power of teacher unions (Kingdon and Muzammil 2003; Murillo 1999; 
World Bank 2008). Further, the focus of policies currently in operation (and which is the 
object of criticism here), is seen as being unduly inclined towards the expansion of 
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―access‖ in education.7 Building new schools, hiring extra teachers, and improving their 
salaries, are some of the favoured activities in this regard. All these measures focus only on 
the ―supply-side‖, and have potential opportunities for generating patronage and illegal 
profits. On purely rational considerations, while these policies were seen as appropriate in 
the early years of nation-building, and indeed found favour in many developing countries 
until the 1970s for this reason, their persistence now is seen as providing patronage 
opportunities for politicians, and something that greatly enhances the power of  teacher 
unions.  Further, their continued operation is seen as the reason behind ―state failure‖ and 
―bad governance‖, issues that have now become important in development policymaking. 
The ―rent-seeking‖ behaviour of states and a ―dirigiste‖ development process with a focus 
on centralised expansion are regarded as being responsible for these failures (Corbridge, 
Williams, Srivastav, and Veron 2005 pp. 151, 154–5). The recommended ―technical‖ 
solution is to move from the current stress on centralised and supply-driven expansion to 
―bolstering the demand side‖ and decentralisation (Coralles 1999).8 
Murillo (1999 pp. 33–4) notes that among international financial institutions 
providing support in the area of education, as also for governments that were reforming 
their educational services, there was a belief that this type of reform was the ―plan that 
would solve many of the inefficiencies of educational systems‖ (in Latin America). She 
cites an Inter-American Development Bank study (1996 p. 257) in this context which 
states that ―highly centralized administered systems are very poor at choosing the best mix 
of inputs, required in varied local conditions; they are also poor at adjusting to changing 
requirements over time‖.9 According to this view, the flexibility of decentralisation allows 
discretion in policies of hiring, firing, and wage setting according to local conditions, and 
in curbing the power of teacher unions.  
                                                          
7
 Education policies can be classified in two main categories—those oriented towards increasing access and 
those oriented towards increasing quality. Access oriented policies increase expenditure and concentrate on 
raising provisions, whereas quality improvement policies mainly enhance the efficiency of expenditure. 
Examples of the latter are measures aimed at improving learning quality and enhancing teacher 
accountability and performance.   
8
 Corrales (1999 pp. 5–6) notes that policies oriented towards increasing access seldom face political 
obstacles because both politicians and teacher unions are content with these policies. However, policies 
which aim at improving quality by measures for improving school efficiency and the accountability of 
teachers face very stiff political opposition. Augmenting the demand side through decentralisation and 
community participation helps to overcome the political impediments that strong vested interests pose to the 
policy reform process. 
9
 IADB 1996, cited by Murillo (1999 pp. 33–4).  
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By suggesting that promoting decentralisation and reducing the power of unions 
were the conditions under which reforms could be successful, these arguments were 
somewhat able to overcome criticisms regarding the inherent proclivity of the earlier 
approaches to over-predict ―reform paralysis‖ (that is, explain only cases where reforms 
have been unsuccessful). Also, many countries were adopting measures for increasing 
teacher quality and accountability and for decentralisation in order to achieve both 
educational objectives and increased participation.
10
 This lent credence to the belief that 
formal political economy arguments were driving state policies for educational reform.  
What I seek to question in this research is not the substantive merit of either of 
these proposals for improving schools. Rather, what I question is their presentation as 
mutually exclusive policies—of decentralisation pitted against the power of unions, or of 
self-interested teachers pitted against the interests of the community. In my view, the 
success of educational reform is not simply a zero-sum game of reducing the power of 
teachers and increasing the power of communities. Such a binary formulation misses key 
issues relating to the context and the process of reform—both of which provide 
opportunities in which political leaders and administrators can find room for manoeuvre, 
and thereby pursue policies in public interest. 
 
1.2 Thesis Topic and Research Questions 
 
My research on the reform-politics relationship addresses two questions.  First, why do 
political leaders and public officials support educational reform even though the odds seem 
to be stacked against them? Second, what incentives do these actors find in implementing 
reforms, even though logical assumptions about their economic self-interest might lead us 
to believe that they would actually gain from blocking change?  
In my view, politics is a process of contest and conflict where the context is 
important. In the analytical framework I employ, educational reform is not simply another 
                                                          
10
 In their review of the politics of educational reform in the 1990s in six Latin American countries, Kaufman 
and Nelson (2004) note that decentralisation is the most important reform measure in each of the country 
cases they examine. The motivations for adopting decentralisation have varied, ranging from efforts to 
reduce central government expenditures, to greater concern for making the educational system more efficient 
and equitable (Kaufman and Nelson 2004 p.261).   
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arena for the pursuit of self-interest by politicians and public officials. Nor is political 
action simply ―determined‖ by the influence of powerful interest groups. Contrary to the 
postulates of formal political economy, political leaders and administrators are often found 
to obtain room for manoeuvre, and implement changes even in the face of constraints 
(although naturally being subject to both the context and the process of change). 
Furthermore, I argue that the introduction of new reform policies can provide political 
opportunities for leaders and administrators to tide over existing constraints and so bring 
public policy closer to public interest. Such opportunities differ at the local and central 
levels, and also between the different actors (that is, politicians and administrators) 
engaged in the process of policy change. Therefore, any attempt to generalise and develop 
a theory from instances of successful reform implementation requires a carefully nuanced 
and grounded analysis for each of these levels and for the main actors involved.  
Contesting the assumption that politics almost always represents a constraint on 
bringing about change, the primary hypothesis forwarded in this research is that politics 
can—and indeed often does—play a positive role in the successful  implementation of 
educational reform. This hypothesis is tested by studying a case in a democratic political 
situation where efforts to bring about change have led to improved outcomes. This is then 
compared with a similar instance where the initiative for educational reform was taken, but 
progress on outcomes was limited. Politics is viewed here as an independent variable, and 
it is seen in terms of the working of interests, institutions, and the actions of political 
leaders and policymakers.  
A second hypothesis proposed is that the actions of political leaders can overcome 
constraints to change posed by interests and institutions working in school education, and 
hence they can contribute to the success of educational reform. In other words, the issue is 
whether competitive politics itself provides the opportunity whereby vested interests and 
institutions can be challenged, manoeuvred, and even marginalised by political leaders. In 
analysing this second hypothesis, it is necessary to examine the role of non-elected 
policymakers—especially the so-called ―policy entrepreneurs‖ among them, who are the 
champions of new policies, notwithstanding the institutional constraints that they are faced 
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with.
11
 Finally, it is crucial to assess the relative importance of the ―policy entrepreneur‖ 
and the political leader in overcoming obstacles to reform implementation. I argue that the 
actions of political leaders matter more than those of policymakers.  
Educational reform in India allows us to explore these hypotheses, and the 
subsidiary questions listed above. It does so in a complex political and institutional setting, 
comprising a federal government and multiple state governments, many political parties at 
the Centre and in the states, varying local government settings within states, and states 
which themselves are at quite different levels of economic and educational development. 
Therefore, this thesis is an important contribution to the literature on understanding the 
relationship between politics and educational reform— literature which hitherto has largely 
been focused on Latin America.  
 
1.3 Defining the Scope and Content of Educational Reform: Differing 
Analytical Perspectives 
 
Before discussing the research questions in the context of India, it is useful to assess how 
educational reform has been characterised in the literature, and which type of initiative can 
be considered as constituting ―educational reform‖.  
In many developing countries, educational reform has been carried out within a 
framework of economic reorganisation and restructuring—often referred to as ―structural 
adjustment‖—especially in the 1980s and 1990s.  The economic reform agenda, around 
which there was considerable consensus at that time, included market liberalisation, 
privatisation, and measures to reduce public expenditure (for example, cuts in the number 
and salaries of civil servants, decreases in subsidies, and the imposition of user charges). 
Many ―educational reforms‖ were driven by this agenda, initially to impose spending cuts, 
and later to reduce the stresses laid on human development by the structural adjustment 
process, where spending on primary education was often either protected or even 
                                                          
11
 Corrales (1999 p. 7) cites Wilson (1986 p. 440) as being one of the early users of the term ―policy 
entrepreneurs‖. They are policy-actors, usually at the cabinet level or with close links to the president, who 
find a way of pulling together a legislative majority on behalf of interests that are not well represented in 
government. Policy entrepreneurs ―dramatize an issue, galvanize public opinion, and mobilize congressional 
support for policies that would not otherwise be approved‖. The formulation of a successful policy proposal 
is the job of a policy entrepreneur. 
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increased. Hence, this wave of ―reform‖ focused on how to reduce public spending on 
education, and subsequently, on how to protect ―priority‖ sectors—such as primary 
education—that were considered to be important for the poor. Indeed, refocusing spending 
on primary education was in many ways considered a considerable reform intervention in 
itself since it often meant cutting back on funding for secondary and tertiary education. 
In the influential volume Education Reforms in the South in the 1990s, which 
analyses concrete efforts for many developing countries, Lene Buchert (1998) sees reform 
as part of a broader strategy of reorganisation.  He describes it as a ―deliberate effort to 
move towards a different situation within the education system‖. Overall, he states that 
reform needs to effect a ―radical transformation of the education system, its sub-sectors, 
organization and functioning, if it is to support broader societal change‖ (Buchert 1998 
p.14).  External aid is involved in most cases, and there may be a considerable degree of 
external influence in setting the agenda for change. This is so even though many reforms 
involve considerable indigenous effort as well. 
The importance of external aid in driving educational reform in developing countries 
has greatly influenced not only the strategies and programmes implemented, but also in 
defining reform and the analytical framework for thinking about the process. Among aid 
agencies, the World Bank has special significance because it has been involved in assisting 
educational reform all over the world. Indeed, by 1995 it was the single largest source of 
educational finance for low and middle income countries. Also, within the World Bank‘s 
lending portfolio, education had the largest share—underlining the importance accorded to 
education lending within the Bank (World Bank 1995).  
The World Bank played an important role in shaping thinking on educational 
reform. Psacharopoulos (1989 p. 180), one of its early principal proponents, defined 
education policy and reform as follows:  
 
Education policy is perhaps the contemporary equivalent of what twenty years ago was 
known as educational planning. Whatever it is, and no matter how many other disguises it 
takes (such as ‗educational reform‘), practically every country in the world has at one 
time or another proclaimed an intention or made a decision that would affect some aspect 
of schooling in society. 
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Psacharopoulos uses the terms ―education policy‖ (known previously as 
educational planning) and ―school reform‖ interchangeably. However, Riddell (1999) 
argues that equating school reform to policy and planning alone has been (and continues to 
be) a dominant way of defining reform, but only when seen from the viewpoint of specific 
disciplines. These points take us to the second set of issues which relate to the analytical 
complexities involved in understanding reform. 
The definition of what constitutes reform has been affected by the ―lens‖ or focus 
of the different disciplines that have shaped the content of change. A detailed analysis by 
Riddell (1999) suggests that there are three lenses which must be applied in understanding 
educational reform—the educational, the economic, and the political. Each presents a 
different agenda, with the boundaries of the respective disciplines constituting important 
impediments to the ways in which individual reforms have been understood. While in the 
past, educational reform was commonly described as a simple history put forward by an 
educational planner, this is not a comprehensive understanding.  Riddell argues for the 
adoption of ―varifocal‖ lenses across the three different disciplines. While this may not 
lead to more successful reforms, it may nevertheless provide a more comprehensive 
interpretive framework.   
Riddell classifies the various issues that have been prominent on the agenda of 
reform in terms of the specific focus of each of these disciplines (1999 pp. 209–16). For an 
educational planner, these include access to education; the quality of learning; equity in 
participation across income, social groups, and gender; and issues relating to school 
effectiveness and improvement. The key concerns of economists have been efficiency, 
resource use, whether or not the system meets its own goals (for example, in terms of 
every child completing primary school), and the interface of the school with the labour 
market in terms of the skills needed and the wages earned. Notice that issues of quality and 
the teacher-learner interface do not appear on the agenda of most economists, although 
they are addressed by educationists. That said there is considerable overlap between what 
educational planners and economists take into consideration. For example, the issue of 
school effectiveness emphasised by planners is similar to the efficiency analyses of 
economists, as both talk about an efficient combination and use of inputs. Moreover, both 
of these perspectives assist educational managers.   
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Analysis emanating from the World Bank used the ―economic lens‖ and 
understandably so given the Bank‘s approach to financing projects that have a clear 
economic benefit. But this analytical perspective had special significance because the 
institution also shaped reform policies on a large scale.
12
 In the first overall review of 
education conducted in 1995, ―prudent use of economic analysis focussed on labour 
market outcomes‖ in order to set priorities for education sector reforms was emphasised 
(World Bank 1995 p. 9). Further, it was stated that: ―while governments determine 
priorities for many reasons, economic analysis of education—in particular, the rate of 
return analysis—is a diagnostic tool with which to start the process of setting priorities and 
considering alternative ways of achieving objectives within a sectoral approach‖ (World 
Bank 1995 p. 94). However, recently there has been a broadening of this narrow analytical 
focus to include aspects of governance—especially issues of providing the right incentives 
and accountability mechanisms to improve the service delivery of education (World Bank 
2003a, 2008).  
Riddell (1999) highlights the distinct focus of the ―political lens‖ as being different 
from the other two—especially with regard to agenda setting and implementation 
processes by which reforms are brought about. This view of the political lens as being 
mainly concerned with implementation is also shared by Grindle (2004 pp.1–2) in her 
analysis of the politics of educational reform in 12 Latin American countries during the 
1990s. She notes that ―most analysis of education policy seeks to assess efforts to improve 
conditions in the sector which include increasing the efficiency with which services are 
delivered, reducing illiteracy and repetition rates, boosting student learning through new 
curricula and pedagogy, measuring the impact of standard based testing, [and] evaluating 
the results of school autonomy‖, among others. While these measures are important for 
improving the quality and functioning of the education sector and for analysing which of 
the alternate policies are more efficient, they take the process of reform for granted. She 
further notes that in order to understand the specifically political dynamic, it is important to 
see  ―…how improved education becomes part of a political agenda, how reform initiatives 
are developed, what interactions and negotiations shape or alter their contents, how 
                                                          
12
 Even though education lending was a large part of the World Bank‘s portfolio, it began to play an 
important role in setting out policy directions for the sector only after the Jomtien Conference on Education 
For All in 1990. 
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important actors and interests respond to change proposals, how initiatives are 
implemented and sustained once they are introduced…‖ For her, reforms signal ―deliberate 
efforts to make changes in policies about education‖. And comprehending the politics of 
this process includes understanding how reformers find room for manoeuvre, and deal with 
sources of resistance. Further, reforms are deliberate efforts on the part of a government‘s 
attempt to ―redress perceived errors in prior and existing arrangements in policies and 
institutions‖ (Grindle and Thomas 1991 p. 4). I adapt this definition to understand the 
deliberate efforts of the government to redress policies and institutions involved in the 
provision of school education. 
Starting from a narrow definition of educational reform driven by the structural 
adjustment agenda, many developing countries have embarked on much wider changes 
encompassing the entire educational system, or one or more of its sub-systems. Consistent 
with the broad consensus of past research, I use the following criteria for what constitutes 
educational reform: a critique and modification of existing policy and institutional 
arrangements that induces major shifts in resource priorities, institutional arrangements, 
and even the culture of work. As the scope of ―educational reform‖ has widened, so the 
narrow economic lens has also proved to be an inadequate one for both designing and 
understanding the reform process. 
 
1.4 Studying the Research Questions in the Context of India 
 
I study the specific research questions raised above within the empirical settings of change 
in two similar political systems with comparable opportunities for improving their public 
primary education systems. The settings are the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and 
Bihar. In the 1990s, these two states were among the most educationally backward in the 
country. Moreover, inequality in school participation based on caste and gender was deep-
seated in both. Although there was little hard evidence, the quality of schools in both AP 
and Bihar was widely seen as poor. In order to improve their school systems, both states 
were provided with similar opportunities in terms of external aid routed through the Centre 
in Delhi. However, after more than a decade of reform interventions, the states experienced 
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divergent trajectories of educational development.
13
 This thesis explores the role of politics 
in accounting for the different achievements in these states, and it tests the two hypotheses 
discussed earlier in order to help understand why they diverged so much in terms of their 
educational outcomes (seen primarily in terms of rates of primary school participation).  
I consider the implementation of educational reform policies in the two states 
between1994–2011.  Within this period, I particularly focus on the period which stretches 
from the early 1990s (when reforms were introduced) until 2005–06, as this happens to be 
a period when there was relative continuity in political leadership in both the states. 
Following the National Policy of Education (NPE) of 1986, and the Programme of Action 
(PoA) of 1992 (that was meant to operationalise the NPE) educational reforms were 
introduced gradually in the early 1990s. They were intended to improve school 
participation rates and the quality of institutions. Further, reforms were first introduced at 
the primary level (that is, grades I–V), followed by reforms targeted at the entire 
elementary cycle (that is, grades I–VIII).  
A comparative analysis of this kind in the two states faces several challenges. The 
first of these derives from the division of powers in the Indian political system. Following 
an amendment to the Indian Constitution in 1976, primary education became a joint 
responsibility of both the Centre and the states. Hence, the changes following the NPE in 
1986 were initiated by federal policies (that is, those of the Centre in Delhi) but they 
subsequently required state level implementation. Hence, actors, interests, and institutions 
at both levels of government need to be considered.  
Second, due to differences in the timing of elections between the central and the 
state governments, and also in elections for different state governments, the specific 
political leaders in office changed with time, particularly at the federal level. Furthermore, 
the tenure of different state governments also differed. Overall, however, there was 
considerable continuity in political leadership in the two states for most of the period under 
consideration here. Thus in AP, Chandra Babu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 
governed between 1995 and 2004. Relatedly, the Chief Minister of Bihar during 1990–97 
was Lalu Prasad Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). After 1997 he retained political 
                                                          
13
 This divergence is evident in the trends in educational participation for primary school grades reported 
from the household surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). For more on 
this see Chapter 4. 
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power indirectly when his wife became the Chief Minister (1997–2004).14 I also 
incorporate policy and political changes after 2005–06, and until 2011—but mainly to 
confirm or modify the findings about the political dynamics of the policy reform process 
observed between 1994 and 2005–06.  
Finally, the ―educational reform‖ considered here comprise a large variety of 
federal interventions in primary school education following the NPE 1986. The first set of 
federal programmes for primary education was introduced with domestic resources alone. 
This was followed by small state projects with external funding. But the large inflow of 
external resources for primary education came mainly with the District Primary Education 
Programme (DPEP) launched in 1993, and subsequently the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) 
which extended the programme to upper primary school grades (elementary education) in 
2000.
15
 Further, states joined these federal reform programmes at different times, adding to 
the complexity of the analysis.
16
 A detailed overview of the various federal interventions in 
school education is provided in Chapter 3. 
For this research I maintain that the changes and initiatives introduced under the 
externally funded DPEP (and following it under the SSA), in the two states deserve to be 
considered as ―educational reform‖. This is because, unlike other federal government 
primary education programmes launched after the NPE 1986, the DPEP signalled 
deliberate change in existing policy and institutional arrangements, including at the state 
level. Moreover, it was aimed at a broad reorganisation of the sector that was continued 
under SSA. I focus specifically on two key aspects of the DPEP programme—both of 
which had significant possibilities for modification and implementation at the state level. 
They are: (i) decentralisation with community participation, and (ii) teacher management 
policies. These constitute two important arenas where the reforms were contested and 
reshaped by the interaction of different political interests and institutions.  I then analyse 
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 Lalu Prasad Yadav had to step down as Chief Minister in 1997 following corruption charges and a term in 
jail. 
15
 The most notable of the school reform programmes started in the early 1990s was the District Primary 
Education Programme (DPEP). Planning for the DPEP started in 1992 and it was formally launched in 1993. 
Policy reforms under the DPEP are the starting point for the period under consideration here. The DPEP also 
marked the first ever World Bank funding for primary education in India.   
16
 Different states entered the programme at different times. For example, in the selected states, the DPEP 
started in AP in 1996–97 with support from the UK government (that is, DFID); extra districts were added in 
1999 with World Bank support. In Bihar, the DPEP was launched in October 1997 and ended in March 2006. 
36 
 
the process and outcome of the implementation of various reforms and initiatives at the 
school level. My purpose in doing this is to understand reform results from the ground 
level, including the contests and factors that operate at the school level. In this analysis at 
the school level I also consider several other federal government programmes besides the 
DPEP. The most significant of these are Operation Blackboard (OB) and the Mid-Day 
Meal (MDM) programme, both of which were domestically funded.
17
 Although these 
programmes were very different from the DPEP in that they allowed little room for 
manoeuvre for state governments to either influence their design or adapt them to local 
conditions, nevertheless they potentially provided substantial federal resources to states, 
and their implementation was definitely influenced by state governments. Moreover, at the 
school level, the beneficiaries experienced the sum total of various government initiatives. 
They did not see themselves or the schools as recipients of benefits deriving from several 
different schemes (such as the DPEP or OB).     
 
1.5 Chapter Plan 
Based on a review of the literature, Chapter 2 analyses the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of the principal theoretical frameworks within which the politics of 
educational reform has been investigated. The findings suggest that there exist two distinct 
sets of approaches inspired respectively by economic theory and sociological theory. In the 
analysis inspired by economic theory, reform is seen as a technical plan whose outcomes 
are beholden to societal interest groups. In contrast, the historical and institutional 
contexts, the evolution of the policy process, and the conflicts involved in policy 
implementation are all more central to deliberations inspired by the sociological theory. 
My particular approach draws on the scholarship inspired by sociological theory, although 
with the modifications suggested by Grindle (2004 p.15) in order to focus on the dynamic 
processes of change as they unfold through time. Ideas regarding change are important. 
And so too are policy actions and political leaders—especially their ability to use the 
opportunities provided by the reform process to negotiate strategically with opponents.  
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 Both the DPEP and domestically funded schemes like the Operation Blackboard became a part of an 
expanded and integrated agenda for school reforms under the SSA launched in 2000. 
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Because I am concerned with the political process of policy implementation, 
especially the contrasting policies of managing teacher interests, enhancing community 
control, and bringing about decentralisation, I examine the available scholarship in these 
particular areas with reference to India. The review underscores that very little analysis 
exists on the politics of educational reform in the country. In recent years the formal 
economy framework has been frequently used; and in this literature, teachers have usually 
been viewed as ―vested interests‖ who are opposed to reforms. Since there is little analysis 
of successful cases, it is unclear whether teachers actually oppose reform as much as 
theory would have us expect. Also, there is a sense of optimism regarding the contribution 
of community participation and decentralisation, once again, not supported by the 
empirical literature. The gaps in previous and current scholarship reflect its implicit 
preoccupation with the political economy theory regarding societal interests, its lack of 
study of successful cases of reform, on the process of change, and on the actions of reform 
leaders.  
At the end of Chapter 2, I outline the methodology adopted for this research. This 
includes providing a description of the sources of data, the tools used for its collection, and 
the procedure for the selection of field sites from where primary information was gathered. 
This forms the basis for understanding how reforms work at the local level in the two 
states selected for the research.         
Chapters 3 and 4 scrutinise the policy framework and empirical context within 
which the comparative study of educational reform implementation is located. Chapter 3 
assesses the context of the federal policy within which reform initiatives were undertaken 
in the states. Based on a review of national policy documents and federal finances for 
education, I argue that by the 1990s there was a thorough critique of the earlier 
preoccupation with expansion-oriented policies in educational development, and that the 
state governments were unable to take the lead in initiating change because they were 
experiencing severe financial constraints. It is in this context that the Centre in Delhi took 
the lead in setting out new policy directions and mobilising additional resources for 
primary education (including getting access to external aid). Based on a review of trends in 
state education finances between 1990–91 and 2007–08, I then compare aspects of the 
variation in the performance of 15 states, with special attention to those categorised as 
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educationally backward.
18
 It is to answer the key question raised by this analysis—namely 
why educationally backward states differed so much in making use of the opportunities 
provided by federal policy and resources—that I compare the two states under study.   
Chapter 4 looks more directly at the units of the study, that is, AP and Bihar. On 
the basis of research and policy literature, the chapter compares the context and 
institutional arrangements through which educational reforms were implemented; and it 
then examines outcome indicators such as school participation rates, using data from the 
National Sample Survey (NSS) for 1993–94 and 2007–08. Two key similarities of context 
were the fact that both the states were educationally backward, and that political power in 
was in the hands of a new political leadership. These led to expectations of similar 
outcomes of reforms and of the role that political leaders would play in the process. Given 
this, the variation in school participation rates in the two states, after a considerable period 
of reform implementation, appears to be a ―puzzle‖. Further exploration of the 
implementation process is considered necessary to explain this.  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 investigate why reform outcomes were so much better in AP as 
compared to Bihar. The expectations generated using the formal political economy theory 
suggest that the explanation might lie in a weaker influence of teacher unions on state 
policies in AP, and that it might also reflect a stronger working of demand side pressures 
generated by community participation and decentralisation in this state. Each of these 
chapters explores the empirical evidence on different aspects of reform goal expectations 
and implementation, based on a review of policy documents, interviews with key actors, 
and surveys and focus group discussions conducted in sample districts, blocks, and 
schools.  
In Chapter 5, reform interventions with respect to teacher policies and the attitude 
of teacher unions to reform are evaluated. At the stage of agenda setting, perhaps 
anticipating resistance, the federal guidelines were silent on the subject of teachers, and 
they did not recommend any ―hard‖ measures. However, the state governments 
implementing the reforms had to respond immediately with explicit measures—faced as 
they were with some difficult choices. On the one hand, high expenditure on teacher 
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 The most recent data on educational finances of the Centre and the states in India is for 2007–08 and this is 
what I have included in my analysis. There is a considerable delay in reporting of actual expenditure. 
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salaries was a key constraint in policy innovation and teacher unions were seen as being 
opponents of reform. On the other hand, there was a need for cooperation from the teachers 
in order to implement the new measures. I find that AP and Bihar adopted contrasting 
policies with respect to teachers, and that this had different implications for the reform 
process. In addition, teacher unions in the two states varied in terms of their strength, 
partisan affiliation, and their relationship with their respective state governments. 
However, in neither state was the collective action of the unions the main impediment to 
change and reform leaders found the opportunity to manoeuvre teacher interests towards 
the goals of new policy. 
In Chapter 6, I examine how far the variation in the performance of the two states 
was due to differences in the design and working of decentralisation and variations in the 
participation of potential beneficiaries. I find that policy and political actors in both the 
states innovated as regards the design of decentralisation, and that they set up school 
committees with statutory authorisation. In AP, these committees worked under a 
centralised model of control by the top political leadership, whereas in Bihar there was 
local ―elite capture‖ of these bodies. In neither state did decentralisation and community 
participation have the beneficial ―demand side‖ outcomes that might have been expected 
on the basis of theory.     
Chapter 7 provides an account of how macro-level reforms have been implemented 
at the local level. This is based on quantitative data from school and household surveys, 
and qualitative data from interviews, focus group discussions, and school observations—
all qualitative data were collected by me and a research team provided support in collecting 
data for the school and household surveys.
19
 I review the results of policy reform at the 
grassroots level in terms of school participation and attendance, and the quality and 
adequacy of inputs—for example, physical infrastructure, teachers, and the working of 
incentive schemes (especially the MDM programme). This local grassroots view of how 
schools work provides a moderated view of some of the claims of ―success‖ in AP. Indeed, 
I found that there was scope for significant improvement in teachers‘ attitudes and the 
physical infrastructure of schools in this state. However, the reform process did work better 
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 In conducting the school and household survey, I had the support of a research team. I was one of the 
surveyors and travelled along with the team. 
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in AP than in Bihar. This was on account of policy innovation and entrepreneurship shown 
by policymakers and support from political leaders. These were evinced in the nature of 
various initiatives coming from ―above‖, in the centralised interventions in teacher 
management policies, curbing vested interests around schools, and effective reach of 
school-based incentive schemes in AP. Reliance on decentralisation in the absence of 
institutional and political support from above led to a situation of ―abandoned‖ schools in 
Bihar, confirming the observations of Corbridge et al. (2005) about there being a scarce 
presence of the state at the local level. What was needed, therefore, was not ―less of the 
state‖, but greater state action in public interest for educational reform to succeed.   
Finally, Chapter 8 pulls together the main findings of this research and its relevance 
for the design and implementation of educational reform in the future. The conclusion I 
draw is that whereas successful reform adoption has been the result of states finding an 
alignment between their own interests and the federal opportunity for reforms, successful 
implementation has been the result as much of policy adaptation, manoeuvring and 
political skills, used to mobilise and align teacher interests towards achieving the goals of 
new policy. There is little evidence of decentralisation and community participation 
contributing to greater local control over schools, or improvement of schools more 
generally. However, they remain goals to be pursued in a normative sense. 
 
1.6 Significance of this Research  
This research adds to the literature on educational reform in several ways.  It explicitly 
focuses on the politics of educational reform in India—a subject that has been almost 
entirely neglected in previous academic literature. It also makes use of differences between 
the execution of reforms in two distinct entities operating in similar policy and political 
contexts of the federal government, and highlights the critical role of political factors, 
ideas, interests, and institutions in shaping the path of overall reform implementation. 
Finally, the work contributes to a broadening of the theoretical framework within which 
the implementation of educational reform should be understood. Viewing policy 
consequences from the ground is innovative as it includes the perspective of those for 
whom change is intended. Therefore, it expands the horizon within which to understand 
the outcomes of change. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theory and Practice of Educational Reform in India: 
A Review of Literature 
 
The policy changes that initiated economic reforms in India since the 1990s, and the 
politics associated with this process, have been widely debated in the global arena. 
However, the politics of educational reform has not received comparable attention. This is 
similar to what Kaufman and Nelson (2004) observed for Latin American countries in their 
analysis of the political factors that influenced the shaping of the education and health 
reforms there during the late 1980s and 1990s. They noted that while ―the politics of 
reform has been examined extensively in the case of ‗first-phase‘ macro-economic reforms 
… it has only very recently begun to receive attention in the case of ‗second-phase‘ social-
sector policies…‖ (Kaufman and Nelson 2004 p. 3). Undoubtedly, the main reason for this 
was the greater significance of economic policies, and their capacity to affect incomes, 
employment, and savings of people, thereby generating immediate and widespread 
reaction. In contrast, reform of education was less ―dramatic‖, and it consisted of slow 
changes in complex administrative systems.
20
 Nevertheless, the changes themselves have 
been considered as politically contentious and they require different lenses in order to yield 
a nuanced analysis of a complex process. 
In India, nearly two decades since school educational reform was initiated through 
slow changes in the federal policy framework, the political dynamics of this process is 
receiving greater attention in research literature. A general explanation of the role of 
political factors, or of differences between various Indian states in implementing and 
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 For most scholars writing about the politics of educational reform like Grindle (2004), Nelson (2007), and 
Kaufman and Nelson (2004), differences in the nature of economic and educational policy reforms are the 
starting point for explaining the ―distinct‖ nature of politics in the process of educational reform. Some of 
these differences have to do with the fact that economic policy reforms were seen as responding to a sense of 
urgency, and the new policies were based on clear ―templates‖ of policy change—as exemplified in the 
Washington Consensus; they could even be stroke-of-a-pen policy changes. In education, however, there was 
never a sense of crisis as things deteriorated over a long period of time and the impact was harder to perceive 
for those who were affected. 
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sustaining educational reform, is yet to emerge.
21
 However, the political dynamics around 
specific reform interventions such as decentralisation, teacher management policies, and 
the role of powerful teacher unions in resisting change are being widely debated.  
This chapter has two objectives. The first is to examine the principal theoretical 
frameworks within which the reform-politics relationship has so far been analysed in the 
literature. Economics and sociological theory provide two distinct sources of inspiration 
for most of the approaches. I argue that the analysis inspired by economic theory underpins 
much of the policy that is designed for educational reform, as well as the emerging body of 
research into the political factors that affect such reform. However, I maintain that this is 
flawed in that it over-estimates both the constraining role of special interests on policy 
change, and the reform-promoting role of decentralisation and community participation. 
Also, while each framework has some strength in terms of how it describes reality or the 
explanations that it posits, independently neither of the two is able to account for cases of 
successful reform outcomes.  
The second objective of this chapter is to explain the methodology for examining 
the research questions of this thesis—specifically the political factors associated with the 
implementation of educational reform in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Bihar. The analysis of 
the approach taken by these two states, including the differences in the idea for reforms 
and the actions of political leaders, forms the basis for evolving a richer and more complex 
understanding of the part that is played by politics in promoting or constraining changes in 
school education.  
           The chapter has five main sections. The first examines the main theoretical 
frameworks and their relevance and adequacy for analysing the relationship between 
politics and educational reform in the Indian context. The next two sections move to the 
implementation of this reform, and present findings of research on specific reform 
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 Much of the early literature on educational reform in India is in the form of programme evaluations or 
reports commissioned by the federal government and donor agencies, mainly the World Bank and the 
European Commission. These include, for example, the World Bank (1997, 2003b); Hirshberg (2002); 
Glinskaya and Jalan (2003); EC commissioned Bashir (2000) and Jha, Saxena, Baxi (2001); and programme 
monitoring and evaluation reports of the Bihar Education Project, the Lok Jumbish Project, and the District 
Primary Education Programme (DPEP). These provide a wealth of information on policy and institutional 
constraints around the implementation of educational reforms in the states. But they do not make any explicit 
references to politics, and reforms are understood only as a matter of technical design.    
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interventions from experience related to India. Accordingly, the role of politics in 
implementing teacher management policies, politics of teacher unions, and scholarship on 
decentralisation and community participation are examined in these two sections.
22
 The 
next section discusses the methodological contributions of this literature, especially the 
growing significance of analysing the local consequences of policy interventions. The final 
section presents the methodology used for this research. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
In the relevant literature, interactions between policy and politics in educational reform 
have been examined within theoretical perspectives developed to analyse state policy 
reforms in general. Grindle (2001) and Kaufman (1999) note that two distinct traditions, 
inspired by economics and sociological theory respectively, lie at the source of these 
different approaches. The new or formal political economy approach and rational choice 
institutionalism were inspired by economics, while comparative-historical institutionalism 
was inspired primarily by sociological theory.
23
 Approaches stimulated by the two 
disciplines model reality in different ways and offer strikingly different explanations for 
policy choice and change. While ―parsimony and elegance‖ are the characteristics of the 
explanations inspired by economics, ―insight into conflict and process‖ are characteristics 
of the explanations coming from sociology (Grindle 2001 p. 346).
24
 
              In the approaches inspired by economic theory, pursuing and protecting self-
interest is seen as the core motivation for politics. Political activity is characterised by 
competition among groups to achieve this end. The image of politics, as it appears from the 
formal political economy explanation, is that of ―capture‖ of the state by special interests. 
In this scenario, reforming state policies is difficult as it is likely to aggravate societal 
                                                          
22
 Given that this research examines school reform policies initiated in the 1990s the literature review is 
largely restricted to research and publications undertaken between 1990 and the present time.  
23
 Grindle (2001 pp. 350–53) refers to it as ―comparative institutionalism‖ following the 1995 World Politics 
symposium on understanding ―The role of theory in comparative politics‖. Hall and Taylor (1996), Ikenberry 
(1994), and Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstretch (1992) refer to it as ―historical institutionalism‖. The latter 
term has been more widely used in the literature. The assumptions and arguments about the political process 
remain the same in both cases. I prefer Grindle‘s usage of the term for its special relevance for a comparative 
analysis of variations in policy processes and for the variety of methods adopted by comparative 
institutionalists.  
24
 She suggests that choice between the two was indeed a ―stark trade-off‖ (Grindle 2001 p. 346). 
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interests. Rational choice theorists accept and develop this explanation of the political 
arena being dominated by special interests still further. They focus more directly on 
political actors and institutions.  According to this theory, politicians face a series of 
collective action dilemmas while deliberating about policy change. At the root of these 
dilemmas is the conflict between the actions that a politician is likely to pursue for 
achieving her/his self-interest—the goals of achieving or retaining political power—and 
the outcomes that would be less than desirable for society as a whole. Even with these 
results, a politician would be constrained against abandoning her course of action because 
this would likely give an advantage to her political competitors. The strong points in 
favour of this theory are the use of deductive methods to arrive at conclusions, and the 
possibility of generalising these conclusions across contexts. However, the key limitation 
of this approach is its inability to explain why policy change happens, as the main 
emphasis is on explaining why politicians will not prefer change. This inability to explain 
change is a direct consequence of the underlying assumption that a political actor‘s 
rationality is equivalent to pursuing her self-interest. That a political actor or the 
government could possibly act with a view to promoting public interest or keeping certain 
larger purposes in mind is difficult to conceive under the tenets of this theory (Grindle 
2001). 
The approach of comparative institutionalists stands in contrast to the above.  
Politics is viewed as a struggle, or a contested process, where the context and institutions 
are very important. Therefore, the politics of reform will be characterised less by 
calculations of income or power, and more by the existing matrix of institutions. In place 
of the ―thin‖ theory of rationality used in formal models of political economy, this 
approach argues that the context shapes the behaviour of political actors in profound ways. 
The resultant theory is rich in depth and complexity, and is historically grounded. Further, 
the explanations are developed inductively; they are not strictly generalisable but are more 
in the nature of ―middle-range‖ theories that can highlight the political conditions under 
which change takes place.  
            Formal political economy and rational choice arguments are prominent in much of 
the recent scholarship on the politics of educational reform in India. In this literature, 
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politics is viewed in terms of opportunities for patronage, control by special interest 
groups, and poor service delivery due to persisting principal-agent dilemmas (Béteille 
2009; Devarajan and Shah 2004; Keefer and Khemani 2004; Kremer, Chaudhury, Rogers, 
Muralidharan, and Hammers 2005). Keefer and Khemani (2004) note that in the Indian 
electoral context, there is a lack of credibility of political promises to provide public goods 
such as education which benefit large numbers, as opposed to private transfers and 
subsidies being given to a narrow section. ―(P)olitical patrons provide private goods to 
their clients‖, and further  ―…the greater the focus of government spending on  items 
targeted for specific individuals (clients),…the less spent on public goods‖ (Keefer and 
Khemani 2004 p. 937). These observations follow from those of Olson (1965) about the 
difficulties of sustaining collective action in large groups, in contrast to targeted action in 
small groups yielding direct benefits in the form of electoral outcomes for a politician. 
Béteille (2009) applies the rational choice method to explore the micro-foundations 
of accountability problems among teachers in the three states of Karnataka, Madhya 
Pradesh (MP), and Rajasthan. She sees the relationship between politicians and teachers as 
one of political exchange. Politicians used discretionary powers given in transfer rules for 
teachers as a patronage opportunity for granting the latter their desired postings; in return 
teachers provided politicians with electoral support.   
Béteille‘s analysis displays a richness and complexity, especially her understanding 
of strategic linkages between teachers and politicians, mediated through informal 
institutions of the middleman (known as a dalal), and power hierarchies, and is based on 
qualitative sources of information that include interviews and newspaper reports (Béteille 
2009 pp.83–5, 136–40). She sees these links between teachers and politicians as a ―deeply 
embedded structural problem of  India‘s democracy‖ (p.9), wherein the compulsion of 
winning elections leads politicians to rely on teachers, and teachers in turn to extract good 
postings from the former, in the process manipulating formal rules and creating 
accountability problems. But she views the role of these political links primarily as a 
constraint that comes in the way of fair implementation of policies relating to teacher 
accountability. She is unable to account for the comparative variations that may have 
existed in the nature of these relationships across the three states she studies, and the 
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impression conveyed is that compulsions of democratic politics will make it difficult to 
implement formal rules, irrespective of differences in the historical or policy context. 
Béteille is also unable to distinguish between the differences in the roles of politicians and 
government officers, whereas, I find the two playing specific and somewhat different roles 
in the course of implementation of reforms, and their actions vary in terms of the impact on 
outcomes.   
Although until recently the scholarship on educational reform in India made no 
explicit use of approaches inspired by sociological theory, historical path-dependence was 
an implicit argument in some of the early literature explaining variations in the 
performance of different states. Specifically, Kerala‘s exemplary performance among all 
the Indian states was explained on the basis of the policies of the princely state of 
Travancore, which was not formally a part of ―British India‖, and where the native 
government proclaimed its responsibility to provide for school education. Through an edict 
in 1817, it decided to defray the entire expenses for education, started government schools 
in many areas, and provided ―grants-in-aid‖ to private schools (Thomas 2001 p. 168). It is 
interesting to note that Keefer and Khemani (2004) adopt a formal political economy 
approach yet make some use of history in explaining the differing performance of Indian 
states. The authors argue that electoral competition in India encourages private transfers to 
a few citizens, rather than broad-based access to public services that would benefit many 
people. They also notice variations in performance among Indian states and see the striking 
contrast in human development outcomes between Kerala and Uttar Pradesh to be a result 
of ―path-dependence‖ on account of historical differences in institutions and patterns of 
mobilisation. Particularly, the states ruled by British colonial rulers through landlords were 
worse-off in comparison to those ruled by native rulers—known as ―princely states‖ 
(Keefer and Khemani 2004 pp. 938–9). 
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Sharma (2000) sees the current constraints in school education as a result of an 
inadequate and weak presence of institutions that could ―professionalize‖ school education 
and teaching. In an explicitly historical-institutional analysis, she concludes that teacher 
training and block level oversight of schools through the office of the Block Education 
Officer (BEO) are the weakest institutions. This inadequacy is the result of a certain ―path-
dependence‖ inherited from colonial times and also due to the sequence in which policies 
emerged in independent India. After independence, the agenda of agricultural 
modernisation took precedence in ideas on community development. As a result, little 
attention was paid to evolving school-oriented institutions at the district and sub-district 
levels. The BEO continued to work in the colonial mould as an inspector, unsuitable for 
the needs of educational development.  Due to the weakness of institutions, Panchayati Raj 
(political decentralisation) was unlikely to make much headway in improving school 
quality. In Sharma‘s analysis, the manner in which institutions have evolved over time acts 
as a constraint to change.  
Sharma and Ramachandran (2009) adopt an explicit institutional focus in their 
comparison of education systems in AP and Rajasthan and use insights from the works of 
Migdal (1994) and Evans (1995) for their research. The authors note the importance of a 
state‘s structure, and consider variations in the internal structure of a state, the relationship 
of the state to society, and differences in the implementation process as the basis for 
comparing the dynamic nature of working of schools in these two states. They conclude 
that the working of a large informal system around the formal structure contributes to 
opportunities for patronage and networking; and that reforms must protect ―the public 
sphere from individual greed‖ (Sharma and Ramachandran 2009 p. 321).    
A different and more sociologically inspired institutionalism is evident in 
Corbridge, Williams, Srivastav, and Veron (2005). The authors follow Migdal‘s approach 
(1994) and develop an inductive micro-theory inspired by local political studies.
25
 They 
analyse some of the ways in which the state deals with the poor, and how the poor in turn 
see the state in rural areas of eastern India (including in Bihar, Jharkhand, and West 
                                                          
25
Atul Kohli notes this to be one of the methods adopted by those who adopt the ―eclectic middle ground‖ in 
terms of methods—with rational choice representing one end of the spectrum and post-modern cultural 
deconstruction the other end (World Politics 1995 p. 48).  
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Bengal). They examine state-poor relations in the context of implementation of two 
programmes meant for the poor—the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) and 
the Employment Assurance Programme. The authors provide an account of the local state 
through its daily practices and assess some of the claims made by policy in the background 
of what obtains in daily practice. They find that official claims of participatory 
development made by the state in India as also by development agencies, had a far greater 
sense of optimism, which was in contrast to what obtained on the ground—there was very 
little of the state to be seen at this level. This means that the claims about greater 
participation of beneficiaries were not resulting in greater state involvement to resolve the 
problems of the poor. 
 
2.2 Specific Reform Interventions: Teacher Policies and the Politics of Unions 
 
Teacher Issues in Official Policy and Research Literature 
 
This section assesses the arguments on the basis of which teachers and their collective 
action were thought of as opponents to the change process, and the extent to which they 
actually blocked the implementation process. In official documents, teachers seemed to be 
one of the key problems in schooling in India in the early 1990s.
26
 School education was a 
labour intensive sector employing nearly 2.8 million teachers in primary and upper primary 
schools in 1993 (World Bank 1997 p.143). State government budgets were spent almost 
entirely on paying teacher salaries, leaving little room for spending on initiatives for 
improving quality.
27
 Poor motivation of teachers and poor quality of teaching were seen as 
the root cause of poor learning outcomes. Field surveys found that teachers were not good 
at the subjects they taught or in the instructional material they used, leading to poor 
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 ―Official documents‖ include some of the literature published by donor agencies involved in the design and 
funding of the programme, especially the World Bank‘s Primary Education in India (1997). This document 
arose from extensive discussions with the Department of Education (DoE) of the Government of India (GoI) 
and research studies carried out in relation to the DPEP. 
27
 According to the World Bank (1997 pp. 1–2), teacher salaries consumed 97 per cent of the primary 
education budget, leaving very little scope for any new expenditure, including instructional materials and 
teacher in-service training.  
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learning outcomes (World Bank 1997).
28
 Efforts to improve this situation needed resources 
and a possible reduction in the expenditure on teachers, a move that was likely to face 
resistance from teacher unions. 
In national policy documents that set the agenda for reform, two things were 
evident. First, the policy documents anticipated likely opposition from teachers and did not 
recommend any harsh steps, and second, they even tried to win over the support of the 
teachers through small measures. For example, they did not recommend any reduction in 
teacher salaries or changing their security of tenure (Government of India 1995; Pandey 
2000). At the same time, teachers had reasons to fear increased workloads, greater local 
supervision, and introduction of new accountability measures, especially through village 
level committees that were likely to be vehicles of both decentralisation and teacher 
accountability. The federal guidelines made no explicit recommendations to increase 
community control over teachers in the nationally formulated technical design. Instead, 
through small measures such as teacher grants, they generated enormous goodwill and a 
sense of participation of teachers in the reform process (Pandey 2000 p. 22). 
Teacher accountability issues gained increasing significance in the research 
literature, especially as reforms moved to the implementation stage in the states. Nearly a 
decade after school reform policies had been launched, issues of teachers being absent 
from their jobs or their poor performance were appropriately highlighted in the literature. 
References were increasingly made to the political power of teachers organised as a special 
interest group and wielding control over democratic politics in the states. 
Research literature on various aspects of school reforms became available only 
around the end of the 1990s. The Public Report on Basic Education (PROBE) (1999) was 
the first of its kind—a research report that brought together the perspectives of researchers, 
activists, and officers concerned with primary education. Based on a field survey in the 
educationally backwards states of Bihar, MP, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh,29 the report 
highlights the dismal status of primary schools in these states. The report combines the 
                                                          
28
 World Bank (1997) cites a study by Bashir (1994) according to which only half of grade IV teachers in 
Tamil Nadu could answer correctly a test meant for grade IV students in Mathematics.  
29
 These states were and are popularly referred to by the acronym BIMARU, meaning sick or unwell in 
Hindi. 
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voices of stakeholders—teachers, parents, and children—whose ―voices (it) broadcast 
without distortion or static‖ (PROBE 1999 Foreword, emphasis added). It devotes a full 
chapter to the issue of teachers (Chapter 5 pp. 53–68). Here it makes a reference to two 
important issues that inspired a lot of the subsequent research on the political role of 
teachers in constraining reforms—the issue of their weak accountability and the political 
role of unions.  
The PROBE report notes that teachers are the key actors of the system. Yet there is 
widespread inertia in their performance due to the demotivating environment in which they 
work and lack of accountability in their performance. The demotivating environment is 
largely due to the lack of effective training and also due to a lack of commitment to 
teaching; teachers see teaching only as a high paying job. The report adopts a holistic 
approach in that it does not blame the teachers alone for this situation. It also notes 
teachers‘ concerns about the poor infrastructure with which they have to teach and parental 
apathy towards schooling as contributing to this demotivating environment.  
According to the PROBE report, the bigger problem is that of accountability, in 
describing which it makes implicit use of the arguments of formal political economy. 
Teachers in government schools were secure in their jobs because no penal action was 
imposed on them for poor performance or lack of accountability; this was in contrast to the 
situation in private schools. Introducing accountability was difficult because of problems 
in observing a teacher‘s work in school. An important way out of the situation, suggested 
by the report, was greater cooperation between a teacher and the community. While a part 
of the explanation for poor teacher performance was the degrading work environment 
where teachers were ―trapped in a ramshackle village school, surrounded by disgruntled 
parents, irregular pupils, and overbearing inspectors‖, the deterioration in teaching 
standards could not be fully accounted for by these factors alone (PROBE report 1999 p. 
63). 
The issue of weak teacher accountability has been frequently taken up in 
subsequent research, especially after the publication of the World Development Report 
(2004). Kremer et al. (2005) point out that there is a lot of wastage of public spending on 
education in India because of teacher absenteeism. In what is a nationally representative 
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survey, teacher absenteeism rates were reportedly as high as 24–25 per cent.30 Almost a 
quarter of the teachers surveyed, and almost half of those present in schools, were found to 
be not teaching. Since teachers enjoyed the status of civil servants and they were almost 
never fired from their jobs for wrongdoing, they were impervious to sanctions.  Earlier 
Sipahimalani-Rao‘s (2004) study on teacher management issues had also addressed a 
concern similar to that of Kremer et al. (2005)—that poor management of teachers was an 
impediment to service delivery.
31
 In what remains till date as one of the few comparative 
analyses on teacher policies in the two Indian states of Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, 
Sipahimalani-Rao examines the full range of issues with respect to policies of teacher 
management and finds that the key differences are that Karnataka did not hire para-
teachers, conducted centralised tests for teacher recruitment, and developed a transparent 
policy for teacher postings.
32
 All of these were missing in the case of Uttar Pradesh, 
leaving scope for political discretion. On the issue of teacher absenteeism, this study 
qualifies the claim of Kremer et al. (2005) by disaggregating leave as authorised or 
unauthorised, and points out that unauthorised leave accounts for only about 3–4 per cent 
of total teacher absenteeism. Hence, the policy needs to address specifically why teachers 
have to be outside schools during working hours on authorised official chores. 
Béteille (2009) views politics as the key impediment which obstructs formal 
policies for teacher accountability from working effectively. Her arguments about the use 
of political discretion in bending rules and cultivating patronage relationships in teacher 
transfers have been discussed earlier in this chapter, and they are illustrative of the main 
tenets of the political economy formulations about the powerful role played by special 
interest groups in controlling the outcomes of democratic politics, that is, winning 
elections. Béteille sees teacher absenteeism as a problem where politically powerful 
teachers are able to bend formal rules and save themselves from punishment. In her thesis, 
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 The survey for Kremer et al.‘s research (2005) was done as a part of background work for the 2004 World 
Development Report. 
31
 The findings of the survey research for Kremer et al. (2005) were available prior to Sipahimalani-Rao‘s 
work in 2004. Sipahimalani-Rao‘s research (2004) was also funded by the World Bank.  
32
 The term ―para-teacher‖ refers to teachers hired on short-term contract. It became a practice in many 
Indian states, most notable among them being Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, to hire such teachers as a part 
of the policy innovations that they adopted in implementing the DPEP, or Lok Jumbish in the case of 
Rajasthan. See NCAER (2008) for details of the variety in policy and practice with respect to para-teachers 
in Indian states. 
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the political power of teachers is said to originate from their role as opinion makers—for 
example, acting as polling agents on election days, and even influencing the outcome of 
elections through manipulation. However, the evidence for this view comes mainly from 
qualitative interviews and newspaper reports analysed by Béteille. They are not robust, 
generalisable observations based on the survey that she undertook for this research. She 
also examines whether teacher absenteeism is higher in the case of teachers with political 
connections and those who are members of unions. For this, she uses the nationally 
representative dataset used by Kremer et al. (2005). The results are revealing in that she 
finds that a major part of teacher absenteeism was due to authorised leave and official 
duties. This conclusion echoes that of Sipahimalani-Rao (2004). For the small proportion 
of unauthorised leave taken by teachers—that is, real absenteeism—political 
considerations seem to have played only a small role.
33
 A teacher‘s membership of a 
political party appears to have some impact, while Béteille finds limited evidence for the 
influence of union membership. She concludes that ―the exact relationship between union 
membership, power and absences needs to be better understood‖ (Béteille 2009 p. 111). 
She also points out that gathering hard evidence on this issue is difficult. 
My criticism of Béteille‘s approach and conclusions pertains to the fact that her 
sole focus is on understanding why things do not function properly. Consequently, her 
approach is restricted to the negative role played by politics. When talking of the nexus of 
relationships between politicians, officials, and teachers she remarks tellingly that while 
there are politicians and government officials who are incorruptible, to find out ―why 
things do not work satisfactorily, it is important to focus on the corruptible ones‖ (Béteille 
2009 p. 43). 
Collective Action by Teacher Unions as an Impediment to Reform 
 
The ―explicit‖ relationship between politics and educational reform has been clearly 
perceived and extensively examined in the literature dealing with the role of teacher 
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 Unauthorised leave was estimated by Béteille at just 2.76 per cent. Authorised leave was the most 
significant reason why teachers were absent—37.69 per cent. Nearly 28 per cent of teacher absence was 
explained by the performance of official duties outside of school such as election related work and attending 
government meetings on health and other issues (Béteille 2009 p. 98).   
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unions. Research based on Olson‘s (1965) ―logic of collective action‖ begins from the 
expectation that unions are potentially the foremost opponents of change. Thus, pursuing 
this logic Corrales (1999) notes that their high level of organisation, their use of the 
discriminatory ―strike‖ weapon to challenge the government, and their lack of aversion to 
enter into conflict with the state (due to the left-leaning ideology of their leaders) are all 
factors that contribute to their political power. Also, in many cases union leaders have 
longer tenure than politicians. This makes them powerful and means that they are in a 
strong position to influence politicians.
34
 Corrales differentiates between types of reform 
policies, and notes that an earlier set of policy changes adopted by many developing 
countries during the initial stages of their nation-building process emphasised the 
expansion of access to schooling. Moreover, expanding access generally found favour both 
with teacher unions and politicians. The unions, however, opposed new reforms aimed at 
increasing the efficiency of schools.
35
 
Along lines similar to these arguments, teacher unions in many Indian states were 
indeed at the forefront of demands for the ―nationalisation‖ of the school sector, that is, 
arguing for the state takeover of the management and teacher services operating under the 
aegis of both the local government and privately managed schools. They were what 
Grindle (2004 p. 15) described as ―winners of prior contests over policy‖. That said there is 
little systematic analysis examining this issue in policy or research literature—a fact 
highlighted in the study of teacher unions in India‘s largest state of Uttar Pradesh by 
Kingdon and Muzammil (2003). Significantly, they note that ―little is known about 
teacher-politics or the political economy of education in India‖ (Kingdon and Muzammil 
2003 p. 7). 
One of the first references to the discretionary role of teacher unions appears in the 
1999 PROBE report. When discussing the issue of lack of teacher accountability, the 
report notes that a combination of poor managerial responsibility and organised resistance 
lies at the root of the problem. The report cites the example of time-bound promotions 
                                                          
34
 In the cases cited by Corrales (1999 p. 11), the Ministers of Education were selected from among 
politicians. In a number of instances union leaders had longer tenures than Ministers of Education.   
35
 See Corrales (1999 p. 5) for details of the nature of ―access‖ and ―quality‖ related reforms and the 
opportunities for political patronage in access oriented reforms. 
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based on seniority rather than performance—a policy that was backed by the unions. This 
was a disincentive for good teachers as they were likely to be rewarded only as much as 
the bad ones. However, the alternative of using the conduct of individual teachers as the 
basis for promotion is also full of opportunity for political discretion. And the authors of 
the PROBE report note that given the circumstances, it is ―understandable that teachers 
want to protect themselves from arbitrary treatment‖ (PROBE report 1999 p. 64). 
Therefore, and significantly, the observations of the PROBE report do not confirm 
theoretical expectations regarding the active protection of self-interest by teacher unions. 
Many of the arguments about the formal political economy of teacher unions were 
first articulated by Kingdon and Muzammil (2003). Their work assesses the conflict of 
interest that makes teacher unions oppose educational reform. The authors adopt an 
historical and descriptive approach in order to highlight two aspects: (i) the political 
participation of teachers, and (ii) the mobilisation of their unions. They use a political 
economy framework, involving concepts like rent-seeking and principal-agent dilemmas in 
their analysis. From such a perspective, they argue that school teachers were extremely 
politicised in Uttar Pradesh—in large part because of a blurring of the boundary between 
the teaching profession and politics. This, they argue, was caused by the statutory 
provision for special representation of teachers in the upper house of the state assembly, 
plus the possibility that teachers from government-aided private schools could directly 
fight elections to the lower house (in contrast to the position of other government servants). 
Thus, teachers formed the base of political parties, and the authors cite discussions with 
noted researcher and activist, Jean Dreze, to highlight the fact that even the outcomes of 
elections could be influenced by teachers (Kingdon and Muzammil 2003 p.7). Further, 
union leaders had also been members of the council of ministers—popularly known as ―the 
cabinet‖. This too can be seen as a reflection of the union‘s power being translated directly 
into political power. Clearly, it also diminishes the possibility of control against poor work 
practices like shirking and absenteeism. 
A second line of argument addressed by Kingdon and Muzammil (2003) concerns 
the collective mobilisation of teachers to advance their material interests. In Uttar Pradesh, 
in the 1960s and 1970s strong powerful unions bargained for better salaries and service 
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conditions. High public expenditure on teacher salaries left little room for expenditure on 
improving educational quality or innovation. Another way in which teachers increased 
their power was by lobbying for private schools to be brought on the government‘s list for 
financial support in the form of ―grant-in-aid‖. The government‘s resource support to 
grant-in-aid schools was direct—in the form of payment of salaries to teachers. This type 
of lobbying, therefore, ensured continued support to unions from teachers of private 
schools in anticipation of receiving higher salaries from the state exchequer (Kingdon and 
Muzzamil 2003 pp. 216–17). The authors see direct political participation of teachers, and 
lobbying by their unions, as being responsible for the evolution of teachers as a rent-
seeking class, and a hindrance to educational reform.       
However, on the present view two notable deficiencies appear in Kingdon and 
Muzzamil‘s arguments. First, they fail to provide complete evidence or analysis for their 
position that teachers can be seen as a ―rent-seeking‖ class. Second, evidence from the 
field shows that teachers may be as much the victims of rent-seeking (and not its 
perpetrators alone), and that they too have to often pay money in order to obtain favourable 
postings (Béteille 2009 pp. 149–150; Ramachandran, Bhattacharjea, and Sheshagiri 2008 
pp. 15–16; Sharma 2009 p. 162). Chand (2006 p. 21) too notes rent-seeking from teachers 
by some politicians to help fund elections. Also in this context, my field research, 
especially local evidence obtained from schools and communities, shows that rent-seeking 
in school education is a systemic issue—involving not just teachers, but other interests. In 
short, teachers are often victims of rent-seeking and they do not obviously form a class of 
rent-seekers. 
The second gap is that according to Kingdon and Muzammil (2003 p. 9), a 
―principal-agent‖ dilemma is caused by the centralisation of school education where the 
government—which is akin to the ―principal‖ in a contract—has little or no control over its 
―agents‖ (that is, the teachers). But the authors also note that decentralisation does not lead 
to a reversal of this process—neither better control of teachers nor a weakening of their 
political power resulted from decentralisation. 
So Kingdon and Muzammil‘s overall perspective on the role of politics in bringing 
about educational reform remains somewhat negative in that they view politics as being 
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detrimental to achieving the goals of policy in the poorly performing state of Uttar 
Pradesh. On the other hand, Goyal‘s study (cited in Chand 2006 p. 41), which compares 
human development outcomes in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, shows that political support 
was a key factor behind the ―success‖ in Tamil Nadu. In fact, Chand‘s work (2006) 
examines several cases of successful innovation in service delivery, and finds that politics 
played an important positive role. The aspects of politics he considers as crucial are the 
existence of: (i) a visionary political leadership, (ii) a consensus across party lines, (iii) a 
stable majority in the state assembly, and (iv) autonomy of administrators in implementing 
reforms. A later volume by Chand (2010) reiterates the important role of politics in 
improving service delivery, specifically the emergence of a coalition in support of reforms 
helps improve outcomes even in a backward state like Bihar. 
 
2.3 Specific Reform Interventions: Decentralisation and Community 
Participation 
 
Decentralisation is one of the most discussed themes among researchers who analyse the 
relationship between educational reform and politics. One reason for this is that 
decentralisation is a widely adopted reform measure, even when other complex types of 
reforms have been aborted. Moreover, it appeals to scholars across the ideological divide 
because of its wider promises of deepening democracy and increasing participation. There 
is also the theoretical possibility that decentralisation can promote efficiency by plugging 
information gaps and resolving principal-agent dilemmas. Such considerations have led to 
wide appeal and multi-dimensional expectations for decentralisation. This makes it 
difficult to formulate the parameters on which the vast literature that exists on the matter 
can be assessed. That said a useful starting point is Nelson‘s (2007 p. 86) observation that 
the technical effects of decentralisation on education (and health) have been analysed a lot, 
but there has been far less effort to assess how they affect the politics of institutional 
reform in the sector. In the light of this observation, I now specifically review the relevant 
literature in terms of the technical expectations and policy effects of this intervention, and 
the political factors associated with it.  
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In the formal political economy literature, educational decentralisation is viewed 
with optimism as an important intervention to ―bolster the demand side‖. It is seen as 
doing this through the dissemination of information, the greater participation of potential 
beneficiaries, and increasing the chances that difficult reforms are adopted (Corrales 1999). 
The 2004 World Development Report, which inspired a framework of service delivery, 
also sees in this measure the possibility of reversing the effects of centralisation on the 
education system—both by evolving short-chains of accountability over teachers and by 
resolving principal-agent dilemmas. 
 
School Councils as a Measure to Promote Educational Decentralisation 
 
The policy inclination in India towards decentralisation predates the emergence of a reform 
agenda; it also predates the provision of assistance for school reform by external agencies. 
This point can be seen in the National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986. And it can also be 
seen in the Programme of Action (PoA) 1992 which envisaged that each gram panchayat 
should have a Village Education Committee (VEC) that would be responsible for the 
administration of delegated educational programmes at the village level. Since education is 
a concurrent responsibility of the states and the Centre, operationalising these central 
policy guidelines required agreement from the states. This came from the Central Advisory 
Board on Education (CABE) which provided detailed guidelines on decentralised 
management of education in 1993.
36
 The federal guidelines for school policy reform, 
contained in these guidelines, gave concrete shape to what was already the practice in 
certain states (for example, Bihar and Rajasthan).
37
 The 73
rd
 Constitutional Amendment of 
1993 became the overarching framework for political decentralisation in the country. It 
also gave additional impetus to decentralisation in the school sector. One of the concrete 
forms that decentralisation took in various states was the setting up of school councils and 
village education committees with powers for school management and monitoring and, in 
some cases, powers for teacher recruitment and oversight.  
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 This committee consisted of the Ministers of Education of all the state governments and the central 
government. 
37
 The Bihar Education Programme and the Lok Jumbish in Rajasthan were noted for their VECs and the high 
level of community mobilisation. 
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Much of the early literature on decentralisation conveys a general impression of 
optimism regarding the likely outcome of this reform intervention (Majumdar 2003; 
Varghese 1996). This literature also discusses a variety of policy designs adopted by 
different states (Pandey 2011; Priyam 2003). The focus in all of these studies is on design. 
They share the notion of reform as a technical intervention, with very little discussion of 
the politics surrounding it. 
However, an explicit discussion of politics is evident in other literature that 
researches the local workings of VECs. Thus Wankhede and Sengupta (2005) studied the 
operation of four VECs in South 24 Pargana district of West Bengal. They found that the 
participation of poor people was constrained due to their weak capacity to challenge 
existing power structures. They conclude that field realities in West Bengal are contrary to 
the expectations of what might be gained from VECs. Thus, on the ground these village 
committees were only a ―weak pressure-group‖. Also, in a study in rural MP, Leclercq 
(2002) notes that the creation of new schools under the Education Guarantee Scheme 
(EGS) provided new opportunities for sarpanches to control both the use of funds (given 
to the panchayats for this purpose), and the employment of contract teachers (the power to 
appoint contract teachers was given to the panchayats. He notes the practice of bribery in 
the appointment of contract teachers and remarks that ―[d]ecentralisation of teacher 
recruitments has led to decentralisation of corruption‖ (Leclercq 2002 p.71).  
Corbridge et al. (2005) also observed the working of VECs. They found severe 
constraints to participation, and considerable limits to what the committees had achieved 
for education. Elite domination of the VECs by upper caste men and the heads of village 
panchayats (mukhiyas) was common. Scheduled Caste (SC) and female members of the 
committees were unaware of their status. And even where SC men and women participated 
actively in their VECs, their children were unable to attend schools. Based on these 
observations, the authors conclude that the ―idea that ordinary villagers could take some 
control over educational issues, and in a sense therefore over the state, was grossly 
overstated‖ (Corbridge et al. 2005 p. 143).  
Further, Corbridge and his colleagues find evidence of rent-seeking by the local 
state. For example, teachers paid bribes to the District Superintendant of Education, who 
was in-charge for Bidupur in Vaishali districts of Bihar. This was so that they (that is, the 
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teachers) could be posted out and could stay out of the purview of the VEC that was 
monitoring teacher attendance (Cobridge et al. 2005 p. 144). Based on these and other 
instances, the authors argue that ordinary poor people understood the local state in terms of 
their everyday, daily encounters (rather than through rhetorical ideologies of participation). 
They conclude that despite much talk about ―participation‖, most men and women 
continued to see the state at a distance, and through intermediaries. 
Very few studies in this area employ quantitative methods. Banerjee, Banerji, 
Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2008) are among the few who do in evaluating the role 
of participation in improving the quality of schools. Their study uses the experimental 
method. It tests some of the theoretical expectations generated by the formal political 
economy approach concerning improvements in the public education system due to the 
introduction of decentralisation and direct participation of citizens. Banerjee et al.‘s study 
uses randomised evaluations. According to the researchers during the course of a baseline 
survey in Jaunpur district of Uttar Pradesh in 2005 they found that even four years after the 
launch of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA),
38
 people were generally unaware of the 
existence of VECs and they did not exercise the powers of school monitoring and 
management envisaged under the SSA programme.
39
 Interestingly, this finding about the 
community not being aware of the existence of VECs, and not exercising its powers, has 
been confirmed by a number of other studies using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Priyam 2003; Srinivas Rao 2009).  
The study by Banerjee et al. analyses three interventions designed and implemented 
by the non-governmental organisation PRATHAM to increase beneficiary control over 
schools. The experiments undertaken were intended to make ―large group control‖ work 
better through mobilising local people, providing them with better information, making 
them aware of the importance of education and, finally, by translating their resulting 
heightened interest into coordinated action by means of a ―small group direct control 
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 Launched in 2001, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) was (and still is) the federal government‘s flagship 
programme on elementary education. 
39
  Ninety-two per cent of the parents responded that they did not know about any such committee (that is, the 
VEC), and only 3 per cent could name members of their own committee (Banerjee et al. 2008 p. 9).   
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strategy‖.40 Meetings were held with villagers; the villagers were trained to complete 
―learning report cards‖ (of students); and remedial classes were held with the help of local 
volunteers. The results from the evaluations of these three interventions showed that none 
of them helped people to gain either direct or indirect control over schools through the 
VECs. The authors conclude that these experiments failed to get the people involved with 
VECs. This may perhaps have been because people were sceptical regarding the outcomes. 
They did not believe that large group mechanisms would succeed: ―if you do not believe 
that these mechanisms work, there is no reason to invest in them‖ (Banerjee et al. 2008 p. 
9). Contrary to Coralles‘s (1999) expectations that constraints on successful 
implementation of educational reform would be eased by bolstering the demand side 
through information campaigns and beneficiary participation, the results from this 
experiment confirm that more information does not always promote greater collective 
action.   
Decentralised Recruitment of Teachers and “Para-teachers” on Contract 
 
The appointment of para-teachers, or contract teachers, by various state governments at the 
implementation stage of reform also elicited discussion about the politics of educational 
reform. This issue brought together reform interventions on teachers and decentralisation 
because contract teachers were appointed by local authorities and school committees rather 
than by state governments (as applies in the case of regular teachers). As the states moved 
ahead with implementing reforms, one of the biggest challenges that they faced was the 
need for additional teachers to manage increased student enrolments. The problem was 
especially acute in the more populous BIMARU states, where the pressure of student 
numbers was immense largely due to an increase in educational participation.
41
 However, 
the severe lack of resources in these states constrained the hiring of new teachers. As a 
result, many of these states appointed teachers on a contract basis, generally at one-fourth 
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 The authors classify beneficiary control over education (or other development interventions) into different 
types by differentiating between the size of groups—large or small—and form of control—direct or indirect. 
Clearly, by using these features interventions can be classified on the basis of their design. However, there 
are trade-offs in adopting one or the other form, which are discussed in Banerjee et al. (2008 p. 3). 
41
 Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh all reported very low literacy rates in the 1991 
Census. These states lagged behind on other social indicators as well. The term BIMARU has been widely 
used by researchers of education—examples being the PROBE report (1999) and Kingdon (2007).  
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or one-fifth of the salary paid to regular teachers (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao 2010; 
Kumar, Priyam, and Saxena 2001b; Sharma and Ramachandran 2009). 
The appointment of para-teachers was a response to the portrayal of teachers as 
being resistant to educational change in two ways. First, it was argued that the appointment 
of para-teachers was an efficiency measure—since the expenditure on regular teachers was 
very high, and contract teachers could assume similar responsibilities at a much lower cost. 
This reduction in expenditure on teachers was a particular incentive for cash-strapped 
states, where the employment of para-teachers proved to be an inexpensive method of 
reducing pupil teacher ratios (Gopalakrishnan and Sharma1998, 1999; Kingdon and 
Sipahimalani-Rao 2010; PROBE Report 1999; Sharma and Ramachandran 2009). Second, 
appointing para-teachers was expected to weaken the strength of the unions by moving 
away from centralised recruitment to decentralised control exercised by panchayats. These 
two themes are asserted in many of the programme review reports and in the writings of 
education officers. Based on qualitative observations, para-teachers are claimed to perform 
better than regular teachers at a lower cost. It is also claimed that they attend school more 
regularly than full-time teachers (DPEP 1999b; Gopalakrishnan and Sharma 1998). 
However, Kumar, Priyam, and Saxena (2001b) criticise this policy; they see in this 
measure a shift of state policy towards encouraging privatisation. Relatedly, Leclercq 
(2002) notes that appointment of teachers on a contract basis in Madhya Pradesh did not 
necessarily lead to a better quality of educational provision.
42
 He observes a lack of 
motivation among para-teachers (as great as among regular teachers), and argues that the 
localised recruitment of the para-teachers, expected to be fairer than ―centralised‖ 
recruitment, in fact favoured the appointment of powerful individuals rather than of 
motivated ones.   
Quantitative survey data do not confirm that the quality of para-teachers is 
significantly superior to that of regular teachers (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao 2010; 
NCAER 2008). Local micro-studies highlight two important aspects of the political 
dynamics surrounding policies dealing with para-teachers. These are: (i) the proliferation 
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 There were three types of para-teachers in Madhya Pradesh—shiksha karmis (used in place of assistant 
teachers in government schools), samvida shikshaks (used in place of additional teachers in government 
schools), and gurujis (employed in new alternative education schools that were set up under the Education 
Guarantee Scheme).  
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of rent-seeking opportunities in appointments made by local panchayats, and (ii) related to 
this, the resulting poor quality of such teachers (Leclercq 2002; Zachariah and Pandey 
2007). Leclercq‘s (2002) work is notable here since it is based on field-work in two 
districts of MP which was the first state under the DPEP to make significant amendments 
to its teacher recruitment regulations and adopt large-scale decentralisation in its 
recruitment policies. Regular teachers (known as ―assistant teachers‖ in government 
schools) were declared to be a ―dying cadre‖ in 1995. As a result, contract teachers were 
recruited on a large scale following the introduction of decentralised recruitment policies. 
Leclercq notes that the bargaining power of teachers diminished significantly after this 
change, although teachers continued to think of themselves as ―civil-servants‖. However, 
many para-teachers appointed initially as assistant teachers in MP approached the courts 
requesting that their status be changed to that of regular teachers through judicial 
intervention; furthermore, other categories of para-teachers were likely to do the same 
because they all saw themselves as civil servants. Sharma and Ramachandran (2009 p. 
318), note that in the hiring of para-teachers with the help of the community, there has 
been a ―deformalisation‖ of the recruitment process, leading to more opportunities for 
patronage-based appointments. 
It is interesting to note that in Clarke and Jha‘s (2006 pp. 225–65) article on service 
delivery in education, based on innovations in two projects in Rajasthan, the authors refer 
to the importance of community control and the use of para-teachers on the grounds that a 
teacher‘s roots in the community are more important than her formal educational 
qualifications. Clarke and Jha support this model as being efficient from the viewpoint of 
helping reduce teacher costs and increasing the efficiency of service delivery. The authors 
note that in the Shiksha Karmi project in Rajasthan ―lies the genesis of ‗para-teacher‘ now 
adopted by several states across India‖ (Clarke and Jha 2006 p. 237). While this approach 
facilitated an expansion of the primary school system at a low cost in Rajasthan, and the 
authors note that the achievement of children in these schools was comparable to those in 
regular schools, there is little quantitative evidence to show that local control has led to 
enhanced accountability (either in Rajasthan or elsewhere).  
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Kremer et al.‘s (2005) study finds no conclusive evidence that contract teachers 
exhibit less absenteeism as compared to regular teachers, or that community control 
enhances overall educational effectiveness. Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2010) review 
further literature on the subject, and observe that in AP, MP, and Uttar Pradesh, para-
teachers appear to be more regular in attendance compared to tenured teachers. In Bihar, 
however, there is no such difference. But the authors also point to a significant 
qualification—namely that regular teachers are absent from school largely on account of 
―official duties away from school‖ and entitled leave, as opposed to unauthorised absence. 
Authorised leave, according to the authors, was the chief reason why the regular teachers 
were away from school (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao 2010 p. 62). It is notable that the 
literature fails to support some of the conventional formal political economy 
assumptions—such as that decentralised control over teachers would reduce problems of 
accountability, and that less security of tenure for teachers would improve the quality of 
their performance. That said, there is widespread agreement that the hiring of para-teachers 
has enabled the expansion of the school system in India at a relatively low cost.   
 
2.4 Lessons from the Literature Review on the Two Reform Interventions 
 
How Interests and Institutions are Viewed 
 
Assumptions about teacher interests being a major constraint to reform that can be 
overcome by augmenting the demand side through decentralisation and community 
participation are simply not borne out by research and evidence on teachers, their unions, 
and school decentralisation. While the poor quality of teaching and the demoralisation of 
teachers are widely accepted, arguments about teacher unions and the direct political 
power of teachers constituting the cause of these problems are not supported by the 
evidence and data. I concur with Béteille (2009), that measurement of teachers‘ political 
affiliations, or union power in a quantitative way is very difficult, as teachers are unlikely 
to be willing to reveal their affiliations. The qualitative literature focuses on both these 
issues, but it does not show agreement as to whether teachers alone are responsible for the 
poor quality of schools. The institutional literature (Sharma 2000) highlights some of the 
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structural reasons for this poor quality of educational provision—mainly unprofessional 
and weak institutional support at the district and sub-district levels—but it is unable to 
inform us as to how change can be brought about.  
While school decentralisation and community participation have been widely 
promoted as policy measures both at the central and state levels, their contribution to 
improving school quality and efficiency has not been on the scale that was expected on the 
basis of theory. In the course of implementing reforms, states have used this aspect of 
policy to innovate and introduce divergent approaches for improving their schools. For 
instance, MP‘s Education Guarantee Scheme was a demand led strategy aimed at 
providing basic education at a low cost (Gopalakrishnan and Sharma 1998; Pandey 2011; 
Ramachandran 2001). Community participation is affirmed by all as a normative goal, a 
good in itself. But its justification in terms of enhancing the efficiency of schools, or poor 
people‘s control over the schooling process, is more tenuous. 
 
How Politics is Viewed 
 
The preceding review suggests that arguments using the formal political economy 
approach and a more historical approach are both inclined towards seeing politics in terms 
of existing interests, and seeing institutions as constraints to change. Attention to 
successful cases of reforms is generally of very recent vintage, and it has mainly been done 
by Chand (2006, 2010). In analysing successful cases, Chand regards the role of the 
political leader, nature of reform ideas, and the existence of bipartisan politics, as all being 
critical. What is still missing is an analysis of variations in outcomes between different 
states. 
One of the important contributions of both local political studies (for example, 
Corbridge et al. 2005) and the service delivery framework (for example, Devarajan and 
Shah 2004) is the focus on how schools work at the local level. Among the earliest 
research on the local impact of central educational reform is that of Dyer (1999). She 
examines the working of the central scheme Operation Blackboard (OB) in selected 
districts of Gujarat, and notes that there is a gap between what the central policies intend 
and the actual outcomes at the school level. She sees this as a result of discretionary action 
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of teacher trainers and implementers, plus the absence of teacher involvement in the 
overall design process. Political dynamics at the local level are hardly mentioned in Dyer‘s 
work. Two distinct approaches to local political dynamics are evident in the work of 
Corbridge and colleagues (2005) and that of Devarajan and Shah (2004). For Corbridge et 
al. (2005), the local arena as seen around schools is an explicitly political one, and conflict 
marks the interactions between community members, teachers, and agents of the state. 
Using the World Development Report–2004‘s (World Bank 2003a) approach, Devarajan 
and Shah (2004) view education as a service and note that ―services‖ fail the poor in India 
very often.43 This was evident in large-scale absenteeism among teachers (seen as service 
providers). Poor people lack an effective voice, and they do not have real power to monitor 
the service providers. Devarajan and Shah (2004) call for remedial action by altering the 
state-citizen control at the local level, and providing a direct contract between citizens 
(who are like ―customers‖ in a market place) and teachers (who are the service providers). 
While Corbridge et al. (2005) view the local dynamics as being those of intense conflict, 
where agents of the state play a partisan role, a situation which could be remedied only by 
a greater presence of the state, Devarajan and Shah (2004) argue for changes in design 
leading to a reduced role for the state. Where the two perspectives converge is in their 
emphasis on the importance of politics around schools at the grassroots level. 
This emphasis on local political dynamics in the research literature on the working 
of social sector reforms in India is very distinct from the equivalent literature on the 
experience of Latin America and Africa. In the latter, the political dynamics of educational 
reform are described in terms of ―external control‖ on policies and resources for education. 
Budgets for education and training shrank in most parts of Africa and Latin America in the 
structural adjustment period of the 1980s, leading to severe pressures within the education 
sector. For instance, there was a decline in real education expenditure per student, a 
reduction in capital expenditure, and a freeze on teacher salaries (Samoff 1994 pp. 5–11). 
Many countries sought to overcome the problem by restructuring their policies for 
education, especially by increasing the efficiency of their resource use and mobilising new 
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 The authors speak of education, health, water, sanitation, and electricity as services that have the most 
direct link with human development, and therefore are in need of priority attention in making services work 
for the poor. However, the article places most attention on health and education. 
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resources from external aid. However, there was domination by external aid agencies in 
this process, leading to a process of dependent national development. Thus, Takala (1998) 
notes that educational policy in many African countries was being made under a 
considerable degree of external influence—particularly in the countries that were subject to 
structural adjustment programmes. He also notes that domestic political conditions such as 
multi-party competition and socialist ideologies had an influence on policy. For Samoff 
(1999) the external control of educational policies seemed to be of a very high order. Based 
on a review of sector studies for education in Africa in the 1990s, he concludes that there 
was a ―lack of national participation, ownership and control‖ in these studies (and thereby 
on the policies that they influenced), and these studies supported perpetuating the aid 
relationship in African countries. (Samoff  1999 p. 249). The theoretical approach of the 
dependency theory was influential in this genre of writing—articulating ideas about 
external control of reform policies, and perpetuating a model of dependent development in 
countries on the ―periphery‖.  
These ideas had considerable influence on my earlier thinking on the politics of 
educational reform in India. Indeed, the article I co-authored with Krishna Kumar and 
Sadhna Saxena (Kumar et al. 2001a) articulated these views and saw the DPEP policy 
measures as having been taken under external influence. However, I now see this view as 
having overly relied on the ―external‖ determinants of policy as defining the political 
dynamics of educational reform, and for having neglected the dynamic process of reform 
implementation in India‘s states. It is the variety of approaches that these states adopted 
towards educational policy reform, alongside the dynamics of competitive politics, that I 
now seek to explore. 
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2.5 Research Methodology 
 
Main Features 
 
Given India‘s federal framework, and the complexity of policy reform in the education 
sector, an appropriate methodology was needed to address the following two challenges. 
First, there was a need to focus on the implementation process, and not just on the policy-
design stage and the outcomes. Focusing only on policy-design and outcomes was likely to 
convey the impression that reform was in fact some kind of a technical plan, for which the 
implementation phase was merely akin to ―a brief pause between a shiny idea and smart 
delivery‖ (Dyer 1999 p. 46). This perception of reform as a technical plan was dominant in 
the literature, and in the past it had resulted in a lack of attention to and very meagre 
literature on implementation (Dyer 1999 p. 46; Grindle and Thomas 1991 p.121). In 
understanding policy change as a contested process, each phase—planning, implementing, 
and sustaining of arrangements on the ground—constitutes a different arena for conflict 
between contending ideas, actors, and institutions. It is not simply the unfurling of a 
technical plan. In this context, once the need to focus on the implementation process is 
agreed, Dyer lays emphasis on the requirement ―to develop methodological approaches 
that allow accumulation of relevant information … [to] be compared and contrasted across 
different contexts‖ (Dyer 1999 p. 46). 
Second, there is a need for an explicit focus on what is happening at the local level. 
This is because policy reforms have arisen precisely because of problems at this level. 
Moreover, the local level is where the ultimate benefits of policy change are hopefully to 
be seen. I have already remarked on the increasing emphasis in recent research on studying 
the local consequences of policy reforms and interrogating what is happening to schools, 
teachers, and communities. 
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Bearing these things in mind, for this research I have adapted Grindle‘s perspective 
of viewing educational policy reform as constituting a complex chain of policy decisions 
and implementation within India‘s federal political system. This involves taking account of 
both central and local level variables. The ―central level‖ here includes actions emanating 
in the federal government and in state capitals. At this level, ideas for change emerge, 
policies are formulated, and resource support is mobilised. I look at the key variables that 
are important for bringing about these changes—namely the actions of political leaders, 
policymakers, experts, and leaders of teacher unions.
44
 The changes emanating from the 
federal government relate mainly to setting out the policy directions within which states 
can initiate new activities. At the state level, the actions relate to some redesign of policy, 
but within federal guidelines. The main activity at the state level is initiating the process of 
implementation of policies. The ―local level‖ refers primarily to the implementation chain 
below the state capital, that is, districts, sub-district units (blocks), and villages. At this 
level, schools, decentralised bodies, and the local state interact, and teachers, communities, 
and local politicians are the important actors. 
The implementation of reform policies is an interactive and contested process 
involving mostly these various institutions and actors. Relevant interaction can only be 
seen in specific arenas of the working of policies. I have selected three important arenas of 
policy implementation: (i) teacher policies, (ii) decentralisation and community 
participation, and (iii) the working of schools on the ground.  Figure 2.1 illustrates this 
interactive process beginning from local institutions and actors at the village and block 
levels and moving upwards to the state level. Below the state level, all the district level 
field work referred to in this thesis was conducted in two selected districts in each state 
(giving a total of four selected districts across AP and Bihar).  
                                                          
44
 Teacher unions had no role to play at the Centre, but they were important in the states. 
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At the sub-district level, field work was undertaken in two sub-district units of each 
district (these are called ―mandal‖ in AP and ―block‖ in Bihar). Thus a total of eight units 
across AP and Bihar were covered in this way. The principle used to select the districts 
was that of contrasting educational indicators—in this case from clusters of districts with 
literacy rates that were higher and lower than state averages. The selection process for the 
districts and sub-district units within them is described in a subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 2.1: Actors and Institutions in the Reform Implementation Process in Indian States 
 
 
Note: The downward pointing arrow indicates the direction of moving from the field sites to the consideration of variables 
that work at the central level.  
Sub-district and village level 
Schools     Teachers    Decentralisation 
District level 
District Reform team 
Department of Education 
Teacher Unions 
State level 
State reform team 
Department of Education 
Teacher Unions 
Chief Minister/Minister of 
Education 
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Specific Tools Used 
 
Within a research design which was essentially that of qualitative analysis of policies and 
observing their field-level outcomes, the research tools employed were a mix of qualitative 
approaches and analysis of descriptive data. The qualitative tools used were interviews, 
focus group discussions, and school observations. The data analysis included examining 
the public expenditure of the federal and state governments, school participation reports 
from national surveys (from the 1990s until the present), and a primary survey conducted 
in schools and households in the selected districts. Details of the tools, sampling strategy, 
and respondents are provided in the Research Methods Appendix (Appendix 1). 
 
Secondary Data Sources 
 
Data on public expenditure on education by the federal government and the states for the 
period between 1990–91 and 2007–08 were analysed for two reasons. First, to highlight 
the federal government‘s role in laying down the agenda for, and stimulating reforms in, 
the states. Second, this analysis was done to compare differences in the performance of 
states that have been classified as being ―educationally backward‖ and those that are not in 
this category. Data from various rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS)—
specifically the 50
th–64th  rounds, covering the period 1993–94 and 2007–08—were 
examined in order to compare the nature of educational participation in Bihar and AP over 
nearly two decades of reform implementation. These data are analysed in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. 
The richest source of insight and information for this research came from 
interviews. I conducted these at the national, state, district, and sub-district levels in order 
to elicit responses from policymakers and institutional and political actors. At the national 
and state levels, key informants from among policymakers and experts involved in 
formulating the design of educational reform were interviewed by me with the help of 
individual interview guides developed for each respondent. I identified the key persons to 
be interviewed following discussions with state reform teams in Hyderabad and Patna, and 
the non-governmental organisation, the MV Foundation, in Hyderabad. The subjects on 
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which information was elicited from these informants, included aspects of the design of 
reform policies—specifically with respect to teachers and decentralisation, and on the 
implementation of the reforms involving a contest or interaction between newly 
established reform teams, the traditional departments of education, and teacher unions in 
the states (see Appendix 1A for details). The information gathered from national level 
experts and policymakers is used in Chapter 3, and that from state level experts and 
policymakers is used in Chapters 4–7. The list of people interviewed (at both the national 
and state levels) is provided in Appendix 2. 
I also conducted structured interviews with a second set of actors. These were 
political actors—the leaders of teacher unions at state, district, and sub-district levels. The 
names of the key primary teacher unions and their state level leaders were collected from 
the government‘s Department of Education (DoE), and from informal discussions with the 
Panchayati Raj Teacher Union leaders in Ranga Reddy district in AP during field visits in 
2005.
45
 The themes on which information was collected included union-government 
relationships, especially in addressing teachers‘ grievances, their political affiliations, and 
finally their identification with the educational reform process. Representatives of each of 
the primary teacher unions were interviewed at the state, district, and wherever available, 
at the sub-district mandal/block levels. The information from these interviews is used in 
Chapter 5, and the list of union leaders interviewed is provided in Appendix 3. 
Additional interviews were conducted at the district and sub-district levels with 
district reform team officers, mandal/block education department officers, political 
representatives (for example, Members of the Legislative Assembly or Members of 
Parliament), panchayat leaders, and teachers in selected districts. These have been used for 
the analysis in Chapter 7, and the list of persons interviewed is provided in Appendix 4. 
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 Field testing of primary survey questionnaires for schools and households was done in Ranga Reddy 
district in June 2005. During this visit, I had discussions with Panchayati Raj Teachers‘ Union leaders in the 
district in order to formulate structured interview guides for teacher union leaders and gather the names and 
contact details of other primary school teacher unions. Since Bihar had very few unions, such a detailed 
exercise was not required; information provided by the state reform team—the Bihar Education Project 
office—was sufficient.  
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Quantitative and Qualitative Data from Selected Field Sites 
 
Primary data was collected from households and schools in selected field sites in both 
states. This was done to understand the implementation of reforms at the local level, the 
relationships between the various actors, and outcomes in terms of school participation. 
Data were collected using separate questionnaires for households and schools.  These data 
are used for the analysis in Chapter 7. Field sites were selected from two districts in each 
state. As noted, these districts were selected from districts having literacy rates higher and 
lower than the state average in 1991. The districts selected were East Godavari and 
Mahabubnagar in AP, and Gaya and Purnia in Bihar. Further, two mandals/blocks were 
selected in each district using exactly the same principle. Thus, a two-stage selection 
process was used in each state to first identify the districts and then the mandals and blocks 
within them. In summary, a total of four districts and eight blocks were selected in this 
way. In East Godavari the mandals selected were Razule and Prathipadu, and in 
Mahabubnagar the mandals were Jadcherla and Dharur. In Bihar‘s Gaya district the blocks 
selected were Belaganj and Fatehpur; and in Purina district they were Baysi and Kasba (see 
Appendix 1D for details).  
In order to compare aspects of design and the working of school decentralisation 
and community participation, I held focus group discussions with members of school 
committees in three randomly selected villages in each selected mandal/block in the two 
states. A list of these villages is provided in Appendix 5. The participants were identified 
from information about members and office bearers of these committees that was available 
in school records. Members were contacted in advance by the school committee office 
bearers, teachers, and/or by members of my research team to participate; special efforts 
were made to encourage women and members of disadvantaged social castes to take part in 
the study. Further, the discussions were held in the latter half of the day after school hours 
were over. The themes on which the discussions were held included the election process 
for committees, the participatory nature of their meetings, their involvement in school 
affairs, and the sense that the community had about the difference that increased 
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participation was making to schools (see Appendix 1E for a detailed list of the themes). 
The responses of participants were recorded in writing and later tabulated for each of the 
themes. The thematic tabulation of this information highlighted the variety (or uniformity) 
between districts of the same state and differences across the two states. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
I expect that this research will serve two purposes. First, it will test the assertion of 
conventional theory about the negative role that politics and special interests play as 
constraints to reform. It will accomplish this by examining relevant evidence in this 
regard—in particular the role of teacher unions, the attitude of teachers to reform, and of 
reform strategies with respect to teachers. I examine whether the weaker educational 
outcomes in Bihar were due to strong opposition from teachers‘ vested interests and the 
collective action of their unions, as compared to better outcomes in AP possibly being 
attributed to the weaker capacity of teacher unions to oppose policy changes. Second, the 
research also examines the empirical evidence on demand side interventions—especially 
decentralisation and community participation—viewed in the formal political economy 
approach as correctives to the negative influence of vested interest. In this regard, I 
examine how far the better outcomes in AP can be attributed to greater decentralisation and 
community participation; I also consider whether the weak outcomes in Bihar were due to 
a lack of community control and participation. These key issues are examined in Chapters 
5 and 6 respectively. To further highlight the nature of working of vested interests, 
political actors, teachers, and community participation, I examine reform results on the 
ground—that is, how schools function after a decade of effort to bring about change in 
Chapter 7.   
In all this, my objective is to understand the specific ―analytical biases‖ around 
formal political economy approaches, which lead to inferences about a ―negative role‖ of 
politics. My own understanding of politics is that of its being a process of contestation, and 
accordingly I look at each of the reform interventions as dynamic arenas. Interest and 
institutions may indeed have played a constraining role. However, the focus of my work is 
on why things improve, even in the face of these formidable impediments. 
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Chapter 3 
Setting the Agenda: The Federal Context of Educational Reform in India 
 
By the 1990s, India‘s school education sector was in dire need of a new direction with 
respect to both policy and operational programmes. The challenges were indeed 
formidable, because the country was home to the world‘s largest number of ―out of school‖ 
children. Moreover, school participation was characterised by deep inequities based on 
social-caste and gender. The problems were concentrated in six of the educationally 
backward states of the country, which included the populous north Indian states of Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh—popularly known as the 
―BIMARU‖ states—and in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and West Bengal.46 To make matters 
worse, while the quality of learning was widely perceived to be poor, there was little 
knowledge of the actual level of learning. Sustained and deliberate efforts to change 
existing policies and institutional constraints were required in order to address these issues. 
Given the complexity of India‘s federal structure and anticipated resistance from certain 
vested interests and institutions (discussed in Chapter 2), this was a challenging task.  
 
In all fairness, there was some recognition of a number of these issues in federal 
policy documents, especially the National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986, and of the 
need for reform: ―Education in India stands at a cross roads today. Neither normal linear 
expansion nor the existing pace and nature of improvement can meet the needs of the 
situation‖ (NPE 1986 p. 2). 
 
                                                          
46
 The concept of ―educationally backward states‖ was used frequently in the policy literature after 1978, and 
in the research literature since the 1990s. The Planning Commission‘s working group set up in 1978 observed 
that 74 per cent of the non-enrolled children were in the ―educationally backward states of Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal‖. In her analysis of 
educational finances in the 1990s, Bashir (2000 p. 25) includes the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh as being educationally backward. The states that I have 
considered as educationally backward follow from Bashir‘s list. All of these states had literacy rates lower 
than the national average in 1991 (see Table 3.1). 
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Yet, the adoption of an agenda for change could not arise from a simple recognition 
of these problems, or from an ―idea whose time had come.‖ 47 There was a process by 
which these issues gained salience, choices were made between various alternative reform 
directions, and the policy reform agenda was concretised. Each step in this process was 
political—in that it was characterised by contesting ideas and actors, with reformers 
identifying the possible sources of resistance and attempting to find room for manoeuvre.  
In this chapter, I delineate this process in terms of the specific ―problems, 
policies, and politics‖ 48 that were dealt with at this stage in the development of India‘s 
education sector, and how priorities were set for educational reform. In the federal 
distribution of powers with respect to education, it was the Centre that played the role of 
a reform leader, setting the agenda and the basic parameters of a technical design. I 
maintain that in playing this role, skilful negotiations at the Centre were responsible for 
overcoming many of the institutional constraints in adopting educational reform and in 
further enhancing these possibilities by creating special opportunities and incentives for 
states (which had the responsibility of implementing the reforms).  I also examine how 
states differed in their use of these opportunities. The findings of this chapter highlight 
the similarity of the policy context within which reforms were undertaken in the states. In 
Chapters 4–7, I study how these reforms were implemented in the educationally 
backward states of AP and Bihar.  
This chapter has five sections. In the first, I provide an overview of the conditions 
that characterised the national education system in the early 1990s; this is based on 
empirical data on selected indicators of educational attainment. The overview provides the 
context in which educational reform was undertaken. In the next section, I analyse the role 
of the Centre in the emergence of reforms. Educational policies were reorganised not 
simply because the problems were severe, but also on account of specific actions of the 
Centre, especially in the wake of the economic crisis of 1991. These actions by the Centre 
included its role in managing contending ideas about educational reform, reorganising its 
                                                          
47
 Kingdon (1995 p.1) uses this famous phrase of Victor Hugo to illustrate the process by which issues gain 
salience in the public domain, and differentiates this from the distinct process by which they get on to the 
agenda of the government.  
48
 I cite from Kingdon (1995 p. 16) who considers these three elements as important in understanding the 
process by which agendas are set and alternative choices among them are specified.  
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own policy priorities, mobilising greater investment for school education, and undertaking 
strategic negotiations with external agencies. The main data used here relate to educational 
finances for the Centre covering 1990–91 and 2007–08, official policy documents on 
educational reform, and interviews with policymakers and experts at the national level. 
In section 3, I evaluate the actions of the Centre in formulating new rules—the new 
policies that constitute ―reform‖ as compared to the ―old‖ set of policies. These new 
policies evolved over a period of more than a decade (1986 to 2001–02). I classify them in 
three broad phases based on differences in their vision for change, and the opportunities 
and incentives in each distinctive set of reform proposals for the Centre and the states.
49
 
While programmes initiated in the first phase (1986–2000) marked the beginning of the 
educational reform process, they worked around inflexible, centrally driven norms.  I argue 
that policies in the second phase (1993- until the present) provided state governments with 
a special opportunity to innovate on their own terms. In the next section, I examine some 
aspects of the variations in the performance of different states, indicated mainly in terms of 
their expenditure on elementary education. I focus on the performance of educationally 
backward states. The main source of data for this section relate to educational finances for 
15 major states between 1990–91 and 2007–08, and official documents on educational 
reform in the states from the 1990s. Section 5 concludes by discussing the key features of 
the political dynamics observed during the phase of agenda setting.  
 
3.1 Problems and Constraints in India’s School Education Sector 
 
Main Problems: Low Levels of Participation and Deep Inequities 
 
India‘s education sector could boast two notable achievements by the early 1990s:  the 
availability of a large infrastructure for schooling, and the existence of a large number of 
people with secondary and higher education. Yet indicators of basic educational attainment 
                                                          
49
 There is some difficulty in classifying the three phases into neat categories of time. This is because 
although the policy decisions and specific programmes in each phase were initiated in chronological order, 
changes initiated in an earlier phase were not discontinued or abandoned even when policy priorities 
subsequently shifted. This led to an overlap—for example the domestically funded and centrally sponsored 
schemes of Operation Blackboard and Teacher Education continued even after the externally funded District 
Primary Education Programme (DPEP) had been launched, marking what I have termed the second phase. 
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presented a picture of very modest achievements. In 1991, adult literacy rates (for persons 
over 7 years of age) were just 52 per cent. Though this was much higher than the level 
reached at the time of independence in 1947 (about 15 per cent)
50
 it was less than the 
literacy rates in East Asian countries when they started their integration with world 
markets. For example, in 1961 South Korea had a literacy rate of 71 per cent and Thailand 
a rate of 68 per cent (World Bank 1997 p.15). In 1991, India‘s literacy rates were closer to 
the figures for sub-Saharan Africa (50.3 per cent) and the Arab states (51.2 per cent) 
(Grindle 2004 p. 29).  
The advances in literacy rates notwithstanding, the total number of illiterates had 
grown very large. In 1981, there were 121 million non-literate males and 181 million non-
literate females. By 1991 these figures had increased to 127 million non-literate males and 
197 million non-literate females (World Bank 1997 p.16). To add to the complexity of the 
situation, there were large variations within the country. In Kerala, for instance, literacy 
rates were close to 90 per cent, and they exceeded 60 per cent in the three advanced states 
of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. In contrast, in all of the educationally backwards 
states, less than half the population was literate (see Table 3.1). 
Enrolment at the primary education level, comprising grades I–V in most states 
(and grades 1–IV in a few) had grown steadily since independence. The Gross Enrolment 
Rate (GER) for the primary stage (reported by the government and unadjusted for age) was 
101 per cent in 1990–91. However, the GER was not a good indicator of school 
participation, as the government‘s figures underestimated the size of the child population 
aged 6–10 years and they over-estimated enrolment by including both underage and 
overage children. As can be seen from Table 3.1, the GER was reportedly higher than 100 
per cent in 10 of the 15 major states, including the educationally backward ones of AP, 
MP, and Orissa. Nevertheless, despite its limitations, the officially reported GER 
highlighted two major problems. First, the gender disparity in enrolment was significant, 
especially in the educationally backward states. Thus, in Bihar and Rajasthan the GER for 
girls was only about half that for boys. Second, the GER for middle school (grades VI–
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 Literacy rates for India are cited from ―Literacy Scenario in India: 1951–1991‖, Government of India. 
Available at the Ministry of Human Resource Development‘s website: 
http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/y/3T/9U/3T9U0301.htm 
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VIII) was much lower than the primary GER, indicating that not many children were able 
to complete elementary schooling.
51
  
A more realistic picture was presented by the school participation rates reported by 
the National Sample Survey (NSS) which involves representative household surveys for 
each state. In 1993–94, the participation rate for primary school age children (that is, those 
aged 6–10 years) was 71.7 per cent; this was 30 percentage points lower than the official 
GER at the all-India level. Nearly one in three children of primary school age was not 
enrolled in school. Gender disparities were the greatest in Bihar, MP, Rajasthan, and Uttar 
Pradesh—all of these were states reporting very low literacy rates in 1991, and they had 
the lowest rates for primary school participation in 1993–94 (see Table 3.1). 
 While the data on literacy rates and school participation at the primary stage 
provided an estimate of what the deficits were, there was little information available on 
how the government‘s efforts to deal with these challenges could be estimated. Data on 
public spending on elementary education, which are indicative of the government‘s effort 
at this educational level, provide one possible way (of estimating government efforts). 
However, these showed wide variation across states, including among the states classified 
as ―educationally backward‖. The lowest expenditures were in the educationally backward 
states of AP, MP, and Orissa, and also in West Bengal, which was not at this time 
classified as an educationally backward state. All these states reported a per-pupil 
expenditure of less than Rs 600 per year, in nominal terms.
52
 Further, evidence of the 
variety came from the fact that this low per-pupil expenditure in these three educationally 
backward states (and West Bengal), was less than half of what was reported for some of 
the other states, notably Haryana and Kerala—both reported per-pupil nominal expenditure 
per year to be nearly Rs 1,200 in 1990–91. Among the educationally backward states, the 
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 In 1990–91, at the all-India level, the GER for primary stage education (grades I-V) was reported at 101 
per cent, while for the middle school stage (classes VI-VIII) it was only 60.11 per cent (Source: ―Selected 
Educational Statistics 1990–91‖, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India, p. 27, 
Table VI). 
52
 Bashir (2000 p. 33) notes that levels of per-pupil expenditure in the states are dependent on the pupil-
teacher ratio, teacher salaries, and non-teacher costs. Since the last item is very small, the main difference is 
due to variation in the other two components. Bashir too notes that in 1990–91, per-pupil expenditure was 
low in the educationally backward states, with the exception of Rajasthan. This state had high per-pupil 
expenditure in this year, and this remained so in relation to the other educationally backward states even at 
the end of the decade.   
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higher per-pupil expenditure in Rajasthan was an anomaly; Bihar and Uttar Pradesh too 
had low literacy rates and primary school participation rates, but their per-pupil 
expenditure in nominal terms were not among the lowest (see Table 3.1).  
Another important indicator was the priority that spending on elementary education 
had in the budget of a state. The percentage share of the state‘s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) being spent on elementary education, was indicative of this. However, even here 
there was no consistent explanation. In Table 3.1, we can see that while Bihar is the state 
with the lowest literacy rates, its elementary education expenditure as a proportion of the 
state‘s GDP is the same as that for Kerala, the state reporting the highest literacy rate in the 
country. Both states spent nearly 2.8 per cent of their GDP on elementary education. So, 
while the government‘s data on educational participation and household surveys showed 
where the deficits were, its data on public expenditure was unable to provide a consistent 
explanation as to its causes. 
The problems were said to lie elsewhere—in the domain of institutions, interests, 
and ideas, all of these working as impediments to change.   
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Table 3.1: Educational Achievement and Deficits in 15 Major States, 1990–91 
State 
Literacy 
Rate 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Rate 
School Participation 
Pupil-
Teacher 
Ratio 
(PTR) 
Public Expenditure 
on Elementary 
Education (6–10 years) 
Total Total Male Female Total Total 
As % 
of 
GSDP 
Per-Pupil 
Expenditure 
in Rs 
(Nominal 
Values) 
Educationally Backward States     
Andhra Pradesh  44.08 107.3 79.3 66.6 72.8 53 1.3 582 
Bihar 37.49 81.7 62.2 45 54.9 50 2.8 758 
Madhya Pradesh  44.67 103.9 67.7 55.6 62 42 1.7 522 
Orissa  38.55 102.5 73.6 62.7 68.3 35 2.2 532 
Rajasthan 49.09 78 73.5 43.5 59.9 42 2.1 836 
Uttar Pradesh 40.71 81.4 71.9 52.1 63 51 2.2 729 
Other States     
Assam  52.89 111.8 80.3 77.6 79.1 40 2.3 614 
Gujarat 61.29 122.8 83.5 74.8 79.4 36 1.7 664 
Haryana 55.85 83.6 85 78.4 82 45 1.1 1,239 
Karnataka 56.04 108 83.5 75.9 79.7 46 1.7 591 
Kerala  89.81 102.5 96 96.3 96.2 32 2.8 1,230 
Maharashtra 64.87 123.2 88.8 82.9 86 39 1.1 670 
Punjab  58.51 95.8 86.1 81.5 84 39   N.A.               N.A. 
Tamil Nadu  62.66 134 92.2 86.2 89.3 45 2 739 
West Bengal 57.7 125.3 73.2 67.4 70.4 41 1.4 557 
All-India 52.21 101 77 65.6 71.7 42     
 
Sources: Literacy Rate: Census of India, 1991; Gross Enrolment Rate from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, Ministry of 
Human Resource Development  (MoHRD), Government of India (GoI) 1990–91; School participation rates are calculated 
from National Sample Survey 1993–94; Pupil-teacher ratio is calculated from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, MoHRD, 1990–
91; Public expenditure is calculated from the ―Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure in Education‖, MoHRD, GoI. 
 
Notes: 1. Literacy rate is reported for 1991; Public expenditure on education, GER, and PTR are reported for 1990–91; 
School participation rates are reported for 1993–94. 2. The gross enrolment ratio, school participation rates, and pupil-
teacher ratio are reported for the primary stage, normally covering grades I-V and the age group 6–10 years. 3. Public 
expenditure on education is reported for the elementary stage, normally covering grades I-VIII and the age group 6–14 
years, as budget classification in India is provided for the elementary stage alone. 
 
Definitions: 1. Literacy rate is defined for population above 6 years of age; 2. Gross enrolment rate is defined as the ratio of 
total enrolment in grades I-V to the child population aged 6–10 years expressed in percentage terms. 3. School participation 
rate is defined as the percentage of children aged 6–10 years attending any type of educational institution. 4. Nominal 
expenditure on elementary education per student is in rupees and at current prices. 
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Institutional Constraints 
 
In the early 1990s, state governments were spending nearly a fifth of their budgets on 
education. And in most of the major states around half or more of the total educational 
expenditure was incurred just on elementary education.
53
 Yet the opportunities for 
initiating renewal were severely constrained as most of the available resources were spent 
on paying teacher salaries and those of the staff in the large educational bureaucracies. 
Also, there were limits to increasing non-salary outlays in view of the severe fiscal crises 
that were being faced by state governments.
54
 Equally important, there were few ideas for 
change within state governments, and there was a widespread fear of opposition from 
teacher unions.  
 
The Centre in Delhi, on the other hand, had both the resources and the ideas for 
change. That said school education was not the Centre‘s priority—because a major share of 
its budget was spent on university and higher education. Besides, principal-agent 
problems—which had been exacerbated by the federal division of power and competitive 
politics since the late 1980s—plagued the relationship between the Centre and the states. 
These problems were evident in the inefficiencies of an earlier generation of centrally 
sponsored schemes (like Operation Blackboard) which had weak attraction for the states 
because such schemes imposed recurrent financial liabilities on state governments, and 
involved no accountability for the Centre. Politically, with the breakdown of the one-party 
dominant system in the early 1990s, the Congress Party in Delhi had to be more sensitive 
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 Among the major states the notable exception was West Bengal which spent a lower proportion of its 
budget on elementary education. In 1990–91 and 1995–96, the proportion of educational expenditure on 
elementary education in the state was only 35 per cent. A majority of the 15 major states spent about half or 
more of their education budgets on elementary education. Data on this are provided on a compact disc 
accompanying the thesis.   
54
 In 1990–91, the combined fiscal deficit of the Centre and the states was nearly 9.3 per cent of GDP, and 
much of the deficit originated in the states. That is, states relied heavily on borrowing. Bagchi (2001 p. 52) 
estimates that in 1990–91, the internal debt of states was 56 per cent of GDP, and total debt was slightly 
higher, at 62 per cent. This situation regarding state finances continued in the 1990s, despite attempts at 
macro-management by the Centre and structural adjustment policies. As a result, the interest burden on state 
budgets rose sharply in the 1990s, accounting for nearly 16 per cent of the revenue receipts in several states 
(Bagchi 2001 p. 16).  
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to the interests of regional and other parties, whose support it might need.
55
 In this period 
of political flux many states were ruled by non-Congress parties, and indeed coalition 
governments. In such a situation, political skills and appropriate incentives were critical, as 
the implementing states were unlikely to accept a hierarchically imposed agenda from the 
Centre. 
 
3.2 From Public Problem to Political Agenda: The Centre sets out the Policy 
Context
56
 
 
Recognition of these problems by itself did not lead to the adoption of new policies. Nor 
was the adoption of reform an uncontested, apolitical process. The central government 
played the role of being the reform leader—setting out the policy priorities for school 
reform. These included reprioritising its own expenditure on education by reallocating 
funds across sub-sectors, mobilising additional resources, managing contending ideas and 
actors, and finally, setting out the federal ―rules of the game‖. In the paragraphs below, I 
detail this role of the Centre as the reform leader on each of these accounts.  
 
Reorganising Priorities: Increasing the Importance of Elementary Education 
 
Prior to the launch of school reform programmes in 1993–94, the Centre was a relatively 
small player in the educational sector as a whole. In 1990–91 (and until 1994–95), only 12 
per cent of the total education expenditure in the country was borne by the Centre, while 
the remaining 88 per cent was borne by the states.
57
 Education was accorded a lower 
priority in overall budgetary expenditure, as the Centre spent only 3 per cent on education, 
compared to 23–24 per cent being spent by the states. Notwithstanding the small amount of 
resources, the Centre remained a significant actor in terms of setting policy priorities. This 
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 At the time of implementing economic and educational reforms, the Congress Party‘s Narasimha Rao led a 
minority government at the Centre. 
56
 This title is an adaptation of Grindle (2004 p. 27) 
57
 This expenditure reflects the division of responsibilities laid down by the Constitution of India, which 
specifies that education is an item on the ―Concurrent List‖ (that is, List III), stated in the Seventh Schedule 
of the Constitution. A domain of joint action, by convention the Centre is involved in policy aspects and the 
states in matters of implementation.  
83 
 
could be seen in the composition of its expenditure in terms of ―Plan‖ and ―non-Plan‖ 
heads.
58
 In 1990–91, nearly 55 per cent of the central expenditure was incurred under the 
Plan head, funding expansion and new infrastructure, whereas the states spent only 11 per 
cent of their resources under the Plan head, and the remaining 89 per cent under the non-
Plan head, funding mainly salaries for teachers and employees of the government‘s 
Department of Education. In terms of sub-sectors, school education was not a priority for 
the Centre, as it directed the major proportion of its resources towards university and 
secondary education, followed by technical education (see Figure 3.1).   
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 Plan expenditure in the education sector is expected to provide an increase in or development of new 
facilities and infrastructure, or new initiatives for improving system effectiveness. I have defined the 
difference between Plan and non-Plan expenditure in the Research Methods Appendix, section 1B. Mooij 
and Dev (2004 p. 110) provide details of how the Five-Year and annual plan outlays are arrived at through 
negotiations between the state governments and the Centre‘s Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance. 
Bashir (2000 pp. 7–8) explains the characteristics and purposes of Plan expenditure in the education sector.   
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Figure 3.1: Percentage Distribution of Real Education Expenditure of the 
Centre across Sub-Sectors and Totals (at 1993–94 prices) 
Others
Adult
Education
Elementary
Technical
Secondary
University
Tot: Rs 22,295 million Tot: Rs 50,901 million Tot: Rs 135,542 million 
Sources: (i) Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development 
(MoHRD), Government of India (GoI), Various Years. (ii) WPI Index provided by Office of the Economic 
Adviser to the Government of India (GoI), Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Available at: 
http://eaindustry.nic.in 
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An increasing emphasis on school education was evident as early as 1994–95, and 
by 1995–96 elementary education had become the Centre‘s top spending priority—with 36 
per cent of the education expenditure being incurred on this sub-sector. The priority for 
school education in the central government‘s approach to education increased over the 
years, and continues until the present. In more recent years (2005–06 to 2007–08) this sub-
sector accounted for over 60 per cent of the total education spending by the Centre (see 
Figure 3.2).  
 
Until 1997–98, an increase in resources for elementary education was achieved 
mainly by reducing the expenditure on university education. However, there was a definite 
and steady increase in the total resources spent on education after that. In real terms, 
compared to 1990–91, the Centre‘s total education budget had increased 2.28 times by 
2000–01. And by 2007–08, the relative increase was nearly 6 times (see Figure 3.1). Thus, 
the twin elements of the Centre‘s reform strategy in terms of allocating resources were 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage Share of Elementary Education in Total 
Education Expenditure of the Centre, 1990–91 to 2007–08 
Source: Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure of Education, Ministry of Human Resource 
Development (MoHRD), Government of India (GoI), Various Years.  
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increasing the priority for, and the volume of, its expenditure on elementary education 
(Figure 3.1 shows the increase in volume in real term).
59
  
What is more, the growth in the Centre‘s expenditure on elementary education 
consisted almost entirely of expenditure on new activities and programmes included in the 
country‘s ―Five-Year Plans‖ (and hence termed ―Plan expenditure‖). Expenditure on on-
going activities was classified as ―non-Plan‖ and comprised mainly of salaries and other 
recurrent expenditures. Hence, the Centre‘s resources were being directed towards new 
initiatives and towards the development of infrastructure in the states; at the same time the 
state governments themselves were lacking in resources to undertake these activities on 
their own. Figure 3.3 shows that of the combined Plan expenditure incurred by the Centre 
and the states, the Centre accounted for nearly 60 per cent in 2007–08, an increase of 
nearly 20 points compared to 1990–91. 
 
However, an increase in spending by itself need not imply significant policy 
changes. Thus, based on a review of quantitative research and case studies, Nelson (2007) 
observes that social sector spending increased in democracies, but this did not necessarily 
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 The compound annualised growth rate for elementary education expenditure by the Centre was 22.9 per 
cent between 1990–91 and 1999–2000 and 24.5 per cent between 2000–01 and 2007–08. In the same periods, 
the growth rates for total education expenditure were 9.5 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. 
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Figure 3.3: Percentage Share of Central Plan Expenditure in Plan 
Elementary Education Expenditure of the Centre and the States,  
1990–91 to 2007–08 
Source: Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development 
(MoHRD), Government of India (GoI), Various Years.  
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involve reform or improved outcomes. Nelson notes that ―[b]etter outcomes also require 
reallocating resources and institutional reforms—changes in the sector organization, 
administration, and incentive systems‖ (Nelson 2007 p. 80). In the present context, these 
were achieved mainly through the Centre‘s mobilisation of appropriate ideas for change 
and modifications in the rules for the transfer of federal resources. A key element in this 
process, discussed in the next section, was the utilisation of external aid for school 
education. 
 
External Aid for School Education 
 
Prior to the 1990s, resort to external assistance—in the form of aid or loans—had not been 
part of India‘s schooling system. Thus, Ayyar (2008) notes that from 1947 until 1983 
external aid agencies were reluctant to provide substantial resources for this purpose, while 
India too was reluctant to avail itself of external resources for primary education.
60
 The 
main reason was that in the 1960s and 1970s, primary education was given far less 
emphasis than higher education, both in the country‘s national plans and in the documents 
of external aid agencies. In short, higher education was viewed as a central means for 
producing the skilled manpower that was required for economic growth. This situation 
changed during the 1980s when there was growing evidence that investment in primary 
education was critical for efforts to reduce poverty. Thus as Colclough and De (2010) note, 
this led to both increased allocations for primary education and changes in aid policy. The 
turning point in the education sector came after the 1990 Jomtien Conference, and the 
economic crisis faced by the country in 1991.  
At the 1990 World Conference on Education held at Jomtien in Thailand, there was 
a coordinated effort among donors to increase funding for primary education, and there 
was pressure on the Indian government to accept external aid. At Jomtien, the World Bank 
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Ayyar (2008 p. 22) notes the existence of small bilateral assistance for four state-specific projects between 
1983–90. But these projects were limited in their geographical coverage and programme content. These 
projects were the Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Project with assistance from the Overseas Development 
Administration of the UK, the Shiksha Karmi Project with funding from the Swedish International 
Development Agency, the Mahila Samakhya which involved Dutch assistance, and Non-Formal Education 
with assistance from NORAD. Large volumes of external aid became available only after 1993, following the 
government‘s decision to avail of assistance from the International Development Association , an arm of the 
World Bank. 
87 
 
played a lead role in taking forward the ―Education For All‖ (EFA)61 agenda, and the Bank 
was very keen to include primary education in its lending portfolio for India. There was 
some history to this issue—with successive World Bank country directors urging the 
government to borrow, and India refusing to do so.
62
 The country‘s refusal to borrow was 
noted as enhancing the bargaining power of the government vis-à-vis the World Bank 
(Ayyar 2008). The proposed credit actually materialised after the 1991 balance of 
payments crisis. This forced India to resort to a loan from the World Bank, while at the 
same time introducing fiscal reforms aimed at reducing government expenditure.
63
 
Following this development, a Social Safety Net Adjustment Credit was offered to India in 
1992, with the aim of protecting expenditure on the social sector. This was followed by a 
World Bank credit for a basic education project in Uttar Pradesh. Thereafter, India 
continued to accept external aid for its primary/elementary education programmes—
including for the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) that was launched in 
1993 and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) that was introduced in 2001. The World Bank 
became the largest donor for primary education in the country. This is exemplified in 
Figure 3.4 which shows the share of various donor agencies in resources for the DPEP 
from 1993 until 2002. 
                                                          
61
 A global movement for universalising primary education, led by UNESCO, the EFA was launched in 1990 
at the Jomtien Conference. The movement consists of representatives of national governments, civil society 
groups, and international organisations. 
62
 See Jones (1996) for further details. 
63
 Since 1985 India had been having problems with its balance of payments. Things reached the proportion of 
a ‗crisis‘ by mid-1991, when foreign exchange reserves were barely enough to fund imports estimated for 
barely three weeks. The caretaker government of Chandra Shekhar had to pledge gold and borrow from the 
IMF.    
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In volume terms, the share of external aid in the Centre‘s expenditure on 
elementary education was not very large—it reached its peak of nearly 35 per cent in 
72% 
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Figure 3.4: Contribution of External Agencies to Resources for 
District Primary Education Programme, 1993–2002 
IDA DFID EC UNICEF Netherlands
Source: Progress Overview Report, 16th Joint Review Mission, District Primary Education Programme, 
Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resources Development (MoHRD), Government of India. 
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Figure 3.5: Share (%) of External Aid in Elementary Education 
Expenditure by the Centre, 1990–91 to 2006–07 
Source: Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development (MoHRD), 
Government of India (GoI), Various Years. 
 
Note: External aid on SSA  data is available from 2004-05. In the earlier years, SSA was a domestically funded 
programme. 
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2001–02, and showed a decline thereafter (see Figure 3.5). With external resources for 
SSA-II coming in, the share was expected to increase again to about 17.5 per cent in the 
three-year period 2008–09 to 2010–11(Ayyar 2008 p. 22), but it was not expected to 
exceed the level of 2001–02. The real significance of external resources was not their size, 
but rather their ability to enhance the investment finances for primary education and allow 
the Centre to introduce changes to the norms for federal resource transfers to the states—
making the process more flexible, while demanding greater accountability. As a result, 
there was some resolution of the principal-agent problem in federal relations, giving the 
Centre some powers of monitoring, while allowing the states greater flexibility of resource 
use. 
 
Managing Contending Ideas, Interests, and Institutions 
 
The evolution of an agenda and a technical design for reform was a contested political 
process. It was not merely a question of finding a technocratic solution to problems. This 
was evident from the role played by the DoE at the Centre in managing contending ideas 
about the vision and scope of reform, and the institutions that would play a part in the 
process. The main contending ideas were whether reforms should focus on primary 
education alone, or on a broader agenda of basic education which included both non-
formal and adult education. At the time of the Jomtien Conference, the country had a 
successful programme on adult literacy, inspired by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. 
The parties of the left, especially the CPI-M which had a strong political base in Kerala 
and West Bengal, backed this programme, and a large number of intellectuals and 
academics also supported it.
64
 The programme involved mobilising volunteers and holding 
learning camps for adults, and it was run outside of formal educational institutions.  
The position of the World Bank stood in contrast to this approach. The Bank put 
exclusive emphasis on the provision of formal primary schooling. This view was shared by 
various aid agencies, and even UNICEF supported the Bank‘s position. These two 
organisations—the World Bank and UNICEF—were the principal sponsors of the Jomtien 
Conference, where they made public their sole focus on funding for primary education 
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 Thus Kerala‘s Ernakulum district was widely noted for the success of its ―Total Literacy Campaign‖. 
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(King 2007). However, both the UNESCO and India‘s then secretary for education, Anil 
Bordia, felt that primary education alone was not enough for universal literacy. They 
stressed the importance of adult literacy and non-formal education, and Bordia‘s stand was 
backed by the adult literacy and non-formal education programmes that were then 
operational.  
The sharp turn in India‘s national policy, in favour of the agenda of primary 
schooling, was affected by the economic crisis of 1991, and the need for World Bank 
resources. This was reflected in the declining importance of adult education in the Centre‘s 
education spending priorities—from 8 per cent in 1990–91 to 1 per cent in 1995–96—and 
the rise in spending on elementary education from 14 to 39 per cent over the same period 
(see Figure 3.1). Notwithstanding this sharp turn, the emphasis on non-formal education 
and mobilisation of volunteer-effort based approaches in basic education (favoured by the 
supporters of a more inclusive agenda) persisted in practice.
65
 As the reforms moved to 
their implementation phase, many states (for example, MP and Rajasthan) adopted them 
alongside a more formal, institutional agenda for primary schooling. 
The bearers of these contending ideas were mainly the World Bank and the 
government‘s DoE. The differences between the two were observed at the Jomtien 
Conference. Thus Jones (1996 p. 222) notes that the Bank faced an influential and highly 
articulate opponent in Anil Bordia. In voicing his critique of the Bank‘s policies, Bordia 
argued on behalf of many less articulate borrowers who were in disagreement with the 
Bank‘s approach of promoting primary education policies exclusively within a context of 
structural adjustment. These differences meant that the Indian government, when it did 
reverse its policy, was careful about the process. In particular, the government did not 
accept the Bank‘s ―conditionalities‖. Instead, the planning process was the government‘s 
own, and a grant from the European Commission for the same programme turned it into a 
multi-donor policy reform (rather than an exclusive one with the Bank). This strategy 
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 Some of the programmes initiated with bilateral external assistance prior to World Bank funding for 
primary education, were akin to ―laboratories‖ where mobilisation-based models were designed and 
implemented. For example, SIDA assisted the Shiksha Karmi and Lok Jumbish programmes in Rajasthan 
(see Clarke and Jha 2006, for details of these two programmes).  
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worked well in enhancing the political acceptability of the programme in the states, many 
of which had powerful teacher unions with left-leaning ideologies. 
The other contesting actors were the two central ministries for education and for 
economic affairs, the DoE and the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in Delhi. 
Conventionally, it was the DEA which dealt with external agencies, and the DoE had little 
role to play vis-à-vis them. The DoE also had no influence over line ministries for 
education in the states, as these were under the control of the respective state governments. 
But this constrained role of the DoE changed during the course of negotiations for the 
funding of the DPEP in 1993–94. Now, the role of the DoE was greatly enhanced both 
horizontally in its dealings with the DEA, and vertically when dealing with state 
governments. The DoE mediated with the external agencies in a manner in which resources 
came in on the basis of programme parameters which were designed domestically. 
External control over school policies was likely to have generated widespread negative 
reactions (especially among the left-leaning parties) and made the task of achieving 
political acceptability for externally financed reform efforts a difficult one.    
As far as the relationship with the states was concerned, the externally assisted 
programmes gave the DoE a direct monitoring role through scrutiny of the annual work 
plans of states (prepared for the DPEP) and a six-monthly Joint Review Mission to the 
states.
66
 The flow of external resources also reduced the exclusive reliance of state 
governments on the Planning Commission for funds. This latter process was negotiated on 
an annual basis (between state governments, the Ministry of Finance, and the Planning 
Commission), and it obstructed long-term planning by the states themselves.
67
 The DoE 
also negotiated with the DEA to pass on external resources to state governments as 
grants—reversing the existing procedure whereby external aid was transmitted to state 
governments as 70 per cent loan and 30 per cent grant. Most of these procedures were 
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 The DPEP initiated the first ever joint review of state education programmes. The review team was set up 
by the DoE‘s bureau for elementary education, and it consisted of representatives from all donor agencies 
and the Government of India. This arrangement continued under the SSA, and donor agencies were not 
allowed any other independent review of how the programme was run in the states. This mechanism 
mitigated donor control on the reform agenda, while it simultaneously permitted the Centre to gain a voice on 
how things were run in the states. 
67
 Bagchi (2001 p. 6) notes that this process worked well until the Congress Party ruled in both, the Centre, as 
well as in the states. However, when non-Congress parties came to power in the states, there was resistance 
to this form of domination by the Centre. 
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accepted and further enhanced by the SSA in 2000–01, especially when external aid was 
accepted for this programme as well as after negotiations in 2003–04. Enhanced resources 
for investment in school education on easy terms provided an opportunity for the states as 
they now had a chance to design some aspects of how they were to proceed with the 
reforms.  
 
3.3 Designing Federal Guidelines for Reform 
 
In this section I argue that the central policies that stimulated change in the states, 
characterised as educational reform, can be classified into three phases on the basis of 
differences in policy characteristics. In the first phase, 1986–93, the policies were more 
domestic in their origin and resource support. These new policies were based on a 
thorough critique of the existing system of education, which despite its many 
achievements, had serious shortcomings in terms of poor coverage, gender and social-caste 
disparities, and also a serious paucity of resources (Government of India 1985 pp. 15–
27).
68
 The magnitude of the problem could be assessed from the government‘s own 
admission, that after spending over 90 per cent of the available resources on teacher 
salaries and administration, ―practically nothing is available to buy blackboard and chalks, 
let alone charts, inexpensive teaching aids, or even pitchers for drinking water‖ (GoI 1985 
pp. 37). Following these observations, specific interventions were made in the form of 
―Centrally Sponsored Schemes‖—in particular, Operation Blackboard (OB), Teacher 
Education (TE), and Non-Formal Education (NFE). The most important of these was the 
OB, which was meant to provide minimum levels of physical infrastructure, teachers, and 
learning materials to primary schools. In 1990–91, the OB programme accounted for 
nearly 66 per cent of federal expenditure on elementary education. Its significance began to 
decline following the introduction of the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) programme in 1995–96. 
Educationally backward states preferred the NFE programme because it left them with few 
or no recurrent liabilities (Bashir 2000; Bashir and Ayyar 2001). 
                                                          
68
 The government published a thorough critique of the existing scenario in education in August 1985, in a 
report entitled ―The Challenge of Education: A Policy perspective‖. The NPE 1986, and the Programme of 
Action (PoA), 1992, followed. These three documents together form the policy statement for beginning the 
phase of reorientation of policies for elementary school education, which I have classified here as ―Phase I‖ 
of the policy reform process. 
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The Centre‘s greater engagement with reforming the school sector began with these 
schemes. As specific purpose grants, they were intended to level out educational 
disparities, but they did not achieve this. Thus, more developed states were better able to 
utilise the funds for the OB and TE programmes, and they progressed with building their 
school education infrastructure. In contrast, the preference for non-formal education among 
the educationally backwards states meant that federal resources were not employed in 
expanding school infrastructure in these states. As specific purpose federal grants, they 
were somewhat restricted in their scope, and did not offer a complete vision for change. 
These programmes continued even after policies more characteristic of what I classify as 
the second phase of reforms came into operation. Many of the local outcomes of these 
Centrally Sponsored Schemes (or their absence) were evident on the ground, especially 
when I surveyed the schools. They form part of my observations in Chapter 7. 
In what I consider as the second phase—1993 until the present—policies were still 
designed domestically, but in terms of their vision they came closer to the ideas of the 
Jomtien Conference and ―Education For All‖. The specific interventions in this second 
stage were made through the DPEP, and they were expanded under the SSA. In this second 
phase, policies moved closer to a global understanding of educational reform, and external 
aid became an important feature. As compared to the rather prescriptive approach of the 
first phase, a ―guideline‖ approach now characterised the two main programmes—the 
DPEP and SSA. The Centre provided indicative parameters of permissible activities, and 
left states free to implement the schemes once their work plans had been assessed. An 
additional attraction for states was the ―society‖ set up at the state level to receive funds 
under both the DPEP and SSA. 
69
 These funds were no longer required to be routed 
through state treasuries (known for their inflexible procedures), nor did states have to 
undertake annual negotiations with the Planning Commission. The associated financial 
norms prescribed a ceiling of 24 per cent on construction activities and 6 per cent on 
administrative costs—two areas well known as rife with opportunities for pilferage and 
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 These societies were special purpose vehicles, set up under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Headed 
by a government officer, usually from the Indian Administrative Service, the society was free to hire 
government and non-government persons on flexible terms.  
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patronage. This also meant that the states were forced to undertake activities which were 
meant to improve the quality of education.   
The innovative guidelines of the Centre and the innovations made by the states 
endured the test of time, and they continued as features of programme design even as a 
new and expanded intervention by the Centre was put in place through the SSA. This 
programme covered all districts of the country. Moreover, it included the entire elementary 
cycle of schooling, and not just the primary grades. Two of the earlier Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes—the OB and NFE—were subsumed under the SSA, and it became the only 
programme for elementary education that donor agencies could support. The relationship 
with external agencies was further negotiated. And unlike in DPEP, external resources 
from a particular agency could no longer be ear-marked for any particular state—they went 
to a common pool of resources meant for the country as a whole.      
A third concurrent phase saw the emergence of more ―rights-based approaches‖ to 
the provision of elementary education and educational incentives. These were seen as a 
universal right, the denial of which allowed the aggrieved party to approach courts for 
redress. The MDM programme and the Right to Education Act (2009) were specific 
interventions of this phase. The associated resources were mobilised domestically, there 
was greater vigilance by civil society, and there was also more judicial activism.  
In Table 3.2 I summarise each of these phases in terms of the substance of the 
reform proposals, and the opportunities and incentives for both the Centre and the states.  
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Table 3.2: Three Stages of Educational Reform in India, 1987–2009 
Context and Main Features  
Programme 
Initiatives 
Type/Substance of Reform 
Incentives for Centre and 
States 
First Stage, 1987 to 2001–02 
Context: Initiated after the 
National Policy on Education, 
1986 
 
Main Features 
 Domestic funding 
 Implemented through 
traditional institutional 
structures 
 Line departments of 
education in the states 
 Keeps the formal and non-
formal primary education 
system on two different 
tracks 
 
 Operation 
Blackboard  
 
 Teacher 
Education 
 
 Non-Formal 
Education 
Type: Access reforms 
 
Substance: Improving the 
physical quality of formal schools, 
hiring additional teachers, school 
supplies, and setting up district-
based teacher education institutes 
 
Centre: Provides resources, 
but has no powers of 
monitoring 
 
States:  
 No flexibility in design  
 States find recurrent  
 liabilities burdensome 
 Educationally backward 
states opt for non-formal 
education which works 
through volunteers and 
imposes no additional 
financial burden 
 
Second Stage, 1993 until the present 
Context: Initiated after the 
economic crisis of 1991  
 
Main Features 
 External aid for DPEP and 
external aid and  domestic 
resources for SSA 
 Implemented through new 
agencies called ―societies‖ 
set up in the states 
 Started with a few districts 
in selected states under 
DPEP-I, nationwide 
coverage under SSA 
 
 District 
Primary 
Education 
Programme 
(DPEP) 
 
 Sarva 
Shiksha 
Abhiyan 
(SSA) 
Type: Improving access and 
quality 
 
Substance:  
 Development of a 
perspective plan for 
institutional reforms in 
primary education under 
DPEP; extended to 
elementary education under 
SSA 
 Focus on gender and social 
caste based inequities in the 
planning process 
 Agenda includes traditional 
issues like increasing access 
by construction of classrooms 
and schools, hiring teachers, 
and also new issues like 
teacher training and textbook 
revision 
 Direct grants to schools, 
teachers, and village 
education committees 
(VECs) 
 New local institutions at the 
sub-district and school cluster 
level 
 
Centre:  
 Provides resources and 
negotiates with external 
agencies 
 Power of monitoring 
through joint reviews and 
control of state societies  
 
States:  
 External funds given as 
grant support 
 Allowed to innovate on 
design 
 Recurrent liabilities under 
SSA to be funded by 
states on a gradual basis 
(central support available 
on a declining basis) 
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Table 3.2 (continued): Three Stages of Educational Reform in India, 1987–2009 
Context and Main Features  
Programme 
Initiatives 
Type/Substance of Reform 
Incentives for Centre 
and States 
Third Stage, 1995 until the present 
Context: Initiated after judicial 
intervention 
 
Main Features: 
 Rights-based approach 
 Universal entitlement to all 
children 
 Involvement of civil society 
groups in design and 
implementation 
 Domestic resources 
 Monitoring by federal courts 
 Statutory authorisation 
through a constitutional 
amendment 
 Fundamental right of all 
children in the age group 6–
14 years  
 Monitoring by new 
institutions—state and 
national level commissions 
established for the 
protection of child rights 
Mid-Day Meal 
programme 
introduced in 
1995; most states 
provided dry 
rations under the 
scheme 
 
2001: Supreme 
Court intervention 
in Right to Food 
case led to cooked 
meals being 
provided to all 
children attending 
primary schools 
 
Right to Free and 
Compulsory 
Education Act of 
2009 
Type: Non-educational incentives 
to increase school attendance 
 
 Cooked meals for all 
students, from classes I-V 
 Grain, transportation cost, 
and conversion cost provided 
by the Centre 
 Guidelines on physical 
infrastructure formulated by 
the Centre and resources 
provided 
 Duty of the states to provide 
free schooling, textbooks, and 
uniforms 
 Normative standard set for 
school quality, teachers, and 
the student-teacher ratio 
 School meals to be provided 
 School  management 
committees to be set up 
Centre: Strong political 
incentive, as it would be seen 
as directly providing food to the 
poor 
 
States: 
 Initially not enthusiastic. 
Forced by the courts to 
set up infrastructure and 
provide cooked meals, 
even in states with very 
poor infrastructure 
 Weak political incentives 
for states, but once forced 
by the court states could 
not afford to be seen as 
delaying on providing 
food to the poor 
 High political cost of non-
provision 
 Legal right, so aggrieved 
citizens can approach the 
courts 
 Increased vigilance by 
civil society 
 States have to implement 
this statutorily 
 
 
3.4 Adoption of Change in the States 
The implementation of these new policies was characterised by differences in approach 
and strategy and by varying performance across the states. Between 1991 and 2001, there 
was a definite improvement in literacy rates for the country as a whole—an increase of 13 
percentage points. All states except for educationally advanced Kerala and Gujarat, and 
educationally backward Bihar, saw an increase of more than 10 percentage points in their 
literacy rates over this decade. Among the educationally backward states, MP and Orissa 
had notable performances, showing increases of 20 and 25 points respectively. AP and 
Uttar Pradesh followed with increases of 17 and 16 points. Bihar trailed behind with the 
lowest literacy of all—47 per cent (see Table 3.3).  
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In primary school participation rates too there was significant improvement in all 
the educationally backward states, with the exception of Bihar. Thus between 1993–94 and 
1999–2000 the NSS reported an increase greater than 10 percentage points in AP, MP, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. However, in Bihar there was a slight decline of 2.2 points in 
primary school participation rates. It was notable too that AP, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan 
also significantly reduced the gender gap in primary school participation (see Table 3.3). 
                 Once again, variation in per-pupil expenditure, especially among the 
educationally backward states, gave some indication of the diversity of approaches that the 
states adopted in implementing reform policies.  Between 1990–91 and 1999–2000, all the 
six educationally backward states experienced an increase in per student expenditure and 
nominal expenditure on elementary education (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3). After that, 
however, only in AP, Orissa, and Rajasthan, has there been some increase. Further, in 
Bihar, MP, and Uttar Pradesh, there has been a decline in per-pupil real expenditure in 
nominal terms, as these states have major changes in their teacher policies. Para-teachers 
(on contract, and at lower salaries than regular teachers), have been hired in these states on 
a large scale, leading to reduced expenditure on a per-student basis.
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 Interestingly, the southern states of Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu have not 
made use of para-teachers. And in AP, para-teachers have been used on a temporary basis 
to cater for increases in enrolment, or until regular teacher recruitment could be made. 
These and other differences in terms of the emphasis on expansion of the formal school 
system (in Karnataka and AP), in contrast to an emphasis on alternate, non-formal 
arrangements like the Education Guarantee Scheme in Madhya Pradesh, are indicative of 
the widely divergent state-level strategies adopted towards schools.  Educational reform 
initiated under the DPEP, and following it the SSA, was clearly providing the states with 
the opportunity to adapt this programme on considerations that were internal to the context 
of each state. The reasons for variation, therefore, have to be seen in the policy and 
political conditions prevalent in each state, and in the manner in which the elected and non-
elected leaders were steering the reform process within this context. 
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 However, when I analysed the data on per-pupil nominal expenditure for every year between 1990–91 and 
2007–08, I found great fluctuations. It is only in the long-run that a trend of steady increase can be seen.  
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Table 3.3: Educational Achievement and Deficits in 15 Major States, 1999–2000 
State 
Literacy 
Rate* 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Rate 
School Participation 
Pupil- 
Teacher 
Ratio 
(PTR) 
Public Expenditure 
on Elementary 
Education (6–10 years) 
Total Total Male Female Total Total 
As % 
of 
GSDP 
Per-Pupil 
Expenditure 
Rs 
(Nominal 
Values) 
Educationally Backward States     
Andhra 
Pradesh  60.5 103.3 87.3 81.7 84.6 47 1 1,376 
Bihar 47.0 78.6 58.8 44.8 52.5 63 6.4 2,223 
Madhya 
Pradesh  63.7 115 76.4 66 71.5 44 2.3 1,232 
Orissa  63.1 108.8 80 69.8 75 37 3 2,072 
Rajasthan 60.4 111.9 84.1 64.3 74.8 54 2.2 1,762 
Uttar 
Pradesh 56.3 65 79.1 66.5 73.4 42 1.6 1,620 
Other States     
Assam  63.3 114.9 82.3 77.5 80 38 3.4 2,108 
Gujarat 69.1 113.4 87.9 79.8 84.2 51 1.5 2,034 
Haryana 67.9 82 88.9 80.9 85.2 43 1.1 2,445 
Karnataka 66.6 109.4 83.5 82.4 82.9 32 1.5 1,645 
Kerala  90.9 85.3 96 94.1 95 45 2 3,218 
Maharashtra 76.9 114.1 92.9 89.3 91.1 35 0.9 1,754 
Punjab  69.7 80.8 90.8 88.3 89.6 41 0.8 2,402 
Tamil Nadu  73.5 100.7 94.3 92.2 93.3 36 1.6 2,931 
West 
Bengal 68.6 100.2 81.3 72.6 77.2 54 1.1 1,495 
All India 64.8 94.9 81.2 72.7 77.2 43     
 
Sources: Literacy Rate: ―Census of India‖, 2001; Gross Enrolment Rate from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, MoHRD, GoI 
1999–2000; School Participation Rates are calculated from the National Sample Survey, 1999–2000; Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
is calculated from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, MoHRD 1999–2000; Public expenditure on elementary education is 
calculated from the ―Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure in Education‖, MoHRD, GoI. 
 
Notes: 1. Literacy Rate: ―Census of India‖, 2001; Gross Enrolment Rate from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, MoHRD, GoI 
1999–2000; School Participation Rates are calculated from the National Sample Survey, 1999–2000; Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
is calculated from ―Select Educational Statistics‖, MoHRD 1999–2000; Public expenditure on elementary education is 
calculated from the ―Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure in Education‖, MoHRD, GoI. 
 
Definitions: 1. Literacy rate is defined for population above 6 years of age; 2. Gross enrolment rate is defined as the ratio 
of total enrolment in grades I-V to the child population aged 6–10 years expressed in percentage terms. 3. School 
participation rate is defined as percentage of children aged 6–10 years attending any type of educational institution; 4. 
Nominal expenditure on elementary education per student is expressed in rupees at current prices, revenue account. 
 
99 
 
 
3. 5 Conclusion: The Political Dynamics of Agenda Setting 
 
The role of the Centre‘s DoE in managing contesting ideas, actors, and institutions 
highlights the fact that agenda-setting is a political process, and not an activity concerned 
exclusively with technical design. The actions of the DoE were of significance in terms of 
how the reforms were introduced and how the process was managed without engendering 
political resistance. The political dynamics differed at each stage of the policy reform 
process. At a relatively early stage, the two critical issues were: (i) managing the dynamics 
between the country and the external aid agencies that were involved in education, and (ii) 
ensuring the smooth adoption of a central programme within the country‘s federal system.  
In fact, the federal distribution of power in India‘s competitive political situation 
turned out to be an ―institutional factor‖ which worked in favour of the adoption of 
reforms. This conclusion is opposed to that suggested by political economy arguments to 
the effect that existing institutional arrangements are likely to constrain policy reforms. 
Instead, states found opportunities in the room for manoeuvre that they got with a new type 
of central programme, together with the greater availability of resources on easy terms. 
States could innovate and contest vested interests around school education, but beyond 
that, political actors in the states could be seen by their electorates as having done 
something for their schools, despite the various constraints. The different approaches to 
implementation in the states gave the reforms a ―local‖ hue, and consequently there was no 
―national‖ resistance to the educational reform agenda.71 Hence, federal actions at this time 
displayed both the use of political skill and the creation of appropriate political incentives. 
The analysis of the contested process of agenda-setting also throws doubt on some 
of the general assumptions about the political economy of the policy reform process. 
Among these assumptions are: (i) that policy-reform emerges only at a time of crisis, and 
(ii) that interests and institutions constrain reforms. In the Indian case, the economic crisis 
of 1991 did indeed play an important role so far as the timing of the reforms was 
concerned. But more important was the subsequent management of the process of 
introducing reforms by the DoE, and how it anticipated possible sources of resistance and 
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 I owe this insight to Jenkins (1999) who argues that economic reform in India did not face the resistance 
expected in theory because the federal distribution of power ―quarantined‖ opposition within individual 
states. 
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features that would enhance the chances of reforms being adopted by the states. These 
features also differentiated educational policy reform from economic policy reform—the 
latter was more like a ―stroke of the pen‖ decision. The educational policy reform was 
characterised more by protracted negotiations and deliberate changes to many institutional 
arrangements—concerns that were not prominent on the agenda of reformers of economic 
policy. In hindsight, the educational reform agenda was far more vigilant about the need 
for political acceptance of the reform both across party lines and across interests with 
different political ideologies.
72
 
The political dynamics were characterised more by these strategic choices than the 
influence of interests or institutions in resisting reforms. At this stage, non-elected 
policymakers played a role that was larger than that played by political actors in managing 
ideas and actors, and designing federal guidelines. Hence, one conclusion about the theory 
of interests and institutions acting as political constraints to change is that their role differs 
at different stages in the overall process. Each stage constitutes a distinct arena for contest, 
and also offers distinct opportunities.  
But the politics of agenda-setting is an incomplete portrayal of the political 
dynamics of the reform process. It does not address implementation, and specifically the 
political actions of managing conflict and creating new stakeholders through incentives 
and alliances that are witnessed during this phase. It was during this implementation phase 
that states carved out their own scripts for reform and opened up new arenas for contest. 
The following chapters focus on the implementation of educational reform and the 
differences in performance of the educationally backward states. These chapters address 
the question of why states performed differently, and why policy and political leaders 
adopted different approaches, given considerable similarity of context in terms of federal 
policy and resources. 
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 For example, West Bengal that was ruled by the CPI-M led Left Front, did not accept World Bank funded 
DPEP in the early days. The Centre mobilised DFID grant support at a later stage. The sensitivity of the CPI-
(M) towards the Bank was an ―unspoken‖ boundary line that the Centre never crossed.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Federal Opportunities, State-level Implementation: 
The Puzzle of Contrasting Outcomes in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar 
 
In this chapter, I focus more directly on the ―units‖ of study that I have selected—that is, 
the states of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Bihar. The basic issues I address relate to the 
context in which educational reform was implemented in these states. I also assess the 
progress made in over a decade of implementation of these policies. Apart from the federal 
support in terms of the resource and policy templates for reforms available to both the 
states, the similarity in social and political context, reform histories, and the presence of 
political leaders who appeared inclined towards taking on the challenge of policy 
innovation, generated similar expectations of successful results in both the states. 
However, variations in performance pose a puzzle for understanding the policy process. 
That Bihar did not do as well as AP, is indicative that policy outcomes are not a 
mechanical consequence of technical inputs in a system leading to change—the process of 
change matters.    
The arguments in this chapter are organised in four sections. On the basis of 
research and policy literature, I first compare some of the similarities of context within 
which educational reform was implemented in the two states. I then examine the problems 
and constraints that these reforms were meant to address, specifically the challenges faced 
by their school systems at the beginning of the 1990s. In the third section, I suggest five 
propositions—drawn from political circumstances and prior efforts of reforming school 
education in each state, which form the basis for expectations about optimistic results from 
reform implementation in both the states. In the fourth, I provide some indicators of 
outcomes—what happened as a result of the reforms on the basis of data from household 
surveys on school participation (namely the National Sample Survey). In concluding, I 
argue in favour of the need for looking at the key intervening ―variable‖—the dynamic 
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process of reform implementation, which must be analysed to unravel the puzzle of why 
states in the Indian federal system use similar opportunities in different ways, and 
ultimately perform differently. 
4.1 The Context of Reform Implementation in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar 
 
Comparison of States in the Policy Reform Process 
 
In the research on the policy-reform process in India, comparisons of variations in the 
performance of Indian states, located within a common, federal policy framework, has 
been of late, quite common. Some examples are Béteille (2009), Jenkins (2004), Sharma 
and Ramachandran (2009), Sinha (2003), and Sipahimalani-Rao (2004). Of these, I see 
Jenkins (2004) as one of the best examples of analytical reflections on the policy-reform 
process on the basis of two-state comparisons. He argues that India‘s federal system with 
its common policy and institutional framework is like a ―boon to students of comparative 
politics who seek to understand and explain the divergent patterns and outcomes that the 
practice of democracy can produce‖. Even cross-national comparisons of democracy do 
not provide a similar opportunity for analysis (as Indian states do), as they are unable to 
control for institutional and policy characteristics (Jenkins 2004 pp.3–4).Sinha (2003) 
considers it important to examine what she calls the ―sub-national developmental pathways 
within India‖, in order to understand why given the common ―constraints‖ of central 
regulatory policy, states have varied in their economic performance (Sinha 2003 p.460). 
Comparative analyses of the politics of social-sector reforms have not been 
attempted as yet, although variations in state performances are increasingly being noted. In 
the area of education policy reform, some scholars who have compared the variation in 
performance of states in the northern and southern parts of the country include Sharma and 
Ramachandran (2009) and Sipahimalani-Rao (2004). Besides outcomes, the differences in 
the approach and strategy adopted by different Indian states is also commonly 
mentioned—for example, Mehendale (2010 pp.11–12) notes the diversity in state 
strategies with respect to teachers, school management committees, and recognition of 
schools noticed at the time of formulating the model rules for the Right To Education Act, 
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2009 for the country as a whole. Yet, comparative analyses of why these variations exist at 
the state level are few. Given this paucity of research, comparative analyses of the politics 
of social-sector reform process, have to of necessity move forward with the analytical 
frameworks developed for examining the politics of economic reforms. 
The motivation for the comparison I undertake is similar to that of Sinha‘s (2003). I 
too examine the question of variations in sub-national performance in my research, given 
similar opportunities by the Centre. Sinha argues that the significance of variations in the 
performance of states within India‘s federal framework had hitherto been considered 
marginal to the analysis on India‘s development trajectory. She sees this variation as a 
―joint product of central rules, provincial strategic choices, and sub-national institutional 
variation‖ (Sinha 2003 pp. 460–61). However, there are two notable differences—first, 
while Sinha‘s focus is on economic policy reforms, I examine the area of education policy; 
second for Sinha, the federal policy framework was a constraining one, a dirigiste model 
of state control, whereas in my analysis, the federal policy framework has been an enabling 
one, promoting educational reform in the states.  
Further, in choosing the units for comparison—one state from the northern part of 
the country and another from the southern, my approach is similar to that of Sharma and 
Ramachandran (2009) and Sipahimalani-Rao (2004). The southern states of India, 
especially Kerala and Tamil Nadu, have performed better as compared to those in the 
northern parts, especially the more populous north Indian states of Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh.
73
 Sipahimalani-Rao (2004) selects the states of Karnataka in the south and Uttar 
Pradesh in the north on the basis of contrasting indicators of educational outcomes 
(Karnataka does much better than Uttar Pradesh), and highlights the contrasting nature of 
policy choices made with respect to teacher management issues in the two states. While 
Karnataka was able to rationalise its policies, reduce discretion, and possibilities for use of 
arbitrary authority, Uttar Pradesh was unable to do so. However, the author does not delve 
into the reasons for this variation. It is this gap that I seek to fill by understanding the 
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 The starting point of the debate on the great internal variations in performance of Indian states is the focus 
on Kerala‘s extraordinary achievement by Dreze and Sen (1989). The authors argue that while India as a 
whole fared badly in comparison to China on indicators of human development (average levels of literacy, 
infant mortality, and life expectancy among others), but the Indian state of Kerala did much better than China 
as a whole on all these indicators. The authors see Kerala‘s better outcomes to be the result of state ―support-
led security‖ and ―public action‖.    
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process of policy reforms as a political one—it is political agency which accounts for this 
variation. While there may be differences of context between different states (Karnataka 
and Uttar Pradesh in the case of Sipahimalani-Rao), these by themselves do not explain 
why seemingly irrational policies persist in some cases and states are unable to effect 
changes, whereas other states are able to do so. 
Similarities of Context in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar: Political Conditions and Prior 
History of Educational Reform 
 
There are many similarities of context between AP and Bihar, and I discuss these in order 
to provide a background to the study of educational reform in the selected states. 
In terms of demographic features, both were large populous states, accounting for 
nearly 7.4 and 8.1 per cent of the country‘s population respectively in the 2001Census. 
Furtherore, the contribution each made to the growth of population in the country 
between1981–91 was also very similar—AP accounted for 7.9 and Bihar for 7.5 per cent 
of the total increase in India‘s population in this period. However, their paths were 
divergent thereafter, and this was especially reflected in the decline of the child 
population in AP. In the 1990s, the state registered a sharp decline of nearly10.3 per cent 
in its decadal growth rate of population (from 24.2 per cent in 1981–91 to 13.9 per cent in 
1991–2001). This was the highest amongst all the major Indian states.   
Over the same time period, Bihar stood out in contrast, with an increase of 5 per 
cent in its decadal growth rate of population (from 23.4 per cent in 1981–91 to 28.4 per 
cent in 1991–2001). This increase was also contrary to the all-India trend of a decline of 
nearly 2.5 per cent (from 23.8 per cent in 1981–91 to 21.3 per cent in 1991–2001), and 
was responsible for changing Bihar‘s position in the ranking of states in terms of their 
contribution to the national population. In 1991, Bihar was ranked fifth among the major 
Indian states, after Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and AP in that order.  By the 
2001 Census, the increase in Bihar‘s population was of a magnitude where it climbed up 
to rank 3, pushing West Bengal and AP below it to ranks 4 and 5 respectively (National 
Commission on Population 2006).  
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The decline in child population in AP had a significant implication for planning and 
allocation of resources for school education. The state was likely to deal with a smaller size 
of school entrants making it possible to provide more for every child. In Bihar, the 
increasing numbers meant that infrastructure and facilities were likely to fall short of the 
demands on the system. 
Seen in terms of its caste composition, their demography had comparable social 
aspects. Both states were home to a very large share of the country‘s Scheduled Castes 
(SCs)—a disadvantaged social-caste group, experiencing severe deprivation evident in 
their very low literacy achievements. Nearly 16 per cent of the population in each state 
consisted of SCs, and the states were noted among the ―top-ten‖ in the country for their 
very large SC population (Government of India 2011). Further, the population of 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) was sizeable only in AP (nearly 6.5 per cent of the total 
population), but not in Bihar following its partition in 2000 when its ST population became 
a part of the new state of Jharkhand.
74
 The other interesting dimension of the social-caste 
composition of their population was the presence of a sizeable Backward Caste (BC) 
population—estimated to be nearly 44 per cent of the total population in AP (Suri 2002 
p.12) and 41 per cent in Bihar (estimated from the National Sample Survey [NSS] 55
th
 
round, 1999–2000).75At the bottom of the social hierarchy, the SCs and BCs together 
formed the majority of the population in each state. 
In terms of literacy rates in 1991, while AP did better than Bihar, both the states 
were below the average reported for the all-India level. However, between 1991 and 2001, 
AP closed its gap with the national average. From being 8 percentage points below it in 
1991, the state‘s literacy rates were only 4 percentage points below the national average in 
2001. The case of Bihar was different—its literacy rates went further below the national 
average in 2001 as compared to 1991.  Marked gender differences also characterised the 
literacy rates of both the states in 1991. In the case of AP, its female literacy rates were 
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 The population of scheduled tribes in Bihar is now estimated to be less than 1 per cent.  
75
 Other than the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes, the decadal census in India does not officially record 
any other caste status, until 2011. Further, the population of backward castes in states is estimated either on 
the basis of the 1931 Census or from reports of Backward Classes Commission specially set up by state 
governments. Another basis for estimates is the NSSO household survey1999-2000 (55
th
 round) which has 
asked respondents for their caste status. The 2011 census, however, has recorded caste status, and its reports 
will form the first robust indicator in this regard. 
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nearly 22 percentage points below male literacy rates, whereas in the case of Bihar, this 
difference was higher, and female literacy rates in the state were nearly 29 percentage 
points lower than male literacy rates. Between 1991 and 2001, these gender differences 
declined somewhat in the case of both the states, but in absolute terms female literacy rates 
in Bihar still remained abysmally low (see Table 4.1). In exhibiting these literacy 
characteristics, AP was an outlier among all states of southern India—as all the other states 
had literacy rates higher than the national average, and a near parity in male-female 
literacy rates, while Bihar was among the worst performers among all the major states.  
Table 4.1: Literacy Rates, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and all-India, 1991–2011 
States/UTs 
1991 2001 2011 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
55.13 32.72 44.09 70.85 51.17 61.11 75.56 59.74 67.66 
Bihar 52.49 22.89 38.48 60.32 33.57 47.53 73.39 53.33 63.82 
All India 64.13 39.29 52.21 75.96 54.28 65.38 82.14 65.46 74.04 
Source: office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 
( Available at www.censusindia.gov.in) 
 
On aspects of economic growth, although AP did not do as well as the other states 
in southern India, its performance was consistently better than Bihar‘s. Though the per 
capita income in both the states was reported to be lower than the national average, AP 
remained closer to the national average while Bihar was the worst performing state among 
all the Indian states. To highlight this, in real terms in 1993–94, while the all-India average 
per capita income was nearly Rs7,700 and AP had a per capita income of Rs 7,416, the per 
capita income in Bihar at Rs 3,037 was just half or less than half of the national average 
and the AP average.
76
Assessments of poverty too confirmed that AP did better than Bihar. 
While estimates of poverty for the 1990s have been a matter of intense controversy and 
scholars point out that economic measures by themselves do not reveal the multi-
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 Directorate of Economics and Statistics provide data for respective state governments, while the All India 
figures are reported by the Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India.    
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dimensional nature of poverty, various assessments made in this regard place AP ahead of 
Bihar. These include the official estimates for poverty, based on NSS household surveys 
adjusted figures reported by Deaton and Dreze (2002), and the estimates of the Tendulkar 
Committee (Tendulkar, Radha Krishna, and Sengupta 2009).
77
According to the revised 
estimates of the Tendulkar Committee (Tendulkar  et al. 2009), in 2004–05  nearly 30 per 
cent of the population in AP and 54 per cent in Bihar were below the poverty line, while at 
the all-India level 37.2 of the population was below the poverty line. 
So, the two important caveats to the argument about similarities in background in 
two states relate to differences in the dynamics of growth and poverty, and the recent 
notable demographic trend of a declining child population in AP. 
However, the two key similarities of context, which led me to select AP and Bihar, 
from among other Indian states, are their status as ―educationally backward states‖ and 
political power being in the hands of new political leaderships. By the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, AP and Bihar were both classified among the ―educationally backward 
states‖, eligible for additional resources, including those from international donor 
agencies.  While the general conditions for federal resource transfers to states in India  
provides for a weightage on population and economic backwardness, the specific idea that 
educational backwardness of Indian states was itself a ground for greater central 
assistance had become an accepted measure in federal policies by this time. Special 
schemes of the federal Ministry of Education and bilateral aid solicited by it were the 
specific instruments for extending such support. 
One of the first explicit policy statements on which states were educationally 
backward can be found in the recommendations for the Non-Formal Education (NFE) 
programme of the government (see Chapter 3 for details on this programme). The 
working group of the Planning Commission which recommended the scheme observed 
that 74 per cent of the non-enrolled children were in the ―educationally backward states of 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and West 
Bengal‖. Assam was later added to this list, and the problem of universalisation of 
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 See Deaton and Dreze (2002) for detailed discussion on the problems with respect to the methods of 
poverty estimation in India. 
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elementary education was seen essentially as a problem of these states (Kapoor 1992 p. 
3).
78
 
As educationally backwards states, both AP and Bihar received early attention from 
donors and the federal government—enhanced central assistance mobilised through 
external finances for implementing school reform was available since the early 1990s 
through state specific projects called the Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Programme 
(APPEP) and the Bihar Education Programme (BEP). Further, external aid provided 
through APPEP and BEP predated the large-scale funds mobilised by the Centre for the 
District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) launched in 1995 as a national programme 
for school reform. These two programmes (APPEP and BEP) were considered frontrunners 
in the sense that lessons from their implementation subsequently influenced the setting up 
of the agenda for DPEP. 
Political leadership at the time of reform was also similar in both the states, with 
power in the hands of regional parties having their roots in opposing the nationally 
dominant Congress Party—the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in AP and the Janata Dal in 
Bihar. Closeness to regional sentiments, a new political base among deprived social castes, 
and a promise for greater welfare for the deprived led to natural expectations about 
political leaders adopting pro-poor policy changes with ease in both the states. These 
similarities in the policy and political context led to expectations of similar outcomes of 
reforms and of the role that the political leaders would play in the process. 
Besides, there were also similarities in the institutional arrangements for 
implementing reforms in the two states (and in all other states implementing DPEP and 
thereafter the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan [SSA])—a new institutional structure in the form of a 
―society‖ was set up in both the states to facilitate some autonomy for the reform 
implementation process away from the control of vested interests and biased institutions. 
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 Set up in 1978, the working group had a broader mandate of assessing the roadmap to universalisation of 
elementary education for children 6-14 years of age. It recommended the setting up of the non-formal 
education programme to cater to the needs of working children and others who could not attend schools in 
normal hours.   
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4.2 Problems and Constraints in School Education at the Beginning of the 
1990s 
 
Although government policy classified the two states as ―educationally backward‖ at the 
beginning of the 1990s, there was a paucity of analytical literature or evaluation studies on 
the situation of school education in either of the states. Lacey, Cooper, and Torrance (1993 
pp. 542, 546) note this in the context of AP, where they find that a research tradition was 
lacking in the state education department, which engaged only in collecting ―descriptive 
statistics‖. Besides, there were issues of reliability of government data, a fact that I too 
have taken note of earlier (in Chapter 3). Although the problems seemed to have been 
commonly understood by policymakers and aid agencies, documentation is surprisingly 
scant. Therefore, some indication of the problems before the school education sector can 
be had on the basis of observations by experts or policymakers associated with the APPEP 
and the BEP, and from the small amount of literature that is available on these 
programmes. On the basis of these, three key constraints appeared to characterise the 
school education system in both the states: institutional constraints, lack of resources 
especially for innovations, and inequities in participation.    
The school education system in AP was described as a ―classic bureaucracy‖, 
where decisions were processed hierarchically and centrally, leading to considerable delays 
(Lacey et al. 1993 p. 542). Teachers had little avenue either for promotion or professional 
development, as neither the directorate, nor the training institutions for teachers (known as 
the District Institutes of Educational Technology or DIETs) absorbed school teachers. The 
educational budget spent on elementary school education was large in both the states—in 
1990–91, AP spent nearly 46 per cent of its total resources for education in elementary 
schools, while Bihar spent an even higher 63 per cent of its total education budget on 
elementary education. However, nearly all of it was spent on salaries, and very little was 
left for measures for improving quality such as teacher training or on textbooks.
79
 A very 
small share of elementary education expenditure in each state was invested in the creation 
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 The real picture of what use this large expenditure on elementary education was put to, is provided by the 
disaggregated expenditure by sub-heads—in 1990, AP spent only 1.3 per cent of its resources for elementary 
education on teacher training, and Bihar only 0.7 per cent. 
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of new capacity and this is evident in the small proportion of elementary education budgets 
that each state spent as ―Plan‖ expenditure—7.5 per cent in AP and 11.2 per cent in Bihar 
(see Table 4.2). This led to schools operating under a severe resource crunch, unable to 
purchase any supplies or teaching learning materials based on their needs, or on the 
discretion of the teacher. The situation was only exacerbated by the focus on ―centralised 
supply‖ of teaching materials in centrally sponsored programmes such as Operation 
Blackboard.
80
 
 
Table 4.2: Selected Characteristics of Elementary Education Expenditure in Educationally Backward 
States, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar 1990–91 
 Share of 
Elementary 
Education (%)  
in Total 
Expenditure on 
Education 
Share of 
Elementary 
Education(%)  in 
Gross State 
Domestic 
Product 
Total Elementary 
Education 
Expenditure  in 
Real terms (in Rs 
million) 
Per-Pupil 
Elementary 
Education 
Expenditure  in 
Real terms (in Rs 
per annum) 
Share of Plan 
Expenditure in 
Total 
Expenditure 
on Elementary 
Education  
Andhra Pradesh 46.0 1.3 6,167 789 7.5 
Bihar 62.7 2.8 10,191 1,028 11.2 
Educationally 
Backward States 
(Average) 
56.6 - 7,489 907 - 
Source: Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure in Education, 1990-91, MoHRD, GoI; Whole sale Price Index 1993/94 series from 
Ministry of Statistics Planning and Implementation, GoI; Selected Educational Statistics, MoHRD, for various years 
Notes: Educationally Backward States-AP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh; Total Elementary 
Education Expenditure is  in Rs million at constant prices, 1993–94=100. 
 
The additional constraints in Bihar were on account of poor infrastructure for 
teacher training. While AP had nearly 23 district-level training institutes (one for each 
district) in 1993–94, Bihar had only one, and even that was not an initiative of the line 
department of education. Following a change in the government‘s policy, teacher training 
was not considered a requirement for recruiting teachers, therefore institutions for teacher 
training were no longer considered necessary by the state. Hence, the resources sanctioned 
by the federal government for setting up teacher training institutions remained unutilised 
(Government of Bihar 2007a p.58). 
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 I owe these observations to Professor Kenneth King‘s note based on a seminar given by him in Hyderabad 
July 19, 1994. The seminar was chaired by the Secretary of Education, GoAP, Mr J.S. Sarma, and attended 
by senior staff of the state‘s Department of Education, and the APPEP project staff. This is cited in the 
bibliography as King (1994 a). Professor King is Professor Emeritus, University of Edinburgh. 
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Although AP did better than Bihar, there were inequities in participation on the 
basis of socio-economic disadvantages of social-caste, gender, poverty, and residence in 
rural areas in both states. For the primary stage of schooling, attendance rates of 6–10 year 
old girls was lower by 12 percentage points as compared to boys in AP, and by 17 
percentage points in Bihar. Also, this was higher than the difference reported at the all-
India level—11 percentage points.81 Further, the gender inequities were acute among 
disadvantaged social castes—the participation of SC girls in AP and Bihar was 19 and 27 
percentage points lower respectively than the participation of boys of the same caste (see 
Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Social Caste and Gender, 
1993–94 
 All Castes Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes 
Other Castes 
(including OBCs) 
State Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
 79.3   66.6  75.0  55.9  69.0  47.9  81.3  70.6  
Bihar  62.2   45.0  50.5  23.6  34.5  21.5  66.5  50.8  
 
Source: NSSO, 50th Round: Employment-Unemployment Survey, 1993–94. 
 
Notes: The ―School Participation Rate‖ refers to percentage of children currently attending any educational institution; OBC-
Other Backward Castes. 
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 At the All-India level, the school participation rate for boys of age 6-10 years was reported (by the NSSO 
1993-94) to be nearly 77 per cent, and for girls of the same age it was nearly 66 per cent. 
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Table 4.4: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Place of Residence and Economic 
Status in Rural Areas, 1993–94 
State 
Place of residence Economic status in rural areas 
Rural 
(a) 
Urban 
(b) 
Difference 
in 
percentage 
points 
between 
(b) and (a) 
Top Quintile 
(c) 
Bottom 
Quintile 
(d) 
Difference 
in 
percentage 
points 
between (d) 
and (c) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
68.1 86.8 18.7 82.3 56.8 25.5 
Bihar 52.6 77.7 25.1 72.3 33.5 38.8 
Source: NSSO, 50th Round: Employment-Unemployment Survey, 1993-94. 
Notes: The ‗School Participation Rate‘ refers to percentage of children of age 6-10, currently attending any educational institution. 
 
 
Residence in rural areas also severely restricted school participation, especially for 
the poor. Table 4.4 shows that the school participation rate for children aged 6–10 years 
was nearly 22 percentage points lower for those residing in rural areas of AP, as compared 
to those living in the urban areas of the state, and nearly 25 percentage points lower for 
those residing in rural areas of Bihar as compared to those living in its urban areas. There 
were marked differences in school participation by economic status in rural areas. In Table 
4.4 we can see that the school participation rates of the poorest strata of rural society, 
represented by the ―bottom-most quintile‖ are lower than the richest strata represented by 
the ―top-most quintile‖ by 26 percentage points in AP, and 39 percentage points in Bihar 
respectively.
82
 
The challenges were indeed formidable, and a new set of policies and enhanced 
federal resources were expected to provide the ―window of opportunity‖ to enable the 
states to overcome them. How the state governments would make use of these 
opportunities was therefore critical. In the next section I argue that based on prevailing 
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 The ‗top-most quintile‘ refers to the top 20 per cent all individuals in rural areas based on their monthly per 
capita household consumption expenditure, and the ‗bottom-most quintile‘ to the bottom 20 per cent of all 
individuals in rural based on their monthly per capita household consumption expenditure. 
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political circumstances, and prior history of implementing reforms, the chances for 
adoption of change seemed fairly high in both states. 
4.3 Expectations for Change in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar: A Few 
Propositions 
 
The specific aspects of political circumstances in AP and Bihar, which I consider as 
supportive of the chances for successful introduction and adoption of new policies in 
school education, relate to the timing of a new political leadership in each state and the 
agenda and the nature of the social alliance supportive of their rule. These arguments are 
based on the literature that is available on the political conditions for adoption of 
successful policy reforms. On the basis of country case studies of economic policy 
reforms, these studies point out that some of the political conditions indicative of 
favourable reform adoption include the timing—soon after a government‘s coming to 
power (also referred to as the ―honeymoon effect‖), especially with a strong legislative 
mandate, presence of a weak and fragmented opposition on which past failures can be 
blamed, a visionary leader with a strong commitment and ability to take risks, and the 
presence of a strong team of ―technocrats‖ (Nelson 1990; Wallis 1999; Williamson and 
Haggard 1994).
83
 It appeared that many of these political conditions were indeed present in 
AP and Bihar at the time of adoption of education reform in 1995, including a stable 
leadership during the phase of consolidation of reforms. 
Although there were significant differences of context between Chandrababu 
Naidu‘s leadership in AP, and Lalu Yadav‘s in Bihar, both were considered significant 
regional leaders, and were in power for fairly long periods at the time of implementation of 
reforms. The differences I refer to relate mainly to the nature of the mandate that they 
enjoyed, their agenda of rule, and the social coalitions which were supportive of their 
leadership. For different reasons, each of these aspects of their rule could be counted 
among political circumstances that were likely to have favoured radical policy changes in 
school education. 
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 See Williamson (1994) for a comprehensive overview of over a dozen country case studies, highlighting 
specially the role of politics in the policy reform process. This is based on the proceedings of a conference 
organised for this purpose by the Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, in 1993.   
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Andhra Pradesh: Naidu Projects Himself as a “New Leader”  
 
There was no ―honeymoon effect‖ of a new government in the case of AP, as Naidu 
came to power following what was widely referred to as a ―palace coup‖ in August 1995 
(Mooij 2007; Reddy 2002). That description of the power of a new government having a 
strong political mandate, was indeed more apt for his father-in-law N.T. Rama Rao (NTR), 
who had led his party the Telugu Desam Party, to a sweeping victory in the elections for 
the state Legislative Assembly in 1994. Naidu supported NTR in those elections. But 
following a change in circumstances, the family and a majority of the legislators supported 
Naidu‘s back-door entry to power as the Chief Minister of AP in 1995. The TDP under 
NTR had come to power on populist political promises such as free rice and housing for 
the poor, and prohibition on sale of liquor, and had the image of being pro-poor, pro-
peasants, and pro-women. 
Given this background, Naidu‘s challenge was to carve out a different ―image‖ for 
himself, and thus out-do the appeal of his predecessor NTR‘s populism. He achieved this 
by adopting the image of a moderniser and a champion of liberalisation oriented policies. 
Characteristic elements of his new agenda were the emphasis on the use of information 
technology, approaching the World Bank for a policy loan for economic restructuring,
84
 
and promoting a global image of the state in economic forums such as those at Davos. 
While Suri (2004) dubbed him as a ―CEO in the arena of democracy‖, Rudolph and 
Rudolph (2001) noted the ―iconisation‖ of the status of Naidu, and argued that this was the 
consequence of sharing of sovereignty with the states in the Indian federal system (whereas 
earlier it had vested only with the Centre in Delhi), in a changed scenario of a liberalising 
India.   
Naidu‘s new agenda for rule had the backing of powerful business and media 
houses in the state, the urban elite, and regionally in a new entrepreneurial class which 
came up in coastal AP.
85
 Besides, a number of backward castes too came to support the 
TDP because of their disenchantment with the Congress Party.  However, it was not as 
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 The Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Programme provided a policy loan for US$545 million to the 
state government in 1998. This was the first ever comprehensive loan to a state government in India. 
85
See Upadhya (1997) for details on the emergence of this regional entrepreneurial class from rich peasants 
of coastal Andhra. 
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much the mandate that Naidu had, or the social alliance backing his rule, as much as his 
reliance on the image of being a moderniser, representing a distinct break from the past, 
which was the most compelling political argument in favour of adopting school reforms. 
Reforming schools and a focus on primary education was presented as an element of the 
growth model that Naidu promoted. This emphasis could be seen in the Vision 2020 
document (prepared by the noted global consulting firm McKinsey), which outlined the 
blueprint of a growth-path for the state following the neo-liberal economic model 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh 1999), the Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring 
Programme loan from the World Bank, which provided funds for covering all districts of 
the state under the DPEP, and in the Janambhumi Development Programme associated 
with Naidu. However, scholars noted that here were no other major policy announcements 
in primary education by the government besides implementing the donor funded DPEP, 
indicating that the government‘s talk about reforming primary education were more in the 
nature of a rhetoric, aimed at creating a ―hype‖ around the more explicit elements of the 
development path he was pursuing via a commitment to market principles (Mooij 2007 
p.37). 
 
Bihar: Strong Mandate and Political Populism 
 
The political conditions of a new government with a strong mandate, having the freedom 
of political manoeuvre soon after assuming office—referred to in the literature as the 
―honeymoon effect‖ (Williamson and Haggard 1994 p.571)—as well as a weak opposition 
in disarray upon whom the blame of past mistakes could be laid were both present in Bihar 
between 1995 and 2004–05, the period under focus in so far as the role of political leaders 
in the reform process is being analysed in this research. In this year, the Janata Dal came to 
power with an absolute majority of its own, under the leadership of Lalu Prasad Yadav.
86
 
The social basis of the Janata Dal was among the upwardly mobile backward castes 
which had benefited from earlier government programmes for land reforms and the green 
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 See Kumar (2002) for an analysis of the rise of Lalu Prasad Yadav led- RJD in the 1995 elections for the 
state legislative Assembly. 
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revolution in agriculture. Besides, Lalu Yadav had an appeal of personality by which he 
was characterised as the messiah of the poor.
87
 In fact in his pro-poor posturing and appeal 
for ―dignity‖ for backward castes, bore many similarities to Naidu‘s predecessor NTR‘s 
pro-poor posturing and appeal for Telugu pride. However, the comparison between the 
pro-poor image and populism of the two leaders could not be carried too far, as NTR‘s 
regime was characterised by a plethora of substantive transfers to the poor, whereas Lalu‘s 
made promises to the poor in his garib-railis (literally, processions of the poor) to give 
them free dhoti-saris (items of clothing for men and women respectively) on subsidised 
rates, but was never really implemented. Hauser notes this to be one more aspect of his 
failure to deliver as an administrator and indeed the ‗inability to apprehend the very idea of 
systematic development and change, leave alone to engage in its implementation‘ (Hauser 
1997 p. 2601). 
The clear orientation of the TDP and RJD leaders towards the poor and 
dispossessed, a strong support base of these parties among the backward castes, and 
regional roots that were critical of the Centre in the case of TDP, or the promise to ―get 
money from Delhi to help the poor of Bihar‖ by RJD leader Lalu Prasad in Bihar, and the 
opportunities in favour of pro-poor reform in school education were similarly poised in the 
two states. It seemed a safe assumption that the pro-poor and regional direction of their 
political positions would imply that implementing school reforms that benefitted the poor, 
especially the disadvantaged social-castes (who voted for the RJD in large numbers), 
would be a matter of political gains as well.   
 
 Introduction of New Ideas and Enhanced Administrative Capability  
 
Similarly poised in both the states were the advantages that they had in terms of having a 
prior history with implementing educational reform. The contributions of APPEP and BEP 
included introducing new ideas in the states‘ educational bureaucracies, creating state-level 
teams of implementers, and also some changes in administrative practises. All of these 
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 See Hauser (1997) for an account of the appeal of Lalu‘s charisma during the 1997 elections, even though 
the political rule in the state was characterised by ―widespread anarchy and administrative atrophy‖.  
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helped to enhance the capability of the state and its functionaries in adopting changes in 
the future. 
In AP, the APPEP set up a project office, project director, and staff, and all of these 
interacted with the state‘s Department of Education (DoE), creating a culture of interaction 
between two different (indeed contrasting) types of organisations—slow moving 
bureaucracy of the state DoE, with its focus on ―routine‖, and which was very remote from 
teaching issues, and a project which lay emphasis on ―innovation‖ and pedagogy. The 
second notable organisational contribution of the APPEP was at the mandal level, and was 
related to giving a new role to teachers as skilled trainers. Based on the belief that talented 
primary school teachers could be identified and given the training for, followed by the 
responsibility, to teach their colleagues, the new role of the Mandal Resource Person 
(MRP), was created at the mandal level (King 1994a p.4).  
The pedagogic changes were to be seen in new textbooks and in the DIETs, where 
new methods of pre-service and in-service teacher training were being put in place. 
Teacher centres were set up for a cluster of schools to encourage regular interaction and 
peer-learning among teachers and address on-going concerns (rather than one-time training 
inputs alone). The strength of some of these changes was apparent in the efforts of the state 
to adapt a federal initiative for teacher training—the ―Special Orientation of Primary 
Teachers‖, to include an orientation to both central initiatives, as well as state level 
innovations. King (1994a) noted this as a more holistic approach to ―what have often in 
India been seen as a set of separate schemes and initiatives‖ (King 1994a p.2). 
A lasting innovation of the APPEP, and one which was adopted by the DPEP  as a 
part of the technical design prescribed by the latter programme for the country as a whole, 
was that of encouraging small, but meaningful expenditure on innovation (that is, 
expenditure on non-salary items) at the school level. This included a small amount of 
money for school supplies—Rs 500 to be spent by each school and Rs 2,000 for teacher 
centres. Besides, a small grant was also given for occasional meetings and conferences of 
teachers and teacher trainers. How significant this small grant from the project was in 
encouraging innovation, and some flexibility of decision making at the school level, can be 
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seen from the fact that this practice was adopted under the DPEP, and was noted in all 
reviews of the programme as one of its lasting contributions (Pandey 2000) 
The BEP too introduced new ideas and administrative practices, although these 
were somewhat different from those of the APPEP. In comparison to the APPEP, the BEP 
worked outside of the state government‘s DoE and its field staff. Also, while the focus of 
the APPEP was on institutions, BEP‘s main focus was on community mobilisation. The 
programme was intended to ―initiate a dialogue on Bihar‘s educational reconstruction‖, 
with the hope that the social forces which would combine to work for this new agenda 
included the Bihari youth, dissatisfied with the way things were in the state, and running a 
number of voluntary agencies and activist groups, dedicated teachers, and public spirited 
people, among others (Government of Bihar and Government of India 1990 pp. 1, 7). The 
institutional innovations reflected both these aspects—of being located outside the 
traditional, institutional structure of the government, and on community mobilisation. 
Two of the notable changes were as follows: first, housing the BEP in a new 
―autonomous society‖, with a specially selected officer of the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) to lead it, but with other staff being drawn from both the government and 
non-government sectors.
88
 Second related to the setting up of community bodies known as 
the Village Education Committees (VECs), to be selected by the aam-sabha (or general 
council of all the villagers), but in reality the members were selected on the basis of  
―instructions from above‖, meaning the BEP bureaucracy (UNICEF 1994 p.9). The VECs 
helped in the distribution of textbooks, donation of land for schools, and construction of 
school buildings. Along with the Mahila Samakhya, a programme for women‘s 
empowerment which worked along-with the BEP in Bihar, the VECs were expected to be 
community bodies to which the schools, non-formal education centres, and teachers would 
be accountable.
89
 Both these institutional innovations—f an autonomous society at the 
state level to house the DPEP, and for schools to have community bodies, were accepted in 
                                                          
88
 Officers of the Indian Administrative Service are recruited and trained by the Centre, and assigned to state-
level cadres. They are generalists who lead the administrative machinery of the state governments, and also 
the Centre. Their responsibilities include both policy formulation and implementation.     
89
 The Mahila Samakhya was a programme for women‘s empowerment, funded by the Dutch government, 
and run by the Centre‘s Department of Education in selected states. Details on the programme can be had 
from http://education.nic.in/ms/Genesis.pdf 
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principle by the DPEP, with some flexibility in design.
90
 In fact, decisions with respect to 
providing small school grants and teacher grants were to be spent in consultation with the 
community bodies—this was an adaptation of the APPEP innovation, along with the BEP 
practice. 
 
  
                                                          
90
 The states were given flexibility in terms of choosing the type of ―community bodies‖ they set up. These 
varied from ―Parent Teachers Association‖,―Mother Teachers Association‖, ―School Management 
Committees‖, and ―Village Education Committees‖.     
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4.4 The Puzzle of Contrasting Outcomes 
 
Some idea of the changes brought about by reforms came from changes in intermediate 
policy variables like public expenditures, which I have taken note of in Chapter 3. 
However, increased expenditures by themselves do not necessarily signify more equitable 
changes or institutional reforms. Besides, I have already taken note of the problems with 
the government‘s reporting of its achievements in school education; one reliable way of 
assessing ―outcomes‖ are the NSS reports on school participation. On the basis of various 
NSS rounds from 1993–94 to 2004–05, I compare the trends in primary school 
participation, disaggregated by gender and socio-economic status in the two states (Tables 
4.5–4.8).The results show that the achievement of increase in total participation rates in the 
case of AP reflects a consistency over the entire time period under consideration, a greater 
participation of disadvantaged social categories, and also greater socio-economic equity in 
participation. These three are missing in the case of Bihar, especially for the first time 
period under consideration—between 1993–94 and 1999–2000. In this time period, total 
school participation rates for primary school-age children in the state declined at first, and 
only after that did they show an upward trend. 
In AP, the participation rates increased, gender and rural-urban gaps declined, and 
the participation of disadvantaged social-castes and the poor, especially in rural areas also 
increased. In 1993–94, the total school participation rates for primary school age children 
in the state was 72.8 per cent, marginally higher than the all-India level of 71.7 per cent. 
This increased by nearly 12 percentage points between 1993–94 and 1999–2000, and then 
again by nearly 11 percentage points, between1999–2000 and 2004–05. By 2004–05, 
nearly a decade after educational reform was introduced, over 95 per cent of the primary 
school age children were reported to be attending school in the state. Critical in achieving 
these high rates of participation was the increasing participation of girls and the narrowing 
down of gender differences—that is, difference between the school participation rates for 
boys and girls. This difference was nearly 12.7 percentage points in 1993–94; however, by 
1999–2000, it had gone down to 5.6 percentage points. By 2004–05, the state was 
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achieving near-parity in the participation for boys and girls at the primary stage (see Table 
4.5).  
Participation rates for children from rural areas increased as well—from 68.1 per 
cent in 1993–94 to 94.3 per cent in 2004–05, an increase of 26 percentage points. The high 
rural-urban gap characteristic of school participation in 1993–94 was also reduced 
substantially. Rural participation rates were lower than urban rates by nearly 19 percentage 
points in 1993–94; this gap was reduced to about 4 percentage points in 2004–05. 
There were other gains indicative of greater equity in AP—he enrolment rates for 
the poorest strata among the rural poor (represented by the bottom-most quintile in Table 
4.8), and the severely disadvantaged social categories of SCs and STs, all increased by 
over 30 percentage points between 1993–94 and 2004–05, and reported participation rates 
above 90 per cent in the 61
st
 round of household surveys, held in 2004–05 (see Tables 4.7 
and 4.8). 
In Bihar, as I have already noted, the total participation rates declined at first by 
nearly 4 percentage points—from nearly 55 to 51 per cent between 1993–94 and1999–
2000. There was an increase thereafter (between 1999–2000 and 2004–05), but against this 
low base of 1999–2000. The total participation rates were nearly 68 per cent in 2004–05, 
an increase of nearly 17 percentage points over 1999–2000. Participation of girls, and of 
children in rural areas, increased too. For girls the participation rates increased by nearly 
18 percentage points over the decade (from 45 per cent in 1993–94 to 63 per cent in 2004–
05) and in rural areas by 12 percentage points (from 52.6 per cent in 1993–94 to 66.9 per 
cent in 2004–05). Gender gap and differences in school participation rates between rural 
and urban areas also declined. However, even with these positive changes over the decade, 
the progress in Bihar was slower than that in AP (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). 
Moreover, notwithstanding the increase in school participation rates reported by the 
data for 2004–05, the low participation rates for SCs (52.3 per cent) and for the poorest 
strata among the rural poor (50.3 per cent, represented by the bottom-most quintile in 
Table 4.8), are representative of the unfinished agenda of achieving equity in primary 
school participation intended to be a universal right of all children (see Tables 4.7 and 4.8). 
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Table 4.6: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Place of 
Residence, 1993–94 and 2004–05 
State 
1993–94 1999–2000 2004–05 
Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
68.1 86.8 72.8 82.6 89.9 84.6 94.3 98.0 95.2 
Bihar 
52.6 77.7 54.9 49.5 68.5 51.3 66.9 80.5 68.0 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Rounds 50(schedule 10), 55(schedule 10), 61(schedule 10) 
Notes: The ‗School Participation Rate‘ refers to percentage of children of age 6-10, currently attending any 
educational institution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Gender, 1993–94 
and 2004–05 
State 
1993–94 1999–2000 2004–05 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
79.3 66.6 72.8 87.3 81.7 84.6 96.4 93.9 95.2 
Bihar 
62.2 45.0 54.9 58.4 42.6 51.3 72.3 62.7 68.0 
All-India 
77.0 65.6 71.7 81.2 72.7 77.2 88.7 85.0 86.9 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Rounds 50(schedule 10), 55(schedule 10), 61(schedule 10) 
Notes: The ‗School Participation Rate‘ refers to percentage of children of age 6-10, currently attending any educational 
institution. 
123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Social Caste, 1993–94 
and 2004–05 
 
State 
1993–94 1999–2000 2004–05 
ST SC Others ST SC OBC Others ST SC OBC Others 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
                     
59.2  
                 
65.4  
                     
75.8  
            
66.6  
            
85.4  
            
83.3  
            
91.7  
                
91.0  
                
95.6  
                
94.8  
                
97.1  
Bihar 
               
29.8  
               
40.1  
                   
59.6  
                
49.5  
                
37.5  
             
52.5  
                
62.4  
            
67.8  
                
52.3  
                
71.1  
                
79.1  
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Rounds 50(schedule 10), 55(schedule 10), 61(schedule 10) 
Notes: (1) The ‗School Participation Rate‘ refers to percentage of children of age 6-10,currently attending any educational 
institution. (2) ST-Scheduled Tribe; SC- ScheduledCaste; OBC –Other Backward Caste. For 1993-94, "OBC" is combined with 
"Others" 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: The School Participation Rate for Children Aged 6–10 Years, by Economic Status in Rural 
Areas, 1993–94 and 2004–05 
State 
1993–94 1999–2000 2004–05 
Topmost 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
in 
percentage 
points 
Topmost 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
in 
percentage 
points 
Topmost 
Quintile 
Bottom 
Quintile 
Difference 
in 
percentage 
points 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
82.3 56.8 25.5 86.2 74.2 12 97 91.4 5.6 
Bihar 72.3 33.5 38.8 69.3 31.6 37.7 86.7 50.3 36.4 
 
Source: National Sample Survey Organization, Rounds 50(schedule 10), 55(schedule 10), 61(schedule 10) 
 
Notes: (1) The ‗School Participation Rate‘ refers to percentage of children, aged 6-10 years, currently attending any educational 
institution (2) Top-most quintile: Top 20 per cent of all the individuals based on their monthly per capita household consumption 
expenditure, Bottom-most quintile: Bottom 20 per cent of all the individuals based on their monthly per capita household consumption 
expenditure. 
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4.5 Conclusion: The Need to Examine the Process of Policy Implementation 
Notwithstanding the similarities of context and the enabling framework of federal 
opportunities, what we can see in the case of AP and Bihar, is a story of sub-national 
variation. The ―puzzling outcomes‖ seen in the form of divergent trajectories of school 
participation in the two states are the result of the intervening role of agents—political 
leaders and policymakers. I now turn my attention towards understanding how they have 
made use of these opportunities, and compare the strategies that they adopted in managing 
the contending ideas, interests, and institutions in the process of school reform. 
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Chapter 5 
Reform Opponents: 
 Teachers, Unions, and the Implementation of Change 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the expectations of the ―conventional paradigm‖91 about the control 
of powerful interest groups over the policy process, which leads to the expected role of 
teachers as reform opponents, as against the empirical evidence from Andhra Pradesh (AP) 
and Bihar on the impediments to reform brought about by their collective action. I examine 
specifically how teacher interests were managed during the course of implementing 
reforms in AP and Bihar, and the nature of organised and collective action of teacher 
unions in opposing the efforts for improving the quality of primary schools in these states.  
The management process in the two states varied—in AP the strategy was one of 
realigning policies for resolving the grievances of teachers, and in the process weakening 
the hold of unions over teachers, while also playing on inter-union rivalries and 
accommodating the demands of the union with the largest numbers. Bihar provides a 
contrast, in that both the direction of policies and the government‘s approach towards 
unions was one of confrontation. In both the cases, there was no formidable challenge to 
the reform process from the unions, although for different reasons. I argue that the political 
dynamics did not mechanically fit the ―stylised‖ view of teacher unions opposing reform. 
It mattered how the process was managed during the course of reform implementation, as 
did the variations in party-political affiliations, structures, and the competitiveness of the 
unions in the two states.  
The two principal sources of information for this chapter are an analysis of state 
government documents relating to teacher policy issues, and interviews conducted with 
                                                          
91
 I borrow the term ―conventional paradigm‖ from Geddes (1995 pp.198–9), and use it interchangeably with 
the terms ―formal political economy‖ or ―new political economy‖. According to Geddes, conventional 
paradigm includes the assumptions and arguments of pluralism and the economists‘ stylised view of politics. 
It is characterised by a focus on interest groups or classes, and on material interests, to the exclusion of all 
others. I have already discussed the critique of such an approach to politics and the policy reform process in 
Chapters 1 and 2.  
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state level policymakers and the leaders of teacher unions. The interviews with office 
bearers and leaders of teacher unions were conducted at the state level, and at the 
headquarters of the selected districts in AP and Bihar.
92
 In Hyderabad I interviewed office 
bearers and the leaders of nine primary school teachers‘ unions, and 16 more in the 
selected districts of East Godavari and Mahabubnagar. Since unions varied in their strength 
in the districts, I interviewed leaders only of those that were considered ―influential‖ in the 
region and had offices in the district headquarters. In Bihar I interviewed the office bearer 
and leader of only one primary school teachers‘ union in Patna, and eight more in the 
selected districts of Gaya and Purnia (see Appendix 3 for a list of the teacher union leaders 
interviewed). 
This chapter has five sections. The first gives an overview of the problems and 
constraints faced by the two states with regard to their existing policies for teachers. The 
second describes the unfurling of the new policy sequence for overcoming the constraints 
viewed as critical in each state. The slow evolution of contrasting policies with respect to 
teachers, and the involvement of multiple institutions, including the judiciary, shows the 
complex and different nature of policy reforms in school education, as compared to those 
in economic policy (a theme I have discussed earlier in this thesis). I observe that changes 
in teacher policies in the two states were in a sense ―embedded‖,93 as they emerged within 
the context of institutional constraints in each state. However, the choices made are not 
simply a response to these constraints. There is a reflection of autonomy from the control 
of vested interests and institutions in the policy choices made by politicians as well as 
administrators. The third section examines the political role of teacher interests, organised 
collectively as unions. I argue that teacher unions in the two states played different roles in 
the process of implementing policy change on account of variations in their structure, inter-
union competition, and partisan affiliations. The fourth section assesses the extent to which 
                                                          
92
 I had initially planned to conduct interviews with union leaders in each selected mandal/block of the four 
districts. However, since there was a very thin presence of teachers‘ unions in the mandals of Andhra 
Pradesh, and no presence of teachers‘ unions at the block level in Bihar, I did not find respondents. The 
strong presence of the unions in the district headquarters in both states was indicative that this was where 
unions were needed the most—for resolving a gamut of teacher grievances at the office of the District 
Education Officer/District Superintendant of Education.   
93
 The term ―embedded‖ is commonly used in institutional sociology, and refers to state institutions being 
tied to, or rooted in society. The term gained wide usage following Peter Evans‘ (1995) book Embedded 
Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
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the collective action of unions posed a threat to reform implementation, and how the 
leadership for educational reform dealt with the unions in each state. Finally, the 
conclusion evaluates the comparative difference in approach and strategy in the 
management of teacher interests, and also how far these differences account for the 
variations in outcomes in the two states. In the light of the empirical evidence on teachers‘ 
and their unions in AP and Bihar, this section also evaluates some of the postulates of 
conventional theory regarding the circumscribing role of ―special interests‖ in the process 
of change. 
 
5.2 Problems and Constraints in Teacher Policies 
 
The main challenges in reform implementation existed with respect to adequate numbers 
and the competence of teachers, and transparent and professional policies for the 
deployment, and transfer of teachers. For most of the 1970s and 1980s, the provision for 
school education in India developed rapidly and in a centralised manner,
94
 focussing 
mainly on the expansion of infrastructure and personnel. The process of centralisation 
added to the complexity of each of these challenges. 
Some idea of the process of expansion can be gained from successive rounds of the 
All India Education Survey (AIES). These indicate that in 1973 nearly 90 per cent of the 
country‘s people were served by primary schools within a kilometre of their place of 
residence; however, by 2002 this figure had increased to nearly 99 per cent of the 
population (National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) 1999, 
2002). Besides, school teaching was one of the fastest growing professions in the country, 
with a growth rate of 11.3 per cent for primary school teachers between 1986 and 1993 
(NCERT 1995, cited in World Bank 1997 p.143). Official statistics indicate that there were 
nearly 1.64 million primary school teachers, teaching 70.37 million enrolled students in 
1991 (Ministry of Human Resource Development Selected Educational Statistics1990–91). 
                                                          
94
 Centralisation was the result of the states taking over schools managed by local bodies and under private 
management, but receiving grants from the government. There was no uniform national policy in this regard, 
and states differed in the specific steps with which this process was achieved.  NCIS (2002 pp.4, 9–11) 
provides details of the process of centralisation in Kerala. Also, Kingdon and Muzammil (2003 pp.138–41) 
document this process for Uttar Pradesh.  
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Yet there were severe constraints on the adequacy and quality of teachers in primary 
schools, reflected partly in the high pupil-teacher ratios shown in Table 5.1. In 1990–91 the 
official policy norm was of one teacher for 40 students, and the prevailing national average 
was 42 students for each teacher. AP had a pupil-teacher ratio of 50:1 and Bihar of 53:1. 
Reform efforts meant increasing enrolments at the primary stage, and there was therefore 
pressure for the immediate recruitment of teachers. 
Constraints on resources constituted a severe challenge in making new 
recruitments. But equally challenging were issues of the process to be followed—selection 
procedures characterised by discretion and lack of transparency were frequently challenged 
in the courts (Sharma 1999 p.1597), and the approval of posts of additional teachers 
required the concurrence of state Departments of Education (DoEs)—which was often 
slow and difficult to get (Sipahimalani-Rao 2004 p. 9). 
The second issue—which finds significant mention in the donor, policy, and 
research literature—is that of the poor quality of teachers (see NCERT 1994 pp.18–22; 
PROBE report 1999 pp. 56–7; World Bank 1997 pp.153–7). The extent of the problem is 
only partly reflected in the figures for trained teachers shown in Table 5.1, as this data 
reflects only the ―pre-service‖ training received by teachers before they joined the 
profession, and is in no way a reflection of their poor skills on the job.
95
 The need to 
improve the quality of teachers by providing training had been one of the central concerns 
of the first phase of educational reform policies (following the National Policy on 
Education 1986). The Teacher Education scheme, funded by domestic resources, 
established District Institutes of Education and Training (DIETs) in districts across the 
country for this purpose.
96
 But the DIETs were focused mainly on providing pre-service 
training, and they developed in a somewhat uneven manner across the country (National 
Institute of Educational Planning and Administration 2000a; Ramachandran and Sharma 
                                                          
95
 I have noted earlier that there was no systematic data at this time on the learning quality of students, and 
the World Bank (1997 pp. 153–7) cites Bashir (1994) to illustrate the poor subject knowledge existing among 
teachers and their lack of teaching skills—all pointing to the poor quality of the pre-service training imparted 
to teachers.    
96
Ramachandran and Sharma (2009 p. 24) note that 461 such institutions had been set up in districts across 
India by 2001. 
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2009 p.24).
97
 Based on a review of policy documents, Ramachandran and Sharma (2009 
p.24) also confirm this uneven development, and they note that the DIETs were somewhat 
better developed in the educationally advanced southern states of the country. The second 
phase of educational reform policies, under the District Primary Education Progamme 
(DPEP) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), placed strong emphasis on in-service training 
and established new institutions at the sub-district level of the block, and at school clusters 
each consisting of 8–10 schools.98 
 
Table 5.1: Pupil-Teacher Ratio and the Percentage Share of Trained Teachers in Primary 
Schools, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 1990–91 to 2007–08 
State 
% Trained Teachers Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
1990–91 1995–96 2000–01 2007–08 1990–91 1995–96 2000–01 2007–08 
Andhra Pradesh 97.0 97 97 94 53 50 45 32 
Bihar* 87.9 86 95* 85* 50 55 67 68 
All India 89.8 88 86 90 42 47 43 47 
Source: ―Selected Educational Statistics‖, Ministry of Human Resource Development (MoHRD), Government of India (GoI). 
Various Years.  
Notes: (i) The pupil-teacher ratio is defined as the number of pupils enrolled in primary schools divided by the number of 
teachers; trained status refers to pre-service training only. (ii) *Figures for Bihar for 2000–01 and 2007–08 are for the new state 
of Bihar, created after its separation from Jharkhand in 2000. 
 
The third main challenge related to policies for the management of teachers and 
was mainly the issue of their deployment and transfer. In both states, teachers feared 
deployment to rural areas, and tried very hard to get postings to schools in urban areas. In 
the absence of clear vacancies, many teachers were simply ―attached‖ to schools in urban 
                                                          
97
 The NIEPA (2000a, pp. iii, 37, 67) Report notes that in West Bengal no DIETs had been opened at the 
time of the review, Bihar had made no recruitment of faculty for its DIETs, and in Uttar Pradesh barely 57 
per cent of the DIETs had regular electricity connections. 
98
Pandey (2000 pp. 23–24) considers this one of the most crucial elements of the DPEP strategy. New 
institutions for in-service teacher training called ―Cluster Resource Centres‖ were set up for 8–10 schools, 
and for every 8–10 clusters a ―Block Resource Centre‖ was established. The DPEP made no interventions 
through the DIETs. But the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan combined both initiatives for teacher training in the first 
phase (DIETs) and under DPEP (BRCs and CRCs). 
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areas by a (mis)use of discretion by the education authorities. This produced an effective 
depletion of teachers available for schools in rural areas. Besides, teachers in both states 
faced very similar problems with respect to what were referred to as ―individual 
grievances‖—these grievances related to issues such as timely payment of salaries and 
increments, promotion, leave, and other benefits. These grievances were to be dealt with 
by the government‘s district-level education officers.99 Since there were a very large 
number of government teachers, there was a huge backlog of cases to be dealt with. In AP, 
teachers complained of the ―authoritarian‖ use of power by the District Education Officer 
(DEO).
100
 In Bihar, the former secretary of education of the state government complained 
that teachers had been reduced to the status of ―class four‖ employees of the state due to 
the process of centralisation.
101
 Teachers had to run to the government secretariat in Patna 
for the redress of any grievance, and it was said that ―a powerless teacher had to deal with 
a very powerful bureaucracy‖.102 
                                                          
99
 In Andhra Pradesh, the District Education Officer (DEO) and in Bihar the District Superintendant of 
Education (DSE) respectively were the officers responsible for primary school teachers. In June 2011, GoB 
effected reforms in the structure of educational administration of the districts and the post of DSE was 
abolished. So in Bihar too, it is now the DEO who heads the district administration for education, including 
primary schools.  
100
 Personal interviews with Mr D.N. Murthy, District Project Coordinator, SSA, East Godavari district, 
Kakinada, 28 February 2006; Mr Sudhakar Reddy, leader of Panchayati Raj Teachers‘ Union, Hyderabad, 
13July 2005. 
101
 ―Class Four‖ refers to the lowest category of government employees, also known as ―Group D‖ 
employees. 
102
 Personal interview with Mr B.K. Sinha, Additional Secretary Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 
Sardar Patel Bhavan, New Delhi, 13 February 2008. Sinha was Education Secretary, Government of Bihar in 
2002. 
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With respect to these issues, the federal reform policies designed at the Centre only 
addressed the need to improve teacher quality through in-service training. Policies for 
recruitment, transfers and posting, and other matters related to service conditions were left 
solely within the purview of the states. It is interesting that, despite similarities in the 
nature of the problems, AP and Bihar took contrasting approaches towards managing their 
teachers. Thus, in AP state policy directed itself towards removing discretion and putting 
in place professional and transparent policies for teacher management, whereas in Bihar 
the thrust of state policy was to reverse the direction of centralisation. 
 
5.3 Contrasting Strategies for Managing Teachers in Andhra Pradesh and 
Bihar 
 
Context for Changes in Teacher Policy 
There were several nuances of the context in which changes in teacher policy were 
introduced in the two states. Because the federal guidelines had not prescribed any ground 
rules on the type of changes to be made, or the procedure to be followed, the contending 
ideas for reform, and also the lead actors and institutions, were those at the state level. As 
far as the institutions were concerned, there was a certain dualism—in that the ―state level 
societies‖, which were the hub of all the activities for educational reform, were given no 
role in determining teacher policies.
103
 This was a domain in which the state DoEs alone 
could operate. While the societies acted as a pressure group, calling for reform in teacher 
policies and improvement of the quality and accountability of teachers, the DoE was seen 
as an institution that was the bearer of an old set of policies and the hub of activity for 
vested interests.   
Given this context, reform in teacher policy was led completely by each state‘s 
political leadership. It was designed by state level policymakers, and was separate from all 
other federally guided reform initiatives. Pressure from teachers and their unions placed 
effective constraints on policy and political actors. However, the courts proved to be a very 
                                                          
103
The Centre directly transferred the external resources for educational reform to these societies. In relation 
to the Annual Work Plans for DPEP and SSA, specific activities related to teachers, such as teacher training, 
were organised by the state level societies.   
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significant institutional actor—their observations and orders played a crucial role in 
shaping both the politics of teachers and the directions of policy in the states.  
Policy Dilemma: Strengthening Formal Recruitment Proceudres for Regular Teachers 
or Decentralisation and Teachers on Contract?  
Contending ideas in the country regarding which new policies to adopt came from diverse 
initiatives in various states. The north Indian states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh 
(MP) took the lead in decentralising teacher recruitments and in hiring para-teachers; 
regular teachers were declared a ―dying cadre‖ in MP (Sharma 1999 p.1598). The southern 
states had a different approach, in that they did not reverse the policies of centralisation or 
hire para-teachers. Karnataka, for example, which has been called ―a front-runner among 
Indian states in introducing many pioneering reforms in teacher recruitment and transfers‖ 
focused on consolidating its formal school system and centralised recruitment policies in 
the course of implementing primary education reform (see Sipahimalani-Rao 2004 p. 2). 
 
5.4 The Direction of Teacher Policies in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 1990–2011 
Removing Discretion and Regular Recruitments in AP 
 
The leadership role with respect to changes in teacher policy in AP was taken by the state 
DoE. It included three important measures—the centralisation of recruitment procedures, 
the removal of discretion and instigation of greater transparency in transfers and postings, 
and improving the career path of teachers by increasing avenues for their promotion (see 
Table 5.2).  I now address each of these measures. 
First, there was a commitment by the state to fill vacancies regularly by recruiting 
full-time teachers. The policy reform in recruitment procedures introduced a written test 
organised by the Directorate of School Education (Government of  
Andhra Pradesh 2001), and the process was accepted by both teachers and their unions as 
being a transparent and fair one. Since complaints about the new recruitment process were 
few, there was no pending dispute in the courts about this issue. The resolve of the state 
towards recruiting full-time teachers, was reiterated in its policy towards contract teachers: 
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while the state did recruit para-teachers on contract, known as vidya volunteers, this was 
seen only as a temporary measure either to provide additional teachers where the increase 
in student enrolments so demanded, or as an interim measure while regular recruitments 
were in the pipeline. Vidya volunteers were never seen as a substitute for regular 
teachers.
104
 
Second, the government took extensive measures for rationalising teacher postings 
and transfers. The new criteria introduced were considered objective and transparent by the 
teachers. Put in place through successive orders of the government, the main feature of this 
policy was a clear specification of the rules for eligibility for transfer and a significant 
reduction of discretion (which had led to arbitrary transfers and favoured postings). 
Furthermore, the process was marked by a lot of transparency, with vacancies in schools 
and teacher applications for transfers being posted on websites for everyone to see (Table 
5.2). 
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 The Principal Secretary School Education, GoAP, Mr D. SambasivaRao, confirmed that this indeed 
remains the government policy until today. The latest round of recruitment is to be held in January 2012 for 
nearly 50,000 teacher positions. Personal Interview, Mr D.Sambasiva Rao, 21 December, 2011.  
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Table 5.2: Recent Teacher Policy Reforms in Andhra Pradesh—Dimensions and Content 
Year(s) Dimension Source(s) of change Content 
2000-01 
 
Recruitment 
 The Andhra Pradesh Direct 
Recruitment of Teachers (Scheme of 
Selected Rules 2000), AP Gazette 
Extraordinary Part-I, 23-01-2001. 
 Regular teachers recruited after 
centralised test 
  
 New procedure takes into 
account academic and 
professional qualification of 
teachers, and past work 
experience 
2002-2011 
 
Transfer and 
Posting 
 Government Order  Ms.No.46, May 10, 
2002 
 Constitutes a competent authority 
at district level for this purpose,  
 Provides clear rules  
 Narrow areas of discretion. 
  Government Order  Ms.No.102, August 
5, 2005 
 Mandal-wise vacancy placed on 
website 
  Government Order  Ms.No.65, May 19, 
2011 
 Teachers, who have completed 
eight years in a particular place, 
put on a transfer list. 
  
 Teachers awarded points- for 
having served in remote areas. 
  Based on points, priority list 
prepared and placed on website 
  
 Areas of discretion and arbitrary 
transfers defined; 
 Scope narrowed for arbitrary 
action 
1998-2005 
 
Promotion 
Avenues 
 Government Order Ms .No.505, 
November 16, 1998. 
 Common service rules for 
recruitment and promotions for 
government and panchayati raj 
teachers 
  Government Order Ms.No.538 
November 20, 1998. 
 Merger of cadre increases 
avenues for promotion and 
vacancies for postings 
 
 Ordinance 12/2005 (enacted as Act 
27/2005 of the GoAP, issued as 
Government.Order.Ms.No.95 and 96, 
July.25, 2005. 
 Reiterates unified cadre for 
promotion 
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The third important initiative was the creation of new opportunities of work and 
faster grievance redress for teachers. Here the reforms were beneficiaries of a prior 
administrative reform effort which created the new sub-district unit of the mandal. This 
was a much smaller unit of administration (at the sub-district level) compared to the 
―block‖ in Bihar, and it was created by Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao in 1986. Further, 
each mandal had a Mandal Education Officer (MEO), who worked as a combined unit for 
reform initiatives under DPEP and SSA, as well also performing the regular activities of 
the government‘s DoE. In practical terms, this meant that the MEO was now responsible 
both for motivating teachers to participate in activities meant to further the objectives of 
reform programmes, and also responding to their grievances. Since the number of teachers 
in a mandal was small—approximately 200–300, in comparison to 600–700 under the 
Block Education Officer (BEO) in Bihar—it was easier for the MEO to respond effectively 
to teacher grievances and win their trust. Besides, as part of the reform initiatives, 
additional functionaries were appointed under the MEO—the Mandal Resource Persons 
(MRPs) who were given the responsibility of making regular school visits to provide on-
site support for teaching and other academic activities. It was mainly the primary school 
teachers, and especially the younger ones among them, who chose to become MRPs. Thus, 
the reform process opened up a new avenue of work and professional satisfaction for many 
of the younger teachers for whom participation in DPEP and SSA training provided the 
chance of opportunity and influence close to the administration.    
Because the post of the MEO was also to be filled partly by the promotion of 
school teachers, the educational administration at the sub-district level came to have a 
composition that was more acceptable to teachers. Oppositional activity of the unions in 
the districts was directed towards the office of the DEO, and not the MEO—leaving the 
implementation of reform in schools undisturbed. Teacher grievances on account of delays 
in things like the sanction of leave, salary computation, promotions, transfer and postings, 
or any other service matter, were directed towards the district. And the reform team was 
seen as concerned only with academic and school improvement issues.     
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Institutional Deadlock and Contract Teachers in Bihar 
 
In Bihar, the key issue was that of the recruitment of teachers for the filling of regular 
vacancies. There was conflict between the government, the teachers, and the courts on this 
issue, and in this process it became clear that the existing policy with regard to the 
recruitment of teachers was not a settled covenant. As a result, no recruitment of teachers 
was made in the state in the 1990s, reflecting the absence of clear policy thinking and 
political will.  
Until the early 1990s, the Bihar government did not have a recruitment policy. 
Instead, it relied on a candidate‘s academic qualifications (having at least 12 years of 
schooling) and pre-service training as professional qualifications. The practice was to 
assign a ―priority‖ for the year in which a potential candidate had received pre-service 
training, and to prepare a district level ―panel‖ of eligible candidates in this manner. 
Whenever a vacancy arose, teachers were simply ―absorbed‖ from the respective district 
level panels. In 1993–94, the state government, led by Lalu Prasad Yadav, questioned the 
quality of pre-service training, and changed the recruitment policy. A centralised test 
conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission, and no regard to professional 
qualification of pre-service training, were the main features of this new policy (see Table 
5.3). Approximately 35,000 teachers were selected through this new process in 1993–94. 
But the new policy was challenged in the state‘s High Court by the Berozgaar Shikshak 
Sangha—a union of unemployed and ―trained‖ youth, who were waiting to be employed as 
teachers under the old system. The court amended the new policy, and directed the 
government to provide one year long induction training to all teachers recruited under the 
new policy, and candidates on the district-level panel were given a chance to appear in the 
test. A large number failed, despite being given three opportunities to pass the test. The 
government felt vindicated in its stand about the poor quality of training imparted in pre-
service teacher training institutions.  
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Table 5.3: Recent Changes to Teacher Recruitment Policy in Bihar—Dimensions and Content 
 
Year(s) Dimension Source(s) of change Content 
1993–94 
Recruitment of 
full-time teachers 
 
 Recruitment through centralised 
testing  
 Only performance in test matters 
 Professional qualification not taken 
into account 
 
2002 
Para-teachers on 
short-term 
contract 
Panchayat Shiksha Mitra(Anubandh 
Par Niyojan) Guideline, June 21, 
2002, Published in the Bihar Gazette 
Extraordinary, No.250, Patna, GoB. 
 Appointments made by panchayats  
 Lowers academic qualification to 10 
years of schooling, (earlier policy of 
12 years of schooling) 
 Professional qualification not taken 
into account 
 Person should be resident of the 
panchayat where she is selected as a 
teacher 
 11 month contract to teachers 
    
2006  
Panchayat Elementary Teacher 
(Employment and Service 
Conditions), Rules 2006, GoB. 
 Decentralised recruitment process-
devolves power of recruitment to local 
bodies 
 Abolishes the concept of para-
teachers (Panchayat Shiksha Mitra), 
and all of them to be absorbed as 
regular teachers  
 Priority in recruitment to trained 
teachers  
 Teachers to be paid a fixed 
honorarium, and no increments or 
benefits 
 
 
Parallel to the changes in the recruitment process, the government also decided to close 
down private teacher training institutes.
105
 The political leaders of the state felt that the 
―unemployed but trained youth‖ organised as the Berozgaar Shikshak Sangha were a 
―vested interest‖ since they mainly belonged to the upper castes. Political leaders also felt 
                                                          
105
 The Education Secretary, GoB, Mr M.M. Jha informed me that nearly 60 teacher training institutes were 
closed down in the state by former Chief Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav (Personal interview with  Mr M.M. 
Jha, Old Secretariat Patna, 5 June 2007).   
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that the court was being partisan in striking down a fair process of recruitment by 
testing.
106 
Following interventions by the court, the new policy was abandoned, and a very 
small number of teachers were recruited in the 1990s. But with nearly 4–5 per cent of 
teachers retiring every year, vacancies were on the rise. By 2005–06, nearly 100,000 
teacher positions were vacant in Bihar, and 90 per cent of these vacancies were in primary 
schools. Table 5.4 provides the Government of Bihar‘s estimate of the number of 
vacancies. The central government took serious note of the situation, especially because a 
large share of the resources under the SSA was coming from federal resources. It was clear 
that no progress could be made on implementing reforms without the teachers. 
In June 2002, the state government led by Rabri Devi formulated new rules for the 
decentralised recruitment of para-teachers by panchayats (see Table 5.3). Nearly 35,000 
Panchayat Shiksha Mitras (PSMs) were recruited on this basis. In the absence of clear 
guidelines on selection procedures, and a lack of effective monitoring from above, 
malpractices became rampant. This policy too was challenged in court by persons eligible 
to be appointed as teachers under the old criteria. In a strongly worded judgement in 2005, 
the Patna High Court observed of its educational system and politicians that: ―the state 
which has not been appointing any primary teacher since 1990, has generated generations 
of illiterates in the past twenty years.‖107 The operative part of the judgement, asked the 
Government of Bihar to formulate a plan for teacher recruitment, wherein trained teachers 
were to be employed as a matter of priority. 
  
                                                          
106
Looking back on these policy measures of the 1990s, the Education Secretary, GoB remarked in an 
interview in 2007: ―His (Mr Lalu Yadav’s) view was that the people who come to training (i.e. teacher 
training) were all from the upper caste. So he felt that we (that is, the government) should recruit through 
tests‖(Personal interview with Mr M.M. Jha, Old Secretariat Patna, 5 June 2007). 
 
107
Personal interview with Mr M.M. Jha, Old Secretariat Patna, 5 June 2007. This observation of the High 
Court has also been cited in news reports: See ―Bihar government ordered to appoint 35,540 trained teachers‖ 
(12 September 2009). Available at:http://www.sify.com/news/bihar-government-ordered-to-appoint-35-540-
trained-teachers-news-education-jmju4dabjhh.html, downloaded on 21 November 2011. 
139 
 
 
Table 5.4: Teacher Vacancy Position in Elementary Schools in Bihar, 1990 and 2005–06 
Year Sanctioned Posts Number of Teacher Vacancies 
1990 
Primary – 176,000 Primary – 35,000 
Secondary – 30,000 Secondary – 3,000 
Total – 206,000 Total – 38,000 
   
1995 
Primary – 176,000 Primary – 40,000 
Secondary – 30,000 Secondary – 5,000 
Total – 206,000 Total – 45,000 
 
2000 
Primary – 176,000 Primary – 70,000 
Secondary – 30,000 Secondary – 12,000 
Total – 206,000 Total – 82,000 
 
2005–06 
Primary - 420,000 Primary – 90,000 
Secondary – 40,000 Secondary – 10,000 
Total – 460,000 Total – 100,000 
Source: Personal Interview, Mr M.M. Jha, Education Secretary, Government of Bihar,5 June, 2007. 
Notes: (i) Primary   includes grades I-V and secondary includes grades VI-VIII, (ii) The number of teacher vacancies are 
―estimated  vacancies‖  for each of the years 
 
Strategic retreats were made by the Government of Bihar in 2006–07, abandoning 
its earlier policy of confrontation with the courts and with unemployed but potential 
teachers. In a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India, the state 
government withdrew from the case, and assured the court that it would provide 
employment to trained candidates on priority. A clear set of rules—referred to as ―Rules of 
2006‖—was formulated to specify the criteria and procedure for appointments, including 
reservations for Backward Castes (Government of Bihar 2006). The panchayats now have 
the responsibility of appointing primary school teachers. The new teachers are a 
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compromise between full time and para-teachers—they are paid a consolidated sum like 
contract teachers, but they do not have a pay scale or any other benefits. Unlike para-
teachers, they are guaranteed security of tenure. However, the issues of a professional 
career path and social security are yet to be addressed, making them comparable to para-
teachers in these respects.  
The recruitment process that followed for over 230,000 teacher positions in Bihar 
was noted as one of the largest in the world, with over 8.7 million applicants.
108
 The 
process is still to reach a measure of stability, with many complaints of irregularities, 
corruption, and nepotism, especially about the arbitrary use of power by the mukhiya. Of 
its own, the Government of Bihar has initiated a review to make the process fairer. It is 
clear from the complaints and reports of the review process that the implementation of 
decentralised policies for teacher recruitment also requires support from the state level. 
The political leadership and policy entrepreneurs in Bihar seem to have moved 
ahead with this strategic move on teacher recruitment, breaking the deadlock with the 
courts. The state political leadership has devolved its powers to panchayats, and perhaps 
won their political support. As the onus for implementation of the new policy is no longer 
on the government‘s DoE, it is saved the burden of handling interventions from the court. 
What has now come up, however, are a variety of individual grievances related to 
irregularities in the recruitment procedure followed by the new ―recruitment units‖ at the 
panchayat level. Apart from compliance and monitoring, what the system does need is a 
fair and quick process of grievance redress that is outside of the courts. 
Strategic Management of Teacher Interests in AP, Confrontation with Interests and 
Institutions in Bihar  
 
The government in AP acted in reforming policies in each of the major challenges 
identified with respect to teacher policies in the early 1990s, whereas the government in 
Bihar took the initiative only in the area of recruitment (see Table 5.5 for a comparative 
picture of policy initiatives). Indeed, some efforts were made in 2005 in Bihar on 
rationalising the transfer and posting policy. While the earlier policy was one of 
                                                          
108
 Job Zachariah and Nilesh Pandey, Rapid Appraisal of Teacher Recruitment in Bihar, UNICEF 2007. 
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consciously posting teachers away from their home village or block by district-wide 
transfers, service rules were amended to reverse this, and prioritise postings in the ―home 
block‖ through a block level committee. These changes were welcomed by the teachers, 
but they were far from achieving the levels of transparency seen in AP or Karnataka. The 
unions complained that there was a ―double establishment‖ that worked in the area of 
teacher transfers—that is, both the district and the block were points of authority.109 B.K. 
Sinha, the former Secretary of Education, Government of Bihar, confirmed that the greater 
were the points of administrative intervention, the more were the chances of the use of 
discretionary authority and opportunities for rent-seeking.
110
 The reversal in teacher 
recruitment policies in 2006, however, made these efforts redundant.  
More important was the sharp divergence in the direction of policies—increased 
centralisation and enhanced state power in AP, as compared to taking recourse to 
decentralisation in Bihar as a way to settle policy deadlocks, and perhaps gaining societal 
legitimacy for the state as the prime mover for pro-poor welfare action. Even with changes 
in government in the two states, the overall policy directions were not reversed. 
As seen in Table 5.5, the overall thrust of policy reform in AP was to reduce the 
grievances of teachers and the exercise of arbitrary authority exerted over them, and so, 
win their support for implementing changes. In Bihar, the grievances of teachers persisted, 
and the attitude of the educational administration at the district and sub-district levels 
towards teachers did not change. Teachers were therefore weakly associated with reform 
efforts. Another noticeable difference is that strategic management of interests allowed the 
state in AP with greater leverage in the handling of disputes in court. The fact that there 
were fewer points of conflict and contest allowed policy changes to persist. In contrast, the 
policy reform process in Bihar was a deeply contested one, and policy changes had to be 
abandoned primarily because of the intervention of courts. The courts were independent 
institutions, and did not act simply at the behest of ―vested interests‖. 
 
                                                          
109
 Personal interview with Mr Mahendra Prasad Singh, ArajpatritShikshakSangh, Gaya district, Bihar, 3 
October 2005. 
110
 Personal interview with Mr B.K. Sinha, Additional Secretary Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 
Sardar Patel Bhavan, New Delhi,13 February 2008.  
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Table 5.5: Political Dynamics of Teacher Policy Reforms, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar 
 Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Initiative 
Dimensions 
of Change 
Contest Outcome 
Dimensions 
of  Change   
Contest Outcome 
1.Recruitment 
  
A. Regular 
Teachers 
-Recruitment 
by centralised 
test  
- Due 
weightage to 
academic and 
professional 
qualification, 
and past 
work-
experience 
Accepted 
by 
teachers 
and 
unions as 
a fair 
process  
Policy 
persists 
-Recruitment 
by centralised 
test 
- No 
weightage to 
professional 
qualification in 
new 
procedure 
Conflict with 
those waiting 
to be 
employed as 
teachers 
 –organised 
as Berozgaar 
Shikshak 
Sangh 
-Policy 
challenged 
in court 
-Regular 
recruitment 
comes to a 
standstill 
-Policy 
abandoned 
B. Para-
Teachers(on 
contract) 
-Adopted as a 
short-term 
measure 
-Do not 
substitute 
regular 
teachers 
 
No 
conflict 
with 
teachers 
and 
unions 
Policy 
persists 
-Adopted as a 
long-term 
policy 
measure 
-Para-
teachers to 
replace 
regular 
teachers 
-Conflict with 
those waiting 
to be 
employed as 
teachers 
-Allegations 
of irregularity 
in 
appointment-
s 
Policy 
challenged 
in court 
-Poor 
quality of 
teachers 
-Policy 
abandoned 
2.Transfer -Transfer on 
the basis of 
transparent 
rules 
-Detailed 
rules evolve 
over time to 
narrow areas 
of discretion 
Accepted 
by 
teachers 
and 
unions as 
a fair 
process 
Policy 
persists 
No initiative 
made by state 
Grievances of 
regular 
teachers 
persist 
Regular 
teachers not 
engaged in 
the reform 
process 
3. Teacher 
Grievances 
 
-Creation of 
the Mandal 
and office of 
Mandal 
Education 
Officer (MEO) 
 
-MEO 
handles fewer 
number of 
teachers 
-New 
promotion 
avenue for 
teachers as 
MEO  
-New work 
avenue as 
Mandal 
Resource 
Persons   
Reliance 
of 
teachers 
on unions  
declines 
 
-Easy 
resolution 
of teacher 
grievances 
-Avenues 
for work 
and 
promotion 
associate 
teachers 
directly with 
reforms 
-No initiatives 
to associate 
sub-district 
administration  
with  reforms 
-Adversarial 
relations 
between BEO 
and teachers 
Weak 
association 
of teachers 
with the 
reform 
process 
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5.5 The State and the Politics of Teachers Unions: Competition and 
Cooperation in Andhra Pradesh, Conflict and Opposition in Bihar 
 
While the teacher unions in the two states differed in their strength, they were widely 
perceived as organisations that could wield political power to protect their own interests. 
Perhaps as anticipated opponents of the reform process, in neither state were they 
consulted during the course of formulating plans for change. But in the implementation 
phase, unions did not play the role expected of them according to formal theory. Thus, 
strong and competitive unions in AP did not stall reforms, nor did weak unions in Bihar 
guarantee major improvements in the school education system. Union-government 
relationships in the implementation of educational reform were strongly influenced by the 
strength of and competition among unions, as well as by their party-political affiliations. I 
now analyse the differences in strength and competitiveness and partisan affiliations of 
unions in both the states. I also assess the extent to which the existence of a cooperative 
relationship in AP, as opposed to a more confrontational one in Bihar, could be the result 
of these differences.  
Competing Unions in AP, Monopoly Power in Bihar 
Andhra Pradesh 
AP presents a picture of vibrant unions, actively competing with each other to enlist 
greater support of teachers, and influence state policies. There are at least nine unions 
which have offices at the state headquarters, and are considered to be ―recognised unions‖ 
(see Table 5.6). Not all of these unions are evenly spread across the state; they also vary in 
strength in different regions. The Panchayati Raj Teachers Union (PRTU) and the State 
Teachers Union (STU) are reported to be strong in the Telengana region, the Andhra 
Pradesh United Teachers Federation (AP-UTF) in the coastal region, and the AP-UTF and 
PRTU in the Rayalseema region. Accordingly, in Mahabubnagar district, the STU and 
PRTU were strong unions, whereas in East Godavari it was the AP-UTF that was the 
strongest. Regular elections were reported to be held every two years by most of these 
unions, even though the top-level leadership was said to alternate between a chosen few, 
and the emergence of really new leaders was rare.  
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Apart from variations in their regional presence, the unions also differed in the 
strength that they commanded, the issues around which they had historically originated, 
and their method of political association. While it may be difficult to state an objective 
basis on which one can classify any of these as a ―strong‖ union, one way to assess their 
strength is the number of their members. But a caveat here is that these numbers are 
provided by the unions themselves. And they may be unreliable on several counts. Thus, 
all unions admit the possibility of dual membership, and the total number of members of 
the unions exceeds the figures for the total number of teachers for the state. Also, the 
criteria of membership may differ between unions. The Government Teachers Association 
(GTA), as the name suggests, is a union of government teachers alone. The Telengana 
Rajya Teachers Union (TRTU), a new union, claims to be an organisation of teachers in 
the Telengana region alone. By definition, therefore, these two unions have a much smaller 
membership. The PRTU consists of teachers appointed under the local self-government 
bodies, and seems to have the largest number of teachers followed by the AP-UTF (see 
Table 5.6). Having a larger membership is certainly an advantage in wielding political 
influence and extracting concessions. 
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Table 5.6: Data on the Teacher Unions in Andhra Pradesh 
 Name of Unions 
Year in which 
established 
Number of 
Members* 
Political affiliation 
1 
Andhra Pradesh Teachers 
Federation(APTF) (Split now into two 
groups, APTF1938 and APTF257) 
1947 70,000 Indian National Congress (INC) 
2 
Andhra Pradesh United Teachers 
Federation (APUTF) 
August 10, 1974 1,10,000 
Communist Party of India –Marxist 
(CPM) 
3 Andhra Pradesh UpadhyaySangh 1984 50,000 
BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP)/ 
RashtriyaSwayamSewakSangh 
(RSS). 
4 Democratic Teachers Federation 2000 30,000 
Parties with a progressive outlook 
(Ultra left  groups, referred to as 
‗Naxals‘) 
5 Government Teachers Association 1982 30,000   
6 
Panchayati Raj Teachers Union** 
(PRTU) 
1978 1,20,000 
Independent-strikes a rapport with 
the party in power 
7 State Teachers Union (STU) 
1946 in the 
Telengana region, 
under Government 
of the Nizam rulers. 
In the regions of 
Rayalseema and 
Coastal Andhra, it 
was set up in 1963 
84,300 Communist Party of India (CPI) 
Source: Personal compilation by the author; see the notes below. 
Notes:  
(i) * The number of members is based on claims of teachers‘ unions themselves. There is no objective way of determining how 
many members a union has, as unions claim to have a following higher than they actually do. In addition, unions also accept the 
possibility of dual membership—one teacher may be a member of more than one union. However, teachers, officials of the DoE, 
GoAP, and the unions have a fair estimate of the relative strength of the various unions in the three regions of AP. I have cross-
verified claims of membership by asking for this figure from the state as well as district level representatives of the unions. In 
case of difference between the figures reported by the state level/district level functionary, the lower figure is reported.  
(ii) ** This union now officially calls itself the ―Progressive Recognised Teachers Union‖ on the ground that since 1991 the state 
government has given to Panchayati Raj teachers, the status of government teachers. This has been challenged by the GTA and 
the dispute is pending in the federal court—the Supreme Court of India. However, it is still referred to by its old name. 
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Bihar  
Bihar presents a contrasting picture. I found only one large union representing primary 
teachers in the state, and in the districts there was no formal set-up comparable to that seen 
in AP.  
The Bihar Rajya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh (BPSS) is the main union with a presence in the 
state capital. Like the PRTU in AP, the BPSS is not formally associated with any political 
party, but in the past it has been closely associated with the Congress Party. The other 
prominent union in Bihar is the Arajpatrit (non-gazetted) Prarambhik Shikshak Sangh 
(APSS)—formally affiliated to the Communist Party of India (CPI). Publicly, APSS 
leaders regard themselves as free of the control of any political party. Thus, one leader 
stated: ―We are only imbued with the colour of the Communist Party, we are a laathi (a 
stick) that can navigate its own way, we do not need clutches of a political party‖.111 The 
union claims a membership of 85,000 at the state level, and notes that its relationship with 
the BPSS is competitive at the primary level (that is, grades I–V), whereas they are 
collaborative and support of each other at the secondary school level (that is, grades I–
VIII).    
Both unions have a very weak presence in the districts and blocks. In one of the 
field districts—Gaya—which is reported to have a history of a strong teachers‘ movement, 
the BPSS was said to have a large following. But unlike what was observed in AP, I did 
not find a formal office for either of the unions in the headquarters of the district. The 
union leaders sat outside the district education office every evening. I met with and 
interviewed them at a road-side tea-stall, opposite the district education office in Gaya.  
The other unique feature is the presence of a ―union‖ of potential candidates, likely 
to have been employed as teachers under the earlier policies of recruitment (that is, the 
policies in existence prior to 1993–94), which employed teachers from a list of candidates 
who had received pre-service teacher training. This was the BSS (unemployed teachers 
                                                          
111
Personal interview with Mr Mahendra Prasad Singh, Arajpatrit Shikshak Sangh, Gaya District, Bihar, 3 
October 2005. 
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association) discussed in an earlier section. Although it is not strictly a ―teachers‘ union‖, 
teacher policy directions in the state were nevertheless strongly affected by the demands of 
this group. It may be useful here to note that the BSS consisted of nearly 60,000 
unemployed youth. And senior policymakers of the Government of Bihar admitted that this 
group had the power to influence the thinking of lawyers and judges in the state.
112
 In Gaya 
district, I also came across another union—the Pragatisheel Shikshak Sangh—whose 
demands were similar to the BSS. The reversal of the centralised recruitment policy in the 
state was in theory expected to break the power of unions. But contrary to this assumption, 
the Panchayat Shiksha Mitras—that is, para-teachers recruited by local bodies—also 
organised themselves as a union in Gaya primarily to demand higher wages, and security 
of tenure, similar to what happened with the Shiksha Karmis in MP (Sharma 1999 p. 
1599). 
The BPSS and APSS have a monopoly of power over teachers, and a very weak 
process of internal democracy within their organisations. Although both unions claimed to 
have a formal constitution that stipulated the regular holding of elections at the block, 
district, and state levels, the process was observed more or less as a token.
113
 In the BPSS, 
Mr Brij Nandan Sharma has remained the head since 1967, and he recollected having been 
elected unopposed last time (in December 2006).
114
 The rival union APSS, asserts that the 
key difference between itself and the BPSS is that ―…while BPSS is a dictatorship, we are 
a democracy‖, and further (in a lighter vein) that Mr Brij Nandan Sharma (the head of 
BPSS) ―…is the chairman at all levels—right from his own village in Jehanabad, to the 
district headquarters of the larger Gaya district, and the state headquarter in Patna‖.115 
Currently, what makes the potential of both unions for collective action largely 
irrelevant is the reversal of teacher policies in the state—in particular, new teachers are 
appointed by the panchayats and do not belong to a state-wide cadre. The key issue that 
the BPSS took up was at least two decades ago—the demand for the abolition of local 
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 Personal interview with Mr Arunish Chawla, Special Secretary cum Additional Finance Commissioner, 
Resources, Government of Bihar, Patna, 4 June 2007. 
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 Formally, delegates elected at the district level form the ―electoral college‖ for state level elections. In 
reality, the same person is elected unopposed. 
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 Personal interview with Mr Brij Nandan  Sharma,  Bihar Rajya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh, Patna 4 June, 
2007. 
115
 Personal interview with Mr Mahendra Prasad Singh, Arajpatrit Shikshak Sangh, Gaya district, Bihar, 3 
October 2005. 
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control over teacher appointments and service conditions, followed by the state‘s takeover 
of privately managed schools governed by local bodies. These demands were fulfilled by 
the then Congress Chief Minister Jagan Nath Mishra in the course of the 1970s 
and1980s.
116
 Interestingly, things have now come full circle in the state, with changes in 
recruitment policy reversing this very policy of centralisation. 
Inter-union Competition and the Desire for Government Status 
 
The presence of strong and competitive unions in AP placed certain pressure on the state to 
compete with the unions to gain the support of teachers (so assisting the implementation of 
reforms). Political leaders and policymakers worked together to design policies to gain the 
support of teachers for the reform process, even while they played competitive politics 
with the unions, extending support to those that claimed to have the largest membership. In 
removing discretion in recruitment and transfer policies, and facilitating redress of 
grievances, the state in AP reduced somewhat the reliance of teachers on unions in relation 
to these matters. 
In winning the cooperation of the unions, in AP the state directly intervened in the 
competitive rivalry between them—especially as it took the side of the Panchayati Raj 
teachers in their struggle to gain the status of ―government teachers‖. Those teachers who 
already had this status fought to exclude those who did not, using both state policy and 
court intervention to try to achieve these goals. There are approximately 30,000 
government teachers, under the DoE, and are organised as the Government Teachers 
Association (GTA).  The Panchayati Raj Teachers Union has almost 275,000 members 
and works under the Panchayati Raj Department. The two categories of teachers differ in 
their relative status and service conditions. In particular, government teachers have a better 
career path with avenues for promotion up to the level of District Education Officers 
(DEOs), and the luxury of getting largely urban postings, whereas Panchayati Raj teachers 
can only rise up to the rank of a school headmaster, and are usually posted in remote rural 
areas.  
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 The government formally took over the management and control of all primary and middle schools in the 
state in 1976, but its order became effective retrospectively from 1 January 1971 (GoB 2007a p. 17).  
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Responding to the demands of Panchayati Raj teachers in 1991, the government in 
AP extended the ―Subordinate Services Rules‖ to include Panchayati Raj Teachers 
through Government Order (GO) number 40. Thereafter, the state constituted uniform 
service rules for both categories of teachers (GO numbers 505 and 538, issued in 1998).  A 
legal battle ensued as the GTA challenged these government orders in the Administrative 
Tribunal, and then in the High Court. The court struck down the rules as being invalid in 
September 2003. It was now the turn of the PRTU to take the issue to the Supreme Court, 
where the case is still being heard. Meanwhile, the Chief Minister used extraordinary 
powers of governance by ordinance, and issued an order in 2005 in favour of the PRTU. 
Another way in which the state of Andhra Pradesh ―signalled‖ the grant of 
government status was by including PRTU, STU, and the AP-UTF as permanent members 
in the ―Civil Services Joint Staff Council of Andhra Pradesh‖ both in the state and its 
districts. Apart from the status, this measure gives the unions proximity to senior 
government officials. This proximity is useful for the unions as they are able to connect 
with the officers informally, and pursue their agenda. It also increases the credibility of the 
unions among teachers.  
Such is the pervasive agreement across the unions on this matter that all, barring 
the GTA, have put aside their internal, partisan or ideological differences, and support the 
PRTU on this issue. The AP-UTF leaders in East Godavari put it very succinctly: ―We 
differentiate between the issues before teachers at the macro-level and the micro-level. At 
the macro-level, the main issue is the Common Service Rules. Only 8 per cent of the 
teachers are government teachers, 92 per cent are Panchayati Raj teachers.‖ Even while 
the AP-UTF does not approve of the ―political‖ nature of the PRTU, and its proximity to 
the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), they say they are united on this ―common issue‖.117 
Thus, acting on the subject of common service rules, the state political leadership in 
AP has been able to ―signal‖ that it is acting on the demands of the unions, winning the 
broad support of teachers and the two largest unions. The unions too have gained more by 
collaborative strategies, rather than through confrontation and strikes. Support from the 
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 Personal interview with K. Sathi Raju, AP-UTF General Secretary, East Godavari District, 28 February 
2006. 
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state enhances the capacity of the unions to act effectively on behalf of teachers, giving 
them greater incentives for gaining concessions from the state rather than opposing it. This 
cooperative relationship is the result of strategic considerations on the part of both—the 
state political leaders and the unions; it also forms the backdrop in which teachers‘ support 
for training and quality improvement in schools has been obtained. What I witnessed in the 
state, therefore, was not a battle between the teachers‘ unions and the state, but the use of 
political skills by the state for the management of interests, and this in turn shaped the 
nature of the demands made by teachers.  
5.6 Politics and Unions: Bargaining Unions in Andhra Pradesh, Caste and 
Partisan Affiliations in Bihar 
 
In theory, it is assumed that the political power of the unions makes it difficult for the state 
to initiate policy changes, especially those which impose costs on teachers. The 
assumption that teacher unions are directly connected to competitive politics and political 
parties, and that this is the reason why they wield enormous power, is common in the 
research literature (for example, see Béteille 2009 and Kingdon and Muzammil 2003). In 
both AP and Bihar, I found that most unions had an explicit association with political 
parties, and that a few of their leaders did indeed become members of the state or central 
legislature.
118
 Since the collective power of the teacher unions was vested in their 
leadership, many of them did find the opportunity to join politics after having served as 
leaders of unions. Further, in AP, each major political party had a teachers‘ union affiliated 
to it (see Table 5.6). However, in Bihar only the APSS was formally associated with the 
CPI. 
Three observations serve as a caveat to concluding that the power of unions is a 
direct consequence of their direct association with competitive party politics. First, the 
union with the largest following in AP is the PRTU, which prefers only a strategic alliance 
with the party currently in power. Second, in some cases I found that the strength of the 
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 In Andhra Pradesh, Mr K.Narayan of the CPI served as an office bearer with the State Teachers‘ Union, 
and was a member of the central legislature—the Parliament; Mr Laksmana Murthy of the CPI-M served as 
an office-bearer with the AP-UTF, AMD was a member of the state legislature—the Assembly.  In Bihar, Mr 
.Shatrugan Prasad Sinha of the CPI backed Arajpatrit Prarambhik Shikshak Sangh  had been a member of 
both the state and central legislatures.  
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union was greater than the strength of the political party with which it was associated—for 
example, the AP-UTF was considered the second strongest union in AP, and was formally 
aligned with the CPI-M. But its significance as a teachers‘ union exceeded the significance 
of the CPI-M as a political party. Third, most of the national parties listed in Table 5.6 
have a political base in Bihar too, but unlike in AP, they do not have formally affiliated 
teachers‘ unions. Perhaps the competitive scenario of teacher unions in AP was an 
incentive for the political parties as well to have their own affiliated unions. 
Andhra Pradesh 
I found that it was the ability to extract concessions from the state which was crucial to 
understanding the ―power‖ of unions. Unions easily compromise on the oppositional 
postures they adopt in order to get state support. The PRTU in AP, for instance, considers 
strikes and opposition to the government in power as being an inappropriate strategy of 
teacher mobilisation. Further, even unions associated with parties of the left—the AP-UTF 
associated with the CPI-M, and the STU associated with the CPI, did not consider strikes 
as an effective weapon.
119
 In Bihar too, the BPSS believed primarily in making pleas and 
petitions to the government, and it found strike an ineffective weapon. The task of 
managing teacher interests in a scenario where unions are competing for the loyalty of 
teachers relies greatly on the state as a strategic political actor, which can change the 
overall context of teacher grievances with its power of authoritative decision making. 
Teachers‘ unions value this capacity of the state, and for them the promise to be able to 
effectively influence government decisions is what is critical in keeping their members 
loyal to the unions and recruiting new members. These are strong incentives for adopting 
strategies of cooperation. 
Bihar 
Even though the BPSS in Bihar was like the PRTU—that is, not formally aligned with any 
political party—it lost its bargaining power because it was viewed as having partisan and 
caste affiliations by the political class as well as by policymakers. Established in 1935–36 
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 Leaders of the STU, associated with the CPI recalled that the last strike launched by them was in 1986. 
Personal interview with Mr K. Subburaju, Jeyaraju K., and D. VenkatRao, State Teachers‘ Union, Kakinada, 
East  Godavari district, 27 February 2006.  
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during the movement for India‘s independence, its current President, Mr Brij Nandan 
Sharma, admits the upper caste affiliation, when he states that ―leaders of the Bhumihar 
caste (an upper caste) played an important role is setting up this union‖. In terms of 
political party affiliations, the BPSS formally maintained a distance from political parties, 
but it admitted that the Congress Party under Chief Minister Jagannath Mishra had been 
most responsive to teacher demands. While Sharma asserted that the currently ruling party, 
the JD(U), had been the least responsive to teacher demands, his own son served as a 
minister of cabinet rank in the JD(U) government.
120
 The rival union, the APSS, also 
acknowledged the proximity of BPSS with the Congress Party, and its own with the CPI. 
The APSS is also known to have a dominance of the upper castes, especially Bhumihars.
121
 
What is evident from this is that neither the independent bargaining strength of the 
BPSS and its extracting concessions from the Congress Party in the past, nor the formal 
affiliation of the APSS with the CPI (even having some union leaders as elected 
legislators) actually increased the strength of the unions. These two important unions were 
not the repositories of institutional or political power that could rally mass agitations and 
block change. The lack of an inter-union competitive structure and vibrant field 
organisations diminished their identity as representative of teacher interests, and as 
effective demand groups asking for the resolution of teacher grievances through state 
action. Their proximity to political power did not enhance their ―voice‖ in raising issues 
related to teachers, or their ability to extract concessions from the state. The weakening 
hold of the unions was reinforced by their dwindling support on account of teachers 
retiring every year without corresponding replacements. Union-government relations were 
characterised more by policies of confrontation and conflict, than by any effort to win over 
teachers to implement the reform agenda. The unions were marginal to the process of 
policy reform and politics in Bihar. 
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 Personal interview with Mr Brij Nandan  Sharma,  Bihar Rajya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh, Patna, 4 June 
2007. 
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Personal interview with Mr Mahendra Prasad Singh, Arajpatrit Shikshak Sangh, Gaya district, Bihar, 3 
October 2005. 
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5.7 Unions and the Reform Process: Local Cooperation in Andhra Pradesh, 
Indifference in Bihar 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
The strategies of cooperation and the skilful negotiations of the government that I have 
discussed in the previous sections were critical in ensuring that teacher unions did not 
derail the reform agenda. Leaders of all the large unions confirmed their ―support‖ to 
reform. On the ground, however, there was variation in terms of how far the unions were 
actually working for reform in the districts in AP. The PRTU and the STU were large and 
influential unions in Mahabubanagar. However, the reform efforts were led and sustained 
by the DoE officials—mainly the MEOs and the MRPs. The unions were concerned 
primarily in dealing with grievances of teachers at the district education office, and on 
some irregularities in the recently effected large-scale transfer of teachers in the district. 
East Godavari presented a contrasting picture—the AP-UTF is very closely linked with 
reform efforts in the district. The reform team (DPEP/SSA project office) has many 
officers who have served as office bearers of the AP-UTF in the past.   
Bihar 
Initially, when reforms were started with the Bihar Education Project (BEP) in 1990, there 
seemed to be enthusiasm towards involving teachers in the process, and taking the unions 
into confidence. ―We had a meeting with the teachers‘ union leaders and the education 
secretary at the state level. We were not undermining their (that is, the teachers) authority, 
or suspending them from their jobs. Our venture was small. So teachers were not against 
us. Also, a number of old teachers were associated with the BEP. Mr Pandey (the former 
Principal of Netarhat residential school, a government school in Bihar set up as a model of 
excellence) was a part of our team in Ranchi‖, said Mr Vijay Raghavan, the first State 
Project Director of the BEP.
122
 BEP‘s vision document referred to as the ―Brown Book‖ 
(Government of Bihar and Government of India 1990 pp. 3–4) called for the questioning of 
certain aspects of ―conventional wisdom‖ on public affairs, and this was to be the basis for 
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 Personal interview with Mr Vijay Raghavan, Industrial Development Commissioner, Government of 
Bihar, New Secretariat Patna, 5 June 2007. 
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policy reform under the BEP. One of these principles that the BEP questioned was a belief 
related to teachers, namely:  
3.2.3 that teachers are politicised; therefore no significant change can be made in their 
conduct and effectiveness 
 
Considering this to be a prejudice without basis in fact, the vision document emphasised 
the centrality of teachers to the changes planned under the BEP. It also called for forging 
alliances with people who could help to make it successful, including ―political parties of 
all hues, teachers, organisations, employers, and trade unions‖—a reform coalition, in 
other words. Union leader Sharma confirmed his agreement, when he said that the aim of 
the BEP was to improve education, keeping the centrality of the teacher in mind.
123
 
 One of the major efforts of the reform team under the BEP was the evolution of the 
10-day residential in-service training for teachers, called the Ujala module.
124
 Widely 
noted at the national level for its participatory nature and teacher focus, the head of the 
reform team, the then State Project Director of the BEP, Mr M.M. Jha, noted after his 
participation in one of the Ujala trainings: ―It (that is, the training) demonstrated that if 
teachers are treated with respect and trust, they could play their rightful role in the 
universalisation of primary education.‖ In 2005, however, the mood was not so positive, 
with teachers noting with disdain that many of these trainings, in the absence of faculty 
(that is, teacher trainers) in the DIETs, had turned into a ―do it yourself‖ training exercise. 
The teachers also resisted being trained by people who were ―untrained‖ (that is, did not 
have pre-service training), and whose academic leadership they were not willing to 
accept.
125
 Clearly, this was an outcome of the pitched battles stemming from the larger 
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 Personal interview with Mr Brij Nandan  Sharma,  Bihar Rajya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh, Patna, 4 June 
2007. 
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 This training effort of the BEP was widely noted in the national literature that emerged from DPEP. 
Viewed as a participatory process, the aim was improving the pedagogical skills of activity-based, child-
centred, and joyful learning. The State Project Director for BEP M.M. Jha recalled participating in one such 
training exercise in the West Champaran DIET (in September, 1995), noting that it was a memorable 
experience (Source: M.M. Jha: Evolution of Cluster Resource Centres as Institutions for Empowerment and 
School Effectiveness, DPEP Calling, September 1997). 
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 These trainings were being conducted by DPEP, and the ―trainers‖ referred to here were resource persons 
appointed by the reform team on short-term contracts. In the selection of these trainers, pre-service training 
was not a criterion (Personal interview with Mr Mahendra Prasad Singh, Arajpatrit Shikshak Sangh, Gaya 
district, Gaya, Bihar, 3 October 2005). 
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issue of unemployment in the state which was being fought outside of the policy arena—in 
the courts. The system therefore came to a grinding halt.  
5.8 Conclusion: Diverging Paths to Teacher Policy Reforms 
 
This chapter illustrates that interests and institutions are important factors in shaping the 
political dynamics of educational policy reform, but their role is not necessarily that of 
opposing change. In AP the political dynamics were characterised by a pragmatic 
strategy—one which separated teacher interests as individuals from union interests as a 
collective. The discretionary and arbitrary policies for the recruitment, transfer, and 
postings of teachers generated patronage opportunities, and found favour with vested 
interests. But this was opposed by teachers themselves, and formed an important reason 
why they had to rely on unions. Clearly, reducing discretion and rationalising policy 
entailed a loss of these patronage opportunities. But gains came from winning the support 
of teachers on a large scale—an outcome that was advantageous for the reform process. 
These are results that are not supported by a theory of politics that is formulated on the 
premise of material self-interest as being the core motivation for policy action.   
In resolving individual teacher grievances, policy entrepreneurs in AP acted such 
that the state positioned itself as an ally of the teachers (and not of vested interest groups 
who were ―winners‖ of prior contest over policy). In supporting the demands of the large 
unions, in AP the state played a political role, a partisan ally of unions—opposing some 
(the GTA) and supporting others (the PRTU and the AP-UTF). Under these circumstances, 
the unions were not left with the option of opposing reform. The unions too admitted that 
oppositional strategies did not give them the room to manoeuvre and gain concessions, 
which were important considerations if they were to sustain their appeal among their 
members. In their dealings with the government, the role of unions as ―agents‖ of teachers 
placed a constraint on them to ―cooperate‖ rather than to oppose. 
Many elements of the political dynamics of union-government relations in the 
reform process were borne out in the case of Bihar as well. The unions preferred 
cooperation as opposed to confrontation with the state. But differences in structure and 
partisan affiliations were an important reason for a difference in the government‘s 
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approach towards them. The weak unions present in Bihar meant that the state found no 
incentive in responding to their demands, and in fact opposed the unions for being aligned 
to the upper castes, and the opponent political party.  The state in Bihar preferred a strategy 
of confrontation compared to the skills and negotiations witnessed in AP. This resulted in 
forced retreat, abandonment, and deadlock. However, even when things came to a 
standstill, the cause of this was not the ―colonisation‖ or control of policies by the vested 
interests of teachers.   
While policy entrepreneurs in both the states thought similarly about the need for 
teachers‘ support in order for reform efforts to succeed, there was little convergence on this 
in the thought and action of political leaders and policy entrepreneurs in Bihar. Initially, 
there were efforts at consulting unions in the state, and the reform team consulted and even 
appointed teachers to work alongside; but these change efforts seemed to be singularly 
championed by policy entrepreneurs with little backing from the political leadership. As a 
result, the main direction of policy backed by political leaders took a turn very different 
from what could have been in the interest of reforms to succeed. In contrast, reform efforts 
in AP were characterised by convergence of actions of the political leaders and policy 
entrepreneurs. 
Within AP, there was variation as to the extent to which unions were associated 
with reform on the ground. The AP-UTF in East Godavari was a pro-reform union; its 
local influence among teachers was a reason for enthusiasm towards the reform agenda. 
The teachers did not see the extra work required of them for school improvement as being 
a burden. The AP-UTF used its official position within the reform team and the resulting 
proximity to the district collector to put pressure on the DEO against arbitrary action as 
regards teachers. In Mahabubnagar, the PRTU and STU were not similarly associated with 
reform efforts on the ground. When compared to East Godavari, this district presented a 
picture of teacher apathy—with many complaints about teachers turning up late for 
afternoon classes, or leaving instructional activities on the shoulders of vidya volunteers. 
Gaps in leadership at the implementation level, caused due to vacancies in the post of 
MEOs in a few of the district‘s mandals enhanced the comparative indifference of teachers 
towards schools. 
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Successful reform efforts have negotiated a convergence of teacher interests with 
the aims of reform. This is an element of strategy that change managers in both states are 
fully aware of. However, the operationalisation of this requires separate and specific 
measures by political leaders and policy entrepreneurs, which are differently aimed yet 
converging in vision. The former sends system-wide change messages of the state being 
interested in teachers and schools, while the policy entrepreneur works to rationalise policy 
and reduce elements of rent-seeking from both teachers and communities. 
The new measures for decentralised recruitment of teachers in Bihar are the result 
of such convergent action and they display the use of skills and negotiation on the part of 
the government. But these measures have not eliminated the contest around teacher 
policies, as much as they have transferred the contest down to the local level. The new 
policies also entail a new set of responsibilities for state action. Whether these measures 
allow the harder process of change for schools to be put in place in Bihar, will be a crucial 
future test. It also needs to be examined whether two divergent roads to teacher policy 
reform, based on the contrasting policies of centralisation and decentralisation in AP and 
Bihar, and in other states within the Indian federal set-up, can lead to the achievement of 
the same goals.    
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Chapter 6 
Reform Proponents: 
The Role of Educational Decentralisation and Community Participation 
in Overcoming the Constraints to Change 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I evaluate policy optimism regarding the effectiveness of demand side 
interventions in overcoming the impediments posed by interests and institutions in the light 
of the experience of the implementation of such interventions—namely school 
decentralisation and community participation in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Bihar. I include 
in the analysis of ―demand side‖ interventions, changes made to formal rules in order to 
move school-related decisions to lower levels of government, and efforts to improve 
participation and accountability, especially by setting up new institutions in the form of 
school councils.
126
 Although not the principal component of the reform process in terms of 
the resources allocated, these interventions were perceived as creating the changed 
conditions under which schools would operate, and they were among its most widely 
discussed aspects.
127
 The federal guidelines for the District Primary Education Programme 
(DPEP) (Government of India 1995) addressed the need to mobilise communities both 
through consultation and the establishment of Village Education Committees (VECs) with 
a view to ―generating a demand for educational development‖. The expectation was that a 
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My definition of ―demand-side interventions‖ follows from that of Corrales (1999 pp. 28–33). He suggests 
that ―bolstering the demand side‖ by measures such as information campaigns, the involvement of 
beneficiaries, community participation, and decentralisation are possible ways in which the political 
conditions for the adoption of reforms to improve the quality of education are likely to benefit. 
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The World Bank (2003b), which is a ―review of educational progress and reform under DPEP‖, notes that 
community mobilisation and village education committees as being ―central‖ to the DPEP, and lists this as 
the first among the programmes major interventions reviewed by the report (Chapter 2, pp. 26-27).Other 
prominent reviews of the DPEP include Bashir and Ayyar (2001), and Pandey (2000), and both reiterate a 
similar notion of centrality of demand side efforts under DPEP. 
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more informed and empowered community would build societal pressure in support of 
educational reform—so countering the self-interested actions of small but powerful interest 
groups and institutions. 
Various theoretical claims and practical policy considerations form the basis for 
this ―policy optimism‖ regarding demand side interventions. Economists argue that these 
changes encourage public spending to be made on the basis of local priorities, and also 
close information gaps between the government and its citizens, allowing the latter to hold 
the former accountable. For political scientists, these changes hold the additional promise 
of stronger and more participatory democracy. For public administration specialists 
focusing on more practical considerations, there is the promise of improved ―service 
delivery‖, with an opportunity for citizens to demand better quality of provision.128 
Following from these expectations of improved governance and enhanced democratisation, 
countries around the world have adopted measures for school decentralisation and 
community participation, and donor agencies insist on some amount of community 
participation being made an integral part of educational reform. The literature, however, is 
also quick to caution about the need to differentiate the ―promise‖ from the ―practice‖, and 
advise that the current faith of participation being a panacea may sometimes be 
unwarranted.
129
 
Given these observations about the need to differentiate rhetoric and theory from 
the actual experience of implementation, the objectives of this chapter are two: first, to 
examine how AP‘s relative success in improving its primary schools, compared to Bihar, 
has been due to its achievements in educational decentralisation and community 
participation; and second, given empirical evidence from both the states, the chapter 
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See Grindle (2007 p. 6–8) for a discussion on the key arguments of economists, political scientists, and 
public administrators on the theoretical promise of decentralisation. In addition, the World Development 
Report (2004) Making Services Work (World Bank 2003a) provides the main arguments about improvements 
in service delivery by creating more short and direct routes of accountability between ―clients‖ (i.e. 
community members) and ―frontline providers‖ (i.e. teachers in the case of education). See Pritchett and 
Pande (2006 pp. 10–13) for an explanation of the relationships of accountability as they exist in the ―service 
delivery framework‖ and its applicability to primary education in India. 
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Pritchett and Pande (2006 p. 20) make a reference of some of the recent international cases of 
decentralisation in education which have not worked well—namely the experience of Indonesia and 
Argentina. According to the authors, a lack of careful design was responsible for these failures. Banerjee, 
Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2008) caution against unwarranted optimism on participation on 
the basis of results of randomised evaluations conducted in Uttar Pradesh. Strategies for improving 
participation in village education councils in this state, leading to better oversight of schools, did not work. 
Channa (2011 p.34) also notes that decentralisation-oriented governance reforms did not have the desired 
outcomes in Pakistan.    
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attempts to scrutinise theoretical expectations regarding the contribution of greater 
participation and local control over school governance in overcoming the challenges posed 
by a centralised bureaucracy. Since educational decentralisation and increased community 
participation are not just an ―input‖ for improving schools, but also an outcome of reform 
interventions, this comparison also serves to help understand the extent to which the 
objectives of participation and decentralisation have indeed been achieved.  
The chapter has four sections. In the first, I analyse the federal policy context 
within which AP and Bihar adopted statutory measures for setting up school councils. I 
argue that two distinct sets of federal policies—for political decentralisation and 
administrative decentralisation in education—provided opportunities for state governments 
to adopt a variety of institutional measures. In the second section, I outline how AP and 
Bihar used this opportunity, given the specificities of context and leadership motivation in 
each state. This is done by comparing the technical design of school decentralisation, as 
outlined in the Andhra Pradesh School Education (Community Participation) Act, 1998, 
and the government of Bihar‘s Vidyalay Shiksha Samiti Adhiniyam, 2000, respectively. 
Further, the technical design—the ―formal rules‖ so to speak—are significant because they 
establish the criteria within which sub-national authorities act and participation takes 
place.
130
 In this section, I discuss the context and motivations for change, and of whether 
the principal actors promoting these changes are politicians or policymakers. I argue that 
the timing, context, and motivation of leaders all have a crucial bearing on how the 
committees actually work.   
In the third section, I assess the experience of implementation of school 
committees, especially their participatory character and functioning. And also their 
relationship with other institutions—vertically with the line department of education, and 
horizontally with panchayats, which further highlight some of the ―real intentions‖ for 
adopting these measures. Based on information obtained from focus group discussions, this 
section provides insight on the discretionary behaviour of frontline officers, and on how 
the people for whom these institutions are meant actually perceive of these ―demand side‖ 
interventions. This is important because research on policy implementation often notes the 
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Burki, Perry,and Dillinger (1999 p. 18) note that these rules are particularly germane in comprehending 
decentralisation, because decentralisation does not mean ―sovereign sub-national governments‖. These are 
reforms where the ―rules of hierarchy in a centralised bureaucracy are replaced by a more limited set of 
constraints on the bureaucratic behaviour of sub-national actors‖.  
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difference in enthusiasm for implementation between bureaucrats at the top, who are 
responsible for designing policies, and field staff below who are responsible for 
implementation. The literature also emphasises the importance of understanding what 
happens at the policy recipient level (Barrett 2004 pp. 249, 253, 256; O‘Toole 2004 p. 
312). This further justifies looking at aspects of implementation, and not just on features of 
design. 
In the light of the experience from implementation, and for reasons of change in 
political leadership, the formal rules relating to school councils were amended in both AP 
and Bihar. I discuss these in the chapter‘s fourth section. I argue that the technical design 
(and redesign) process was politically contested in both the states. This offered 
opportunities for political leaders and policymakers to alter conflict equations in the 
process of school reform. In the chapter‘s final section, I analyse whether superior 
technical design, or the politically contested working of school committees, were 
determinants of outcomes—both for school reforms, and for achieving the objectives of 
decentralisation and participation. 
The principal sources of data used here include state policy documents (1998–
2011), interviews with policymakers and experts to help understand the process of 
technical design (and redesign) of rules, and focus group discussions with parents and 
school committee members in order to appreciate their experiences of implementation. A 
total of 26 focus group discussions, attended by 467 community members, were conducted 
during 2005–06. A consolidated community level report, recording responses on each of 
the themes, was generated for each focus group discussion (See Research Methods 
Appendix 1E for details of the procedure of selection of villages and the themes on which 
responses were elicited from community members during the discussions. Further, 
Appendix 5 provides a list of villages where discussions were held).  
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6.2 Federal Opportunities: Two Sources of Policy Impetus to Promote 
Decentralisation  
 
Strategic Dichotomy: The Centre Prescribes Political Decentralisation, Promotes School 
Autonomy 
Two distinct aspects of federal policy change form the context in which both AP and Bihar 
adopted the route of legislative authorisation to set up school councils. These were the 
constitutional amendments for political decentralisation, and the impetus from educational 
policy reform, which was somewhat distinct in origin even to begin with, and was widely 
adopted following the introduction of externally assisted educational reform programmes. 
The political impetus came from the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 amendments to the federal Constitution 
which made it mandatory for states to have an elected third-tier of governance—that is, the 
panchayats. Further, it was recommended that the responsibility for primary education 
should be devolved to the panchayats, meaning that powers and responsibilities with 
respect to primary schools should actually be moved downwards in the decision making 
hierarchy.
131
 However, the Centre did not specifically prescribe how this was to be done, 
leaving this as an opportunity for states to evolve and adopt their own specific design. 
The second impetus came from educational policy reform—the National Policy on 
Education (NPE) 1986, was the first to emphasise the need for ―decentralisation and 
autonomy of educational institutions‖ and of giving ―pre-eminence to people‘s 
involvement‖ in the management of education (Ministry of Human Resource Development 
1986 pp. 26–27). It was in this context that a committee on decentralised management of 
education was set up by the Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE) in 1993. This 
committee  recommended the establishment of ―Village Education Committees‖ in view of 
the fact that panchayats were likely to be ―political bodies‖ and therefore incapable of 
taking on the task of school reform (Raina 2000 p. 8).
132
 The dilemma between the need to 
devolve powers downwards to a third tier, versus some autonomy from local political 
control for educational initiatives (by forming school councils) formed the backcloth for 
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These two Amendments were enacted in 1992 and became operational a year later. 
Seehttp://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend73.htm for details of the amendment Act.  
132
 The committee was set up under the chairmanship of Union Minister VeerappaMoily for the purpose of 
recommending the management framework for school education following the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 amendment to 
the Constitution, and is commonly referred to as the ―Moily Committee Report‖. 
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the contesting ideas wherein states charted their strategies for educational decentralisation 
and increased community participation. 
In the research literature on this issue, experience from the cases of other countries 
too points towards a similar dichotomy between two strategies—―autonomous schools‖ 
versus ―municipalisation‖, within which the specific course of educational decentralisation 
has been charted out. Gershberg (2004 pp. 415–18) notes this to be the case even in 
Nicaragua, where school decentralisation programmes were adopted following a change of 
government in 1990. The Autonomous School Programme, 1993, recommended monthly 
fiscal transfers to schools and formation of school site councils, whereas the 
municipalisation programme recommended the transfer of some school administration 
responsibilities to lower levels of government. Both elements of policy were not 
implemented with equal enthusiasm—reforms related to the Autonomous School 
Programme were sustained as they became a part of the wider agenda of neo-liberal 
economic reforms, while municipalisation was ―all but abandoned as a national reform by 
1996‖, even though both efforts had been started at nearly the same time (Gershberg 2004 
p. 418). 
 
States Use the Federal Opportunity to Evolve Distinct Strategies of Decentralisation 
 
Additionally, in the case of India, state-level experience in implementing externally 
assisted school reform programmes prior to the launch of the DPEP, had promoted 
institutional models of school site councils and the idea of greater community 
participation.  The two notable initiatives in this regard were the Lok Jumbish in Rajasthan 
and the Bihar Education Project (BEP). Further, both programmes had supported the 
exercise of some informal supervision by the community over teachers to ensure that they 
attended school regularly. However, these initiatives were limited to the geographical areas 
where these projects worked, and remained isolated interventions pushed by policy 
entrepreneurs in state-level reform teams and supported by donors, but not adopted by state 
governments. In fact, these formed a second set of contested ideas—between the state 
governments (specifically, it‘s Department of Education) and the reform team, on whether 
or not to scale-up the experience gained from these externally assisted projects.  
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However, federal guidelines for the DPEP, followed by the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan 
(SSA), tilted in favour of scaling up the experience from these earlier projects, and made it 
mandatory for states to have school-level community bodies. Under these two 
programmes, a very small grant of Rs 2,000 was given to these committees to be spent on 
school improvement.
133
 Once again, the states were left free to adopt their own design. 
From the practice that emerged in various states, two different models could be seen—
school councils as community bodies (as in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh), and as user groups 
of parents (as in AP, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh) (see Mehendale 2010 p. 12).  
So from these federal policy initiatives and the ensuing variety in state-level 
practice, the different sets of ideas about the appropriate strategy to be adopted can be 
clearly seen. The basic policy dilemma before the states was of how to implement the 
mandatory measures for political decentralisation, even while protecting the autonomy of 
schools. Besides, political decentralisation also produced fear among teachers that their 
services could be transferred to local bodies—so changing their status as ―government 
servants‖.134 Political leaders and policymakers in AP and Bihar made their choices about 
the appropriate ―technical design‖ from these contending ideas about institutionalising 
community participation and school autonomy.  
 
6.3 The Design of School Committees: Contrasting Models of Decentralisation 
in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar 
 
To a certain extent, the initiatives taken by AP and Bihar can be argued to have been 
similar, in that both states adopted the route of legislative authorisation for their school 
councils.
135
 However, differences in leadership motivation, the wider context of policy 
implementation, and the envisaged relationship with panchayats as the institutions of 
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 Although the amount was small (approximately 50 $US) it forced state governments to set up school-level 
community bodies. The money was to be spent jointly by the school authorities and the school councils.   
134
Pandey (2000 pp. 37–38) takes note of the apprehensions among teachers towards decentralisation, fears 
that had to be strategically managed by reform leaders through appointing union representatives on the state-
level societies that managed the reform programme. 
135
The other possible routes are by administrative orders or ―ordinance‖. Both are perceived to be led by the 
executive branch of the government, i.e. a ―ministry led‖ strategy. See Gershberg (1999) for a comparison of 
legislative versus-ministry led reform strategies in educational decentralisation. 
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political decentralisation, formed the basis for two contrasting models of educational 
decentralisation in AP and Bihar.    
School Education Committees in Andhra Pradesh: A Political Model of Centralised 
Decentralisation 
 
The Andhra Pradesh School Education (Community Participation) Act, 1998, was enacted 
by Chief Minister Chandra Babu Naidu as a part of his wider vision for economic 
development linked to liberalisation and globalisation. In this, the role of the state was 
visualised as that of a ―facilitator and catalyst‖, and no longer as a controller of the 
economy (Government of Andhra Pradesh 1999 p. 8). Reforms in education were integral 
to this vision outlined in the ―Vision 2020 document‖.136 Here, the stated goal was of AP 
not just as a ―literate society, but [as] a knowledge society‖, capable of taking on the 
challenges of the 21
st 
century. The governance changes in education would involve 
―participatory management by stakeholders‖—this was the vision of community 
participation in the overall management of education.  The SECs were therefore a ―user-
group‖ of stakeholders (in this case, parents), within this wider scheme of development. 
Further, these school committees were part of Naidu‘s unique programme—the ―Janam 
Bhumi‖ (literal meaning—land of one‘s birth)—for rural development. This programme 
was based on the formation of stakeholder groups for each specific area of rural 
development—for example, watershed development, forest management, and water-use. 
The programme worked on direct interaction between government officials, political 
executives, and line departments on the one hand, and local people on the other. Every 
quarter, one specific area of development was the subject of focus. Further, its institutional 
mechanism at the community level was parallel to the panchayats, and in practice the 
involvement of panchayat members was discouraged. The programme was used by the 
ruling Telugu Desam Party (TDP) to strengthen its base at the local level.
137
 
In technical design, therefore, the SECs were under the control of the line 
Department of Education (DoE), and did not have any connection with the panchayats (see 
Table 6.1 for an elaboration on specific aspects of design, including powers and the 
vertical and horizontal relationships envisaged for SECs). Local level officials and teachers 
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 The Vision 2020 document was prepared by the global consulting firm Mckinsey.  
137
SeeVaddiraju (2001) for details of the Janambhumi programme. 
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were supportive of this model for political reasons—it protected them from control by 
panchayats. The line department exercised its supervision and influence over the school 
committees in formal and informal ways, but mainly through the control of the election 
process and careful selection of chairpersons. No real powers were given to these 
committees, and their expected role was mainly to support school enrolment drives, and to 
authorise expenditure of school development grants. Critical decisions were taken by the 
school headmaster, who acted as the ―member-convenor‖ of the committee, and worked 
according to the instructions of the Mandal Education Officer (MEO).  They were 
essentially weak committees, under firm central control, intended to serve political 
objectives of the ―central‖ political leadership—weakening local politics in the form of 
panchayats, and identifying local development processes with the ruling political party. 
Vidyalay Shiksha Samitis in Bihar: The Policy Entrepreneur’s Support for a Strong 
Model of School Decentralisation 
 
The case of Bihar was different—there were significant differences of context between the 
two states, and Bihar had prior experience with village education committees. Unlike in 
AP, at the time of legislation of the Vidyalay Shiksha Samiti (VSS) Act, 2000 (and until the 
change of state government at the end of 2005) there was no broader plan for economic or 
social sector development in Bihar (see Chapter 4 for details). The VSS Act, 2000 was 
therefore an attempt on the part of ―policy entrepreneurs‖—the reform-minded 
bureaucrats, led by the then Education Secretary to the government—to provide a statutory 
status to ―village committees‖, with which the state had nearly a decade of experience 
under the BEP.
138
 It was a case of what Gershberg calls—the ―legislative cart being placed 
before the reform horse‖ in Nicaragua, where a legislative authorisation for the 
Autonomous School Programme came a decade after implementation on the ground.
139
 
The rationale for this legislation was identified by the state‘s former secretary for 
education as its ability to counter the key constraint facing the state‘s school system, which 
                                                          
138Mr B.K. Sinha, officer of the Indian Administrative Service was the Government of Bihar‘s Secretary for 
Education between January and November, 2000. The legislation was passed during his tenure.   
139
Gershberg (2004 pp. 408, 415) observes that most countries first create legal and legislative frameworks 
and then implement changes. But the Nicaraguan ―Autonomous School Programme‖ in the 1990s ―put the 
reform cart before the legislative horse‖ as the law came nearly 10 years after implementation of changes 
began.  In the case of Bihar, the VSS Act provided legislative authorisation following nearly a decade and a 
half of establishment of village education committees under BEP. 
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had its origins in prior government policies of nationalisation of the school sector. This 
process turned teachers into ―government servants‖, severing their links with the 
community and leaving them under the control of an educational bureaucracy of which 
they were at the lowest ladder. Further, teachers were left at the mercy of a very 
discretionary system of transfers which operated at the will of politicians and the 
bureaucracy. Strong village committees had the potential to counter some of these 
challenges.
140
 
Put in place after consultations with parents, members of civil society, and 
academics, the objective of the VSS Act was to ―minimise the control of the bureaucracy 
of the state‘s education department on schools and teachers, reconstitute people‘s control 
over schools, and create a societal force which could fight for education‖. The vision for 
the future was that of ―school autonomy‖, reversing the policies of centralisation adopted 
in Bihar in the 1980s.
141
 
In terms of design, elections were to be held by the general assembly of all 
villagers—referred to as the ―aam sabha‖. The committees were given strong powers for 
supervision of teachers—their leave was to be approved by the committees, and 
absenteeism could invoke the recommendation of punitive action. Also, while VSS were 
protected from being overwhelmed by political panchayats (the provisions for independent 
elections and statutory status were intended to give them such a protection), they were also 
linked to them by statutory design, unlike the situation in AP (see table 6.1 for specific 
aspects of the design of VSS).  
However, political support for the legislation was lacking. In a measure signalling 
political indifference (or even opposition to the Act), the Education Secretary (responsible 
for bringing about the VSS Act) was transferred within a year, even before the first round 
of elections for the committees could be held. Also, due to this unscheduled transfer, the 
vertical support structures for the VSS, envisaged to be set up at the district level, could 
not be established. In the absence of support from the political leadership in the state, the 
VSS was prone to weak implementation from the very beginning. 
The comparative differences of context, motivations of leadership, as also the 
strategic choices about different features of design, are summarised in Table 6.1. These 
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Personal interview with Mr B.K. Sinha, New Delhi, 13 February 2008. 
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Personal interview with Mr B.K. Sinha, New Delhi, 13 February 2008. 
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differences left their impact on the implementation process—this is reviewed in the next 
section. 
 
Table 6.1: Comparative Features of School Education Committees in Andhra Pradesh and the Vidyalay 
Shiksha Samiti in Bihar 
Context Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Overall development 
agenda in the state 
 Part of Chief Minister Naidu‘s 
overall development strategy of 
economic growth by 
liberalisation,  privatisation, and 
globalisation. 
 
 Part of the Janam Bhumi 
development programme, 
encouraging the formation of 
self-help groups in specific 
sectors of development. 
 
 No prior experience with school 
committees (unlike Bihar). 
 No link with broader 
development programme.  
 
 No vision for overall 
development existed in the 
state.  
 
 Political panchayats should not 
overwhelm the gains  made by  
the BEP in community 
mobilisation. 
 
 Local vision of VSS as a 
pressure group to counter 
panchayats. 
 
 VSS originate from prior 
experience of VECs under the 
BEP. 
Link with Political 
Decentralisation-
Panchayats 
 Naidu weary of political 
decentralisation; school 
committees used to undercut 
the role of panchayats. 
 
 Unlike Bihar, the Education 
Department and reform team 
work together, and they are 
under the control of political 
leaders. 
 Political leadership weary of 
panchayats, but not interested 
in schools or VSS. 
 
 The education reform team  
works alone—no support comes 
from the Education Department; 
political leaders are 
disinterested. 
Link with Education 
policy 
Abolish child labour, responsibility 
for compulsory education of 
children.  
Reversing centralisation in state 
policies for school education, 
especially teachers. 
Initiative 
Political leader. Policy entrepreneur. 
Authorisation Process 
Legislation. Legislation. 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
Context Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Features 
 Four-tier committee at the 
school, panchayat, mandal, 
and district level. In reality, only 
school committees work. 
 SECs are a single purpose 
committee of ―users‖—parents. 
 Elected by parents. 
 Reservation for disadvantaged 
social castes and minorities. 
 The post of chairperson is 
reserved for women; in reality, 
men (husbands) exercise these 
powers. 
 Single-tier committee, exists 
only at the village level. 
 
 VSS- committee of users and 
non-users. 
 Elected by an aam sabha of all 
villagers. 
 Reservation for disadvantaged 
social castes. 
 Either the chairperson or the 
secretary has to be a woman; in 
reality, women are not allowed 
to speak. 
Relationship with 
Other Institutional 
Actors 
a. State level—
Department of 
Education  
b. Local level -
Mandal/Block 
Department of 
Education 
c. Gram panchayat 
a. Fully involved in design and 
implementation. 
 
b. Strong formal and informal  
control—elections, functioning, 
expenditure, dispute resolution.   
 
c. No relationship with panchayats. 
a. Involved in design; no control 
over  implementation. 
 
 
 
c. Under a sub-committee of the 
panchayat. 
Expected 
Role/Powers 
Weak role—no real power 
 Enrolment and retention of 
children. 
 Funds only from the DPEP and 
SSA. 
Strong powers 
 Concrete powers of teacher 
supervision. 
 Funds only from the DPEP and 
SSA. 
Sources: (i)Andhra Pradesh (School Education) Community Participation Act 1998, Government of Andhra Pradesh; (ii) 
―VidyalayShikshaSamiti Act”, 2000, Government of Bihar. 
 
6.4 Implementation Experience: Voices of the Poor
142
 
 
In this section, I assess the experience of implementing school committees on the basis of 
focus group discussions with members of SECs and VSS (see Appendix 5 for a list of 
villages where FGDs were held). On each of the themes discussed, the responses from AP 
indicate a more uniform presence of the committees, and fewer grievances among the 
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 I borrow the phrase from the title of Narayan and Petesch (eds) 2002. Voices of The Poor From Many 
Lands. 
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people. However, strong grievances against the non-responsiveness of the local state were 
expressed in Bihar. 
 
AP: Regular Elections and Meetings, but the SECs do not have Effective Powers 
 
Elections 
Elections to the SECs were reported to have been held regularly under the supervision of 
the headmaster and the MEOs. There was no variation of this procedure in either of the 
districts, and neither were there complaints of arbitrary use of powers by government 
officials, or subversion of the election process. However, the elections did not seem like a 
procedure of parents exercising real choice, as members were ―identified‖ in advance by 
local officials. Further, community members openly acknowledged the ―support‖ of the 
TDP for these elections. These conclusions are drawn on the basis of responses from 
discussions with community members—I now cite some of these observations for each 
district.  
 
East Godavari District: In Prathipadu mandal,village Kittamooripeta, the MEO ―invited‖ 
those who were to be elected as members for the SEC, and parents cast votes in a ballot 
box. Chairperson Gudem Kannarao admitted that he was being supported by the TDP, and 
the sarpanch. In Peedipalem, the elections were held in the presence of the MEO and by 
parents ―raising their hands‖. TDP‘s support for the election process was openly 
acknowledged. In Razule mandal’s Vegivariapalem village, committee members of the 
primary school in SS Colony reported that election of the members was ―unanimous‖. The 
sarpanch was instrumental in identifying members prior to the election. Also, this was the 
only FGD where committee members acknowledged support from the Congress Party in 
their selection. Villages Thattipakkamattam and Gandipuram also confirmed regular 
elections and support from the TDP. 
 
Mahabubnagar District: In Jadcherla mandal, village Kodgal, elections were held by a 
show of hands, and the TDP had supported the elections here as well. The same procedure 
was followed in Pedda Adirala. The headmaster, MEO, and sarpanch were present for the 
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elections. The sarpanch was reported to have played a role in pre-selecting members of the 
SEC; members were elected unopposed as they had the support of the TDP. 
In Dharur mandal, village Kothulagidda, votes were cast by parents in a ballot box 
and the MEO and the headmaster supervised the elections. The MEO reportedly identified 
the parents who could become members. In Turup-Tanda, the SEC members were invited 
by the sarpanch, and were elected by a show of hands. The TDP was once again said to 
have supported the elections. 
 
Functioning 
In its functioning too, there was a regularity of procedure in AP. Meetings were held 
regularly—once every month—although members did not participate regularly or speak 
actively on issues of concern when attending. Also, only routine matters were discussed 
and no major initiatives were taken up by the community as a result of these meetings. One 
of the expected powers to be exercised by the committee was the expenditure of the school 
development grant. However, in practice, the committee members had no idea where this 
money was going, and it was spent mainly on items decided by the headmaster or 
chairman. Also, they had little knowledge of how the contracts for the maintenance of 
school buildings and the construction of additional classrooms were being awarded. 
Although there were strong indications that these contracts were being awarded either to 
the chairman or his (or her) relatives, there no complaints arose about the possible misuse 
of funds.   
 
I cite once again from the observations I have in this regard, from the focus group 
discussions: 
East Godavari District: In Prathipadu mandal’s village Peedipalem, committee meetings 
were reported to be held regularly, but members had no idea of either their role or what 
was discussed. Also, the chairman and the headmaster alone knew details of the 
expenditures made and the contracts awarded, not the committee members. In Gajjenpudi, 
the situation was the same—meetings had been held regularly, but there was no clarity of 
roles among committee members. In Venkatnagaram, members had no idea of when the 
meetings had been held, or what decisions had been taken. In Kittamooripetta, members 
reported that meetings had been held regularly, but they did not attend them. No significant 
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decisions were taken, and this was apparent when members said they discussed—―about 
children‘s studies, about child labour, and about facilities‖—in the meetings. They also had 
no idea of how the school development grant was spent. Guddem Kannarao, the 
chairperson, reported that he and the headmaster had ―repaired the school building‖ for a 
contract of Rs 140,000. 
In Razule mandal, members of the SEC for the cooperative school reported that 
very few meetings were held (for example, meetings were held on Independence Day 
merely as a token gesture), and only a few attended. Members also had no idea of their 
role, and reported that no funds had been given to them. In village Gandipuram too, 
members had no idea of when the meetings were held or what their role should be. 
 
Mahabubnagar District: In Jadcherla mandal, Kodgal village, meetings were held 
regularly, but they did not attend regularly, nor ―did they get a chance to speak‖ if they 
attended.  While they were aware that the annual school development grant had been spent 
on buying furniture for the school, gifts for children, and as salary for a sweeper to clean 
the premises, they were unaware as to how the contracts for repairs to the school building 
were awarded. SEC member Raghupati Reddy said in this regard—―the chairman knows 
everything‖.143 
In Pedda Adirala, committee meetings were held regularly, and issues of 
―regularity of teachers, and children‘s study‖ were said to have been discussed. But the 
school development grant had been spent by the headmaster. The contract for construction 
of the school toilet had been awarded to someone related to the chairman—while the group 
refused to divulge any more on this issue, they admitted that the ―chairman knew 
everything about it‖. In Chinnapally village, members came for the meetings whenever 
they were called, but did not know of their role, nor were any major decisions taken in 
these meetings.  
In Dharur mandal, Guvvaladine village, committee meetings were held every 
month, but members had no idea of their role. In Kothulagidda, members confirmed 
attending 6–8 meetings in the past year, where the issues of child labour and drop-out had 
been discussed. But they had no idea of what the school development grant was spent on; 
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Notes from focus group discussion, village Koddagal, JadcherlaMandal, Mahabubnagar, February 2006. 
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most felt that it was only the headmaster who knew about this. One committee member, 
Rangaswamy, had been given a contract to build toilets in the school. In Turup-Tanda, 
meetings were held once every three months, but members in the group had not 
participated in any. They had no idea of the role of the SEC or about the school 
development grants—it was the headmaster who took decisions in this regard, not the 
committee. They were also unaware of contracts for school construction. 
On the basis of these responses relating to elections and functioning of SECs, I 
conclude that these committees were designed and implemented in order to serve political 
purposes—of distributing patronage through appointment to a ―post‖ (that of the 
chairperson), and award of small contracts for school construction and maintenance.  
Participation of the community was neither intended, nor achieved.  
Bihar: Elite Capture of the Election Process, VSS are not Deliberative Bodies of the 
Village Community 
 
Elections 
Even though the VSS Act of 2000 envisaged the election of village members in an aam 
sabha, in practice the communities in both complained that no such process had been 
followed. Further, block officials whose task it was to have supervised a fair election 
process, connived with the locally dominant to subvert the process. In this unfair process 
of ―elections‖, only those close to the mukhiya or the locally dominant became members of 
the VSS. The envisaged role of the VSS as deliberative bodies of the village communities 
could not be achieved. 
 
Gaya District: Community members in both blocks complained that the election process 
was neither fair nor participatory. In Fatehpur block, no aam sabha was organised in 
villages Mayapur and Dhanchu. In other places, even if the aam sabhawas held, there were 
complaints of local officers, mukhiya, and politically powerful people subverting the 
electoral process. In Dhanchu, block officials, the mukhiya, and a few villagers connived to 
―elect‖ all the members. Among those elected, there were many who did not live in the 
village. The mukhiya’s wife became the chairperson. In Aamin, residents of the village 
were not given any prior information about the venue and timing of the aam sabha; a few 
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people, favourably inclined towards the mukhiya, came and signed on the register and so 
legitimised the election process. Only those close to the mukhiya were ―elected‖ to the 
VSS. When people got to know about the election, and reached the election site, there were 
physical clashes.  
In Belaganj block, Hemant Bigha village, the aam sabha was once again in 
question—no officers were present, nor did all the villagers participate. Village Saraiya 
Harijan Tola-Bindaspur was an exception—here it was reported that the VSS had been 
elected by an aam sabha with no pressure of any kind. However, the working of the VSS 
in this village is such that the chairman, secretary, and the headmaster of the school 
connive to do whatever they like; the VSS is unable to deliberate or take any decisions on 
issues relating to the school. 
 
Purnia District: In this district, complaints regarding the electoral process seemed less 
severe—the aam sabha was reported to have been held in most places, but the process of 
domination of elections by powerful locals was affirmed even here. In village Bareta, 
Kasba block, only those considered close to the chairman were elected as members. In 
Sonapur, Baysi block, only those amenable to the mukhiya and the secretary were 
nominated.  So in Bihar the process of domination of the election process is very evident.  
Further, these being ―village committees‖ (and not user committees of parents, as in AP), 
they mirror the power structures of villages—that is, the dominant castes have their way. 
Even in cases where the electoral process seemed to have been conducted in a fair fashion, 
the working style nevertheless reflected local power structures.   
This has an impact on the provision of special representation for socially 
disadvantaged castes and women. Nominations are manipulated in such a way that the 
representation of these groups is neither real nor effective. Women members were selected 
largely for reasons of proximity to the mukhiya, or because they were related to him.  In a 
number of cases, members were illiterate women who did not have their own voice on the 
committee, and did what was dictated to them.  In Amin and Mayapur, both in Fatehpur 
block of Gaya district, the women and Scheduled Caste members selected were considered 
to be very ―weak‖ candidates—they could not sign their names, and were incapable of 
raising issues on their own initiative. In the same block, in Dhanchu women and SC 
members were ―selected‖ by the mukhiya and the headmaster. Often women members did 
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not know what their role in the VSS should be. Thus, their participation was unlikely to be 
effective.   
 
Functioning 
In Bihar, the meetings of the VSS were held infrequently or not at all. And some of the 
important powers given to these committees by statutory authorisation, especially the 
power of supervision over teachers, were not being exercised. Therefore, even though in 
theory the devolution of powers to the committees made it seem like a somewhat stronger 
model of decentralisation, in practice this is not the case. 
 
Gaya District: In Fatehpur block, Mayapur village community members said that they 
were not consulted, and all decisions were taken by the chairperson and the headmaster. 
The last meeting of the VSS was held more than three months previously.  At that meeting, 
when members asserted their right to be consulted, a situation of violent confrontation 
arose. In Dhanchu, the VSS has hardly ever met; when it did, members found it difficult to 
raise issues because the mukhiya did not let anybody speak. It was claimed he even 
threatened several members who tried to speak. In Aamin village, the VSS had never met.  
Therefore, it had had no influence on either the teachers or the school.   
In Belaganj block, village Hemant Bigha, the chairman denied the request of the 
members to hold a meeting. It was interesting to note the functioning of the VSS in Saraiya 
Harijan Tola-Bindaspur. While the villagers reported that the process of elections had been 
fair, the functioning of the committee was not participatory. The chairman and the 
secretary did whatever they liked, without taking the committee members in confidence. 
Villagers were angry with these two functionaries, and complained that the entire system 
had collapsed.   
 
Purnia District:In Baysi block, village Bajardih, meetings were held irregularly. The 
secretary dominated the VSS, and did not inform either the chairman or the villagers about 
its meetings.  In Purana Ganj, a backward caste woman member of the VSS came to meet 
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us after the focus group discussions and reported that people were afraid to speak out due 
to fear of those who dominated the VSS.
144
 
The committees did not emerge as collective bodies of village communities, 
capable of deliberating on their behalf, articulating their demands about schooling, and 
countervailing political power; rather, they were usually dominated by the chairman, 
secretary, mukhiya, and the local officers. When the officers, mukhiya, local notables, and 
officers acted collectively, they were able to exclude community participation and voice—
leaving no avenue for the airing of popular grievances. Moreover, when these dominant 
actors worked at cross-purposes, the working of committees came to a standstill. For 
example, in the village of Mayapur in Gaya district, the chairman and the secretary were 
opposed to each other. Therefore, hardly any business was done—because the chairperson 
refused to call meetings. 
Although complaints about shortages of teachers, absenteeism, and irregular 
timings were the most important issues raised by villagers, the VSS invariably made no 
effective use of the statutory powers given to it in this regard. Indeed, the perception is so 
strong that teachers are part of the local structure of power, that even though villagers 
complained about them, they did not exercise the powers conferred on them under the VSS 
Act.  There is a feeling that VSS post-holders, local education bureaucracy, and teachers 
are collectively a part of the local power structure,and that therefore, complaints from poor 
people will not be heard. 
 
 
AP:  SECs have no Links with Panchayats, Strong Control of the Education Department 
 
The design of SECs in AP had envisaged no links with panchayats, and that is how these 
bodies existed on the ground—one among the many parallel forms of user groups, 
intended to undercut the power of panchayats. In reality, the sarpanch had greater local 
power than the school committees, and very often he influenced the selection of committee 
members. No funds or powers were transferred by the gram panchayat to the education 
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This lady member of the VSS suggested that only if the research team were to meet the poor people by 
themselves, would they get a real picture. Poor people like her will never speak because of a fear of the 
group. 
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committees. Therefore the SECs remained ―official bodies‖ outside the control of 
panchayats. Also, the SECs did not have any relationship with the other user groups. This 
reinforced their status as isolated bodies with no horizontal links. However, the Education 
Department‘s control on the committees was strong. 
 
Bihar: Powerful Panchayats Control VSS, No Links with the Education Department 
 
In Bihar, although it had been envisaged that the VSS would have a degree of autonomy 
from both the panchayats and the mukhiya, in reality the situation was different—the 
mukhiya dominated. It was mostly candidates supported by him who were ―elected‖ to the 
committees. Block level officers often worked alongside locally dominant individuals, 
including the mukhiya, and denied poor people their right to complain about subversion of 
the electoral process, and irregularities in the working of government schools. There was 
no oversight by the state department of education. So, the VSS were officially abandoned 
institutions. 
 
Major Issues and Grievances 
 
Nothing brought out the contrast in local context in which school committees, and indeed 
schools themselves, operated in the two states more than people‘s responses regarding 
what they felt were the major issues and grievances with respect to the working of schools. 
The difference was stark—with the school system appearing to be virtually non-functional 
in Bihar. Indeed, the malpractices and irregularities associated with school meal provision 
came close to constituting a denial of children‘s basic rights. To highlight this contrast, in 
this section I reverse the order in which I present observations for the two states—
discussing the ―voices‖ from Bihar first.   
 
Bihar: Irregularity and Absenteeism of Teachers, Poor Quality of Mid-day Meals 
 
There were two major issues on which communities expressed their grievances—those 
relating to their regularity and absenteeism of teachers, and the unsatisfactory working of 
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mid-day meals (MDMs). I present some of the complaints of people on each of these 
issues, as recorded during focus group discussions. 
 
I. Irregularity and Absenteeism of Teachers 
Gaya District: 
The school has a female teacher, who does not come to school every day. On the days that 
she does, she arrives between 12 noon and 2 pm. The children come to school every-day, 
but since they see the school closed, they return home. Parents once confronted the 
teacher about this issue, but since she is a powerful woman, nothing could be done. In 
fact, the teacher went to the local police station and lodged a ―first information report‖ on 
the basis of which two of the parents were arrested. On another occasion, the VSS 
exercised its powers of teacher supervision, and sent an ―absentee certificate‖ to the BEO. 
However, the teacher was only suspended for one month, and she was then reinstated 
because of her political clout (Notes from focus group discussion in Mayapur village). 
The headmaster almost never comes to the school. Whenever he does come, he 
demonstrates his power in the school. He says he is busy with official work, and then 
leaves the school. The teachers are also irregular in their attendance. Some come once 
every three or four days, the others are more regular, but even they do not reach school on 
time—arriving anywhere between 11.00 am and 2.00 pm. The villagers are very angry 
with this (Notes from focus group discussion in Saraiya HarijanTola-Bindaspur village). 
The school in this village is almost always closed.
145
 The teachers come probably once in 
a month, and then go back home after doing some work. Panchayat Shiksha Mitras (para-
teachers on contract) have been appointed in the school and they come from the 
neighbouring village. But even they do not come to work regularly. Because of this, the 
villagers have hired a maulavi (that is, a Muslim cleric) who charges Rs20 per student, but 
at least the children learn something. We have also tried sending our children to the 
neighbouring village school in Marawa village. However, the situation is similar there. 
The school does not open regularly; teachers are employed on government duties other 
than teaching, and the para-teachers come only to mark their attendance. The VSS is 
unable to exercise its powers and control the teachers, as they are ―agents‖ of the village 
officers and the mukhiya. Whenever we complain to the BEO, our complaint is dismissed. 
Also, reaching our village is difficult. As a result, no one ever comes to supervise things 
(Notes from focus group discussion in Majlispur village).  
 
Purnia District:  
The situation in this district appeared very similar to what was found in Gaya. In village 
Sonapur, Baysi block, the community complained that the school had two teachers—but 
only in name. The head teacher was busy with election work, and the second teacher did 
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 I visited the school at 1.00 pm, when there should have been maximum attendance at the MDM. However, 
I found the school locked (visit to primary school SaraiyaHarijanTola in Bindaspur village, Belaganj block). 
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not come to school. Consequently, the meal programme had to close. ―How could they 
supervise a teacher who was away on election duty?‖ villagers asked—meaning that the 
powers given to the VSS could not actually be exercised. Meanwhile, children had to be 
taught through private arrangements. In village Bareta in Kasba block, two teachers had 
been appointed to teach nearly 400 children. It was said: 
The head-teacher does not teach, and the second teacher is a para-teacher 
who has to teach all of the children. The head-teacher creates problems 
during the admission of children. He does not enrol them in any other 
month except January. He also charges us Rs10 for every new admission 
(Notes from focus group discussion in Bareta village). 
The complaints made about the irregularity and poor quality of school meals in Bihar 
completed the picture of severe neglect by the state of its own poor people. Indeed, 
political apathy towards schools and the poor created conditions for local vested interests 
to flourish. Teachers became agents of power, of ―vested interests‖ in this local context, 
rather than because of their capacity to wage collective action, enhanced by the policies of 
centralisation. 
 Although they have little bearing on what the direction of educational policy 
reform should have been, in these narratives the ―school‖ became a site of contested 
politics—meals that rightfully belonged to the children of poor people were being 
siphoned off to serve vested interests, while teachers and local state officials looked the 
other way. I noted little variation betwen the two districts. And the grievances were equally 
intense in both. 
 
II. Poor Quality of Mid-day Meals 
Gaya District: 
In village of Dhanchu, the mukhiya and the headmaster acted in concert. The meals were 
irregular and of poor quality, and some very subtle ways were used to deny children a real 
meal. Thus I recorded: 
The children get MDM only five to seven days in a month, and even on 
these days, they do not get a full meal. They are served only one or two 
spoons full of food, and then they are asked to leave. The daai (that is, 
maid-servant) to cook the mid-day meal has been appointed by the 
mukhiya—he took advice from no one regarding this matter. And, further, it 
depends on the headmaster when the meals will be cooked; and the 
headmaster also discriminates in the distribution of food. Some children are 
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given more food, but some may not receive any food (Notes from focus 
group discussion in Dhanchu village, Fatehpur block). 
 
In Saraiya Harijan Tola Belaganj block, at the time of my visit the MDM had last 
been provided about two months before. The villagers also found that the teachers had 
enrolled the names of ―non-existent‖ children—primarily to obtain their quota of grain 
supplied by the government. When parents confronted the teachers on this issue, they were 
told that this was being done on the instructions of the headmaster—one more instance of 
the headmaster demonstrating his ―power‖ over poor people. In village Majlispur, the 
secretary of the VSS, Zohra Khatun, met us after the group discussions were over. She told 
us that meals had never been cooked in this school. The rice that was supplied for this 
purpose was sold off, and the money distributed amongst VSS members.
146
 
 
Purnia District:  
The complaints were even more intense in this district. In Sonapur (where the headmaster 
was away on election duty), the last time a meal was served in the school was three months 
earlier. The villagers complained that when meals were given in the past, the children did 
not get enough to eat. In Bajardih, the rice and pulses were of such poor quality, that there 
was a smell of rot the moment these were cooked. Complaints were lodged with the 
secretary of the VSS and the mukhiya. But neither was able to do anything to improve the 
situation. 
The strongest grievances, however, came from discussions held in the Kasba block. 
In Nimatol, the quality of the food served was extremely poor, whereas in Bareta and 
Tinpania, no school meal had been cooked in three months. Further, in Nimatol the VSS 
supervised the meals, yet found it difficult to improve its quality: 
The quality of the rice is poor—insects crawl around in it. Children fall sick 
after eating the khichadi (a mixture of cooked rice and lentil). Many parents 
feel that either the quality of the food should be improved or the meal should 
be stopped altogether (Notes from focus group discussion in Nimatol village). 
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 Discussions with Zohra Khatun, Secretary Vidyalay ShikshaSamiti, Majlispur, block Belaganj, District 
Gaya, Bihar. 28 September 2005. 
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In Bareta, there were charges of corruption relating to the supply of rice. The chairman and 
the villagers brought this to the attention of the district administration. As a result, a ―first 
information report‖ was filed for police action, and the Additional District Magistrate was 
reported to have visited the village. Nevertheless, no administrative action had been taken, 
and things stood unchanged. Such encounters with the local state leave people with a sense 
of hopelessness.    
 
Fewer Grievances in Andhra Pradesh 
 
The problems articulated by villagers in both districts of AP were far less severe. The 
grievances were mostly about the need for more physical infrastructure—rooms, toilets, 
drinking water—and for greater funds and power to be devolved to committees. In East 
Godavari, there were no complaints regarding teacher irregularity or absence, although 
there were some in this regard in Mahabubnagar district. There were also no complaints in 
either district about the quality or irregularity of school meals—complaints that had been 
so forcefully articulated by communities in both districts of Bihar. 
In Dharur mandal of Mahabubnagar district some criticisms were expressed about 
teachers being irregular in their attendance at school in villages Guvvaladine and 
Kothulgudda. ―When one teacher comes, the other one does not‖, was the compliant in 
Guvvaladine, whereas in Kothulgudda community members felt that both teachers and 
MDMs were irregular—and that their grievances were not heard. In Jadcherla mandal too 
there were complaints about teachers being irregular at Chinnapally school.  
 
The two states compared 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of community perceptions with respect to the functioning of 
school committees. In AP, the SECs were uniformly present, although they had no real 
role. The chairman dominated the committee, had partisan affiliation with the ruling party, 
and was often awarded small contracts for school construction or repair. The community 
had a limited role in using the school development grants. But these grants were spent by 
the headmaster, and the committee merely authorised decisions that had already been 
taken.  The committee played no role as a user group; effectively, it functioned as a ―node‖ 
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for the strengthening of central control. Although in their design, the SECs in AP seemed 
akin to a model of ―administrative decentralisation‖, the gains in implementation were 
actually more political. 
In Bihar, the VSS was envisaged as a ―village‖ body and not a user group 
consisting only of parents. It was expected that the VSS would mobilise the community on 
an agenda of public interest—namely, school education. However, due to local struggles 
and domination, this did not happen. The election process was subverted. The local 
administration supported dominant individuals in the village and did not hear complaints 
from the poor. Weak vertical support from the state level DoE and administration meant 
that VSS were ineffective bodies. 
Bihar also illustrates the significance of local contextual factors in shaping how 
―democratisation, accountability of local officials, and participation are encouraged or 
discouraged‖ (Grindle 2007 p. 3). There is indeed a ―shortfall‖ of government at the local 
level, as can be seen in the many grievances expressed. 
Photo 6.1: A School Building constructed by the Vidyalay Shiksha Samiti, Belaganj, 
Gaya, Bihar 
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Table 6.2: Community Perceptions regarding the Working of School Education 
Committees/Vidyalay Shiksha Samitis in AP and Bihar, 2005–06 
Dimension Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Participatory Process 
 Strong. 
 Elections held regularly. 
 
 Election process supervised by 
MEOs. 
 Weak. 
 Aam sabha not held for election 
of members. 
 Election process dominated by 
block education officials, 
mukhiya. 
Special 
Representation  
a. Gender 
 
 
 
b. Social Caste 
 
a. Women are members and they 
participate in meetings; but 
reservations for women to the post 
of chairperson are not effective. 
 
b. Socially disadvantaged castes 
and minorities represented, but  
have no real voice.  
 
a. Weak and ineffective 
representation; women have no 
voice. 
 
 
 
b. Weak and ineffective 
representation; nominations are 
manipulated by mukhiya/chairperson. 
Functioning 
a. Meetings 
 
b. Decision-making 
process 
 
 
c. Contribution to 
functioning of schools 
 
 
 
a. Regular meetings. 
 
b. No domination, but the 
headmaster and chairman take 
decisions. MEO controls the 
decision making process. 
 
c. None authorised decisions 
already taken. 
 
a. Infrequent or no meetings. 
 
b. Dominated by chairperson, 
secretary, head teacher. 
 
c. None. 
Relationship with  
Panchayats 
 No relation with panchayats. 
 
 Exists as parallel centre of 
power to panchayats. 
 Mukhiya dominates the election 
process and functioning. 
 
 Unable to challenge the political 
powers of panchayats. 
Relationship with the 
Government—
Department of 
Education 
a. State level 
b. Local level 
 
 
 
a. Strong control of state level 
officers. 
b. Strong control of mandal level 
officers. 
 
 
 
a. No relationship with the state level 
DoE. 
b. Discretionary action by block-level 
officers. 
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Table 6.2 (continued) 
Dimension Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Compliance with 
Design Envisaged in 
the Act 
Strong. Very weak. 
Grievances  Few—mainly about improving 
infrastructure facilities in schools. 
 
 No complaint about mid-day 
meals. 
 Teachers not regular in 
attendance.  
 Powers for monitoring them 
cannot be  exercised in reality. 
 Poor quality and irregular 
provision of mid-day meals. 
Comments on Political 
Dynamics 
 Chairpersons are dominant; 
considered to be local workers of 
the TDP. 
 SEC members acknowledge  
affiliation with TDP. 
 Seen as a direct initiative of the 
political leader—Chandra Babu 
Naidu. 
 Undercuts the authority of other 
political actors—MLAs, 
opposition party members, 
panchayat head. 
 Chairpersons are dominant, but 
they are not affiliated to any 
particular political party.  
 
 VSS members affiliated to the 
locally dominant. 
 
 Indifference, even apathy of state 
level political leadership. 
 
 Local political MLAs and other 
political parties have no interest.  
 
 
6.5 Changes to Design and Strategy, 2006–09 
 
Sharp Reversals in AP, but the Basic Design Persists in Bihar 
 
The politically contested nature of the institution of school decentralisation was evident 
from the changes made to the formal design, that is, the rules within which participation 
was to take place, by the new governments that came to power in 2004–05. In these 
elections, incumbent governments were defeated—a government led by the Congress Party 
replaced the TDP-led government in AP; and in Bihar the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
government was replaced by a coalition government of the Janata Dal-United (JD-U) and 
the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). While the core strategies of central control in AP and local 
control in Bihar persisted, the design changes were significant only in AP. 
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Andhra Pradesh 
The 2004 elections in AP saw a sharp reversal in electoral fortunes, as the Congress Party 
led by Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy won a majority in the Assembly (185 seats for the 
Congress Party compared to only 47 seats for the TDP in a total of 294 seats). Since the 
SECs were widely noted to be partisan in character—especially as their chairpersons were 
viewed as local leaders and workers for the TDP—changes were expected. As the SECs 
completed their term in 2005, the new Congress government held elections for new 
committees in abeyance for over a year, and then issued guidelines incorporating changes 
in design in 2006.
147
 In making these changes, the government did not go through a 
process of legislative authorisation. Instead, it made use of its powers of decree through an 
ordinance. The two major modifications made were that the SEC should be a nominated 
body, and that the visible role of the chairpersons in the SECs should be subordinated. 
Further, cabinet ministers were given the power to nominate members. The position of 
―chairperson‖ (earlier selected for partisan affiliation to the ruling TDP) was now given to 
the sarpanch of the gram panchayat, who was to be its ex-officio head. These two changes 
signalled a new style of rule by a ―different political party‖ (that is, the Congress Party), in 
place of the ―personalised‖ style of rule by Naidu.148 There was a redistribution of local 
power involving gram panchayats, and also in the nature of control from above (exercised 
through the minister). However, the model remained one of centralised decentralisation. 
 
Bihar 
In Bihar too a new coalition government led by the JD-U came to power in October 
2005—elected on a promise of reform in governance.149 Improving primary schools was 
high on its agenda. And the two key steps that the new government took in this regard 
included appointing a reform minded administrator to lead its DoE and setting up a 
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Government of Andhra Pradesh (2006) Andhra Pradesh School Education Management Committee 
(Community Participation) Rules 1998.GO Ms.No.95. 
148
 The new government made a regional distribution of responsibility among cabinet ministers, making them 
responsible for looking after the development programmes of particular districts. This was an informal 
distribution of power, because the ministers were formally responsible for their ―portfolio‖—i.e. the 
government departments of which they were head. The district ministers-in-charge were to nominate four 
members to the school committee. 
149
 Two rounds of elections were held in 2005, in February and October, and the coalition of BJP and JD-U 
won 147 out of a total of 243 seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. 
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commission to examine all aspects of change needed in schools.
150
 These two measures 
signalled a convergence between the political leadership and policy entrepreneurs in Bihar, 
similar to what I have observed to be the case in the initiatives taken for teacher policy 
reform in AP (see Chapter 5). In its report, the commission affirmed the basic philosophy 
behind decentralisation and noted that the VSS were trying to ―return to the community 
what the government had taken away in the 1970s and 1980s‖ (Government of Bihar 
2007a p 18). 
Basic design features of the school committees persisted. And there was also an 
augmentation of the safeguards required to maintain their autonomy. A new legislation 
recognised complaints about the irregular attendance of teachers in school, and the capture 
of school committees by powerful groups, as subjects requiring immediate attention. 
Several steps were taken towards establishing a process of free and fair elections for the 
VSS.  First, the Election Commission—a statutory body entrusted with the conduct of 
elections for the state legislature—was given the responsibility of overseeing elections to 
VSS (Government of Bihar 2009 p. 6). Second, the earlier process of ―election‖ in the aam 
sabha was replaced by secret ballot of an electorate consisting of parents.
151
 While I have 
noted observations about the local state being non-responsive to the needs of poor people, 
now the block level education officers were accountable for holding fair elections, and 
investigating complaints against the chairperson or secretary of the VSS.  Also, while the 
overall superintendence of the panchayats was retained, many of the discretionary and 
informal ways in which mukhiyas controlled the bodies, were blocked by detailed rules of 
procedure (Government of Bihar 2009, and see also Table 6.3). 
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 The government appointed the Common School System Commission in 2006 to recommend measures to 
provide quality education for children, with a special focus on equality of opportunity and social justice. The 
new Education Secretary of the government, Mr M.M. Jha also served as a secretary to this commission 
(GoB 2007a pp. Annexure I, p ii-iii). 
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 The Act of 2007 referred to parents as constituting the ―electoral-college‖ for the VSS, whereas the 
detailed rules issued by the government in 2009 added an extra condition—namely that only parents whose 
children had over 40 per cent attendance at school were eligible to vote (GoB 2009 p. 6).  
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Table 6.3: Recent Changes to School Education Committees in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 
2006–09 
 Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
Year>> 2006–07 2007–09 
Context 
Change of government in 
2004. 
Change of government in 2005. 
Motivation 
Political affiliation of earlier 
SECs  with the Telugu Desam 
Party.  
Weak implementation of earlier 
legislation. 
Authorisation Process Ordinance.* Legislation.* 
Dimensions of Change 
 Nomination of members in 
place of their election. 
 Ministers get a chance to 
control nominations. 
 Sarpanch of gram 
panchayat to be ex-officio 
chairperson. 
 SECs become ―School 
Education and 
Management 
Committees‖. 
 Strengthens the process of 
election by providing detailed 
rules of procedure, including 
preparation of electoral rolls 
and voting by secret ballot. 
 Election Commission to 
supervise elections. 
 Mainly parents are to be the 
members.  
 Procedure for inquiry about 
complaints against 
chairperson, secretary, and 
members. 
 Specifies relationship with 
local government—BEOs to 
supervise election process and 
to inquire into grievances.  
 Specifies relationship with 
local government—safeguards 
against domination of VSS, yet 
power of superintendence with 
gram panchayat. 
 
Sources: (i) GoAP 2006, 2007 (ii) GoB 2007b, 2009. 
 
Notes: (i) SEC—School Education Committee in Andhra Pradesh; GP—Gram Panchayat; VSS—VidyalayShikshaSamiti in Bihar. 
(ii) *These are two different ways in which the government makes laws in India. A ―legislation‖ is an act passed by both houses of the 
state/central legislature, and approved by the Governor of the state/President of India. An ordinance is a temporary measure, a law or 
legal order issued by the government when the houses or legislatures are not in session. An ordinance must be ratified within six 
months of its promulgation. 
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The two states compared 
The main motivation for change in AP was the political affiliation of the SECs with the 
TDP and its leader Chandra Babu Naidu, while in Bihar it was political indifference 
resulting in weak implementation. The changes in design abandoned the process of holding 
elections in AP, while in Bihar it was the process of holding elections that was 
strengthened. The changes also reflected an alteration in political style, following changes 
of government in both states.  In AP there a political message was conveyed—signalling a 
―distribution‖ of power with other party leaders, and heads of gram panchayats. This 
contrasted with Naidu‘s previous central control over all policy and political processes. In 
Bihar, the new focus on governance was meant to distinguish Chief Minister Nitish 
Kumar‘s different approach compared to the earlier rule of Lalu Prasad. In different ways, 
both states were signalling a move away from the populist and personalised rule of the 
earlier political leader. Augmenting the fairness of the election process in Bihar was also 
an attempt by the government to reach out to people—thus bridging a ―trust deficit‖. 
Therefore, in both the states, the changes conveyed a political message. 
 
In many ways, the changes made to the VSS in Bihar following the 2007 Act made 
these committees similar to what the former SECs looked like under Chief Minister 
Chandra Babu Naidu in AP. By this I mean committees dominated by parents and under 
the responsibility of the government‘s Education Department. But two basic differences 
persisted in the Bihar committees: first, they never became ―user committees‖ that 
undercut the powers of the panchayats, as had been the case under Naidu. Second, they 
were given powers of monitoring the presence of teachers—a role which was never given 
to the committees in AP. The changes also signified a strong local contest around schools 
in Bihar, compared to a more centrally-controlled process in AP.   
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
In both AP and Bihar, the technical design and the redesign process—and that of 
implementation—of school councils, have been deeply contested in political terms. This 
observation highlights the initial remarks I have made in this thesis that the process of 
educational reform is not simply about the unfolding of a technical plan. Even though 
decentralisation and community participation seem to have contributed little to school 
outcomes in either state, the efforts of technical design and redesign have been seen as 
political opportunities in both. In the first instance, the committees were designed by 
adapting federal opportunities, and strategic choices made about balancing political 
decentralisation with demands of educational policy. However, the redesign process in 
2005–06 was meant to send clear signals of a new style of political leadership in both 
the states, and to reaffirm the distribution of patronage to new local actors in AP.  
 
That technical design alone is not a guarantee of success is further underscored 
by the failure of VSS in Bihar. Of far greater significance for outcomes is the need for 
support from the political leadership, and the presence of an overall agenda of 
development. In the context of pursuing an agenda of neo-liberal economic policies, 
even symbolic measures such as the SEC were implemented effectively and showcased 
as a part of reforms. The lack of a development agenda in Bihar resulted in political 
indifference. These conclusions highlight how differences in context, and the 
motivations of the leadership, lead to divergent outcomes for demand-side interventions 
  
The experience of AP suggests that the legislative process had a sense of a ―final 
outcome‖—that is, central control of the state‘s Education Department and partisan 
affiliation with the ruling party. There was also an imprint of the ―centralist‖ style of 
Chandra Babu Naidu in his attempts to undercut the power of panchayats. This was 
because the SECs were modelled like user committees in other sectors of development. 
The process of redesign initiated by the new Chief Minister of the Congress-led 
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government altered this style more than anything. It sought to ―redistribute‖ the gains of 
central control—sharing them with other ministers and panchayat leaders. But it did not 
make any change to the basic strategy of central control over school committees. There 
were no moves towards greater school autonomy or the devolution of powers over 
schools downwards to panchayats despite the change in political regime. The state 
remained on the list of ―weak decentralisers‖ (Manor 2003b).  
 
Since the basic design did not envisage any real devolution of power to 
committees, or involvement of the community in decisions related to schools, there was 
little evidence that AP‘s somewhat better outcomes as regards schooling were because 
of its achievements with respect to ―demand side‖ interventions.    
 
On the other hand, superior technical design and stronger powers for the school 
committees also had little impact on outcomes in Bihar. This was because elite capture 
of the committees, and weak support from the state government‘s DoE, made them very 
weak bodies. Bihar also highlights the need for institutional support to come from the 
top for decentralisation measures to be effective. 
 
The comparison of the two states also throws some light on the research question 
of which actors matter most in the policy reform process. While the policy entrepreneur 
acted alone in Bihar, the political leader exerted control over the process of change in 
AP. The policymaker alone was neither able to institutionalise change, nor signal an 
ethos of decentralisation to lower levels of the implementing administration.    
 
These observations from the experiences of AP and Bihar also form the basis for 
suggesting modifications to the expectations of political economy theory regarding the 
role of ―demand side‖ interventions in countervailing the power of teacher unions. In 
Bihar, reversing the policies of centralisation and local control over teachers was an 
explicit element of the design of VSS. Yet the committees did not achieve their intended 
objectives—not because of opposition from ―strong‖ teacher unions, but rather because 
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of the control and domination of local powerful interests. Uniformly, the narrative from 
the voices of the poor was one of denial, and of the local state colluding with dominant 
individuals. In such circumstances, the poor felt there was no way in which to be heard.  
 
The indifferent outcomes of decentralisation and community participation also 
provide an indication of the unfinished agenda of school reform. The ideal vision of 
autonomous school councils, on whom powers and resources for school management 
have been adequately devolved, is a long way off. However, more than two decades of 
federal and state initiatives have been successful in institutionalising the idea of having 
local bodies associated with the school reform process. Both states considered here are 
once again in the process of redesigning their school committees in order to bring them 
in conformity with new federal guidelines of the Right to Education Act, 2009. Now, all 
states are to have school management committees consisting largely of parents. This is a 
case of ―federal adoption‖ of the model that exists in AP (and also Karnataka).This 
development, and the wider role now envisaged for school committees, as in Bihar, is an 
example of educational reform in the states forming constituent elements of a ―federal 
design‖. This is also an instance of legislation following over a decade of reform in the 
states—although this time at the federal level. 
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Chapter 7 
Politics, Schools, and the Poor: A Local View 
 
The objective of this chapter is two-fold: first, assessing the results of the 
implementation of macro-level reforms at the local level, looking in particular at 
variation between districts in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and also at variations between 
these states. The second objective is analyzing local level political factors that contribute 
to these differences.  In particular, the chapter examines how the technical design of 
particular reform initiatives are ―reinvented‖ or ―adapted‖ at the local level through 
interaction and struggle between the school, communities, and political actors. Hence, 
the chapter examines the relationship between reform and politics in a new (third) arena, 
characterised by the interaction between local interests, institutions, and the state in 
determining reform outcomes. 
Based on extensive field work in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, the 
chapter compares the differences in reform ―results‖, as indicated by school 
participation, the working of schools and teachers, and the implementation of the Mid-
Day Meal (MDM) programme. It also discusses the factors associated with these 
differences as obtained from community perceptions of the functioning of the education 
system, and through an analysis of the functioning of local institutions.  
The chapter uses data from two research methods: (i) a quantitative survey of 
households and schools in selected districts of each state, and (ii) qualitative information 
from school observations and interviews with parents, teachers, political actors, and 
administrators. Data was collected from two districts each in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar 
during 2005–06, with one district being ―educationally advanced‖ (that is, with literacy 
rates higher than the state average) and the second being ―educationally backward‖ (that 
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is, with literacy rates lower than the state average).  The selection of two contrasting 
districts within each state facilitated an analysis of local level differences. Hence, East 
Godavari in AP and Gaya in Bihar were selected as ―educationally advanced‖ districts, 
and Mahabubnagar in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Purnia in Bihar were selected as 
―educationally backward‖ districts. 
This chapter has five main sections. The next outlines the methodology of data 
collection and analysis. Sections two and three present an analysis of the ―results on the 
ground‖ of the reforms in terms of student participation, and provision of inputs for the 
education process. Section two presents data from a household survey on participation in 
elementary education, disaggregated by social categories of caste, religion, and gender. 
It compares the districts in each state and also the districts across the two states. This is 
complemented by observation data on attendance on the day of the school visit.  Section 
three compares the availability of physical infrastructure, the presence and adequacy of 
teachers, and implementation of incentive schemes for promoting school participation, 
specifically the MDM programme in the two states.  This is done through a school 
survey and observations during field visits, particularly about the type of interaction that 
the teachers have with students, and community experiences. The next section analyses 
the role of local politics in the functioning of schools. It focuses on the role of the local 
state, organised interests, and local political actors. The concluding section summarises 
what school reforms, implemented for over a decade, have actually provided to the poor 
and explores why reform implementation in AP differs from that in Bihar, with a focus 
on the role that local politics plays in determining these differences. 
7.1 Methodology of Data Collection 
Sample Selection 
 
Information was collected from a survey of schools and households, school 
observations,   and interviews with teachers, political representatives, and government 
officers; field notes on school observations, including discussions with parents in 
selected field sites in the two states also formed part of this exercise. The selected field 
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sites were eight sub-district units in the two states, selected after a 2-stage sampling 
process. In the first stage, two districts were selected in each state. In the second stage 
two sub-districts units were selected from within these two districts, giving a total of 
four sub-district units in each state. The districts were selected on the basis of 
contrasting educational indicators—literacy rates that were higher and lower than the 
state average.
152
 The two sub-districts within each district were also purposely selected 
on the basis of better/worse literacy rates.  Within each sub-district, 10 schools were 
selected at random using the list of primary schools available with the District Education 
Office (DEO).  In each school, 10 households were chosen for a survey, giving a total of 
100 households per sub-district unit.  Hence, 40 schools and 400 households were 
surveyed within each state.  Annexure Table A7.1illustrates the selection process and 
Annexure Table A7.2 gives details of the sample. 
These findings are not statistically ―representative‖ of the situation at the state 
level; they are more representative of the situation in selected districts.
153
 The real 
significance of the findings of the survey is the insight it provides into how reforms was 
implemented on the ground, and how children, teachers, and parents experienced it. 
Second, the selection of districts based on literacy rates enables an investigation of the 
local factors that are responsible for better or poor educational performance, given 
similar support in terms of resources and policies from the higher levels of the 
government. 
Data Collection Instruments 
 
The instruments used for data collection were: (i) a household questionnaire, with 
questions on school participation of children, functioning of the school, role of teachers 
and regularity of children attending school, and the role of education committees and 
panchayats in improving schools. This questionnaire was administered through face-to-
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 All districts in these two states were divided into three clusters—districts with literacy rates higher than 
the state average, close to the average, and lower than the average. Selected districts are from the top and 
bottom clusters.  
153
At best they represent an average of the situation in two districts in each state, one district with good 
educational indicators and the other  with poor educational indicators. 
195 
  
 
 
 
face interviews preferably with female heads of households, (ii) a school survey 
questionnaire, with questions on school infrastructure and facilities, attendance of 
children, and teacher availability and quality. This was administered in schools through 
face-to-face interviews with the teachers present, (iii) interview guides for discussion 
with teachers, block/mandal education officers, and political representatives, and (iv) 
open-ended interviews with parents, teachers, political representatives of panchayats, 
and government officers.
154
 School observations were recorded as field notes. 
 
Characteristics of the Sample 
 
The high literacy districts selected were East Godavari in AP and Gaya in Bihar; the low 
literacy districts were Mahabubnagar and Purnia in AP and Bihar respectively.  Literacy 
rates as per the 2001 Census are given in Figure 7.1.  Clearly, although both districts in 
Bihar had lower literacy rates than their comparators in AP, the difference in literacy 
rates between districts in each state was roughly similar. This is important because it 
allows us to look for differences in the implementation of ―state-level‖ reform initiatives 
in widely differing local contexts. 
Annexure Tables A7.3 to A7.5 summarise some salient features of the sampled 
households and indicate the social context of each sub-district unit.  
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 See Research Methods Appendix (Appendix 1 Section D) for details. 
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Social Profile of the Households Surveyed 
 
Understanding the social profile of the surveyed community, mainly in terms of its 
social-caste composition, is an important starting point for discussion of school 
participation.  
 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
Over half of the sample households in Andhra Pradesh (53.4 per cent) belonged to Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs). The second highest concentration was that of Scheduled 
Castes (SCs) (22 per cent) who are at the lowest levels of the caste hierarchy. The 
concentration of Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the sample was also high at 15.4 per cent. 
Keeping in mind the fact that as per the 2001 Census the proportionate share of STs in 
the total population of AP was only 6.60 per cent, their proportionate share in the sample 
was 2.3 times higher than their share in the total population of the state. In fact, the 
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of Literacy Rates for Total Population 
in Survey Districts of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2001 
 
East Godavari 
Gaya 
Mahabubnagar 
Purnia 
Source: Census of India  2001 
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proportionate share of all three deprived social groups—OBCs, STs, and SCs—in the 
survey was higher than the estimates available for their share in the population, 
indicating a fair inclination of the sample towards deprived social-caste categories (see 
Annexure Table A7.3).
155
 
Within the state, there was noticeable variation in social-caste proportions across 
the selected districts. Mahabubnagar had a very high concentration of OBCs; at 60.6 per 
cent this was nearly one and a half times more than their proportion in East Godavari. 
Mahabubnagar also had a higher proportion of SC households (25.8 per cent) as 
compared to East Godavari (18.6 per cent) (Annexure Table A7.3). 
 
Bihar 
 
In Bihar too, OBCs had the highest share in the sampled households (45.7 per cent). But 
the comparative situation for the two other deprived social groups was quite different. 
The share of SCs in the sample was very high at 40.3 per cent and almost equal to the 
share of OBCs. Second, the proportion of ST households in the sample was very small 
as the state was left with a very negligible population of STs (0.90 per cent) after its 
bifurcation and the creation of the new state of Jharkhand in 2000.  
Within Bihar, variations between the selected districts were not much. The two 
districts had very similar proportions of the OBC population—47 per cent in Gaya and 
45 per cent in Purnia. Gaya had a slightly higher SC population as compared to Purnia, 
and the latter district also had a higher proportion of the upper caste population 
(Annexure Table A7.3). 
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The share of Scheduled Castes in the total population of Andhra Pradesh was reported to be 16.20 per 
cent in the 2001 Census. In the surveyed areas the estimated population was higher by 6 percentage points 
than the Census figures. Backward Caste population was not counted in the Census, but research sources 
(Srinivasulu 2002 p. 4) report their share in AP‘s population to be 47 per cent. 
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The two states compared 
 
In all the four selected districts in the two states, Mahabubnagar had the highest 
proportion of OBCs, East Godavari of STs, and Gaya of SCs. In terms of religion, the 
overwhelming majority were Hindu in AP (close to or above 90 per cent of the 
households), and in Gaya (91per cent of the households). Purnia was an exception, as 
only 45 per cent of the households surveyed were Hindu, and over half the households 
(55.5 per cent) were Muslim. East Godavari was the only district in the two states with a 
small Christian population—9 per cent (Annexure Table A7.4). 
Children of School Going Age 
 
The demographic profile of the sample, viewed in terms of the distribution of child 
population by age group, reflected an important difference between the two states. New 
entrants to the Bihar population—children in the 0–4 years age group (18.7 per cent) 
were nearly twice the number in Andhra Pradesh (9.9 per cent). The implication of this 
is that there will be a much larger number of school going children in Bihar in the future. 
In both the states the highest proportion of children was in the primary school 
going age group (6–10 years), indicating that the school system in both the states was 
dealing with its most severe challenge at the time of the survey. In Bihar, the average 
number of children per family was higher (3.62) as compared to AP (2.26). In both the 
states, districts with better educational indicators reported fewer numbers of children per 
family on average (see Annexure Table A7.5). 
7.2 Results on the Ground: School Participation and Attendance 
Household Reports on School Participation 
 
School participation (as reported by the households in the survey) and school attendance 
(as measured by the number of students counted present on the day of the field visit as a 
percentage of those marked present by the teachers) were used as indicators to judge the 
results on the ground.  The justification for this method is that while the former indicates 
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from the households‘ point of view whether they access the service that the state is 
supposed to provide, the latter shows both the actual utilisation of the service and the 
extent to which there is mis-reporting and hence, indirectly, potential for diversion of 
resources.  
School participation was broken down by two age groups: 6–10 year olds who 
represented children eligible for primary school, and 6–13 year olds who represented 
children eligible for elementary school.  As education reform was specifically supposed 
to improve participation of the underprivileged, school participation was reported 
specifically for girls, SCs, STs, OBCs, and also by religion. To supplement the picture 
on current school participation, data was also collected on those who had dropped-out 
and those who had never enrolled in school, which gave a more complete picture of 
service access in the past. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 highlight the differences in school 
participation between districts within a state in the primary and elementary school age 
groups respectively. 
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Figure 7.2: Percentage Distribution of Children (6 to 10 years) by Status of 
School-going, Drop-out and Never-enrolled 
Never-enrolled
Drop-out
School-going
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06. 
Note: "School-going refers to children currently attending school; ‗Drop-out‘ refers to children who were enrolled and 
attended school but currently are not attending school; ‗Never-enrolled‘ refers to those who have never been enrolled in 
a  school. All three refer to children in the age-group 6-10 years who should be attending primary grades I-V.  
  
Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
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Andhra Pradesh 
In Andhra Pradesh, the participation of primary age children (6–10 year olds) was high 
in both districts—95 percent in East Godavari and 93 percent in Mahabubnagar (Figure 
7.2).   Equally impressive, the participation of 6–13 year olds was also high—93 per 
cent and 89 per cent respectively (Figure 7.3). The small difference between the districts  
is noteworthy given the fact that there was a 21 point difference in literacy rates of the 
same districts just five years ago (2001 Census).  The narrow difference in the 
performance of districts was confirmed by participation rates for girls, SCs, and STs.  
First, within each district, there was not much difference in the participation rates for 
these groups. For instance, there was a less than 5 per cent difference between the 
participation rates of all children aged 6–13 years, and SC children of the same age in 
East Godavari; this differential was even lower (3 per cent) in Mahabubnagar, the low 
literacy district.  Second, the difference in participation rates of different social groups in 
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4.3 5.7 10.4 
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Figure 7.3: Percentage Distribution of Children (6 to13 years) by Status of 
School -going, Drop-out and Never-enrolled 
Never-enrolled
Drop-out
School-going
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06. 
 
Note: "School-going refers to children currently attending school; ‗Drop-out‘ refers to children who were enrolled 
and attended school but currently are not attending school; ‗Never-enrolled‘ refers to those who have never been 
enrolled in a  school. All three refer to children in the age-group 6-13 years who should be attending primary 
Andhra Pradesh Bihar 
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the districts was also not large. For instance, the participation rate of SC children aged 
6–13 years was 88 per cent in East Godavari and 85 per cent in Mahabubnagar. Finally, 
the percentage of children in both age groups who had never attended school was 5 per 
cent or less in both districts, a remarkable testimony of the success of the reform efforts 
in the state. 
Bihar 
The picture was different in Bihar.  To begin with, the participation rate of children aged 
6–10 years (the youngest cohort) in both districts was significantly lower than that in 
AP. Compared to the low literacy district of AP (Mahabubnagar), there was a 10 
percentage point difference with Gaya (district with high literacy rates) and an almost 25 
percentage point difference with Purnia (district with low literacy rates).  Between Gaya 
and Purnia, there was an 11 percentage point difference, compared to a 2 percentage 
point difference between selected districts of AP (Figure 7.2). Surprisingly, this 
difference between districts in Bihar did not seem so large for the age group of 6–13 
year olds, with a 79 per cent participation rate reported in Gaya and a 72 per cent 
participation rate reported in Purnia (Figure 7.3).  
Even more striking was the percentage of children aged 6–10 years who had 
never attended school in the two districts of Bihar. Almost one-quarter of the children in 
Purnia and one-eighth in Gaya had never been to school, an equally remarkable 
testimony of the failure of the implementation of reform efforts in Bihar. 
Gender Differences in School Participation 
 
A disaggregated view of participation in terms of social categories of gender and caste 
provided a more insightful view of who came to school and who got left behind.  In 
terms of gender, the situation in AP was better than in Bihar, as the overall participation 
rates were higher and the participation rate for girls was only marginally lower than that 
for boys. Table 7.1 shows that on average, the gender differential
156
 was close to one 
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See the ―Notes‖ for Table 7.1. 
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(0.98) in AP, indicating very little difference in the proportion of boys and girls 
attending school. Girls‘ participation rates in Mahabubnagar were 5 percentage points 
lower than in East Godavari. 
In Bihar, the overall participation rates were lower, and gender differentials were 
higher (0.93), indicating a much lower participation of girls in comparison to boys in 
schools. On average, participation rates for girls in Bihar were 18 percentage points 
lower than what they were in AP.  The inter-district variations in participation rates for 
girls were similar to that in AP. Participation rates for girls in Purnia were lower than 
that in Gaya by 5 percentage points (Table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.1: School Participation Rates (%) by Gender, District Level 
State/ 
Districts 
Boys Girls 
Gender  
differential* 
East Godavari 93.8 92.4 0.98 
Mahabubnagar 90.3 87.6 0.97 
Andhra Pradesh 91.9 89.9 0.98 
Gaya 81.4 75.4 0.93 
Purnia 75.1 69.8 0.93 
Bihar 78.0 72.4 0.93 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
Notes:  
(i) Gender differential was calculated by dividing the participation rate for girls by the 
participation rate for boys. The closer the value of the differential (reported in column 3) to 
unity (1), the less the differential.  
(ii) School participation is for children in the age group 6–13 years. 
 
 
Caste status reinforced gender differences in both states, with the highest 
differentials among SCs. In AP, the differential was 0.90 while in Bihar it was 0.86, 
indicating a higher gender disparity in Bihar.  Further, at 63.3 per cent, the participation 
of SC girls in Bihar schools was lower by almost 21percentage points as compared to the 
participation rates of upper caste girls in the state (84.2 per cent). At 82.1 per cent, the 
participation rates for SC girls in AP were about 19 percentage points higher than that 
for SC girls in Bihar, and similar to the participation rates of upper caste girls in Bihar. 
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In a sense even the worst off social categories in AP reported school participation rates 
that were comparable to or better than privileged upper caste groups in Bihar (see 
Annexure Table A7.7).  
There was parity in participation of upper caste boys and girls in both the states 
(a gender differential of 1 or more). The situation was the same for girls from backward 
castes in AP; their participation in schools was equal to that of boys. Unlike AP, 
participation rates for girls from backward castes in Bihar were not equal to that for 
boys, but the disparity was lower (gender differential of 0.96 for OBCs in Bihar). 
Social-Caste Differences in School Participation 
 
In both states, the lowest participation was reported among SCs and STs, although STs 
had a significant population only in AP and not in Bihar.  
AP‘s better performance, as compared to Bihar, was on account of both higher 
participation by upper and backward castes, and because even the most disadvantaged 
social groups, the SCs and STs, performed better than comparable social groups in 
Bihar. This was illustrated by the higher school participation rates reported in East 
Godavari. The district‘s success was based on the fact that its large backward caste 
population had a near universal participation rate of 95 per cent, and universal 
participation rate for upper caste children. The STs in the district did not do as well, and 
at 84.3 per cent, they had the lowest participation rates among all the social castes. Yet 
they did very well as compared to the disadvantaged social castes in Bihar. In Gaya, the 
comparable district selected in Bihar (better literacy rates), participation rates for the 
most disadvantaged social group, the SCs, was 72.5 per cent or nearly 12 percentage 
points lower than that for STs in East Godavari (see Annexure Table A7.8). 
In all four districts surveyed in the two states, the worst performing social group 
was SCs in Purnia. At 65.3 per cent, their participation rates were approximately 7 
percentage points lower than those for SCs in Gaya, and 19 percentage point lower than 
those for STs in East Godavari, the worst performing group in AP (Annexure Table 
A7.8).  
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Religion based differences were not as important as those based on caste. In both 
states the participation rates for Muslim children were equal to or only slightly lower 
than for Hindu children. In Purnia, the only district with a Muslim majority population, 
Muslim children reported better participation rates than SCs. In AP, only Mahabubnagar 
had a small Muslim population (9 per cent), and the participation rate of their children 
were only marginally lower than that for Hindu children (Annexure Table A7.9). 
Low Attendance in Schools 
 
Finally, there was a striking difference between the two states in terms of the children 
actually present on the day of the field visit expressed as a percentage of those marked 
present by the teachers. In AP, this was 88 per cent in East Godavari and 81 per cent in 
Mahabubnagar. In Bihar, the figures were 49 per cent in Gaya and 44 per cent in Purnia 
(Figure 7.4). Over half the children marked present were not in school in both districts in 
the state. The issue of lower actual presence of children in Mahabubnagar in AP, and in 
both districts of Bihar was taken up with school teachers during the field visit. Some of 
this qualitative information is now analysed. 
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Figure 7.4 : Actual Presence (%) of Students in Schools in Survey 
Districts 
 
East Godavari 
Mahabubnagar 
Gaya  
Purnia 
Source: School Survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06. 
 
Notes: Headcount Ratio: Headcount of actual presence of students as a percentage of children marked 
present by teachers on the day of the school visit 
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Andhra Pradesh 
Inter-district variations in school attendance were high in the state—7 per cent (Figure 
7.4). This was striking in view of the low variations in school participation rates reported 
in the two districts in the state (2 per cent for the 6–10 year age group). In East 
Godavari, I came across very few instances of schools with low attendance. In 
Prathipadu mandal many teachers felt that the good relations between the school and 
community members built over the last few years were responsible for an increase in 
attendance. The Mandal Parishad primary school Gajjenpudi in this mandal, was a very 
vibrant one where children came on time, attendance was high, and many parents were 
around to help with small jobs in the school. The teachers considered the former 
chairman of the School Education Committee, Sacchi Narayan as its main pillar of 
support. He had mobilised the community and had helped in resolving school related 
issues at the level of the community.  
Another important factor behind the Gajjenpudi school working well was the 
strong vigilance by ultra-left groups belonging to the Communist Party of India-Maoist-
Leninist (CPI-ML).
157
 The village sarpanch was affiliated to the CPI-ML, and his son 
Gopi confirmed that the group took a keen interest in the functioning of the school: ―We 
resolve all the problems at the community level, and do not allow any interference from 
outside, especially the police.‖ According to him, only 60 to 70 children were not 
attending school due to hardships faced by their families on account of a severe drought.  
The Girijan primary school, Bappanadara (Prathipadu mandal), located in the 
dense forests of Rampachodavaram, and attended mostly by the Kondadora tribes, was 
also being monitored by CPI-ML, cadres of which had chopped off the nose of School 
Education Committee (SEC) member Chintalnokkaraju because of suspicions of  
pilferage of school supplies (Photo 7.1). This had sent a strong message to the 
                                                          
157
Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist People‘s War Group was active in this area. Usually known 
as the People‘s War Group, the party believes in the use of violence for overthrowing state power and   
renounces electoral politics.    
207 
  
 
 
 
government administration as well as the community to keep vested interests away from 
the school. Children attended school because it worked well. 
 
In Mahabubnagar, attendance was low in many schools, especially after lunch. In 
the Musapet primary school, I found empty classrooms (see Photo 7.5). Five teachers 
were present, but there were no children. The teachers gave many reasons for why 
children were not in school: children from the backward and scheduled castes had gone 
to the nearby residential hostel where lunch was being served for them, and they had not 
come back.
158
After waiting for over an hour, I was told that some children had gone 
fishing after lunch, while some others had gone to a fair in the local market. I also 
visited the fair, but found no children there. 
                                                          
158
Andhra Pradesh had an extensive network of hostels set up by the government for backward caste and 
scheduled caste children. Lunch for these children was provided by their hostels and not in the schools.  
7.1: Bappanadara School in East  Godavari: Chintalnokkarju's nose was 
chopped off by  CPI-ML cadres (Photo by Mansi Midha) 
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The Musapet school was a combined Telugu and Urdu medium school, with 
specific teachers appointed to teach in Urdu.  But there were no students learning Urdu. 
For the empty classroom in the Urdu section, I was given the reason that Muharram, the 
Muslim day of mourning, had been observed a week ago. Since then the Muslim 
students (who were enrolled to study in the Urdu section), had not come back to school 
in full strength. 
When the issue of low attendance was taken up with the local sarpanch of 
Musapet, A. Bhaskar Goud, the researcher was told that poor people were not very keen 
on sending their children to government schools.
159
Anybody with any means to educate 
their children preferred private schools as they did not have confidence in the 
government system. In many other schools in Mahabubnagar, a local jatra of the deities 
was cited as the most common reason for low attendance. In the Nallikonda primary 
school, children had gone home after lunch. However, within minutes of my reaching 
the school a message was sent to the village and the children came back. 
Often the teachers hid the real reasons why children were not coming to school, 
for example, because of drought and migration. The area had witnessed a severe drought 
over the last few years that had forced people to migrate. This was an important reason 
for explaining why schooling of children had been disrupted. Sheeresya, parent of a 
child in primary school Sankalmati, articulated this issue when he said that ―migration is 
a huge problem as there has been a drought in the district for the last seven years. 
Families have had to migrate under pressure.‖160 
Admitting a drought in the area had implications on the official machinery—of 
the state being unable to serve its poor citizens—and the teachers, therefore, refrained 
from making any statements that could have possible negative implications on the 
working of the government. 
 
                                                          
159
Personal interview with Mr A. Bhaskar Goud sarpanch Musapet, Addakal mandal, Mahabubnagar, 14 
February 2006. 
160
Personal interview, Sheereshya, Primary School Sankalmati, Mahabubnagar, 14 February 2006. 
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Bihar 
In Bihar, attendance was poor in both districts, and inter-district variations (5 percentage 
points) were lower than the variations in school participation (11 percentage point 
difference in school participation for 6–10 year olds). Local festivals and weddings in 
the village were frequently cited as reasons for low attendance. A village wedding also 
meant that the school was shut down for a few days as the functions were held in the 
school.
161
 In many schools, teachers refused to show attendance records. In Fatehpur 
(Gaya), a lady teacher had torn off pages from the school register meant for marking 
attendance. In Purnia‘s Gotphar school (Baysi block), the attendance registers were 
locked. The teacher came to the school after many requests, especially from local 
notables, and then the attendance records were shown to me. Many teachers in Gaya told 
the researcher in confidence that higher attendance records were maintained so that more 
grain could be picked up and more allowances taken from the government for school 
meals. The teachers also claimed that a number of children came to school at lunch time 
to eat the Mid-Day Meal (MDM) and did not attend classes. But none of the reasons 
given by the teachers could explain why only half (or less) of those marked present were 
actually attending schools. 
In both the districts in Bihar, there was a distrust of the state among parents, and 
very little hope that anything would be done as there was an abysmally low presence of 
the state in the local context.
162
 In the absence of state machinery, schools were 
operating under strong constraints from local vested interests. Such an uneasy 
relationship between the school and the community would hardly render the school a 
place where young children in need of care could be left behind.
163
 
                                                          
161
 Schools were used as a ―board and lodge‖ facility for the bridegroom‘s family and friends.  
162
 This ―sighting‖ of the local state confirms the findings of Corbridge, Williams, Srivastav, and Veron 
(2005 pp.33–35) of ―scarcity‖ of the local state in states of eastern India—Bihar, Jharkhand, and West 
Bengal. This observation was based on the poor performance of the state in the anti-poverty, employment 
assurance, and primary education programmes, as viewed from the perspective of its beneficiaries. 
163
 The survey also asked households to respond to reasons for lack of enthusiasm in sending children to 
school. There was a very low response to this question in Gaya. In other places, households cited ―lack of 
interest‖, ―nobody to monitor (children‘s education) at home‖, and ―nobody to monitor in school‖ as 
important reasons.  
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7.3 Results on the Ground: School Infrastructure, Teachers, and the Mid-
Day Meal Programme 
Access to Schools and Physical Infrastructure 
 
When it comes to issues of access to schools and the physical infrastructure available, 
field visits showed that official data often made claims that did not exist on the ground 
in Bihar. The contrasting experience of reaching schools in Baysi block in Purnia and 
Dharur mandal in Mahabubnagar illustrates this. Both were educationally backward with 
only a quarter of their populations being literate (2001 Census; Annexure Table A7.2). 
Yet, reaching schools in these two areas, and seeing how they functioned, was not the 
same experience. 
Getting to the primary school in Gotphar in Baysi block was an uphill task. Even 
though officially the school was reachable as it had a kuccha approach road, I walked for 
over an hour from the main road and still did not find any kuccha road. The path was 
intersected frequently by open drains for diverting rain water. Walking bare feet in the 
soft, muddy slush was the only option for reaching the school. On reaching Gotphar the 
researcher found the school closed. According to the villagers the teacher had not come 
to the school for over a month and the meal programme had been non-functional for 
over four months. In many other schools in Purnia and Gaya, teachers complained about 
how difficult it was to reach the schools because there were no roads or transport, a 
situation which worsened in the rainy season. 
Reaching schools in Dharur was not so difficult, as the roads were in good condition 
and the timing of public transport buses had been synchronised with school timings. 
Like Dharur, commuting to the remote mandals of Gattu and Ieeja in the same district 
was also not difficult. Ieeja had a female Mandal Education Officer (MEO), Mariamma, 
for whom moving around in the field and visiting schools was not a difficult task. 
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Distance of Schools from Village and Availability of Roads 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
Villagers had better access to schools in Andhra Pradesh because approximately 77 per 
cent of the schools surveyed were within a kilometre radius of the village. Inter-district 
variations in school availability (within a kilometre of a village) were not large, 
indicating uniformity in provision by the state. Better availability of roads made access 
to schools easier—100 per cent of the schools in East Godavari and 90 per cent in 
Mahabubnagar were connected to pucca or semi-pucca roads (Annexure Table A7.11). 
A systematic effort had been made in the state to pool resources from different central 
and state government schemes and discretionary grants available with the legislators to 
build and maintain roads. Since schools were mostly within walking distance of villages, 
better roads were an advantage for teachers and education officers responsible for school 
supervision and support. MRPs, whose job it was to provide academic supervision in the 
field, were present in many schools at the time of the researcher‘s visit; very often they 
were seen cycling to reach the school. 
An important difference between the two districts was in the number of new 
schools opened (in the last 10 years)—15 per cent in East Godavari and 5 per cent in 
Mahabubnagar. The district reform team informed me that the slow pace of construction 
in the latter district was not due to lack of funds from the state, but mainly due to 
bottlenecks in decision making at the district level (Annexure Table A7.11)
164
. 
Bihar 
In Bihar only 50 per cent of the surveyed schools were within a kilometre of the villages 
that they served. Hence, small children had to walk longer distances to reach school. 
Gaya (higher literacy rate district) had a lower proportion of schools within a kilometre 
                                                          
164
 Personal interview with Mr Rajeshwar, Assistant Programme Coordinator, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, 
Mahabubnagar, 28 February 2006. 
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of the village (40 per cent), than the lower literacy district of Purnia (60 per cent). This 
indicated that low participation or attendance in schools in Bihar was not completely on 
account of the distance of the school from the village.  
Greater distances, along with poor roads made the situation difficult for both 
students and teachers. Only 55 per cent of the surveyed schools in Bihar had access to 
pucca or semi-pucca roads, whereas in AP the corresponding figure was 95 per cent. 
There were no inter-district variations in schools having access to roads, and only 55 per 
cent of the schools in both the districts were connected to pucca or semi-pucca roads 
(see Annexure Table A7.11).  
Using a cycle to reach the school seemed impossible in Bihar. The condition of 
the roads was poor and travelling even a few kilometres by car could take hours. Not 
surprising that I did not find any Block Education Officers (BEOs) in the field during the 
survey. 
People in Bihar did not perceive distance of the school to be a major problem—
only 15 per cent of the households cited this as a problem in the survey. Lack of 
infrastructure and teaching staff, incompetence and irregularity of teachers, and lack of 
monitoring by BEOs and Education Committees were seen as bigger problems by the 
community (Annexure Table A7.19). 
Poor Quality of Physical Infrastructure in Schools  
 
Andhra Pradesh 
The quality of school buildings left a lot to be desired in both the states, although 
schools in AP were somewhat better than those in Bihar in terms of the availability of 
specific facilities. Nearly 82 per cent of the schools had pucca buildings, though the 
maintenance was not very good. On average, schools in AP had three rooms and 90 per 
cent of these rooms were in a usable condition. Nearly 85 per cent of the schools found 
having verandahs in front of the classrooms, but most of these were used as classrooms 
due to lack of enough space to hold classes. There was not much difference between 
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districts in terms of quality or extent of utilisation (number of children per room) of 
physical infrastructure (Figure 7.5A; Annexure Table A7.12). More than 70 per cent of 
the schools reported having the two basic facilities of toilets and drinking water. A 
higher proportion of schools in Mahabubnagar reported having toilets (84.2 per cent), as 
compared to East Godavari (63.2 per cent). But the condition of the toilets was better in 
East Godavari—53 per cent were in a good condition, while only 21 per cent of the 
toilets were reported to be in a good condition in Mahabubnagar (Figure 7.5A; Annexure 
Table A7.13). Field observations also suggested that the actual condition of these toilets 
was bad in Mahabubnagar, suggesting a lower availability for use by children (see 
Photos 7.2A and 7.2B). 
 
Bihar 
Similarly, in Bihar 92.5 per cent of the surveyed schools had pucca buildings, having an 
average of 2.6 rooms in each school. Approximately, 87 per cent of schools had 
verandahs in front of the classrooms, and 80–90 per cent of the schools in the two 
districts surveyed reported using these as classrooms. The inter-district variations were 
not much with regard to the existence of these facilities (Figure 7.5B; Annexure Table 
A7.12).  
 
The two states compared 
 
The real difference between the two states, however, was in the number of children who 
used these classrooms.  A far larger number of children used each of these rooms in 
Bihar as compared to AP. On an average, each classroom in Bihar reported having 80 
children, while in AP the average was 38 children, or close to the national norm of 40 
children per classroom (Figure 7.5A; Annexure Table A7.12). The differences between 
districts were high. Gaya reported an average of 65 students using each classroom, 
whereas in Purnia the average was 93. The overcrowded rooms, along with poor 
ventilation and no electricity, made the atmosphere inside the room almost unbearable. 
This also put a lot of stress on the infrastructure. 
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The current Secretary for School Education, Government of Bihar, recognised 
this when he stated in an interview, that ―...we need almost 300,000 classrooms. What 
we have now is just half of this number. Looking at the current allocation of resources, 
we need over ten years to provide for so many rooms. The state is still grappling with 
basic issues of access and enrolment. Presence of good schools with facilities and 
teachers is a basic need. Only then can we talk about (improving) quality‖ (emphasis 
added).
165
 
A critical facility was that of toilets for children, especially girls. A very low 17.5 
per cent of the schools in Bihar had toilets as compared to 73.7 per cent in AP. An even 
lower proportion of these were actually in a usable condition.
166
 
  
                                                          
165
 Personal Interview with Mr. Anjani Kumar, State Project Director, Bihar Education Project, Patna, 6 
October 2005. 
166
 Photos 7.2A and 7.2B give some indication of the poor condition of toilets in Gaya and Mahabubnagar 
respectively. 
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Photo 7.2A:Toilets in Beladih primary school in Belaganj, 
Gaya. They are unusable for lack of water supply and doors 
Photo7.2 B: School toilet ,Jadcherla mandal Mahabubnagar. 
Unusable for lack of a door and water 
(Photo by Mansi Midha) 
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Figure 7.5A: Physical Infrastructure in Schools  in Andhra Pradesh 
Mahabubnagar East Godavari
Source: School survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar,  2005-06 
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Figure 7.5 B: Physical Infrastructure in Schools in Bihar 
Purnia Gaya
Source:School Survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06  
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Teachers: Availability, Quality, and Interactions with the Community 
 
On the basis of school observations and a survey in the educationally backward 
BIMARU states in north India, the PROBE report (1999 p. 54) noted: ―If any single 
resource factor can make the difference between a poor school and a successful school, 
it is the commitment and initiative of the teacher.‖ These observations were confirmed 
by what I found during the course of my field work. Even in very remote areas in 
mandals and blocks noted for very low literacy rates, teachers were observed to be 
making a difference in the way in which the schools functioned even in the midst of 
poor school infrastructure and scarce support from the state. In Baysi block in Purnia, 
the primary school in Hijala (not very far from the Gotphar school mentioned earlier) 
was functioning well. Like the Gotphar school, this one too faced constraints of access 
during the rainy season but unlike the Gotphar school this one was functioning well, it 
had good attendance and the school meal programme was efficiently run. It was the 
teacher in this school who made all the difference. To overcome problems of access 
during the rainy season, he built a check-dam with support from the community to 
restrict the flow of rain water. 
 
In Mahabubnagar‘s Dharur mandal, the Bureddypalli primary school had near total 
attendance even in the afternoon. The notebooks were impressive, with clear writing in 
Telugu and English. The high attendance and academic standards were credited to the 
hard work of lady teacher, S. Noorjehan. In the same district, the efforts of M. 
Janakramulu, the only teacher in the Manthatti primary school with 52 children on the 
rolls, made a difference.
167
 The attendance was nearly 85 per cent, despite there being a 
festival related to a local deity in the village. In the last four months, the school had 
moved up from the lowest ―Grade D‖ to ―Grade B‖ in the Education Department‘s 
ranking of school quality.
168
 
                                                          
167
 PS Manthatti was located in Nagarkarnoolmandal, Mahabubnagar district. 
168
 Schools in AP were being evaluated on the basis of academic performance of students under the Child 
Language Improvement Programme (CLIP), and were ranked on this basis.  
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Beyond these individual cases where teachers‘ efforts made a big difference to 
schools, some of the systematic differences in school outcomes in the two states were 
also due to the differences in the availability and quality of teacher resources.   
 
 
i. Availability of teacher resources 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
On average, schools in both the states had three teachers, but the real difference was in 
the number of students that each teacher was expected to handle. Expressed as the 
―pupil-teacher ratio‖ (PTR),169 in AP the average was 29 students for every teacher. In 
both districts in the state, this ratio was well within the national norm,
170
 indicating 
adequate teacher presence. Teacher vacancy rates were also low in the state, with East 
Godavari reporting a lower vacancy rate (9 per cent) than Mahabubnagar (21 per cent) 
(Annexure Table A7.14). The state also had a high proportion of female teachers (41.6 
per cent), and the inter-district differences in this regard were noteworthy. Nearly 48 per 
cent of the teachers in East Godavari were female, while in Mahabubnagar, the 
proportion of female teachers was lower (35 per cent) (see Annexure Table A7.15). East 
Godavari, the district with better literacy rates, had both lower teacher vacancies and a 
higher proportion of female teachers. 
The presence of female teachers in primary schools has been noted to have a 
positive effect on female enrolment, and in creating a more comfortable and less violent 
environment for young children (PROBE report 1999 p. 55). Although it is difficult to 
draw conclusions based on hard evidence in this regard, my field observations showed a 
better school environment in East Godavari than in Mahabubnagar. Indeed in the latter 
district, I gathered evidence of use of violence against children in schools.    
                                                          
169
 ―Pupil-teacher ratio‖ (PTR) is the ratio of the total number of enrolled students to the total number of 
teachers. 
170
 The national norm with respect to the pupil-teacher ratio is 40:1. 
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Bihar 
The average PTR in Bihar was 1.7 times higher than in AP. The inadequacy of teacher 
resources in the state becomes more evident, when seen alongside the high vacancy rates 
in the state. Nearly half the sanctioned posts were vacant in both districts of Bihar at the 
time of the survey (Annexure Table A7.14). In an interview, the Bihar Government‘s 
Secretary for Education (cited earlier) emphasised that the presence of at least one 
teacher in every school being a basic requirement, without which there could be no 
discussion of improving school quality.
171
 
 
               The proportion of female teachers in the state was only 31.7 per cent, 10 points 
lower than that in AP. There was a 13 percentage point difference between the 
proportion of female teachers in the two districts of AP, whereas the difference in the 
two districts in Bihar was marginally lower at 11 per cent (Annexure Table A7.15). 
ii. Employment status and educational qualification of teachers  
 
There were two other areas of concern in Bihar: the presence of a large number of para-
teachers, and lower educational qualifications of teachers. More than half the teachers in 
the surveyed areas in the state were para-teachers, employed on contract and on the basis 
of lower eligibility criteria for educational qualifications. The proportion of para-
teachers in the state was almost three times more than that in AP and was indicative of 
the fact that this is how teacher vacancies in the state were being dealt with.  East 
Godavari had the lowest proportion of para-teachers while Gaya had the highest (Figure 
7.6, Annexure Table A7.15). 
                                                          
171
 Personal Interview with Mr Anjani Kumar, State Project Director, Bihar Education Project, Patna, 6 
October 2005. 
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The educational qualifications of the teachers in the two states were also different. 
Nearly 80 per cent of the teachers in AP had been through university education, at the 
under-graduate or post-graduate level, whereas 70 per cent of the teachers in Bihar had 
only been through school education (Figure 7.7). Notwithstanding the high educational 
qualifications of teachers in Andhra Pradesh, there were complaints about poor 
motivation of teachers and their attitude towards the children. In both Mahabubnagar 
and East Godavari, there was a feeling that teachers in government schools were more 
qualified and were paid better, but teachers in private schools worked harder.
172
 On the 
basis of the research done it is difficult to conclude how much difference the attitude of 
teachers made to children attending schools, or to the quality of teaching. What was 
                                                          
172
Personal interviews with Bhaskar Goud, sarpanch Musapet, Mahabubnagar, 14 February 2006, and 
Muthuraju, officer with the SarvaShikshaAbhiyan, East Godavari District Programme Office, Kakinada, 6 
March 2006. 
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Figure  7.6: Percentage Distribution of Teachers by Employment Status 
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Source: School Survey, selected field sites,  Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06. 
 
Note: Para-teachers refers to teachers employed on contarct for a short period. It includes part-time 
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222 
  
 
 
 
apparent though was a greater enthusiasm amongst teachers all over East Godavari 
district as compared to an indifferent attitude amongst those in Mahabubnagar. 
 
 
The lower educational qualification levels of teachers in Bihar became a bigger 
issue when seen alongside the fact that the state was also facing a huge shortfall of 
trained teachers. Whereas a majority of the teachers in AP had received training prior to 
their joining the profession, in Bihar there was a major lack of trained teachers. The 
scale of the challenge was highlighted by Job Zachariah, Education Programme Officer 
with UNICEF in Bihar, when he stated that nearly 50 per cent of the 200,000 teachers in 
the state were untrained, and the government had no policy to train them. This was in 
contravention of the national norms on training requirements for teachers put in place by 
the National Council for Teacher Education. In 1991, the erstwhile government of Chief 
Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav put an end to the policy of providing teacher training in 
primary teacher education colleges, thus drastically reducing the number of trained 
teachers in the state. Zachariah described the staff in these institutions as ―sitting idle, 
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Source: School Survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005-06. 
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completely uninvolved with the teacher training activities undertaken by the Bihar 
Education Project as a part of the reform activities‖.173 
Hence, it did not come as a surprise that poor people perceived lack of teaching 
staff and their incompetence when they did exist, to be the main problems with 
government schools—70.6 per cent of the households in Bihar thought that teachers 
were incompetent as compared to just 1.9 per cent in AP. The other significant 
complaints in Bihar were about teachers attending schools irregularly and not coming on 
time, with nearly 50 per cent of the households reporting these to be a problem in 
government schools (Annexure Table A7.19). 
iii. Teacher-parent interactions 
 
Andhra Pradesh 
A majority of the households in AP (56.5 per cent) reported regular interaction with 
teachers on the performance of their children in school. The regularity was higher in 
East Godavari than in Mahabubnagar (Annexure Table A7.16). On the academic front, 
one of the small but expected issues on which parents and teachers interacted was home 
assignments. In AP, assigning homework to students seemed to be a state-wide practice, 
with nearly 90 per cent of the households reporting that their children got homework, 
and teachers checked the work done by the children. East Godavari did better than 
Mahabubnagar on both these counts, with nearly 10 per cent higher reports of children 
receiving homework and their work being checked by teachers. Households in AP also 
reported more involvement of adult family members in assisting children and of teachers 
in checking homework, than in Bihar. Inter-district variations were sharp, as the 
proportion of households reporting adult support to children in their work was 20 
percentage points lower in Mahabubnagar than in East Godavari. On this issue, 
Mahabubnagar fared better than Purnia (low literacy district) and worse than Gaya (high 
literacy district) in Bihar (Annexure Table A7.17). 
 
                                                          
173
 Personal interview with Job Zachariah, Education ProgrammeOfficer,UNICEF-Bihar, UNICEF Office, 
Pataliputra, Patna, 6 October 2005. Zachariah was an officer of the Indian Administrative Service, who 
served in the Central Government‘s Department of School Education before joining UNICEF. 
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Bihar 
The situation in Bihar was in sharp contrast. It was surprising to note that an 
overwhelming majority (nearly 76 per cent) of the households reported that the teacher 
had rarely or never told them about the performance of their children in school. A very 
small percentage of the households (8.5 per cent) reported regular interaction with 
teachers, and the frequency of this interaction seemed to be uniformly poor, as inter-
district variations were not much (Annexure Table A7.16). Only 45.5 per cent of the 
households reported that their children were given homework, half the number in AP. 
There were significant inter-district variations, with a higher proportion of households in 
Gaya (better literacy district) reporting that their children received homework that was 
checked in school and adult members helped the children with their studies at home. 
Poor school-community interactions provided possible answers to the poor performance 
of Purnia in Bihar (Annexure Table A7.17).     
School Incentives: Mid-day Meals Signify a Difference in School Culture 
 
What clearly differentiated school culture in the two states was the delivery of two 
important school based incentives—textbooks and meals. Under two different schemes 
of the central government, there was universal entitlement to free textbooks and school 
lunch (known as the mid-day meal programme) for all children who attended 
government primary schools. The MDM programme had a special significance as it was 
taken up under the watchful eye of federal courts. While AP reported a near universal 
reach of both these incentives in both districts, in the case of Bihar only 40 per cent of 
the parents reported that their children were getting mid-day meals in school; the 
situation was equally poor in both districts. The reach of textbooks in the state was half 
of what the government had planned for. Since resources were being provided for both 
these incentive schemes, poor reach was an indication of the potential diversion of 
public resources. Bihar‘s failure to deliver on both these was also indicative of the state 
having very weak capacity to serve the poor. 
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Field observations on the working of the MDM programme highlighted the 
strong involvement of the community and the local state in providing school meals in 
AP, and apathy and neglect by the local state in Bihar. In the latter state, the non-
involvement of the community in providing meals for their own children was 
particularly surprising.  
 
Andhra Pradesh 
School meals in AP were being provided by women and their self-help groups, who 
were involved in cooking the meals. The meals had a menu plan, and occasionally eggs 
or butter-milk was also given to the students. All the children ate together and the meal 
seemed like a collective feast.
174
 There were some complaints in Mahabubnagar about 
the quality of rice, delay in supplies, or meals not being tasty. The more significant 
complaint in Mahabubnagar was about the lack of water to cook the meals, and children 
having to carry water bottles from home. But in neither district did I come across any 
complaint of grain pilferage, or meals not being provided. 
Bihar 
In Gaya, the quality of the meals was better than in Purnia, and a semblance of 
organisation could be seen. Yet, the non-involvement of the community in getting 
together to feed its own children was evident. Schools had appointed servants to cook 
meals for over 200–300 students. Caste and community prejudices overwhelmed school 
interactions as families refused to let children come to school with their own plates for 
eating meals: ―Only beggars move around with steel plates and bowls‖.175 Girls at the 
Adarsh Madhya Vidyalay Silonjha, Belaganj, Gaya ate their meals separately from boys. 
Many girls, especially from the upper castes, brought their lunch from home, as they 
would not eat with boys of a lower caste.  Also, no women from the village were 
involved in the cooking of the school lunch in Silonjha or other schools observed in 
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 The researcher carried a box of sweets for school children, to be shared at meal time. 
175
Personal interaction with parents at Adarsh MadhyamikVidyalay, Silonjha, Belaganj, Gaya, 1 October 
2005. 
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Bihar. This was a contrast to what I observed in AP, where it was the women who 
cooked and managed the school lunch programme entirely, with the support of self-help 
groups. 
Field observations from Baysi block in Purnia completed the picture of apathy 
with dirty unwashed vessels used for cooking MDMs strewn around in classrooms. In 
many places, insects crawled from the rice cooked for children.  
To a certain extent, the poor quality of school meals was due to the low 
involvement of the community, especially women. Miki Tanae, Project Officer with 
UNICEF working on education and women, confirmed that the non-involvement of 
women was resulting in poor quality of school meals. The situation was different in 
some areas of the state, she said, where women from the Mahila Samakhya
176
 group had 
taken up the responsibility for school lunch. But this was an intervention limited only to 
some areas of Bihar, and not a state-wide phenomenon.
177
 Perhaps the larger issue was 
the existence of organised vested interests around schools in Bihar which were diverting 
what was due to the poor. The poor kept away from both schools and free lunch 
programmes because of their inability to fight these vested interests. 
 
7.4 Explaining Results on the Ground: Role of Interests, Institutions, and 
Political Actors 
 
A review of ―results on the ground‖ tells us that schools in AP looked very different 
from those in Bihar. As seen from schools and villages, the major differences were 
indicative of initiatives from the ―top‖ in AP (or lack of it in Bihar): state policies in 
teacher recruitments and infrastructure such as roads and school buildings, were outside 
the control of local institutions or political factors. Yet, variations in teacher attitudes, 
schools and community interactions, and poor working of the schools, especially the 
                                                          
176
Mahila Samakhya is a programme for women‘s empowerment in rural areas, working since 1991 as a 
part of the reform efforts undertaken by the BEP.  
177
 Personal interview, MikiTanae, UNICEF Office, Patna, 5 October 2005. 
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school lunch programme for which a similar resource support had been provided to 
schools across the country, were compelling arguments for probing the role of the 
―local‖.  Although I have not looked at issues of teaching or learning quality, it may be 
appropriate to mention here that I noticed special efforts in East Godavari schools to 
improve the quality of learning. These included the ―library on strings‖ in Razule 
mandal, and special alphabets for tribal children in Prathipadu mandal (see Photos 7.3 
and 7.4 respectively). I now examine the specific ―local‖ role of politics viewed in terms 
of organised interests and institutions working around schools, and the role of local 
political actors. 
 
Institutions: Role of the Local State 
 
A key difference between the field sites in AP and Bihar was a far greater presence of 
local education authorities in the field in AP as compared to their near absence in Bihar. 
This was significant as the presence of the institution of the state at the local level was 
felt through its functionaries in the field—MEOs in AP and the BEOs in Bihar.  
Andhra Pradesh 
There were two important differences in the way in which the local education offices 
were structured in the two states. First, the mandal was a much smaller unit than the 
block, as a result of which the MEO had fewer schools to look after in a smaller 
geographical area. Second, below the MEOs, there was a group of MRPs, one for every 
7–10 schools. MRPs were field officers, selected from amongst teachers who provided 
academic support to schools. 
In both districts in AP, I met the MEOs in the field, and MRPs were seen 
providing academic support to teachers while teaching in schools. MRPs visited every 
school at least twice every month, and stayed in the school for the entire day.  On their 
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visit, they taught in the classes and reviewed teachers‘ diaries, among other things.178 
The MEOs had a very clear idea of their role and the performance of schools in their 
mandal. Since detailed household surveys were held by the Education Department, 
mandal officers knew the families where children had dropped-out from school. The 
MRPs provided a continuous link between schools and the mandal office, reporting to 
the MEOs after school hours. 
Even though it was pointed out that the post of the MRP was preferred by 
teachers to avoid postings in remote areas, and it may very well have been an 
opportunity of this kind for teachers, but this ―opportunity‖ was translated into an 
advantage by enhanced field presence of the local state. Delays in postings of MEOs, 
was seen as being responsible for the somewhat inferior performance of schools in 
several mandals in Mahabubnagar (some positions were vacant at the time of the field 
visit).
179
 
Bihar 
The comparable officers in Bihar were the BEOs, who seldom visited schools and 
provided no support to teachers. They visualised their role mainly as administrators and 
supervisors, and had no idea of the problems that the schools were facing. They were 
also unaware of people‘s grievances. An example of this was the denial by the Belaganj 
BEO of high drop-out rates or low attendance being a problem in this block.
180
 He and 
the other BEOs interviewed, identified the MDM programme to be the biggest problem 
in schools.
181
 Further, they did not share a cordial relationship with the teachers, and 
blamed them for all the problems in schools. The BEO of Fatehpur block expressed this 
when he said that ―teachers ought to be posted 100 kilometres away from their home so 
                                                          
178
The researcher noted that MRPs in both the districts were well versed with the school text and poetry 
recited by children. They sang along with the children when they recited some of the poetry. The teachers 
and children recognised the MRPs and greeted them cordially, a testimony to the good relations between 
schools, the community, and the administration. 
179
Personal Interview with Mr Rajeshwar, Assistant Programme Coordinator, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, 
Mahabubnagar, 28 February 2006. 
180
 The survey showed a low figure of 52 per cent actual attendance in the block. 
181
Personal interview with Rampravesh Singh, Block Education Officer, Belaganj, Gaya, 2 October 2005. 
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that they stay in school and are not able to go home.
182
 Negligence of duties by BEOs 
reinforced the picture of schools being abandoned by the state. Nearly 70 per cent of the 
households in Bihar cited lack of supervision by BEOs as a major problem in the 
functioning of schools (Annexure Table A7.19). 
 Interests Working Around Schools 
-Teacher Unions in Local Contexts 
In the theory of political economy, organised teacher interests are viewed as a political 
constraint in initiating school reform. In the backdrop of this observation it was 
interesting to note the local variations in the role played by teacher unions in AP, and 
their disinterest in school reform in Bihar. 
In East Godavari, the reform agenda received close support from the United 
Teachers‘ Front (UTF), one of the influential unions in the district that is affiliated to the 
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) political party. Many of the officers on the 
reform team, including its project coordinator, Mr D. N. Murthy, were erstwhile office 
bearers of the UTF. The close association of the union with the reform process allowed 
it to function closely with the district administration and resolve teacher grievances. For 
its parent political party, the CPI-M, this became an opportunity for evolving a hold on 
grassroots politics and competing with rival parties like the CPI-ML. 
Mahabubnagar presented a different picture: rival unions were in conflict over 
the issue of teacher transfers. The Panchayati Raj Teachers Union (PRTU) and the State 
Teachers Union (STU) were in conflict with each other, as their influence in the region 
was dependent on getting teachers loyal to them posted in the district. This conflict left 
its impact on teachers in the district. In the Prathmik Pathshala Vemoula, 
Mahabubnagar, students of grades 1, 2, and 4 sat together. A fourth grade student taught 
them, while the teachers were huddled together in one corner, discussing the issue of 
teacher transfers in the district. 
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Personal interview with Ishwar Singh, Fatehpur block, Gaya, 3 October 2005. 
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-Vested Interests in Bihar 
Teacher unions had no local presence in either of the two districts in Bihar, and their 
block units were defunct. In place of organised teacher interests, what could be seen 
around schools were vested interests. The poor functioning of the MDM programme and 
complaints about the low quality of the meal and pilferage of grain were indicative of a 
thriving local political economy of rent-seeking. The differences in expectations of the 
poor people and the thinking of the local state officials about this programme were a 
pointer to such opportunities: 
The children get very poor quality meals in the school. The teacher replaces 
the grains supplied by the government with poor quality ones. The dal 
(lentil) has no taste, as there are no spices in it, only salt. The children feed 
these meals to stray dogs. Children of poor people like us cannot hope for 
anything better from the government. (Munni Devi, mother of a child 
attending the primary school in Silonjha village, Belaganj, Gaya).
183
 
The mid-day meal programme in schools should be stopped. It is a 
distraction to teaching activities, and hinders the performance of our 
educational duties. It encourages pilferage of grains. Storage of grains and 
cooking food in schools is difficult. Instead, dry food should be supplied 
through NGOs. (RambhagatYadav, BEO, Baysi, Purnia).
184
 
When I discussed the issue of school meals with villagers in Bihar‘s Gaya and Purnia 
districts, it was clear that the poor people wanted the school meals to be supplied 
properly. They did not want cooked meals to be replaced by a ―dry-ration‖ distribution 
programme, unlike what the BEO had suggested. They felt that the local officers and 
many teachers wanted NGOs or the local fair-price shops to distribute dry rations as this 
was likely to provide opportunities for pilferage and making money. Further, owners of 
fair-price shops or NGOs were likely to share the spoils with local education officers. 
Clearly, individual interests and institutions were working at the local level in 
Bihar to deny people the benefits of reforms and welfare initiatives driven from the 
                                                          
183
Personal interactions with community members at Adarsh Madhya Vidyalay, Silonjha, Gaya, 4 October 
2005. 
184
Personal interview withRambhagat Yadav, Block Education Officer, Baysi block, Purnia 12 September 
2005. 
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Centre. This denial was leading to distrust for the local state, and a sense of hopelessness 
among the poor. 
 Local Political Actors 
 
In neither of the states were political representatives elected by the people involved in 
the reform process, although the contexts were different.
185
 In AP, the representatives 
were mostly away in Hyderabad, and they seldom visited schools. In Bihar‘s Purnia 
district, the local Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) were very closely 
involved with what was happening in schools, but all they wanted to do was to influence 
the selection process of teachers and control elections to VECs.
186
 In other words, they 
wanted to become influential players in the local control over schools. 
The local political institutions of panchayats were closer to the schools. In AP 
the panchayats were not given any real powers over schools. Their expected role was to 
assist with mobilisation of the community during enrolment drives and contribute 
resources towards school improvement. During the course of field observations I noted 
that in many schools in East Godavari, the sarpanch took a keen interest and played a 
role in mobilising resources for the school, provided support for construction activities, 
or helped with resolving disputes.  
One role expected of the panchayats was of payment of salary to para-teachers, 
known as vidya volunteers in AP. There were complaints of abuse of this power in 
Mahabubnagar. In the Vemoula school, three vidya volunteers had been employed as a 
temporary measure to manage the increase in enrolments. They taught, but complained 
that they were not paid regularly. When the gram panchayat paid them after a delay of 
six months, it was less than their due. An unofficial rent had been extracted by powerful 
locals from these para-teachers who had no backing from the teacher unions in the 
district. However, unlike in Bihar, complaints of corruption were not as rampant in AP. 
                                                          
185
 There were two sets of directly elected political representatives—Members of the State Legislative 
Assembly, known as MLAs and Members of Parliament at the Centre, known as MPs. 
186
Interviews with MLAs Haji Subhan and former MLA Md. Aalim, Purnia, 20 September 2005. 
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In any case, the hiring of para-teachers was seen only as a temporary measure in the 
state unlike Bihar where all new appointments made were of para-teachers. 
The hiring of a large number of para-teachers in Bihar under the Panchayat 
Shiksha Mitra scheme was done by political heads of panchayats—the mukhiyas—and 
there were complaints of rampant corruption. Assessing ―quality‖ was hardly a criterion 
of selection, and people in both the surveyed districts in Bihar cited a common figure of 
Rs.10,000 that had to be paid to panchayat heads as bribe for these appointments. 
Further, many Panchayat Shiksha Mitras complained that they were not paid regularly, 
and that the panchayat head deducted a certain amount as commission before giving 
them their salaries.
187
 Common knowledge among people of bribes being taken for 
appointing para-teachers, and use of discretion in appointments confirmed that schools 
in Bihar were functioning under pressure from local vested interests. The poor also knew 
that political leaders in the state were not interested in stopping these malpractices. 
 
  
                                                          
187
Panchayat Shiksha Mitras Amit Kumar Yadav, Hemlata Kumari Paswan, Kanchan Kumari, Farhat 
Bano, and Siyaram Prasad Yadav, Belaganj Block Office, Gaya, 4 October 2005. 
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Photo 7.3: Library on a String, Razule Mandal, East Godavari, Andhra Pradesh 
 
(Photos 7.3 and 7.4 by Mansi Midha) 
Photo 7.4: Special Alphabets for Tribal Children, Prathipadu Mandal, East Godavari, AP. 
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Photo 7.5: Empty classrooms, Jadcherla Mandal , Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh 
 
(Photo by Mansi Midha) 
 
 
 
7.5 Conclusion: The Role of Local Politics in Educational Reform 
 
At the outcome level, school participation as reported by the households confirmed 
higher rates of participation in AP and smaller differences across regions, somewhat 
bridging the perception of the existence of different levels of educational performance 
within the same state. These differences persisted in Bihar, and Purnia selected for its 
poor educational indicators, continued to be a laggard, with low school participation. 
The two states also differed on how disadvantaged social groups, identified on the basis 
of caste and gender, performed. AP had progressed by closing gender gaps and 
improving the participation of SCs. 
On the ground, one of the main reasons for the better performance in AP was 
improved access to schools, on account of there being more number of schools and 
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better road connectivity. The other main difference was the greater availability and 
better quality of teacher resources. All these inputs were mainly due to support from the 
state, especially from the political leadership in Hyderabad.  State policies and resources 
for building roads, and appointing and training teachers, were missing in Bihar. 
But there were nuances as to how the schools functioned locally, and it would be 
erroneous to construe support from the top alone as being responsible for differences in 
outcomes. Schools in the two states, and the districts within them, exhibited differences 
in working culture and attitudes; each of these were significant in explaining why things 
worked better in AP and not in Bihar. 
Two such local factors that provided a somewhat strong explanation of 
differences in the working of schools in AP were school-community relations and 
teacher attitudes.  A visible difference between the schools in East Godavari and 
Mahabubnagar was better school-community relations in the former. As a result, even 
with the poor physical quality of the buildings, schools in East Godavari had a vibrant 
atmosphere. In comparison, schools in Mahabubnagar wore a deserted look.  
Another visible difference between schools in East Godavari and Mahabubnagar 
was teacher attitude towards children. Teachers‘ indifference in Mahabubnagar was 
expressed in subtle ways such as just sitting around and not teaching and performing 
their jobs as if they were ―government servants‖, with no real connection to the people. 
Of course, photographs of sticks lying on teachers‘ tables in schools in the district went 
a long way in to reinforce the notion that teaching was considered an administrative job. 
An important influence on teacher attitudes in the two districts in AP was the 
relationship between the reform team and the teacher unions. In East Godavari, the UTF, 
aligned with the CPI-M led the reform team, and was also the strongest union in the 
district. It had a certain control over teachers, and also took up teacher related issues 
with the district‘s Education Department. It was interesting to note that while the CPI-M 
and CPI (M-L) were daggers drawn in the political arena, there was implicit cooperation 
between them in implementing the school reform agenda in East Godavari. 
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Weak school-community relations were observable in the way in which schools 
functioned in Bihar. There was low involvement of parents in their children‘s school 
activities, including in the cooking and management of meals. There were no clear 
responses on why children were not sent to schools even when they were functional, and 
response such as ―child not interested‖, were only pointers to this indifference. In 
isolated instances where the community took an interest, things did work better—
building a check-dam in the Hijala school in Purnia being one example. But such 
instances were rare. In Bihar it was more the case that schools were surrounded by local 
vested interests, against the power of which they had no hope of fighting. School-
community relations worked as a factor in building better schools only under conditions 
where the state had ensured the basic minimum requirements of quality, identified by 
Bihar government official Anjani Kumar as the ―presence of classrooms, at least one 
teacher, and functional roads. Without this basic there could be no discussion about 
quality‖.188 
 
Indifference of teachers towards children and the poor was marked in Bihar. 
They behaved like government officers, who could come and go at will, with little 
supervision by the state authorities above them. In the absence of regular contact with 
the block or district administration, schools were like abandoned institutions, and 
teachers behaved like agents of the state (that had no presence in the field). Teachers 
were also under the control of local vested interests that were capable of siphoning off 
resources meant for the poor; these vested interests exercised control over teachers by 
threats of transfers to remote locations. New powers of appointment of para-teachers 
greatly enhanced the powers of vested interests. 
 
These differences between AP and Bihar made it seem that the two states were at 
different stages of educational development. Bihar was still struggling with basics like 
getting classrooms and teachers in place; it also faced huge demographic pressures, 
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 Personal interview with Mr Anjani Kumar, State Project Director, Bihar Education Project, Patna, 6 
October 2005. 
 
237 
  
 
 
 
whereas in AP there were adequate teachers and classrooms, and the child population 
was declining.  
 
Better schools in AP did not mean an absence of politics, understood as 
―constraints‖ to school reform in the political economy approach. Instead, the state 
political leadership established the basic conditions for effective schooling, and then 
used strategies of competitive politics to curb local vested interests. Schools in Bihar 
were hemmed in by these interests—the panchayat head extracting bribes for teacher 
appointments, pilferage of grains meant for school meals, poor children not getting their 
textbooks, and negligent teachers and BEOs. Even the state leadership had been unable 
to break this local stranglehold. 
For poor people in both the states what they received from the reforms for over a 
decade, was contingent on the actions of state political leaders. Local political actions 
mattered only after the essential basic steps had been taken.  
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Annexure A7 
 
 
Table A7.1: Stages of, and criteria for selection of field sites, survey schools, and 
households 
Steps Selection of Units Criteria 
Step 1 Districts—2 in each state Contrasting educational 
indicators.* 
District 1 –better 
educational 
indicators. 
District 2-poor 
educational 
indicators. 
(Total 4) 
Step 2 Sub-district units—2 in 
each district  
Mandal 1—better 
educational 
indicators. 
Mandal 2—poor 
educational 
indicators. 
(Total 8) 
Step 3 Schools—10 in each sub-
district unit 
 
 
Random selection from 
list of primary 
schools available 
with the district 
education office 
(Total 40) 
Step 4 Households—100 in each 
sub-district unit 
Random selection of 10 
households from 
school records of 
each school 
selected. 
(Total 400) 
*Note: The educational indicator used was that of the literacy rate provided by the Census of India 2001. 
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Table A7.2: Characteristics of Sample (Schools and Households), Field Survey, Andhra Pradesh 
and Bihar 
  Literacy Rate 
No. of schools 
surveyed 
Total no. of 
teachers in 
schools 
surveyed 
Total 
enrolment 
in schools 
surveyed 
No. of 
households 
surveyed in 
mandal/block 
Andhra Pradesh 
District 1: Mandals selected in East Godavari district 
Pratipadu 49.02 10 29 1429 100 
Razole 80.10 10 32 779 99 
District Total 65.48 20 61 2208 199 
District 2: Mandals selected in Mahabubnagar district 
Dharur 25.86 9 18 503 100 
Jadcherla 58.29 10 34 570 98 
District Total 44.41 19 52 1073 198 
Andhra Pradesh 
Total 
60.49 39 113 3281 397 
Bihar 
District 1: Blocks selected in Gaya district 
Belaganj 52.94 10 36 892 100 
Fatehpur 40.13 10 25 1336 100 
District Total 50.45 20 61 2228 200 
District 2: Blocks selected in Purnia district 
Kasba 35.13 9 30 2646 100 
Baysi 28.03 11 48 1858 110 
District Total 35.10 20 78 4504 210 
Bihar Total 47.00 40 139 6732 410 
 
Sources: Census of India, 2001 for literacy rates (col.1); School and household survey in selected field sites, Andhra 
Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.3: Percentage Distribution of Households by Social Caste Within 
Districts 
Districts SCs STs OBC-I OBC-II General Total 
East Godavari 18.6 23.1 35.7 10.6 12.1 100 
Mahabubnagar 25.8 7.6 57.6 3 6.1 100 
Andhra Pradesh 22.2 15.4 46.6 6.8 9.1 100 
Gaya 44 2.5 5.5 41.5 6.5 100 
Purnia 36.8 4.3 4.8 39.7 14.4 100 
Bihar 40.3 3.4 5.1 40.6 10.5 100 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
 
Table A7.4: Percentage Distribution of Households by Religion Within 
Districts 
Districts Hindu Muslim Christian Total 
East Godavari 89.9 1.0 9.0 100 
Mahabubnagar 94.9 5.1 0 100 
Andhra Pradesh 92.4 3.0 4.5 100 
Gaya 91.5 8.0 0.5 100 
Purnia 44.5 55.5 0 100 
Bihar 67.5 32.3 0.2 100 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7. 5: Average Number of Children per Family and Percentage Distribution of Children by 
Age Group, District Level 
States/ Districts 
Average 
number of 
children per 
household 
Percentage distribution by age group (in completed years) 
0 – 4  5 – 9  10 – 14  14 – 17  Total 
East Godavari 2.07 10.2 48.3 36.7 4.9 100.0 
Mahabubnagar 2.45 9.7 47.5 36.2 6.6 100.0 
Andhra Pradesh 2.26 9.9 47.9 36.4 5.8 100.0 
Gaya 3.37 18.0 38.2 36.1 7.7 100.0 
Purnia 3.87 19.2 40.8 29.3 10.6 100.0 
Bihar 3.62 18.7 39.6 32.4 9.3 100.0 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06 
 
 
Table A7.6: School Participation Rates in Survey Districts (% Children) 
State/District 
% Children currently 
enrolled in  school % Children dropped-out % Children never attended 
6–10 years 6–13 years  6–10 years 6–13 years  6–10 years 6–13 years  
East Godavari 95.0 93.1 2.0 2.6 3.0 4.3 
Mahabubnagar 93.1 89.2 2.2 5.2 4.8 5.7 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
94.0 91.0 2.1 4.0 4.0 5.0 
Gaya 81.3 78.6 5.8 11.0 12.8 10.4 
Purnia 69.9 72.3 5.4 10.0 24.4 17.5 
Bihar 74.9 75.2 5.6 10.5 19.4 14.2 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
Note: Children aged 6–10 years are eligible for primary school; children aged 6–13 years are eligible for elementary school.  
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Table A7.7:  Percentage of Currently Enrolled Children (6–13 years) by Social Caste 
and Gender, District Level 
State/District  
Sub-district 
and social 
caste  
Children 6 to 13 years enrolled* (%) 
Gender 
differential** Boys Girls 
Andhra Pradesh 
East Godavari Total 93.8 92.4 0.98 
Mahabubnagar Total 90.3 87.6 0.97 
Andhra Pradesh 
SC 90.7 82.1 0.90 
ST 90.9 83.7 0.92 
OBC-I 91.1 92.0 1.01 
OBC-II 100.0 100.0 1.00 
OBC Total 95.3 95.3 1.00 
General 95.3 96.8 1.01 
Total 91.9 89.9 0.98 
Bihar 
Gaya Total 81.4 75.4 0.93 
Purnia Total 75.1 69.8 0.93 
 Bihar 
SC 73.9 63.3 0.86 
ST 77.8 63.2 0.81 
OBC-I 80.8 77.8 0.96 
OBC-II 80.6 77.7 0.96 
OBC Total 80.7 77.7 0.96 
General 82.4 84.2 1.02 
Total 78 72.4 0.93 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
Notes: * Children aged 6–13 years eligible for elementary school; **Gender differential was calculated by dividing 
the participation rate for girls by the participation rate for boys. The closer the value of the differential (reported in 
col. 3) is to unity (1), the less the differential. 
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Table A7.8: Percentage of Currently Enrolled Children (6–13 years) in Elementary by Social Caste,  
District Level 
State/District SCs STs OBC-I OBC-II OBC-Total General Total 
East Godavari 88.3 84.3 97.5 100 98.1 100 93.1 
Mahabubnagar 86.5 100 88.3 100 88.9 89.3 89.2 
Andhra Pradesh 87.2 88.3 91.5 100 92.5 95.9 91 
Gaya 72.5 70 91.3 82.1 82.9 85.7 78.6 
Purnia 65.3 70.4 70 76.3 75.6 82 72.4 
Bihar 69 70.3 79.2 79.2 79.2 83.1 75.3 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
 
Table A7.9: Percentage of Currently Enrolled Children (6–13 years) in Elementary by Religion,  
District Level 
State/District 
Religion 
Hindu Muslim Christian Total 
East Godavari 94.9 50 82.9 93.1 
Mahabubnagar 89.3 87 NA 89.2 
Andhra Pradesh 91.8 81.5 82.9 91 
Gaya 78.5 77.8 100 78.6 
Purnia 72.1 72.9 NA 72.6 
Bihar 76.3 73.5 100 75.4 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.10: Number of Students Marked Present as Per School Records and Actual Presence on 
the Day of School Visit 
Sub-
district/District 
Attendance marked present  in 
school register (number) 
Headcount  (students present as 
percentage of those marked present) 
Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total 
East Godavari 92 106 199 89.1 88.7 88.4 
Mahabubnagar 112 108 221 80.4 83.3 81.4 
Andhra Pradesh 204 214 420 84.3 86.0 84.7 
Gaya 201 171 373 50.7 48.5 49.6 
Purnia 355 270 625 43.4 45.2 44.3 
Bihar 556 441 998 46.0 46.5 46.3 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
Table A7.11: Selected Data on School Accessibility—Year of Opening, 
Distance from Nearest Village, and Type of Approach Road  
(% of Schools within District) 
State/District 
 Schools 
within 1 km 
of village 
Schools 
opened 
within the 
last 10 years 
 Schools 
opened 
within the 
last 20 
years* 
Schools with 
pucca/semi-
pucca approach 
road 
East Godavari 80 15 30 100 
Mahabubnagar 73.7 5.3 21.1 89.5 
Andhra Pradesh 76.9 10.3 25.6 94.9 
Gaya 40 5 25 55 
Purnia 60 0 5.3 55 
Bihar 50 2.6 15.4 55 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.12:  Availability of School Facilities by District (% Schools) 
Districts 
Schools 
with 
pucca 
building 
(%) 
Schools 
With 
compound 
wall in 
brick and 
in a good 
condition 
(%) 
Schools 
with 
verandahs 
in front of 
classrooms 
(%) 
Schools 
where 
verandahs 
used as 
classrooms 
(%) 
Schools 
with gate 
in front 
(%) 
Average 
number 
of rooms 
per 
school 
Average 
number 
of 
children 
per room 
East Godavari 80 25 70 65 36.8 3 37 
Mahabubnagar 84.2 21.1 100 89.5 17.6 3 39 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
82.1 23.1 84.6 76.9 27.8 3 38 
Gaya 95 15 80 84.2 10 2.4 65 
Purnia 90 10 95 90 25 2.7 93 
Bihar 92.5 12.5 87.5 87.2 17.5 2.6 80 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
 
 
Table A7.13: Percentage of Schools with Toilets and Drinking Water Facilities, 
by District 
State/District 
Schools with 
toilet 
facilities 
Schools with 
toilet 
facilities for 
girls 
Schools with 
toilets in 
good 
condition 
Schools with 
own source 
of drinking  
water 
East Godavari 63.2 26.3 52.6 85 
Mahabubnagar 84.2 21.1 21.1 73.7 
Andhra Pradesh 73.7 23.7 36.8 79.5 
Gaya 20 20 15 85 
Purnia 15 5 10 100 
Bihar 17.5 12.5 12.5 92.5 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.14: Teacher Availability and Adequacy, by  District 
State/District 
Average no. 
of teachers 
per school 
Pupil 
teacher ratio 
(PTR) 
Enrolled girl 
child to female 
teacher ratio 
(GFTR) 
Teacher 
vacancy 
rate 
East Godavari 3 36 39 8.8 
Mahabubnagar 3 21 30 20.5 
Andhra Pradesh 3 29 36 13.5 
Gaya 3 37 41 57.4 
Purnia 4 58 87 47.2 
Bihar 3 48 63 51.9 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
Notes: (i) Average number of teachers=total number of teachers divided by total number of schools;  
           (ii) PTR=Total number of  enrolled students divided by total number of teachers;  
           (iii) GFTR=Girl child female teacher ratio-enrolled girl child divided by female teachers. 
 
 
 
 
Table A7.15: Percentage Distribution of Teachers by Gender and 
Employment Status, by District 
State/District 
Gender Employment Status 
Male Female Full-time 
Part-
time/para-
teacher 
East Godavari 52.5 47.5 90.2 9.8 
Mahabubnagar 65.4 34.6 76.9 23.1 
Andhra Pradesh 58.4 41.6 84.1 15.9 
Gaya 62.3 37.7 39.3 60.7 
Purnia 73.1 26.9 53.8 46.2 
Bihar 68.3 31.7 47.5 52.5 
Source: Household Survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.16: Percentage Households Reporting Frequency of Teachers’ Reports to Parents about 
Performance of Child in School, by District 
State/District 
Household response (%) on frequency of teacher reports to 
parents about children  
Regularly Sometimes Rarely or never 
East Godavari 61.4 25.2 13.4 
Mahabubnagar 52.2 26.9 20.8 
Andhra Pradesh 56.5 26.1 17.4 
Gaya 6.1 15.5 78.4 
Purnia 10.8 16.3 72.9 
Bihar 8.5 15.9 75.6 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7.17: Children’s Homework 
% households 
reporting yes 
Child receives 
homework 
Teacher checks 
the child’s work 
Adults helps the 
child with 
homework 
Districts 
 
East Godavari 96.7 94.1 70.3 
Mahabubnagar 85.1 85.4 49.4 
Andhra Pradesh 90.5 89.4 58.8 
Gaya 61.1 57.3 56.7 
Purnia 30.6 33.8 39.5 
Bihar 45.5 45.1 47.9 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
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Table A7.18: Coverage of Mid-Day Meals and Textbooks  
(% of Households Reporting ―Yes‖) 
State/District Mid-day meal Books 
East Godavari 96.5 98.9 
Mahabubnagar 96.5 98.9 
Andhra Pradesh 96.5 98.9 
Gaya 40.3 62.1 
Purnia 37.7 47.6 
Bihar 39 54.5 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
Note: Per cent households reporting child receives free textbooks and school meal. 
 
. 
 
Table A7.19: Households’ Perception of Problems with Government Schools 
(% Household Reporting ―Yes‖) 
State/District 
Distance of 
school 
from 
residence 
 Lack of  
infrastruc-
ture 
Lack of 
teaching 
staff 
Incompet-
ent 
teaching 
staff 
Unfriendly 
atmosphe-
re in 
school 
Irregular 
teachers 
Teacher 
not 
punctual 
Lack of 
monitor-
ing by 
BEO/ME
O 
Lack of 
pressu-
re from 
VEC 
East Godavari 5.4 79.6 28.5 1.1 5.1 0.6 2.3 36.4 39.4 
Mahabubnagar 1.6 86.2 50 2.7 11.2 20.4 24.2 47.2 58.7 
Andhra Pradesh 3.5 82.9 39.3 1.9 8.2 10.7 13.5 41.6 48.4 
Gaya 13.2 78.8 62.7 67.2 48.9 53.4 59.2 64 66.7 
Purnia 17.4 76.5 74.6 74.6 40.4 43.5 44.7 77.2 78.9 
Bihar 15.1 77.8 68.1 70.6 45 48.8 52.5 69.5 72 
 
Source: Household survey, selected field sites, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2005–06. 
Note: The responses are not mutually exclusive as the respondents were allowed to respond to more than one category. 
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Chapter 8 
Politics Matters: The Continuing Agenda of Educational Reform 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have been concerned with understanding the contested 
process of educational reform—its design and implementation. I have been 
particularly concerned with understanding the political dynamics of agenda 
setting, involving federal actors and institutions (Chapter 3), and implementation  
in the states in three specific arenas of teacher policies, decentralisation and 
community participation, and the working of schools (Chapters 5–7). In each of 
these arenas, I have started with the assumptions of the formal political economy 
approach to the role of politics in educational reform. But I find the results on the 
ground to be somewhat ―unanticipated‖ and, indeed puzzling.  
 
Opposition to reform from teacher interests is an assumption embedded 
both in theory and in policy, and this is where I began. My research, however, 
shows that such opposition appears to be weaker than expected on the ground in 
both Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. Besides, I have found evidence of the use of 
political skills by leaders and policymakers in order to counter possible 
opposition, and so ―align‖ the interests of teachers with the broader objectives of 
reform. This leads me to conclude that the resistance and impediments 
anticipated in theory are far from being insurmountable in practice.  
 
In another arena, the expectations of support from ―demand-side‖ 
initiatives of decentralisation and community participation have also not been in 
conformity with the theoretical script. Political leaders at a more ―central‖ level 
have been able to adapt this institutional reform measure to extend political 
patronage and so curb the new political competition emerging at the local-level. 
Different and contrasting roles played by the political leaders, in different 
arenas—playing the role of a ―reform champion‖ in one, and the ―partisan 
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politician‖ in another— are indicative of the complex role of politics in the 
policy reform process.       
Both in aligning teacher interests and in making political use of school 
decentralisation, I conclude that new political opportunities were created in the 
process of implementing reform. Moreover, often support for implementing 
change was established where none previously existed. Indeed, ―success‖ in 
reform outcomes seems more a consequence of these political manoeuvres 
emanating from the concrete actions of political leaders and policymakers, than 
from the absence of opposition from collectively organised interest groups and 
from institutions biased against reform. From each of these arenas, and from the 
process of policy design as well as implementation, the conclusion I draw is that 
―politics matters‖. This may seem like stating the obvious, but it departs from the 
conclusions of standard economic approaches to reform.
189
 
 
In this chapter I take a step back, move away from the conflicting arenas 
of educational reform and the specificities of the field sites examined in Chapters 
5–7, to address the two general questions that formed the starting point for this 
research—first, why political leaders and public officials support educational 
reform even though the odds seem to be against them. And second, the political 
incentives they find in implementing reform, even though their ―logical‖ 
calculations based on self-interest are a pointer to the benefits that they are likely 
to have in blocking change.  
The chapter has four sections: in the first I examine some of the 
achievements of nearly two decades of educational reform efforts in India. In the 
second I compare across the arenas of policy design and implementation to 
examine which actors, interests, and institutions have made a difference, and at 
what levels in explaining successful outcomes. The third section then forwards 
                                                          
189
 Bambaci, Saront, and Tommasi (2002, p. 85) conclude the same for the economic policy 
reform process in Argentina under Carlos Menem (1989–1999), and they recommend looking at 
the polity in order to explain policy reform outcomes. According to them, standard economic 
approaches are unable to do so. 
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four general observations about the part played by politics in steering the reform 
process successfully. These relate to the significant contributions of political 
leaders, the presence of a larger development agenda within which educational 
reform was being pursued in cases of success, the role of the local state and local 
oversight, and the missing role of legislatures and political parties both in cases 
of success and in its absence. The chapter‘s fourth section analyses the 
theoretical contributions made of my research, including suggestions for 
modification of what I perceive to be the current analytical biases in the study of 
the political dynamics of educational reform. I conclude with a reflection on the 
limits of my research, and suggestions regarding possible future directions for 
investigation. 
     8.1 The Achievements of Two Decades of Educational Reform  
Notwithstanding the contentious process of policy implementation, clearly much 
has changed for school education in India as a whole, and in the two states 
studied here. Indeed, things now appear to have changed even in the state of 
Bihar, where a reform minded political leadership has replaced the Rashtriya 
Janata Dal government under the leadership of Lalu Prasad Yadav at the end of 
2005. For the new coalition government led by Nitish Kumar, reforming schools 
and improving the participation of disadvantaged social castes and girls has been 
an agenda of priority. In fact Kumar‘s re-election in the 2010 state Assembly 
elections has been widely credited to the efforts made under his leadership for 
pursuing a wider agenda of development, including reforms in school 
education.
190
 
 Educational participation based on the National Sample Survey (NSS) 
data, the indicator of attainment used in Chapters 3 and 4, provides some 
                                                          
190
 Special efforts to bring in disadvantaged social castes to schools through residential bridge 
courses and incentives to girls by way of free uniforms and bicycles to encourage them to attend 
schools, were some of the main approaches of the new government in this regard. See Priyam 
(2011) for a discussion of some of these special efforts through residential bridge courses, and 
Priyam (2010) for a description of how the incentive schemes to bring girls to schools, along with 
a broader agenda for development, assisted the incumbent government in winning the 2010 state 
assembly elections. 
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evidence of these positive changes at the all-India level and in Bihar. Attendance 
rates for primary education at the national level have reached the mark of near 
universal participation, following an increase of 18 percentage points since the 
time that reforms began (in 1993–94). In AP the attendance rates for primary 
schools were put at 94 per cent in 2007–08—an increase of 21 percentage points 
since reforms began.  In Bihar too there are signs of definite change with a 
participation rate of 76 per cent in 2007–08. This again is the result of an 
increase of nearly 21 percentage points since 1993–94. What makes Bihar‘s 
efforts significant and unusual (and different from the national trends and those 
in AP), is that participation rates for primary schools initially showed a 
downward movement in the state. Following a dip in 1999–2000, the increase in 
participation rates for children of primary school- going age was nearly 25 
percentage points—from 51 per cent in 1999–2000 to 76 per cent in 2007–08 
(see Figure 8.1). 
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What is significant is that this increased participation is due to a reduction of the 
gaps in participation of the poor (especially in rural areas), of girls, and of disadvantaged 
social castes. In the 1990s, participation of the rural poor in Bihar was characterised by 
very low rates of school attendance and very high inequality between the rich and the 
poor.
191
 However, between 1999–2000 and 2007–08, the participation rates for the 
poorest strata of the rural population (represented by the bottom quintile in Tables 8.1a 
and 8.1b) increased from 31.6 to 65 per cent, and inequality in participation narrowed 
down by half. School participation in the state had also been characterised by wide 
gender differences that persisted during the 1990s. Here too there was a marked 
                                                          
191
 The inequality in school participation has been arrived at on the basis of difference in participation 
rates of the richest and poorest 20 per cent of the population, calculated on the basis of monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure reported by the National Sample Survey Organisation.  Participation rates for 
the 1990s are described in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 8.1: Growth in Current School Attendance Rate (%) for 
Children of Age 6 to 10 Years, 1993-94 to 2007-08 
1993-94 1999-2000 2004-05 2007-08
Source: National Sample Survey Organisation, Rounds 50, 55, 61, and 64. 
 
Notes: "Current Attendance Rate" refers to the percentage of children in the age-group of 6--10 years, 
currently attending any educational institution 
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improvement, especially after 2004–05. The difference between the attendance rates for 
girls and boys which was nearly 16 percentage points in 1999–2000, fell to just 7 
percentage points in 2007–08.  
Meanwhile, AP, which had already reduced the gender differential in a significant 
way in the 1990s, demonstrated gender parity in its school participation rates by 2007–
08. Socially disadvantaged castes also improved their participation. The low rates for 
STs and SCs seen in the early 1990s became a phenomenon of the past. In 2007–08, all 
social castes in AP reported school attendance rates of over 90 per cent. Bihar too made 
some improvement in this regard—the participation of disadvantaged social castes, the 
SCs and the OBCs, increased by 30 and 25 percentage points respectively between 
1999–2000 and 2007–08 (see Tables 8.1a and 8.1b for a description of the socio-
economic characteristics of school participation at the primary stage). 
Research by others confirms that increase in school enrolment and in literacy 
rates are sure signs of progress (see Annual Status of Education Report 2010; Little 
2010; Pritchett and Pande 2006). However, the major area of concern now appears to be 
the poor quality of learning, highlighted especially by the Annual Status of Education 
Reports (ASER).
192
 The learning achievement of children in government schools is an 
issue where there was little information until the end of 1990s. But with the regular 
publication of ASER reports on learning achievements, this critical deficiency is being 
filled and the deficits in this regard are highlighted regularly. However, ―learning 
quality‖ too is not an uncontested notion and with scholars claiming that the current 
debate on quality has been overly concerned with ―learning outcomes‖, and ―less with 
issues of reform of curriculum, pedagogy, textbooks, and role of teachers‖ (Little 2010, 
p. 43; Sarangapani 2010 p. 45, as cited in Little 2010, p. 43) the political dimensions of 
the debate about improving quality are beginning to emerge. Clearly, educational reform 
in India is poised to grapple with the new challenges posed by another stage of policy 
                                                          
192
 The ASER reports have been put together since 2005 by the non-governmental organisation 
PRATHAM. They highlight basic reading and arithmetic abilities of children through a household survey. 
These can be accessed at: http://www.asercentre.org/ 
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reform in education and the implementation of these efforts are likely to benefit from the 
lessons obtained from an earlier phase that I have assembled here. 
I now move towards drawing general conclusions from the experience of 
political dynamics in specific arenas and localities. 
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Table 8.1 a: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Educational Participation at the Primary 
School Stage, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 1999-2000 
State 
Social Caste Gender Rural Areas 
SC OBC Others Total Girls Boys Total 
Top 
quintile 
Bottom  
quintile 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
85.4 83.3 91.7 84.6 81.7 87.3 82.6 86.2 74.2 
Bihar 37.5 52.5 62.4 51.3 42.6 58.4 49.5 69.3 31.6 
Source: National Sample Survey Organisation, Round 55th (schedule 10) 
Notes: (i) ―Primary Stage‖ refers to children in the age group 6-10 years, (ii) Current Attendance Rate: The Percent of Children 
Currently Attending Any Educational Institution (iii) SC-Scheduled Caste; OBC-Other Backward Castes; Others-all social 
castes excluding SC, ST, and OBC, (iv) Top quintile: Top 20% of all the individuals based on their monthly per capita 
household consumption expenditure, Bottom quintile: Bottom 20% of all the individuals based on their monthly per capita 
household consumption expenditure  
 
 
Table 8.1 b: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of Educational Participation at the Primary School 
Stage, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, 2007-08 
State 
Social Caste Gender Rural Areas 
SC OBC Others Total Girls Boys Total 
Top 
quintile 
Bottom 
quintile 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
94.5 93.3 96.4 94.0 93.3 94.7 92.8 95.7 89.9 
Bihar 67.5 77.0 85.5 76.1 72.3 79.0 75.5 82.2 65.0 
Source: National Sample Survey Organisation, Round 55th(schedule 10) 
Notes: (i) ―Primary Stage‖ refers to children in the  age group of 6-10 years, (ii) Current Attendance Rate: The percentage of 
children currently attending any educational institution (iii) SC-Scheduled Caste; OBC-Other Backward Castes; Others-all social 
castes excluding SC, ST, and OBC, (iv) Top quintile: Top 20 per cent of the individuals based on their monthly per capita 
household consumption expenditure, Bottom  quintile: Bottom 20 per cent of all the individuals based on their monthly per capita 
household consumption expenditure 
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8.2 Lessons from Across the Arenas of Implementation 
The process of educational policy change in the Indian federal framework has been a 
long one. It has developed through several phases of agenda setting, policy design and 
adaptation, and implementation at the local level. Each of these phases have involved 
interactions between political and policy actors, with varying interests in the policy 
process. Further, each of them have also served as distinct political arenas in their own 
right, with the outcomes of the contested process in each bearing upon the progress (or 
otherwise) of school reforms. I now describe this process for each specific arena, 
including observations about opportunities offered and the political responses to them. 
Agenda Setting 
At the stage of federal agenda setting, the political role of the Centre has been two-fold: 
first strategic decisions to manage political opposition, and second, offering new 
opportunities to state governments as an incentive for easy acceptance of the reform 
agenda.  Also, at this stage the actions of political leaders have seemed to matter less 
than those of policymakers, especially of officers belonging to the line ministries of 
education and finance. Key decisions with respect to accepting structural adjustment 
loans to resolve India‘s balance-of-payments crisis of 1991 were indeed political 
decisions. However, the technical details were finalised by the finance ministry, 
including the decision to borrow from the World Bank for primary education reforms in 
the country. The technical design of educational reform remained the responsibility of 
the Department of Education (DoE) in Delhi.  The two key challenges before the design 
team were (i) negotiating the entry of the World Bank with minimum political 
opposition, especially from the left-leaning political parties, and (ii) getting the state 
governments, whose responsibility it was to implement the changes, to accept the reform 
programme. 
Anticipating these challenges by federal policymakers helped. Strategic choices 
were made by the Centre in order to manage possible opposition. To handle the 
challenge of negotiating the World Bank‘s entry in the primary education sector with 
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minimum political opposition, two key strategic choices were made—first, making the 
District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) a multi-donor programme, and not a 
reform programme identified solely with the World Bank. And second, the government 
did not accept interference from the Bank and other donors in designing the DPEP. This 
toning down of the identification of the reform programme with the World Bank was 
also an element which contributed to the DPEP‘s easy acceptance by state 
governments—indeed even Kerala, where the left-front was a dominant political player, 
became one of the states where the DPEP was accepted for implementation. 
As far as the states are concerned, the programme design offered them several 
opportunities which aligned with their own interests. This was an important reason why 
the DPEP, and following it the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, were easily accepted by the state 
governments. The opportunities included the transfer of a larger volume of federal 
resources to states on easy terms, and for investment in building new capacity at a time 
when the states themselves were severely constrained in terms of resources. Teacher 
unions were not consulted at the stage of federal design. And federal institutions such as 
the Department of Education actually facilitated the change process (and did not act as a 
constraining force as noticed by scholars working on economic policy reform—as for 
e.g. see Sinha, 2003) or as expected from the postulates of new political economy. 
Further, federal design of reforms also set up new institutions at the state level and 
mobilised experts who could provide critical ideas for change. These were to form the 
new allies or support groups for the reform process. 
 Managing opposing interests and biased institutions was a real challenge at the 
state level, in contrast to what we saw at the Centre. Challenges from opposing interests 
and biased institutions needed to be overcome for reforms to find their feet. The line 
departments of education at the state level were truly an impediment to reforms, in 
contrast to the ―facilitating‖ role of the same department at the federal level. The activity 
of the state departments of education was limited to paying salaries for the large number 
of teachers who were serving as government employees following measures of 
centralisation, and handling the grievances of teachers which were often taken to the 
259 
  
 
 
 
courts. The state departments lacked the ideas, resources, and indeed the very motivation 
to change things. Additional institutional constraints came from the norms of the state 
treasury, which did not easily permit spending on innovations.  At the state level, 
therefore, institutions preferred status-quo over change. Here, the technical design of 
reforms provided some opportunity—the new institution of the ―society‖ (discussed in 
Chapter 3) allowed the transfer of funds directly from the Centre to the states, so 
bypassing some of the institutional constraints of the state departments of education and 
the treasury. 
With regard to the anticipated opposition from teacher unions, federal 
policymakers showed skills in not making any explicit recommendations on taking ―hard 
measures‖ for teachers, leaving it to the discretion of implementing states. So, the 
federal agenda setting process was characterised by political skills of aligning new 
opportunities towards interests of state governments, and introducing reforms by a type 
of ―stealth‖ (that is reducing the association with the World Bank by making reform 
policies multi-donor financed and domestically designed) and keeping political 
opposition from left parties and the state governments at bay.
193
 The few instances of 
resistance on issues such as changes in teacher recruitment policies in Madhya Pradesh, 
and on the revision of textbooks as in the case of Kerala, were limited to the states and 
never gathered the momentum of a ―national‖ level opposition.194 In this, the federal 
division of institutional power between the Centre and the states helped the situation—
the Centre was limited to designing policy guidelines and it was the responsibility of the 
states to implement change. 
Interest Management 
In many ways, the findings of how teachers and their unions were managed during the 
reform process in both AP and Bihar did not conform to the image of vote-seeking 
                                                          
193
 Jenkins (1999, pp. 5–6, 47) notes that a similar process characterised the introduction of economic 
policy reforms in India. Political opposition to these policies did not materialise as expected, because 
political skills were used to blunt the opposition and a strategy of ―reform by stealth‖ was pursued.     
194
 See Leclercq (2002) and Sharma (1999) for a description of state-level opposition to reforms in teacher 
recruitment in Madhya Pradesh; Husock, Moore, and Orren (2000) describe the political resistance from 
teacher unions and political parties to changes made in textbooks in Kerala.    
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politicians colluding with rent-seeking unions, and resisting change, put forward by 
proponents of formal political economy theory. 
In Andhra Pradesh, the state followed a consistent policy (from 1998 on) of 
reducing opportunities for discretion and the use of arbitrary authority with respect to the 
transfers and postings of teachers. The direction of these policies persisted, 
notwithstanding the change of government in 2004.
195
 In making these changes the state 
not only put an end to the opportunities for political patronage and rent-seeking in 
transfers and postings, but it also won over the loyalty of teachers. This, along with the 
opening of new avenues for promotion at the mandal level, and the unification of two 
different cadres of teachers, further aligned policy actions with teachers‘ interests.196 
 
Political skills were also evident in the manner in which the state of AP dealt 
with teachers‘ unions—that is playing on inter-union rivalries and pitting the 
Government Teachers‘ Association against the Panchayati Raj Teachers‘ Union. The 
government granted concessions to the latter union (which commanded the support of 
the largest number of primary school teachers in the state). This government support to 
the Panchayati Raj Teachers‘ Union left it with little option than to provide tacit support 
for government policies. For other reasons too the unions did not really have the choice 
to oppose the government that was in power—their command over teachers depended on 
how skilfully they could negotiate with the government and extract concessions. 
Otherwise, they ran the risk of losing their members to rival unions. Both the divide-
and-rule strategies and compulsions for cooperation among unions blunted the expected 
opposition from the organised collective action of teachers. In its dealings with teachers 
                                                          
195
 I have noted the last set of specific instructions issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh  in the 
year 2011 (GoAP 2011b, G.O. Number 65, 19 May) for reducing discretion in transfers and postings in 
Chapter 5.    
196
 Reducing discretion in teacher transfers and postings did not mean that opportunities for bribes, 
corruption, and political patronage were completely abolished. On the contrary observers note that there 
were opportunities of rent-seeking and patronage in other areas, including transfers in government 
departments.  Writings of scholars like Manor (2002 p. 17), Mooij (2007 p. 44), Suri (2004 p. 5497) make 
a mention of these.  My own research also takes note of the new opportunities for political patronage 
opened up by ―selection‖ of chairmen of school committees. These were TDP loyalists, and were awarded 
contracts for the building of schools. 
261 
  
 
 
 
and their unions, the actions of political leaders displayed a series of concessions in 
terms of the content of policies and their appropriate timing and sequencing. 
Local strategies of union-reform cooperation—witnessed in East Godavari where 
former office bearers of the left-leaning State Teachers‘ Union (STU) became officers of 
the district reform team—were pointers to the highly context specific and embedded 
ways in which the political dynamics of reform implementation played out in practice. 
While ideologically the union was opposed to World Bank funding, its rivalry with the 
strong ultra-left local groups in the region, and the threat of ―sitting out‖ while school 
reforms were being implemented (that is, if the STU followed a dogmatic ideological 
position), forced it to follow a pragmatic line on externally financed reforms.
197
 The 
STU also used its official position in the reform team to resolve teacher grievances at the 
District Education Officer‘s (DEO‘s) level—another example of using the opportunities 
given by reforms to advance its own interest as a union (by taking up issues related to 
teachers, and winning their loyalty). 
In Bihar, the strategy of confrontation with the unions, and other institutional 
actors such as the judiciary, proved detrimental to implementing the reform agenda. The 
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) government, under the political leadership of Lalu Prasad 
Yadav, accused the main union—the Bihar Rajya Prathmik Shikshak Sangh, of partisan 
affiliation with the rival Congress Party and of being dominated by the upper castes.
 198
  
This attack was meant to send a message to the RJD voters (who were largely from 
backward castes) that the poor quality of schools (and indeed a general lack of 
development and extensive poverty in the state) was due to the domination of partisan 
and upper caste affiliations of state institutions. However, having made this critique the 
RJD government failed to pursue an alternate agenda of development, and strictures 
from the judiciary forced it to abandon the policy reform it intended to follow. This 
preference for an approach of confrontation over negotiations, making use of skills and 
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 I have noted in Chapter 5 that the STU was backed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Jenkins 
(1999p. 64) also observes this in the case of economic policy reforms—they received tacit, followed by 
―more explicit‖ backing from left-leaning and communist parties which ruled many Indian states. 
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 The Congress had been the main ruling party in the state before the Rashtriya Janata Dal came to 
power in early 1990. 
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strategy, resulted in a lack of support for reforms among institutions as well as teachers. 
This, coupled with the overall context of weak governance in the state, resulted in an 
inability to implement even technically well-designed measures.   
The contrasting approaches towards and outcomes of state action with respect to 
teacher policies in the two states—strengthening centralisation in AP and reversing it in 
favour of decentralised recruitment in Bihar—also shows that there are no easy answers 
with respect to either direction of policy. Centralised policies worked in AP under 
conditions of reducing discretion and the arbitrary use of authority, evolving detailed 
rules of procedure over time to sustain these changes, and changing the attitudes of 
district and sub-district level officers. On the issue of changing the attitude of district 
and sub-district officers, the gains were limited and further progress needs to be made. 
This is evident from the persisting grievances amongst teachers in Mahabubnagar 
regarding large-scale transfers in the district, and the consistent need for state action in 
issuing detailed instructions for narrowing discretion in teacher policies.  
Decentralised recruitments did not work in Bihar in the first instance, when para-
teachers known as Panchayat Shiksha Mitras were recruited in large numbers in 2002. 
There were many charges of corruption and poor quality of recruitment, and the policy 
was challenged in court. In the second instance, the decentralised recruitment of teachers 
worked after strategic retreats were made by the new government in 2006, and 
institutional conflicts with the court and the union Berozgaar Shikshak Sangh had been 
negotiated. These new decentralised recruitment rules also needed support from the state 
for sustained implementation, which was very similar to the support given to centralised 
recruitment rules in AP. Decentralisation in no way means the end of policy 
challenges—these are simply pushed down to a lower level and new forms of 
responsible state action are required in order to sustain these policy changes. 
The role of the political leadership and the local context for reform 
implementation are fore-grounded in the political dynamics witnessed in this arena. In 
Andhra Pradesh, Naidu‘s political skills were demonstarted in sustaining policy changes, 
authorising bureaucrats to act, and in manoeuvring the unions. On the other hand, it was 
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not the strength of opposing interests as much as a strategy of confrontation, especially 
with institutions pursued by the government, which was the cause of sharp reversals and 
even abandonment of policies in Bihar. Under these circumstances, it did appear that 
impediments posed by vested interests and institutions were resisting change in the state, 
a belief that the political leadership itself held and propagated. 
Decentralisation and Community Mobilisation 
Political motivation in this arena of policy change is in complete contrast to what I 
noticed apropos teacher policies in AP. While reducing discretion and patronage 
characterised the policy changes with respect to teachers in the state, the new 
community initiatives with respect to decentralisation and community participation in 
AP were intended to build a network of influence around the party leader by distributing 
patronage among new actors. The school committees were also meant to undercut the 
status of panchayats which were the new institutions of political decentralisation, 
directly elected by the people. The school committees were very much like the user 
committees established by Naidu for other development sectors in the state, and they 
underscored the insecurity that political leaders like him anticipated from competitive 
politics at the local level.  
The intended ―centralised‖ objectives of policy were achieved by effective 
implementation and strong control of the line department of education over school 
committees. The actions of mandal education officers and head masters in selecting 
chairpersons with strong partisan affiliations to the ruling TDP party highlighted that the 
bureaucracy was effectively used for political purposes, whenever required. Besides, the 
claims of community participation were more a rhetoric than reality—members did not 
know their role, seldom deliberated on issues of significance, and simply authorised 
decisions taken by the headmaster. When I look at the political dynamics of policy 
changes in both arenas together, I find considerable merit in Mooij‘s (2007) argument 
that Naidu‘s efforts at reform implementation were marked by both ―political skills and 
much hype‖. The former was employed by the political leader to manoeuvre political 
support and the latter to create a distinct image of Naidu as a new type of ―leader‖ 
264 
  
 
 
 
moulded as a technical manager, efficient in implementing the neo-liberal model of 
economic development.  
The partisan affiliations of the committees, and more specifically of their Chairs, 
meant that there were changes to the technical design with a change in government. But 
these changes did not alter the basic direction of Naidu‘s model of ―centralised‖ 
decentralisation for schools, or of political control being extended over them. The 
changes that the new Chief Minister Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy of the Congress Party 
made in AP were largely symbolic, signalling a change from Naidu‘s style of 
personalised control and simply adding some more political actors to the list of those 
who were to be the ―masters‖ of these committees. The changes did not deepen the 
electoral or participatory features of design, or grant them any real powers or resources.   
 
Bihar is a case in contrast. Here, the lack of effective implementation led to the 
weak institutionalisation of a technically well designed policy for school 
decentralisation. Important elements of technical design were the envisaged direct 
elections for school committees and devolution of some real powers of effective 
community control over teachers. Neither of these policy intentions could be realised in 
practice due to local elite capture and the collusion of authorities of the local state. The 
state‘s political leadership remained indifferent to these dynamics of local politics. 
Subsequent changes to school committees, especially after 2006, placed emphasis on 
strengthening their election process, bringing it under the regulatory control of the state 
election commission (which was widely considered to be an autonomous and fair body, 
possessing wide powers for punitive action in case authorities were found to be 
subverting the electoral process).  
The lack of supportive action from the state and non-responsive local authorities 
created an impression of ―less state‖ and a trust deficit at the local level. Even though the 
poor knew that they could complain against errant teachers, unscheduled closure of 
schools, and irregular service of very poor quality mid-day meals, they did not use these 
powers. They were sure they would not be heard by the authorities. Thus, these 
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measures of decentralisation in Bihar remained the actions of reform minded 
bureaucrats, without the support of the political leadership. 
Two observations with respect to the changes in teacher policies and 
decentralisation highlight the effects of ―policy feedback‖—a concept which has been 
given considerable emphasis in the literature on comparative institutionalism.
199
 In 
teacher policies as much as those related to school decentralisation, both AP and Bihar 
persisted with certain basic tenets of policy, notwithstanding changes in government. 
Centralised control over teacher policies and school committees continued to be the 
main aspects of changed policy design in AP, while in Bihar the changes were 
characterised more by an enhanced emphasis on decentralisation—in teacher policies, 
and in the augmentation of local control over schools. In both cases, it seems that policy 
changes, once initiated are difficult to reverse, and enhance government capabilities in a 
manner in which they guide the possibilities for future official initiatives.  
Schools and Local Politics 
The claims of ―success‖ in AP appeared far more modest when I viewed results from the 
ground—from the working of schools, and from the perspective of communities. 
Notwithstanding the reforms of teacher policies, there were instances of administrative 
power being used in an arbitrary manner over teachers by district authorities, even 
though the Mandal Education Officers and the reform team were often prepared to 
mediate on their behalf. There were attitudinal problems among teachers as well—
especially in Mahabubnagar district where a rapport between teachers and students was 
missing in several of the schools observed. The actual attendance of children in schools 
was lower than what was showed in ―official‖ records and teachers hid the real reason 
why children were absent. In other instances, teachers simply huddled together and did 
not work, leaving the entire responsibility of teaching on the shoulders of the para-
teachers. 
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 See Ikenberry (1994 pp. 23–24) for a discussion on how resolution of policy struggles at one moment 
has an impact on institutional settings and interests and capabilities of groups and individuals.  
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However, compared to Bihar, government schools seemed to be working much 
better in AP. The mid-day meals were of good quality and were provided regularly, the 
actual presence of children in school was much higher, and parents had fewer 
complaints against teachers. Higher school attendance by children, but more than that 
the better presence of teachers was helped in a major way by the presence of better roads 
and public transport facilities in the state. In contrast, a lack of such facilities abetted the 
irregular presence of teachers in Bihar. These considerations are also indicative of the 
support extended to improving schools from other elements of the development agenda. 
Interestingly, building better roads has been high on the agenda of the new government 
in Bihar. In an earlier section, I have highlighted the achievements of the new 
government in improving primary school participation.
200
 
In Andhra Pradesh, administrative changes made in the past, especially the 
creation of mandals, has been of help in implementing school reform measures on the 
ground. Here, the local state seems to have greater administrative capability and 
responsiveness as compared to Bihar. The Mandal Education Officers in AP had a far 
smaller number of schools and teachers to supervise and were not antagonistic to the 
teachers, unlike what I noticed to be the case with the Block Education Officers (BEOs) 
in Bihar. Besides, the MEOs, the Mandal Resource Persons (MRPs) employed in his/her 
office also visited the schools regularly. This was a contrast to the BEOs in Bihar, many 
of whom could not recollect when they had last visited the schools. In fact, the 
educational reform efforts in AP can be said to have had an ―unanticipated benefit‖ from 
this pre-existing structure, increasing the capacity of the local state, another example of 
policy feedback highlighted in comparative-institutional literature on the policy reform 
process.  
In contrast, the BEOs in Bihar were noted to be ―anti- reform‖—a community of 
government officers, unresponsive to the community, antagonistic to the interests of the 
teachers, and having very little links to the schools. They were seen as non-responsive 
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 See Priyam (2010) on the political benefits that accrued to the Nitish Kumar government from building 
better roads in the state.  
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by both the teachers and the community in Bihar. Policy entrepreneurs in the state saw 
the BEO as an instrument of rent extraction from teachers. Accordingly, decentralisation 
related reforms in the state were backed by policy entrepreneurs to reverse the control of 
BEOs and district educational authorities on teachers. Community control was seen by 
them as a counter to centralised control. For lack of political support, the first round of 
policy changes could not be implemented.  
Besides, the merging of two distinct chains of command from the ―top‖ at the 
mandal level—from the line department of education as well as the reform team—
implied convergent implementation, and reform initiatives did not run ―parallel‖ to or as 
a substitute for departmental initiatives. In Bihar, reform initiatives and departmental 
policies ran on parallel tracks almost until 2006. Only after this year can the effects of 
support from a new political leadership for the initiatives made by policy-entrepreneurs 
were to be seen seen especially in the area of strategic negotiations over teacher policies. 
I also infer from this that while the presence of policy experts and policy-entrepreneurs 
located in the reform team outside the government‘s department of education was a 
necessary condition for initiating policy changes it was by itself not sufficient for the 
consolidation of change.   
Merging of the implementation of new reform ideas and initiatives alongside 
instiutions such as the line department of education, considered to be inclined towards 
old policies and ideas, was another element of strategic negotiation of the reform process 
in AP. In theory such institutions are viewed only as opponents of change. Following a 
change in political leadership in Bihar in 2005, growth oriented policy reforms have 
been pursued more vigorously and education policy changes are being seen as a critical 
element of the broader agenda of development. The regressive role of officers of the 
local state—the district and block level offices of the education department—has been 
recognised as a matter of policy concern in the state. That said, policy action on this 
issue has been introduced slowly, and only after the government had consolidated its 
political base in the Assembly elections of 2010.  
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The new administrative reforms put in place by the government of Bihar in 2011 
have abolished the post of the ―district superintendant of education‖—an office known 
to have no links with the academic life of schools, and disliked by teachers and the 
community alike for its potential to extract rents from each of them. Besides, the new 
changes have added programme related functionaries in the district education office. 
With these changes the isolation of educational reform by the line department of 
education in the state comes to an end even in Bihar, and administrative procedures in 
this state have become similar to what I have noted in AP—integration of the reform 
team with line department of education and a more responsive sub-district 
administration. The recent reforms in district and sub-district structures of educational 
administration in Bihar are indicative that the government understands that reforms in 
the structure of the local state are important if educational reform has to find a toe-hold 
on the ground (GoB 2011b). Also, it elucidates the slow and evolutionary nature of 
changes that characterise the policy reform process in education, involving various 
levels of a complex federal system, in contrast to economic policy reforms which can be 
brought about more swiftly by ―stroke of the pen‖ decisions.   
8.3 The Process of Politics: Leadership Matters 
 
Reducing patronage in some areas of policy and building new networks of political 
influence in others, it was political skills that Naidu used to steer the agenda of reforms 
in AP. While technical design did have an impact in terms of the substance of change, of 
greater significance to the outcomes was the signalling effect of the political leader. 
Naidu‘s clear association with the reform process sent a message to the multi-layered 
administrative machinery responsible for implementing reform programmes. Policy 
entrepreneurs made strategic use of this opportunity to negotiate institutional change, get 
things moving across multiple bureaucracies, and secure political authorisation for 
policy level changes. The timing of policy changes and the sequencing of each policy 
intervention were critical aspects of the efforts made by leaders. The absence of such an 
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association of the political leader with reforms in Bihar meant that no amount of efforts 
at the design and policy level was able to steer change or sustain innovation.  
The Role of Political Leaders 
In many ways the comparative success of the reform process in AP and the lack of it in 
Bihar, points to the role of leadership as a determinant of the variations in outcome. This 
conclusion is in conformity with what scholars have noted for the economic policy 
reform process (Wallis 1999; Williamson 1994). In guiding teacher policies, exercising 
authoritative control over school committees and the decentralisation process, putting 
implementing bureaucrats in line, and in building a coalition of support for reform 
through these changes, Naidu made abundant use of political skills. His style indeed was 
one focused on portraying him at the centre of all the changes, making it appear as if it 
were his ―personality traits‖  that were responsible for these policy changes. However, as 
Wallis (1999, p.40) notes, this gives only a partial understanding of the role of 
leadership in the policy reform process, one that lays emphasis only on the supply-side, 
as it were. She notes that there is in addition the need to understand the ―situational 
factors‖ which give these leaders the opportunity to exercise their leadership.   
If personality traits and charisma were the only characteristics that mattered, then 
I argue that in the case of Bihar too there were many favourable political conditions 
which were pointers to the possibility of a strong reform leadership emerging under Lalu 
Prasad Yadav. He too was portrayed as a political leader with charisma, and the support 
of political circumstances in terms of a strong mandate, and faced by a weak opposition. 
Both have been identified as supportive political conditions for the adoption of policy 
reforms (Wallis 1999 p. 41, Williamson and Haggard 1994 pp. 571-77). Lalu Prasad 
Yadav was quick to identify the Congress Party with earlier policy failures and for its 
association with vested interests, signalling that his government was capable of taking 
on vested interests and exercising autonomous policy-leadership. Indeed, his early 
pronouncements about the charwaha vidyalay—a non-formal school for shepherd boys 
usually belonging to the lower castes built ―hype‖ around his leadership, in much the 
same way that Jos Mooij (2007) describes for Naidu in AP. Nevertheless, weak 
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implementation became a characteristic of all policy measures initiated under his 
leadership, and indeed of his general style of governance.
201
 
The fact that a new government in Bihar, led by Nitish Kumar, could pursue an 
agenda of educational reform was indicative that structural constraints and vested 
interests were not insurmountable. A consistent, visionary, and unconstrained 
authoritative leadership was important for successful reforms. But also crucial were 
negotiations over policy. In many ways, Nitish Kumar was doing in Bihar what Naidu 
did in AP a term earlier, although without emphasis on ―personality‖ that was 
characteristic of Naidu‘s rule in AP.202 The new government in Bihar began to use 
federal opportunities aligning them with the interests of the state. 
 
The Role of Experts: Policy-Entrepreneurship in Educational Reform 
In addition to the political leaders, an ―informal network‖ of bureaucrats—with 
experience in implementing the Andhra Pradesh Primary Education Programme, the 
Bihar Education Programme, and the District Primary Education Programme—were 
important in steering the reforms in both states. These policy entrepreneurs were 
generally officers of the Indian Administrative Service, who either led the reform team 
at the state level or were posted in the line ministry (of education) at the federal level, 
and gained considerable exposure to global ideas as also experience in reform 
implementation. These officers were well-versed with the institutional structure of the 
line departments and they helped the process of negotiating around institutional 
impediments.  
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 See World Bank (2005) for a description of the critical bottlenecks and failures in governance at the 
end of the decade long rule of the RJD in the state. See Sinha (1995) for a description of the failure of his 
innovative scheme of charwaha vidyalay. See Hauser (1997) for a discussion of Lalu Yadav‘s failures in 
the implementation of other populist schemes announced by him.  
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 The publicity   around Naidu‘s leadership promoted the belief that policy reforms were the result of 
some personality traits or charisma borne in the person of the leader. These claims were contested by 
political observers, and indeed by Naidu‘s own actions in different policy arenas. Policy actions under 
Nitish Kumar‘s leadership come close to the ideal type of the ―coherent policy leader‖ as described by 
Wallis (1999 p. 42)  
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Further, many acts of policy entrepreneurship, such as the school decentralisation 
legislation in Bihar, were the result of their efforts.
203
 Indeed the endeavours of political 
leaders would not have been successful if this trained cadre of policy experts were not 
available in the states.  
However, no instances of policy entrepreneurship by the officers would have 
worked on their own, without the backing of the political leader. While AP offered 
almost no instances of reform champions acting on their own, Bihar had many examples 
of ―entrepreneur‖ like activities from policymakers, in designing new policies seeking 
legislative authorisation, yet absence of political support proved to be a critical 
deficiency in sustaining these changes.   
In terms of the stages of reforms, what can be seen is that while actions of policy 
entrepreneurs are important in agenda setting and turning policy design into an 
implementable framework, it is political leaders who matter in terms of how reforms are 
implemented (rather than how they are designed). 
Pursuing Educational Reform within a Broader Agenda for Development 
An important incentive for Naidu‘s efforts in improving primary schools, and thereafter 
for Nitish Kumar was that both men saw these changes as linked to broader development 
goals. Thus, they pursued a wider vision of development of which education was a part. 
Naidu‘s idea of pursuing a path of economic growth through globalisation and 
liberalisation articulated the need for a globally competitive, literate AP as an essential 
element. Literature on educational policy reform from other countries too confirms this 
observation (about greater chances of success when pursued along with a broader 
development agenda).
204
 But an important caveat here is that AP and Bihar are sub-
national units, not completely free in their choices and institutions—they both act within 
a federal framework. 
                                                          
203
 In AP, the notable officers were the late Nagarjuna, (State Project Director for DPEP), and I.V. Subba 
Rao (Secretary, Education for the GoAP). In Bihar, the notable reform leaders were the late M.M. Jha 
(State Project Director for BEP, who later became Education Secretary in Nitish Kumar‘s government), 
Vijay Raghavan (State Project Director for BEP), and Anjani Kumar Singh (State Project Director for 
BEP, and current Education Secretary of the Government of Bihar). 
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 Draibe (2004) for example, analyses the case of educational reform in Brazil pursued under the 
Cardoso administration‘s wider agenda for development. 
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Missing Voices: Legislature, Party, and Politicians on the Side-lines 
In Andhra Pradesh, key political leaders such as elected representatives for the federal 
parliament or state assembly (known as ‗Member of Parliament‘ and ‗Member of 
Legislative Assembly‘ respectively), and other party leaders were on the fringe of the 
reform process. The new political opportunities opened up by reforms held no appeal to 
political actors other than the Chief Minister. This applied even within the party in 
power. The local legislators were not associated with or interested in these changes in 
either AP or Bihar. The process of legislative authorisation for school committees did 
not alter the situation in any way, as a strong majority of ruling parties in both states and 
the emphasis on the ―leader‖ within these parties, did not leave any agency with 
legislators.   
 
Local State and Local Oversight 
Politics understood as the actions of the political leader at the macro-level alone does not 
explain the full ambit of what I have argued is its dynamic relationship with educational 
reform. The significance of a political leader diminishes somewhat at the local level. 
How people accept change or participate in the efforts for change is ultimately explained 
more in relation to the working of the local state. Functionaries of the state at the 
―frontline‖ of service delivery in both the states very often excluded the poor through 
their attitude or worked as a part of a rent extracting mechanism. The exclusion of the 
poor was the result of a variety of micro-processes that characterised the ―governance‖ 
of schooling and worked to keep the poor out of school affairs. 
The non-participation of the poor in Bihar schools does not seem to be simply 
apathy. Rather, it constitutes an active rejection of a local system where poor people felt 
that their complaints were not heard. In the grievances of the people that I have reported, 
complaints about the high handed attitude of teachers, their irregularity, and their 
assertion of power as government servants are many.  From the observations on school 
committee elections and functioning, and on the working of schools, there seems to be a 
far greater control of vested interests at the local level in Bihar than in AP. The role of 
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institutions and interests in blocking change seemed real at this level. The inability of the 
―central‖ state to intervene on behalf of the poor made matters worse and led to a deep 
distrust of the state among the poor.  
Emergence of local political competition from panchayats—the institutions of 
political decentralisation— was a challenge to the authority of ―new‖ political leaders 
pursuing the agenda of educational reform alongside a broader agenda of development. 
How they would negotiate this new political competition from below, would provide 
analysts with greater insights on motivations of leaders and help unravel the ―hype‖ or 
packaging of reforms from its real intentions.  
8.4 Contributions and Future Directions 
Contributions  
While I have found limitations of the explanatory potential of formal political economy 
approaches in understanding the political dynamics of education policy reforms, I do 
recognize that this approach makes important contributions—especially in providing the 
framework within which the challenges to the policy reform process can be understood. 
I too have used the framework as one of ―first principles‖ and organized my thoughts 
around it. Moreover, I find that its description of there being vested interest around the 
policy-process does have a strong empirical referent. However, that said, the weakness 
of the political economy approach lies in its inability to explain how or why policy 
change does in fact happen. Here, I agree with the observations of Jenkins that ―new- 
political-economy approaches are at times helpful in framing research questions, but 
tend to systematically discount the incentives facing governing elites to take limited 
risks, as well as the capacity for interest groups themselves to respond to new 
incentives…‖ (Jenkins 1999, p.7) 
One of the contributions of this research relates to modifying the analytical 
biases relating to the constraining role of strong interests in society, and advancing the 
understanding about the role of ―agency‖ in the process of change. Leadership acts with 
greater autonomy from the control of either structures or interests than current 
assumptions in theory. This autonomy of action can be seen in the timing and content of 
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new policies—as seen in the skilful use of new opportunities, and in negotiating the 
process of change.     
Further, it contributes to the limited body of knowledge on the policy reform 
process in the social sector by comparing similar cases for variations in outcomes, 
located within a common federal democratic context. The results I have underline the 
differences of dynamics between the ―first generation‖ of policy reforms involving 
changes in economic policies, and the ―second generation‖ of policy reforms involving 
changes in the social sector. In the latter case, a series of complex and discrete policy 
changes are needed to sustain the reform process; the state needs to play a more active 
role in this arena of change; and skills of negotiation have greater relevance as a longer 
time-span is required to implement and consolidate new policies.     
Limitations of This Research 
The limitations of this research stem from the aspects of policy initiative and political 
action that it has not been able to observe, and from aspects that it has been able observe 
but not explain fully. Three important aspects of state action that I have not been able to 
observe are interventions for improving the quality of learning, strategies to better the 
welfare of disadvantaged social castes, and other programmes for poverty alleviation.  
Educational reform made some significant interventions to improve the quality of 
teaching—for example, in teacher training and in improving textbooks. Although I  
noticed that the quality of teaching and even learning, was better in AP than in Bihar, 
considerations of how much the learning quality of children improved lie outside the 
scope of my research.  
Also, reduction in gender and social disparities was a notable outcome of reform 
efforts. Indeed the data I have presented on school participation reflect these gains. 
Besides community mobilisation and improvement in formal schools (the aspects that I 
have seen and discussed here), a range of initiatives led by line ministries other than 
education, contributed significantly in reducing these disparities. However, since my 
observations were limited to policy actions initiated by the line department of education 
and the reform team, these were also outside the scope of my research. 
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How people related to schools and to the local state more generally, was also 
dependant on the efficiency and transparency with which a range of other development 
schemes worked in the state, especially those related to poverty alleviation. As 
Corbridge, Williams, Srivastav, and Veron (2005, pp.252–55) note outcomes such as 
participation in school committees or people‘s interactions with schools and teachers, 
are only one aspect of the relationship between the state and its poor citizens in the local 
context. The full nature of this relationship depends on how the functionaries of the local 
state work in implementing other development schemes, and on how much the state is 
trusted by the poor in making goods and services available to them in a reasonably 
efficient and impartial manner.  Research studies which focus on the working of the 
local state, and the impact this has on participation in schools by children and 
communities, is a recommended area for further research.  
Because I have focused on the working of government schools, I have not 
evaluated how much of the progress in AP may be due to the growth of low cost private 
schools. This subject is gaining significance in research and policy discussions, 
especially since the publication of Tooley‘s (2009) book on the existence of low cost 
private schools in the suburbs of Hyderabad, and findings of high—nearly 22 per cent 
enrolment of 6–14 year olds in private school in rural areas of India (ASER 2010). I 
have noted parents‘ claims that private schools are better than government schools in 
discussions reported in Chapters 6 and 7. However, two caveats are in order here—the 
figures for participation in private schools do not in any way reduce the significance of 
my conclusions with respect to the political dynamics of government institutions. 
Second, for Tooley (2010) the enrolment figures for private schools and their low costs 
as compared to government schools, form the basis for arguing for ―exit‖ options for the 
poor by way of giving them school vouchers, with which the poor can choose the school 
their children attend. Arguably, this may be another area of contested policy 
deliberation, but normatively it does not absolve the state of its responsibility to provide 
good quality schools for its poor citizens.    
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Among those aspects that I have observed, but have not fully explained is the 
issue of leadership motivation. Although my research identifies leadership action 
especially that of the political leader as a key determinant of policy outcomes, it does not 
propose a deeper explanation of what motivates leaders to pursue such change. 
Explanations based in economic theories of rational self-interest are inclined to argue 
that electoral advantages for themselves or their parties are the key motivation for 
leaders. However, there is abundant evidence from the cases I have analysed that not all 
the changes pursued can be explained on the basis of this logic alone. Thus, policy 
decisions related to reducing discretion in teacher policies in AP represent some degree 
of ―autonomy‖ from calculations of political advantage. Also, in the policy measures 
where political advantage was expected to accrue, for example in building local party 
cadres through school education committees, the outcomes did not conform to these 
expectations, in the sense that school committee chairpersons were not significant actors 
at the time of elections. Besides, the literature points towards Naidu alienating many in 
his own party through the ―reform‖ policies that he pursued (Suri 2004). And 
opportunities for political patronage were rife in sectors other than education (Manor 
2002; Mooij 2007).  
There are limitations also on the extent to which the findings and conclusions 
here can be generalised and the extent to which they can be used to predict what may 
happen in other democratic contexts. Here it is important to note that a significant aspect 
of the inference I draw from the comparison of AP and Bihar, is about the relevance of 
context and the locally embedded ways in which reforms unfold. Agents matter for 
change to take place, yet their skills are a response to the specificities of the context. 
This research shows that relying on ―global lessons‖ or applying ―good practice‖ 
models from other contexts, is fraught with difficulty. We have seen that even within 
India, within a programme operating according to national guidelines and criteria, two 
states adopted radically different paths. The unintended consequences of policies with 
respect to decentralisation, especially their adaptation for different contexts and 
motivations further underscores the importance of appreciating the local contexts, 
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shaped by the contests of ideas and interests. Furthermore, the continuous adaptation of 
reform during implementation should not only be expected, but accepted as being the 
norm.  Hence, the approach of designing the ―perfect technical reform‖ to be 
implemented in a top down manner should be eschewed. 
Future Directions 
Suggestions on the way forward—on what can specifically be done with respect to 
improving schools, teacher policies, decentralisation and state-citizen relationships at the 
local level—derive from some of the observations of achievements and deficits in AP 
and Bihar, and especially from the pursuit of change ―despite the odds‖ since a new 
government has stabilised its rule in Bihar. The fact that the state is now able to pursue a 
path of policy change in order to improve its schools indicates that the constraints of 
political structures and those of inherited institutions and interests are not 
insurmountable. In short, political leadership continues to be critical in navigating the 
path of policy change. 
Proposals  to bring about improved directions for future policies—especially 
those which aim to improve the quality of teaching and learning— include persisting 
with efforts to improve school-community relations, the need for improving teacher 
attitudes even in cases of ―success‖, and reforms in district and sub-district 
administration—the mandal and the block in AP and Bihar respectively. Of course, 
these critical endeavours are unlikely to be achieved as local pursuits and they need 
responsible support from the central leadership.  
Accordingly, developing better theories to understand leadership motivations in 
the context of developing countries, where interests are weakly articulated and party-
political competition is fluid and fragmented, remains a challenge. Some of the nuanced 
political circumstances that need to be addressed include the increasing competition 
arising from the presence of regional (in contrast to national parties) and of the enhanced 
local competition due to increasing political decentralisation. Of course empirical 
observations from more cases regarding how political leaders strategically negotiate the 
reform process and find new incentives and allies in the course of pursuing changes, 
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including case-comparisons from other Indian states, will be an aid to both endeavours, 
of new policy as well as theory. 
In conclusion, I quote Geddes (1995 p.214) regarding the requirement to build 
theories where empirical observations of success, policy adaptation, and unintended 
consequences no longer appear anomalous. In this context, she states: ―…politicians, 
their interest, and the political circumstances that shape the ways in which they pursue 
their interests. This is the research frontier. It is from these theories that a new paradigm 
will emerge.‖ 
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Appendix 1 
Research Methods Appendix 
 
This research uses a variety of primary and secondary data sources in order to understand the 
complexities of implementation educational reform in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Bihar. The primary data sources include interviews with education policymakers and policy 
implementers, teachers and their unions, school and household surveys in selected sub-district 
units, and focus group discussions with school education committee members on the working of 
educational decentralisation. The secondary data sources include an analysis of national policies 
on education reform for nearly two decades (1990–2009), budgetary resources for education of 
the Centre and the states (from 1990–2007 to 2008), and data on educational participation 
provided by the National Sample Survey (from 1993–94 to 2007–08).  
The tools used are both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative tools include interviews 
and focus group discussions. Quantitative tools include an analysis of budgetary data for school 
education, National Sample Survey data on educational participation, and school and household 
surveys in two selected districts in each state. Table 1 lists the data sources for Chapters 3–7. 
Table 1: Data Sources by Chapter 
Chapter No. Chapter Title Data Sources 
Chapter  3 Setting the Agenda: The Federal Context 
of Educational Reform in India  
 
1. Government of India‘s education policy and 
programme documents 1990–2009. 
2. Analysis of the budgetary resources for 
education, Central and state governments, 
1990–91 to 2006–07. 
3. Interviews with policymakers and experts. 
4. Research literature, including reports 
commissioned by donor agencies on school 
education reform programmes in the 1990s. 
Chapter  4   Federal Opportunities, State-level 
Implementation: The Puzzle of 
Contrasting Outcomes in Andhra Pradesh 
and Bihar  
 
1. Research literature on the political context 
of implementation of educational reform in 
the two states. 
2. Programme guidelines and evaluation 
documents for the Andhra Pradesh Primary 
Education Programme and the Bihar 
Education Programme. 
3. Interviews with policymakers and experts. 
4. Analysis of data on educational 
participation provided by the National 
Sample Survey, 1993–94 to 2007–08. 
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Table 1(continued) 
Chapter No. Chapter Title Data Sources 
Chapter  5 Reform Opponents: Teachers, Unions, 
and the Implementation of Change 
1. Interviews with teacher union 
representatives at the state and district 
level, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. 
2. Interviews with teachers in selected field 
sites in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.  
3. Interviews with policymakers and 
implementers in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. 
Chapter  6 Reform Proponents: The Role of 
Educational Decentralisation and 
Community Participation in Overcoming 
the Constraints to Change 
1. Focus group discussions with community 
members in selected field sites in Andhra 
Pradesh and Bihar. 
2. Policy documents of the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh and the Government of 
Bihar. 
3. Interviews with policymakers and experts at 
the state level. 
Chapter 7 Politics, Schools, and the Poor- A Local 
View 
 
 
1. School and household surveys in selected 
field sites in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. 
2. Discussions with teachers and community 
members in selected villages in Andhra 
Pradesh and Bihar. 
3. Interviews with block/mandal level 
education officers and non-government 
organisations (NGOs)  
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Appendix 1(continued) 
1 A. Note on Key Informant Interviews-Policy makers, reform implementers, 
teacher union leaders, political representatives  
 
By far the most important source of information was interviews with key informants, especially 
policymakers and stakeholders. Since the policy process in a federal context goes through 
various stages, from setting out or ―diagnosing‖ the issues, debating ideas, formulating an 
agenda and authorising policy, to its implementation, and thereafter the consolidation of change, 
the number of actors are many, and they work at various levels. Table 2 lists the actors 
interviewed at various levels, and the themes on which information was obtained from each of 
these interviews. 
Further, the names of national policymakers, state-level policymakers and implementers 
were available to me from my experience of work with the Government of India‘s District 
Primary Education Programme during 1993–95, and from having served on various review 
missions of the Government of India to the states implementing the reform programme. Field 
officers of the UNICEF, the officers of the department of education in the Government of 
Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, and the MV Foundation in Andhra Pradesh, also provided me with 
the names of relevant persons to be interviewed in the two states.  
Table 2: Interviews at Various Levels 
Level Actors/Stakeholders Theme 
National Policymakers and experts Political-economy context of reform policy 
design and implementation 
State Policymakers and experts, including non-
government organisations involved in 
educational reform 
 Political-economy context in the 
states. 
 Critical issues in school education 
policy in the states—policy making 
and implementation challenges. 
 Policies for teacher management and 
school decentralisation.  
 Attitude of political leaders to reforms. 
 Issues in implementation of reforms in 
the states.  
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 Teacher union representatives   History, internal structure of unions. 
 Teacher issues and grievances. 
 Attitude to education reforms. 
 Relationship with other unions. 
 Relationship with government. 
 Relationship with political parties and 
the political role of unions. 
District Reform implementation team  Perception of key issues in the 
implementation of reforms in the 
district. 
 Teacher union representatives (Same as teacher union representatives at the 
state level). 
Block/Mandal Educational administrators—Block Education 
Officers/Mandal Education Officers 
 Role perception in terms of the needs 
of school teaching. 
 Academic support provided by them 
to teachers and schools. 
 The frequency/adequacy of their 
presence in schools. 
 
 Office bearers of Panchayati Raj Institutions  Their understanding of the key 
challenges before school education in 
their area 
 Their role in the working of schools  
 Their attitude towards school 
committees (interface of political 
decentralisation with educational 
decentralisation). 
 Mandal/block level representatives of teacher 
unions if present  
A very thin presence of union representatives 
was found at this level. 
 Political representatives   Association with schools—how often 
they visit schools; what they actually 
do for the schools. 
 Knowledge of school reform 
programmes. 
 Attitude towards school reform 
programmes, and working of school 
or village education committees. 
 Relationship with panchayats. 
Village Focus group discussions with community 
members (including parents, non-parents, 
 Participatory nature of the 
committees, including process of 
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socially disadvantaged castes, and women) 
and members and office bearers of 
school/village education committees. 
elections and special representation 
for weaker social groups. 
 Functioning of committees—regularity 
of meetings, issues taken up, 
decision-making process. 
 Effectiveness of the committees in 
taking up school related issues, 
including teacher supervision.  
 Relationship with the institutions of 
political decentralisation.   
 Political interference in the working of 
committees. 
 Teachers in schools   Challenges faced by them in teaching 
in poor rural areas. 
 Academic support given to them by 
the educational administration team. 
 Their expectations on the nature of 
academic support required by them to 
improve teaching.  
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Appendix 1(continued) 
 
1B: Note on Analysis of Data on Educational Finance Data (Chapter 3) 
 
The expenditure of the Centre and the states on education has been taken from the Government 
of India‘s Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education 1990–91 to 2006–07.  
Budget Classification of Expenditure on Education: The budget classifies education 
expenditure under two heads—―General Education‖ and ―Technical Education‖. I have used the 
expenditure classified under ―General Education‖, and in the text, use of the term ―education 
expenditure‖ of the Centre and the states refers to expenditure classified under ―General 
Education‖, and incurred by the Department of Education alone. There are further sub-categories 
of this expenditure—namely expenditure on higher education, elementary education, adult 
education, language development, and others. 
Revenue and Capital Expenditure: Budgetary expenditure for each sector is classified into 
two broad categories—expenditure incurred on the revenue account, and expenditure incurred on 
the capital account. ―Revenue Account‖ disbursements show expenditure on salaries and 
allowances, contingencies, grants-in-aid, and maintenance outlays. ―Capital Account‖ 
disbursements show incremental capital expenditure on construction and equipment. Bashir 
notes that almost 99 per cent of the expenditure of the Education Department is incurred on the 
―Revenue Account‖. But this does not mean that no investment expenditure is made in 
education. The capital investment in education mainly comes from other departments of the 
government such as the departments for rural development (undertakes school construction 
under poverty alleviation and employment generation programmes). Also, some of the ―Revenue 
Account‖ expenditure such as grants-in-aid to local bodies allows investment expenditure to be 
incurred (Bashir 2000 p. 3). I have used only the expenditure incurred by Department of 
Education and not by other departments on education. I have, therefore, mainly analysed the 
revenue expenditure of the education department of the states and the Centre.  
Plan and Non-Plan Expenditure: The Indian central and state budgets make a distinction 
between Plan and non-Plan expenditure. Mooij and Dev (2004 p. 99) estimate that nearly one 
quarter of the aggregate government expenditure is on Plan heads and is ―officially intended for 
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new programmes and initiatives‖.  Further, they estimate that about three quarter of the 
aggregate expenditure is for non-Plan heads, and this includes the recurrent costs for all 
government departments (mainly salaries), interest repayments, and subsidies.   
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Appendix 1(continued) 
1C: Note on Analysis of Data on School Participation, National Sample 
Survey, 1993-94/2007-08 (Chapters 4 and 8). 
 
1. To explain the changes in school participation over time (1990s to present), by gender, 
social groups, and economic status, I have used NSSO data from four rounds, which 
include three ―quinquennial‖ rounds on ―Employment and Unemployment Situation of 
India‖ ( 50th, 55th,  and 61st rounds) and the latest round on education (64th round). 
2. While the formats for presentation and analysis of data were developed by me, the 
research organisation Indicus Analytics, and independent researcher Mridusmita 
Borodoloi provided assistance with extraction of unit level data using STATA software.   
3. The year, sample size in terms of number of households and persons for each round of 
survey, are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Sample Size and Estimated Number of Persons for National Survey Rounds, 1993–94 to 2007–08 
NSSO Round Year* Sample size in 
households 
Sample size by 
number of persons 
Estimated number of 
persons** 
 All India 
50 1993–94 115,354 564,740 778,297,682 
55 1999–2000 120,514 596,281 916,607,400 
61 2004–05 124,680 602,833 971,897,367 
64 2007–08 100,581 445,960 1,011,228,200 
 Andhra Pradesh 
50 1993–94 8,552 37,332 62,143,594 
55 1999–2000  53,380 73,139,000 
61 2004–05 8,428 34,310 71,894,223 
64 2007–08 6,971 26,313 73,884,700 
 Bihar 
50 1993–94 7,468 34,577 51,939,329 
55 1999–2000  50,471 69,849,050 
61 2004–05 5,754 30,844 71,069,853 
64 2007–08 7,031 34,147 75,951,500 
Note: *NSSO years are July-June. **Estimates generated by multiplying sample numbers with weights provided by NSSO. 
310 
  
 
 
 
 
4. Weights: The in-built weighting system, provided by the NSSO for every round has 
been used for generation of estimated numbers. 
5. Data for ―New Bihar‖: The state of Bihar was bifurcated in 2000 into Bihar and a new 
state of Jharkhand.  To ensure the comparability of NSS data for 50
th
 and 55
th
 rounds 
(when Bihar had not been bifurcated) with that of the 61
st
 round, all the data for the state 
of Bihar refers to ―New Bihar‖, and includes NSS data for the region Jharkhand within 
the state of Bihar. 
6. Quintiles of Monthly Per Capita Expenditure (MPCE): A household‘s monthly 
expenditure per month is taken as a proxy of the living status of the household. 
Computed on a per person basis, the MPCE is the basis for official calculation of 
poverty in India. Quintiles based on MPCE for each round have been generated 
separately for each of the states, in this case separately for the states of Andhra and 
Bihar. Within each state, rural, urban, and overall (rural + urban) quintiles have been 
generated separately. Quintiles are generated separately for rural and urban areas for the 
following reason: the monthly per capita expenditure levels in rural areas are generally 
much lower than in the urban areas. If quintiles were generated based on overall 
population, then lower quintiles would be highly skewed towards rural areas and higher 
quintiles would be biased towards urban areas. Moreover living standards of rural and 
urban areas are also different.    
7. 55th round of NSS consists of two rounds—―original‖ and ―revisit‖. The revisit round 
consists of an additional sample size of 25 per cent of the original sample. Households 
covered in the original round of survey, were not covered in the revisit; the additional 25 
per cent were therefore new households, covered only in the revisit schedule. Basic 
household information such as expenditure, caste, religion, and type (of household) was 
not covered in the revisit round. For the household characteristics that are not available 
for the revisit round, columns for such information show up as ―non-reported‖. 
8. For the 55th round, data analysed include original and revisit round, so we have a larger 
sample. 
9. Lack of Sample and Missing Values: In case of lack of sample in the raw data for a 
certain variable, the corresponding space in the table (reporting for that variable) has 
been kept blank. In case of missing values for certain indictors, those records with 
missing values in the raw data have not been excluded both in the numerator as well as 
denominator while calculating ratios/percentages. This methodology basically assumes 
that the missing values are equally distributed across all categories so as to avoid a bias 
in calculation. In most of the cases, missing values (if at all they are present) constitute 
less than 0.5 per cent of the total sample size for the particular state.  
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Definitions of key terms: 
a) Enrolment—Individuals reported by households as currently attending any 
educational institution and course of study are shown as ―enrolled‖ by the NSSO 
data. Official figures on enrolment, published by the Government‘s Department of 
Education, are collected on the basis of figures reported by the schools themselves. 
These figures are likely to have a possible bias in terms of reporting every name on 
the school register as ―enrolled‖. Very often therefore, the official gross enrolments 
exceed the child population for that age. Ghost reporting can be cross-checked by 
changing the source of information on enrolment from school to household reporting 
provided in the NSS. The exact question asked in the NSS survey is ―current status 
in educational institution and course of study‖. This question is asked for all persons 
below 30 years. Those who report ―currently not attending‖ have been further 
classified as a) ―never attended‖ and b) ―ever attended but discontinued study‖ ( in 
the 55
th
 round) and  ―ever attended but currently not attending‖ (in the 61st round). 
These two classifications of not attending persons are not available for the 50
th
 
round.    
b) Drop-out—Individuals categorized as ―ever attended but discontinued study‖ ( in 
the 55
th
 round) and  ―ever attended but currently not attending‖ (in the 61st round) 
have been considered as ―drop-out‖ and the drop-out ratio has been calculated as the 
ratio of the number of children who have dropped-out to total number of children for 
the respective age groups being considered.     
c) Never enrolled—Individuals categorized as ―never attended‖ have been considered 
as ―never enrolled‖ and the never enrolled ratio has been calculated as the ratio of 
number of never enrolled children to total number of children in the respective age 
groups. Accordingly total out of school children constitutes all those currently not 
attending, that is—a) ―never attended‖ and b) ―ever attended but discontinued‖ 
taken together. 
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Appendix 1(continued) 
1D:  Note on Selection of Field Sites for School and Household Survey, 
Interviews with Teachers and their Unions, and Focus Group Discussions on 
Educational Decentralisation 
 
Selection of Districts: A two-stage selection process was used in each state to identify the 
districts first, and within them the mandals or blocks, as the sub-district units in Andhra Pradesh 
and Bihar respectively are known as. The criterion for selecting the districts, followed by the sub-
district units, was that of contrasting educational outcomes. In the first stage, all districts in each 
state were ranked on the basis of literacy rates of the 2001 Census (a robust indicator of 
educational outcomes), and three clusters made (clusters of districts with above, close to, and 
below state average literacy rates).Thereafter, one district was selected from the top cluster with 
higher than state average of literacy rate, and the second was selected from the bottom cluster 
with poor educational indicators. 
Districts East Godavari in Andhra Pradesh and Gaya in Bihar were selected from districts with 
literacy rates above the state average, and Mahabubnagar in Andhra Pradesh and Purnia in Bihar 
were selected from the lowest cluster of districts with literacy rates below the state average. 
Selection of Blocks or Mandals: Selection of sub-district units (2 in each of the selected districts) 
was the second stage of the selection process. In each district, two sub-district units were selected 
on the same principle of better and poor educational indicators. A total of 4 districts and 8 blocks 
were selected in this way. In AP, the selected mandals were Jadcherla and Dharur in 
Mahabubnagar and Prathipadu and Razule in East Godavari. In Bihar the selected blocks were 
Belaganj and Fatehpur in Gaya and Baysi and Kasba in Purnia.  
Within each block or mandal, the following were undertaken: 
i. Interviews with teachers and their union representatives (this forms the data for 
Chapter 5). 
ii. A school and household survey to compare the condition and working of schools, 
nature of educational participation, and household involvement in schooling of 
children (this forms the data for Chapter 7).  
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iii. Community responses on the nature of the local state and working of school 
decentralisation were elicited through focus group discussions (this forms the data 
for Chapter 6).  
School and Household Survey 
While data from the National Sample Surveys provided the research with robust indicators of 
household participation in schools, and of changes in educational participation over time, they 
were unable to shed light on the manner in which schools function in local settings. The sample 
survey for schools and households was undertaken by me with the objective of filling this gap.  
 For the survey, I had the assistance of a research team of five field researchers provided by the 
New Concept Information System, New Delhi and Hyderabad. Permission of the concerned 
officers in the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Government of Bihar was obtained prior 
to visiting the field sites in September –October 2005 in Bihar and February March 2006 in 
Andhra Pradesh.  
a. Selection of Schools: The schools were randomly selected for each sub-district unit from 
school lists (for primary school or elementary schools with a primary section) provided 
by the District Primary Education Programme office. The total number of schools on the 
list was divided by the ―quota‖ that is, 10 schools for every mandal/ block. The quotient 
―n‖ was used for counting on the school list, and schools that fell on the ―n‖ th number 
count were selected; 10 per cent oversampling was done in case schools were found to 
be closed at the time of visit. A survey questionnaire was administered for every school 
which was answered by the headmaster or in his absence, any other teacher. For every 
school, teachers were also interviewed separately on the challenges they faced with 
respect to teaching.  A total number of 39 school were surveyed in AP and 40 schools 
were surveyed in Bihar. 
 
b. Selection of Households: The households were randomly selected from the school 
records for primary school grades I-V, 10 households for every school (making it a total 
of 100 households in each block/mandal, 200 households in every district, and 400 in 
each state). The random sample of households refers to those selected randomly from 
the school register. Since data on ―out of school‖ children (drop-outs or never enrolled 
children) were not available in the school, such households were traced by asking at the 
village level. The purposively selected sample includes households additionally 
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identified in this manner. The total sample refers to both randomly selected and 
purposively included households. A total number of 399 households were surveyed in 
AP and 410 households were surveyed in Bihar. 
 
c. While randomness was compromised to the small extent of purposive inclusion of 
households with children out of school, this measure enhanced the stated objectives of 
the survey of inclusion of the community‘s voice on a range of issues of school 
participation and institutional functioning.   
 
d. Survey Questionnaire: 
 
The survey questionnaires were developed by me and discussed with research scholars 
at the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi. They were also pre-tested in June 
2005, before I started the survey in September 2005. 
School Record Schedule—This schedule records the quality of physical infrastructure in 
schools, teacher quality and adequacy, and student attendance. The respondents were 
head-teachers or in his/her absence, the officiating or senior-most teacher.   
Household Schedule—This schedule records parent perceptions on the functioning of the 
school, their  involvement in the schooling of their child, regularity of child‘s attending 
school, and their perception of the role of decentralisation (political in the form of 
panchayats and educational in the form of school committees) and political parties in 
improving schools. The respondents were heads of household, preferably female.   
Teacher Interviews— This questionnaire was to be answered collectively (sitting 
together) by teachers in the school. This questionnaire mainly gathers teacher perceptions 
on the challenges of teaching, academic support received by them from the higher levels 
of the educational administration, grievances with respect to service conditions and 
administrative response to these. Sections of the questionnaire also elicit specific 
responses from para-teachers, and teacher opinion on the role of unions.  
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e. Data Analysis: 
The primary data collected at the ground level was entered in Microsoft Access, and 
each page of the questionnaire was designed as a different table (file). After initial 
scrutiny and consistency check, files were imported in SPSS. Analysis of data and 
generation of analytical tables were done as SPSS output. The SPSS output tables were 
exported to Microsoft Excel. Tables were finally formatted in Microsoft Excel. 
Field testing of primary survey questionnaires for schools and households was 
done in Ranga Reddy district in June 2005. During this visit, I also had discussions with 
Panchayati Raj Teachers‘ Union leaders in the district in order to formulate structured 
interview guides for teacher union leaders and gather the names and contact details of 
other primary school teacher unions. Since Bihar had very few unions, such a detailed 
exercise was not required; information provided by the state reform team—the Bihar 
Education Project office—was sufficient. 
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Appendix 1(continued) 
 
1 E: Note on Focus Group Discussions with Community Members and 
Members of School Education Committee in Andhra Pradesh and Vidyalay 
Shiksha Samiti in Bihar (Chapter 6) 
 
Method: The villages where focus group discussions were held, were selected randomly from 
amongst the villages where schools had been selected for the survey. The villages selected were 
―feeder‖ villages to the schools selected (that is each selected schools was earmarked for serving 
a particular village, and children from the particular village were expected to attend the 
earmarked school). I have detailed the procedure for selection of schools for the survey in 
Appendix 1D.  
The names of SEC/VSS chairperson/adhyaksha, and other committee members were 
gathered from the school. Time and place of the FGD was publicised in advance. Women, 
members from marginalised castes and minority communities, and parents of non-school going 
children were specially mobilised to attend. The FGDs were held in both states after school 
hours, but before it was dark in Bihar (late afternoon) as there was no electricity. In Andhra 
Pradesh, the SEC members would often converge near the school even during school hours, 
while in Bihar, we had to persuade the members to come together and speak about issues related 
to their schools and children.  
In Andhra Pradesh, resource persons from the New Concept Information Service, 
Hyderabad, led by Sudha, facilitated the mobilisation of villagers to attend the meeting and 
helped with the local Telugu language. I had learnt some key telugu words and was able to 
understand most of the conversation. The discussions were recorded by me in English, and one 
team member in Telugu. In Bihar, the New Concept Information Service, New Delhi team led by 
Shafique Ahmed and Pravin Ramteke facilitated mobilisation of VSS members, especially 
encouraging the purposive inclusion of members from the weaker castes and communities and 
women. I was conversant with the local dialects in both Gaya and Purnia, therefore no language 
assistance was required.  
The discussion were structured around the following issues: 
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1. The process of elections and nature of membership—whether the elections were free, 
fair and regular, whether women and weaker sections were adequately represented. 
2. Regularity of meetings and the participatory process. 
3. Issues or grievances raised in the meetings. 
4. Whether the schools function regularly and have adequate resources. 
5. Teacher punctuality and regularity, teacher‘s interaction with community members. 
6. Working of incentive scheme mid-day meal—quality, regularity. 
7. Schools committees and politics, especially the role of panchayats and teacher unions. 
8. Other issues and voices of the community. 
The discussions were recorded in writing and later cross-tabulated around these themes for 
analytical purposes. On this basis, a final report was generated for discussions with each 
community. 
Table 3: Total Number of FGDs conducted and of Persons who Attended the FGDs 
 
District/Block/Mandal No. of 
FGDs 
No. of 
Persons  
District/Block/Mandal No. 
of 
FGDs 
No. of 
Persons  
East Godavari 7 74 Gaya 7 141 
Razule 4 37 Belaganj 4 70 
Prathipadu 3 37 Fatehpur 3 71 
Mahabubnagar 6 36 Purnia 6 216 
Jadcherla 3 20 Baysi 3 142 
Dharur 3 16 Kasba 3 74 
Andhra Pradesh 13 110 Bihar 13 357 
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Appendix 2 
 
Key Informant Interviews 1: Policymakers and Experts, National and State Level. 
Name Location Position Organisation Date 
Amita Sharma Office of the Ministry 
of Rural Development, 
New Delhi 
Joint Secretary 
 
(Former State 
Project Director of 
the Madhya 
Pradesh Rajiv 
Gandhi Shiksha 
Mission) 
Ministry of Rural 
Development, 
Government of India. 
11 May 2009. 
Anjani Kumar BEP office, Patna, 
Bihar. 
State Project 
Director, Bihar 
Shiksha Pariyojana 
Parishad. 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of Bihar. 
1 October 2005. 
 
Anjani Kumar 
Singh 
New Secretariat, 
Patna, Bihar 
Principal Secretary, 
Education 
Government of 
Bihar 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of Bihar. 
12 January 2011. 
Aruneesh Chawla Old Secretariat, 
Patna, Bihar 
Special Secretary –
cum-Additional 
Finance 
Commissioner. 
Government of Bihar. 4 June 2007. 
B.K. Sinha Office of the Ministry 
of Panchayati Raj, 
New Delhi 
Additional 
Secretary 
Department of 
Panchayati Raj, 
Government of India. 
13 February 2008. 
Chandramouli Office of the District 
Primary Education 
Programme, 
Hyderabad. 
State Project 
Director, Andhra 
Pradesh District 
Primary Education 
Programme 
Government of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
6 February 2006. 
D.Sambasiva Rao By telephone and 
email 
Principal secretary, 
School Education 
Government of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
21 December 
2011. 
Deepak Kumar New Secretariat, Principal Secretary, 
Department of 
Department of 
Panchayati Raj, 
12 January 2011. 
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Patna, Bihar Panchayati Raj Government of Bihar. 
Dr.I.V.Subba Rao Government of 
Andhra Pradesh 
Secretariat, 
Hyderabad. 
Former Secretary, 
Department of 
Education, 
Government of 
Andhra Pradesh 
Hyderabad. 
Government of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
6 February 2006. 
Prof. Krishna 
Kumar 
National Council for 
Educational Research 
and Training, New 
Delhi. 
Director National Council for 
Educational research 
and Training (NCERT). 
11 February 2008. 
H.S. Negi BEP office, Patna, 
Bihar 
State Project 
Director, Bihar 
Shiksha Pariyojana 
Parishad 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of Bihar. 
2 March 2005 
Job Zachariah UNICEF Office, Patna, 
Bihar. 
Programme Officer 
for Education 
UNICEF Office for Bihar 
and Jharkhand. 
6 October 2005. 
Latha Menon UNICEF state office, 
Hyderabad. 
Education Officer UNICEF 24 January 2006. 
Dr. M.M. Jha Department of 
Education, New 
Secretariat, Patna, 
Bihar 
Principal Secretary 
Education 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of Bihar. 
5 June 2007. 
MikiTanae UNICEF Office, Patna, 
Bihar. 
Assistant Project 
Officer, Education 
and research 
student at the 
Graduate School of 
Education, 
Harvard. 
UNICEF Office for Bihar 
and Jharkhand. 
-1 October 2005. 
-6 October 2005. 
Rajesh Bhusan Soochana Bhavan, 
Patna, Bihar 
State Project 
Director, Bihar 
Shiksha Pariyojana 
Parishad 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of Bihar. 
12 January 2011. 
Dr.R.V.V.Ayyar  National University of 
Educational Planning 
and Administration, 
New Delhi 
Professor, Public 
Policy and former 
Additional 
Secretary 
Department of 
Education, Ministry 
of Human 
Resource 
Indian Institute of 
Management, 
Bangalore. 
27 December 
2008. 
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Development, 
Government of 
India.  
Reddy Prakash Directorate of 
Education, 
Government of, 
Andhra Pradesh 
Project officer 
DPEP and 
Janshala (UNICEF 
assisted) 
Department of 
Education, Government 
of  Andhra Pradesh 
- 20 June 2005. 
- 23 January 2006. 
Sanjay Pataliputra Colony, 
Patna 
Bihar State co-
ordinator 
PRATHAM, and NGO 
working in education 
12 January 2011 
Prof. Shanta Sinha   National Commission 
for the Protection of 
Child Rights 
-22 and 23 June 
2005. 
 
-2 May 2010. 
Vijay Raghavan Office of the Industrial 
Development and .., 
New Secretariat, 
Patna, Bihar. 
Principal Secretary, 
Industries, 
Government of 
Bihar 
Government of Bihar 5 June 2007. 
Venkat Reddy MV Foundation Office, 
Hyderabad 
Secretary and 
founder member, 
MV Foundation, 
NGO working for 
child rights and 
education 
M V Foundation 22 June 2005. 
Vinoba Gautam UNICEF Office, Patna, 
Bihar. 
Programme Officer 
for 
Education(formerly 
with Bihar 
education Project, 
Ranchi, Bihar) 
UNICEF Office for Bihar 
and Jharkhand. 
6 October 2005. 
Yagati Chinna Rao School of Social 
Sciences, JawaharLal 
Nehru University. 
Expert on Andhra 
Dalit politics. 
Jawahar Lal Nehru 
University, New Delhi 
25 October 2011. 
 
Note: Includes a list of policymakers and experts at the national level, interviewed in New Delhi, and at the state level 
interviewed in Hyderabad and Patna respectively (unless other-wise mentioned). 
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Appendix 3 
Key Informant Interviews 2: Teacher Union Representatives  
 
I. Andhra- Pradesh 
 Name Location Position Organisation Date 
Hyderabad 
1. P. Sudhakar 
Reddy 
Hyderabad President/General 
Secretary 
Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
(PRTU) 
-13 July 
2005. 
- 23 
August 
2005 
2. K. Venugopal Chennupati Bhavan, 
Hyderabad 
President Andhra Pradesh 
Teacher‘s 
Federation 
(APTF)-257 
16 August 
2005. 
3. Y. Satyam C/o M. 
Balakrishnamma, 
Chikadpally, 
Hyderabad 
President Andhra Pradesh 
Teacher‘s 
Federation 
(APTF)-1938 
8 August 
2005. 
4. S. Ramchander 
Rao, President 
206 Kesav Nilayam, 
Barkatpura 
Hyderabad 
President Andhra Pradesh 
Upadhyay Sangh 
(APUS) 
29 August 
2005. 
5. N.S.S.Sarma Anuradaha 
Apartments, 
Barkatpura 
Hyderabad 
President Democratic 
Teacher‘s 
Federation (DTF) 
18 August 
2005. 
6. Dr.M. Gangadhar -do- General Secretary -do- -do- 
7. K. Venkateshwara 
Reddy 
Government High 
School Rajendra 
Nagar, Ranga Reddy 
District. 
General Secretary Government 
Teacher‘s 
Association 
(GTA) 
 
8. P. Subba Reddy STU Bhavan, 
Kachiguda, 
Hyderabad 
President State Teacher‘s 
Union (STU). 
2 August 
2005. 
9. M. Sathi Reddy  Vice President Telengana 
Regional 
Teacher‘s Union. 
28 July 
2005. 
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.... 
Continued. Name Location Position Organisation Date 
10. M.A.K.Dutt Chenupatti Bhavan, 
Hyderabad. 
Central Secretary 
(Office) 
United Teacher‘s 
Federation (UTF) 
25August 
2005. 
11. N. Narayan -do- General Secretary United Teacher‘s 
Federation (UTF) 
3 August 
2005. 
 District East Godavari  
12. Y. Venkat Raju SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
General  Secretary, 
East Godavari 
District 
APTF-257 2 March 
2006. 
13. K. Apparao SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
Vice President, East 
Godavari District 
APTF-257 2 March 
2006. 
14. T. Venkat Rao SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
District Vice 
President, 
Hyderabad District. 
APTF-257 2 March 
2006. 
15. K. Sathiraju SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
General Secretary, 
East Godavari 
APUTF 28 
February 
2006. 
16. K.S.S. Prasad SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
District Secretary, 
East Godavari 
APUTF 28 
February 
2006. 
17. I. Prasad Rao Prathipadu Mandal 
Head quarter office. 
District Counsellor 
and Secretary of 
Joint Action 
Committee of Non-
Government 
Employees 
APUTF 1 March 
2006. 
18. Subbaraju SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
Conveynor, 
Academic Wing 
State Teachers 
Union (STU) 
27 
February 
2006. 
19. Jeyaraju K. SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
State Associate 
President 
State Teachers 
Union (STU) 
27 
February 
2006. 
20. D. Venkat Rao SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
District President State Teachers 
Union (STU) 
27 
February 
2006. 
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21. V. Makhiraju SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
District President Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
28 
February 
2006. 
22. N. 
Venkateshwara 
Rao+ 
SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
District General 
Secretary 
Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
28 
February 
2006. 
23. PVSR Murthy SSA office, Library 
Road, Kakinada 
State Organising 
Secretary 
Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
28 
February 
2006. 
25. C.H. Nageswara 
Rao 
 Former District 
President 
Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
28 
February 
2006 
 District Mahabubnagar 
26. B. Satya Narayan SSA Office, 
Mahabubnagar 
District President State Teachers 
Union 
14 
February 
2006. 
27. Kishtaiah Office of UTF, 
Near Bus Stand, 
Mahabubnagar 
Secretary United 
Teacher‘s 
Federation 
(UTF) 
13 
February 
2006. 
28. Ramakanth Rao JadcharlaMandal 
Education office. 
President, 
Jadcherla Mandal 
Panchayati Raj 
Teachers Union 
10 
February 
2006. 
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I. Bihar 
 Name Location Position  Organisation Date 
1. Brij Nandan 
Sharma 
Prathmik Shikshak 
Sangh office, Near 
Gandhi Maidan, 
Patna 
State Adyaksha 
(Chairman) for the 
teachers union for 
primary school 
teachers-Prathmik 
Shikshak Sangh 
Prathmik Shikshak 
Sangh. 
4 June 2007. 
2. Devendra Prasad 
Sinha 
Silonjha Middle 
School, Belaganj, 
Gaya. 
Block-level Secretary 
Prathmik Shikshak 
Sangh, Block 
Belaganj, Gaya. 
Prathmik Shikshak 
Sangh. 
29 
September 
2005. 
3. Mundrika Prasad 
Yadav 
Outside the District 
Education office, 
Gaya. 
Pradhan Sachiv Non-Gazetted 
Primary Teacher‘s 
Union, Gaya 
28 
September 
2005. 
4. Ravi Nandan 
Sharma 
 Gaya District 
Secretary 
Prathmik Shikshak 
Sangh 
28 
September 
2005. 
5. Krishna Nand 
Singh 
Bhatta Market, Kasba Pradhan Sachiv, 
Kasba Block, Purnia. 
Prathmik     Shikshak 
Sangh 
18 
September 
2005. 
6. Mahendra Prasad 
Singh* 
Tea-stall opposite 
Office of the District 
Superintendant of 
Education, Gaya. 
Leader and 
Spokesperson for 
Gaya District 
Arajpatrit Prathmik 
(Non-Gazetted) 
Prarambhik Shikshak 
Sangh.  
3 October 
2005. 
7. Chandradeo 
Prasad Singh* 
Tea-stall opposite 
Office of the District 
Superintendant of 
Education, Gaya. 
Bihar State President Arajpatrit Prathmik 
(Non-Gazetted) 
Prarambhik Shikshak 
Sangh. 
3 October 
2005. 
8. Mohammed 
Mansur Ansari* 
Tea-stall opposite 
Office of the District 
Superintendant of 
Education, Gaya. 
Gaya Mahanagar 
President 
Arajpatrit Prathmik 
(Non-Gazetted) 
Prarambhik Shikshak 
Sangh. 
3 October 
2005. 
9. Dhananjay Singh* Tea-stall opposite 
Office of the District 
Superintendant of 
Education, Gaya. 
Representative Pragatisheel 
Shikshak Sangh, a 
union of untrained 
teachers. 
3 October 
2005. 
Notes: Structured Interview schedules were used for conducting these interviews (by me). Mr.Vidyasagar Kolan Reddy,Ccentre for 
Economic and Social Studies Hyderabad, assisted in conducting the state-level interviews in Hyderabad. *Persons did not respond 
to the structured interview schedule; discussions were held with them and I requested them to comment on issues i-v above (and 
covered in greater detail in the questionnaire). So, their responses, recorded by me in my field notes, were comparable to those in 
the questionnaire. 
325 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
Key Informant Interviews 3: District and Mandal/Block-Level: Officers of the 
Department of Education, Reform Implementation team, and Political 
Representatives 
 
Name Location Position  Organisation Date 
I. ANDHRA PRADESH 
Mr. D.N. Murthy SSA Office, 
Kakinada 
District 
Programme Co-
ordinator (DPC) 
Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan/District 
Primary 
Education 
Programme, 
East  Godavari, 
AP. 
28 February, 
2006 
Mr. Rajeshwar SSA Office, 
Mahabubnagar 
Assistant 
Programme Co-
ordinator (APC) 
Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan/District 
Primary 
Education 
Programme, 
Mahabubnagar, 
AP. 
9 February 
2006 
Mr. B.Yadagiri MEO Office, 
Jadcherla, 
Mahabubnagar 
Mandal 
Education Officer, 
Jadcherla 
Education 
Department, 
Government of 
Andhra Pradesh 
11 February 
2006 
Mr. Swaraj MEO Office, 
Dharur, 
Mahabubnagar 
Mandal 
Education Officer, 
Dharur 
Education 
Department, 
Government of 
Andhra Pradesh 
15 February 
2006 
II. BIHAR 
Mr. Rambhagat 
Yadav 
BEO Office, 
Baysi, Purnia 
Block Education 
Officer, Baysi 
Education 
Department, 
Government of 
Bihar 
September, 12, 
2005 
Mr. Rajak  BEO Office, 
Kasba, Purnia 
Block Education 
Officer, Kasba 
Education 
Department, 
Government of 
Bihar 
September 20, 
2005. 
 
Mr. Ishwar Singh BEO Office, 
Fatehpur, Gaya 
Block Education 
Officer, Kasba 
Education 
Department, 
Government of 
Bihar 
October 1, 2005 
Mr. Rampravesh 
Singh, Gaya,  
BEO Office 
(outside), 
Belaganj, Gaya 
Block Education 
Officer, Belaganj 
Education 
Department, 
Govt. of Bihar 
October 2, 
2005. 
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Mr. Haji 
Abussubhan 
Baysi, Purnia Member 
Legislative 
Assembly, 
Baysi 
Associated with 
the Rashtriya 
Janta Dal 
(Political Party) 
September 19, 
2005 
Mr. Afaque 
Aaalam 
Kasba, Purnia Member 
Legislative 
Assembly, 
Kasba 
 September 19, 
2005 
Mr. Syed 
Ruknuddin 
Baysi, Purnia Political Leader, 
Former Member 
Legislative 
Assembly, 
Baysi  
Associated with 
the Congress 
(Political Party) 
September 21, 
2005 
Notes: Structured Interview schedules were used for conducting these interviews (by me). Mr. 
Shafique Ahmed, New Concept Information Service, assisted while conducting the interviews in Bihar.  
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Appendix 5 
List of Villages where FGDs were held. 
 
I. Andhra Pradesh 
Village Mandal District Date 
District 1    
Gandipuram Razule East Godavari 1 March 2006 
ThatipakaMatham Razule East Godavari 3 March 2006 
SC Colony Vegivaripalem Razule East Godavari 5 March 2006 
Co-operative School Razule East Godavari 5 March 2006 
Gajjanpudi Prathipadu East Godavari 8 March 2006 
Peedipalem Prathipadu East Godavari 13 March 2006 
Kittamooripeta Prathipadu East Godavari 15 March 2006 
District 2    
Guvvaladine Dharur Mahabubnagar 14 February 2006 
TurupaTanda Dharur Mahabubnagar 16 February 2006 
Kothulagidda Dharur Mahabubnagar 15 February 2006 
Chinnapally Jadcherla Mahabubnagar 10 February 2006 
Pedda Adirala Jadcherla Mahabubnagar 13 February 2006 
Kodgal Jadcherla Mahabubnagar 11 February 2006 
 
II. Bihar 
Village Block District Date 
District 1    
Mayapur Fatehpur Gaya 22 September 2005 
Dhanchu Fatehpur Gaya 21 September 2005 
Aamin P.S. Fatehpur Gaya 26 September 2005 
SaraiyaHarijanTola Belaganj Gaya 24 September 2005 
HemantBigha Belaganj Gaya 25 September 2005 
Majlispur Belaganj Gaya 28 September 2005 
Akhtu Belaganj Gaya 29 September 2005 
District 2    
Bajardih Baysi Purnia 14 September 2005 
Puranaganj Baysi Purnia 12 September 2005 
Sonapur Baysi Purnia 13 September 2005 
Neematol Kasba Purnia 16 September 2005 
Bareta Kasba Purnia 15 September 2005 
Tinpania Kasba Purnia 17 September 2005 
 
 
